Majority Shareholder Ownership and Real Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the influence of majority shareholder ownership on real earnings management. It investigates whether there is a conflict between or an alignment of majority and minority shareholders' interests. If majority shareholders' interests are aligned with those of minority shareholders, a greater majority shareholder ownership lowers real earnings management. On the other hand, if they are not aligned, majority shareholders' attempts to exploit minority shareholders will increase real earnings management. This study does not find a systematic relationship between majority shareholder ownership and real earnings management. However, real earnings management significantly decreases in the upward earnings management incentive bracket as majority shareholder ownership increases. This occurs primarily because majority shareholders are more sensitive to upward real earnings management, which has a negative effect on future performance. These results suggest that the larger the ownership of majority shareholders, the more they play a positive role in mitigating real earnings management. This positive role is only effective in the post‐Asian economic crisis period. These results may suggest that the economic crisis in Korea helped majority shareholders more conscious of the long‐term costs of real earnings management. These findings support the convergence‐of‐interests hypothesis, providing evidence by investigating real earnings management instead of accruals‐based earnings management.     

Motives and consequences of IPOs in cold periods

We analyze the motives and long-term stock price performance of firms that pursue IPOs in cold IPO periods. We find that firms are more likely to engage in an IPO during a cold period when their earnings are relatively high and are expected to decline in the future. We also find that IPO firms during a cold period are more likely to have managed their earnings prior to the IPO. Furthermore, we find that cold IPO firms experience significantly weaker stock price performance than hot IPO firms, and results are robust to different criteria for defining hot and cold IPO periods, different measures of stock price performance, and different investment holding periods. We find that investment opportunities, the backing of a venture capitalist, and an increase in earnings in the year of the IPO lead to significantly higher long term stock price performance of IPO firms. Our multivariate models confirm the adverse cold IPO period effect on stock price performance even after controlling for the IPO motives and the firm's earnings performance. Our results also hold within the post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) era.     

Expressive Shareholder Democracy: A Multilevel Study of Shareholder Dissent in 15 Western European Countries

This study develops an expressive understanding of shareholder dissent. In this view, shareholder dissent is not only about the voting outcomes of proposals put to the vote, but also expresses an evaluation of the firm's corporate governance set‐up. We hypothesize that shareholder dissent expresses an agency theoretical evaluation of corporate governance, but that the degree to which the capitalist system of a country is a coordinated market economy (CME) leads shareholders to evaluate corporate governance more in team production terms. We test our theoretical model using multilevel techniques on a sample of 12,513 proposals voted on in 717 firms listed in 15 Western European countries and find support for our predictions. Our study not only contributes to a better understanding of the corporate governance role of shareholder dissent, but also shows that what shareholders express through dissent differs across national contexts.     

CEO Stock‐Based Incentive Compensation and Firm Performance: A Quantile Regression Approach

This study employs the quantile regression model to examine the non‐monotonic impact of CEO stock‐based compensation on firm performance, using the data for U.S. non‐financial firms from 1993 to 2005. The results indicate that while the impact of CEO stock‐based pay on firm performance is positive for firms in the higher earnings quantile levels, the impact is negative for firms in the lower levels. In addition, the “V‐shaped” relationship between CEO stock‐based pay and firm performance satisfactorily explains the longstanding disagreement among earlier studies with regard to whether CEO stock‐based pay can enhance firm performance. Furthermore, the quantile‐varying pattern of the impact of stock‐based compensation on firm performance is robust after controlling for the industrial and yearly effects. It is also robust to the use of the pay‐for‐performance sensitivity as an alternative explanatory variable or the market‐based measure of performance as the dependent variable, or the consideration of the suspected endogenous problem between firm performance and stock‐based compensation.     

Shareholder Loans and Earnings Smoothing – Empirical Findings from German Private Firms

This paper analyzes the interplay between shareholder loans and earnings smoothing in German private corporations. Shareholders who grant loans have a dual stakeholder role, being both equity holders and creditors. Those loans could be lost, because bankruptcy law requires their subordination in the event of bankruptcy. We therefore expect shareholder loans to mitigate agency problems of debt. This reduces the need for debt covenants and earnings smoothing. Moreover, the interest payments from shareholder loans tend to lower payout volatility which also reduces the need for dividend and earnings smoothing. We expect and find that private firms with shareholder loans exhibit significantly lower levels of earnings smoothing than other private firms. We find that with a 10 percentage-point increase in the shareholder loans to total assets ratio, earnings smoothing decreases by about 10% of the mean value. We also find that this substitution effect usually occurs in case of managerial ownership and tends to be slightly weaker in the event of dispersed ownership. The results are robust for different econometric specifications, including different measures of key variables and propensity score matching. The paper suggests that financial reporting by private firms responds to the dual stakeholder role of shareholder loans.     

大股东资金占用、业绩困境与盈余管理

文章手工搜集了中国资本市场上市公司2002年-2006年大股东资金占用的财务数据,实证研究了上市公司"大股东资金占用(掏空)→业绩困境→利用财务报表的盈余管理加以掩饰"的行为模式。研究发现:对于陷入经营困境的亏损公司而言,大股东资金占用越严重,上市公司越可能向上盈余管理、美化业绩。大股东资金占用的上市公司为了避免投资者、监管部门等将公司业绩恶化归咎于其非法的"掏空"行为,从而竭力延迟坏消息、进行盈余管理、虚增收益。     

The Information Content of Earnings Components: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market

China's listed firms report substantial non-operating revenues and expenses. We argue that these non-core earnings should have different properties and different valuation implications than operating or core earnings. Furthermore, the different types of firm ownership may have differential impacts on the information content of earnings components. Based on data from 1996 to 2008, we find that core earnings are more persistent than non-core earnings. Because of this, core earnings have a greater association with contemporaneous stock returns. However, the stock market does not fully incorporate all the information in earnings; we find that core earnings are undervalued and non-core earnings are overvalued. This effect is much reduced for privately controlled listed firms. We develop an investment trading strategy to exploit these market inefficiencies.     

Shareholder litigation and toxic releases

We examine the environmental impact of the staggered adoption of universal demand laws by 23 U.S. states between 1989 and 2005. Universal demand laws impede derivative lawsuits and thus undermine shareholder oversight of corporate environmental performance. We find that weakened litigation rights for shareholders are positively associated with the release of toxic chemicals by firms. The effect is stronger for firms with weak governance, and environmental mismanagement by firms after the passage of the laws lead to poorer financial performance. Overall, our findings imply that derivative lawsuits by shareholders are not frivolous, as is often asserted. Rather, they act as an effective mechanism of corporate governance.     

Shareholder Activism, "Voluntary" Restructuring, and Internal Labor Markets

We model an internal labor market in which employee behavior and compensation are affected by the firm's financial position and the threat of hostile takeover or other exercise of shareholder "voice." We show how good past performance can result in excessively generous promotion and pay decisions. While the threat of shareholder activism will remove this "slack," activists optimally face a positive cost barrier, which in turn varies across firms. The cost barrier is higher when cooperation or "helping" between employees is more important, and is lower when employees receive efficiency wages due to an inability to "pay" for their jobs. Since the importance of helping is associated with pay compression and "flat" pay ladders, such firms should also exhibit a greater degree of management entrenchment.     

High‐involvement work practices and analysts' forecasts of corporate earnings

Research has shown that high‐involvement work practices are positively related to corporate financial performance. However, it is unknown if investors are able to use information on high‐involvement practices to predict the performance of specific companies. In this study, we examine earnings forecasts for a sample of Fortune 1000 firms and find professional stock analysts consistently underestimated the earnings of firms that made greater use of high‐involvement practices during the 1990s. Based on data collected from newspaper articles and annual reports, we argue that these lower estimates resulted from a lack of information on innovative HR practices. Recommendations to managers for disseminating information on and leveraging highinvolvement HR practices are discussed. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Long-run underperformance following private equity placements: The role of growth opportunities

Our results show that the post-offering performance of private equity issuers is related to growth opportunities. We find significant long-run underperformance in stock returns following private placements only for firms with high Tobin's q. High-q firms experience not only poor stock price performance but also poor operating performance. Low-q firms, in contrast, do not display significant stock price or operating underperformance. We further examine three potential explanations for this relation: over-investment in assets by managers, investor skewness preference, and over-optimism about earnings prospects. Our results are consistent with the view that investors are overly optimistic about the prospects of high growth firms.     

Real and Accrual‐Based Earnings Management in the Pre‐ and Post‐IFRS Periods: Evidence from China

The purpose of this study is to investigate the prevalence of both accrual‐ and activities‐based earnings management for Chinese A‐share firms surrounding the adoption of substantially IFRS‐convergent accounting standards. Since 2007, all listed A‐share firms in China have been required to comply with a new set of accounting standards that have substantially conformed to IFRS. The new reform also produced a set of new auditing standards and internal control reporting requirements. Based on a sample of 4,050 firm‐year observations from 2002 to 2011, we find that Chinese firms in the post‐IFRS period (2007–2011) are less likely to engage in accrual‐based earnings management. The magnitude of discretionary accruals also declines after IFRS adoption. In response, we see firms turning to real activities manipulation as a substitute for upward earnings management. The reduction in accrual‐based earnings management could stem from higher quality accounting standards associated with IFRS adoption and/or concurrent changes in the governance regimes introduced with the IFRS mandate. A further analysis, however, indicates that the benefits of IFRS adoption in curbing upward accrual‐based earnings manipulation are not evenly distributed across firms. Specifically, the benefit diminishes for firms that are controlled by Chinese central or local governments, are located in less developed regions, and that have weak financial performance and therefore subject to delisting status. We also find that the benefit is less pronounced for manufacturing firms than for their non‐manufacturing counterparts.     

The Effect of CEO Stock-Based Compensation on the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper examines whether CEO stock-based compensation has an effect on the market’s ability to predict future earnings. When stock-based compensation motivates managers to share their private information with shareholders, it will expedite the pricing of future earnings in current stock prices. In contrast, when equity-compensated managers attempt to temporarily manipulate the stock price to maximize their own benefit rather than that of shareholders, the market may not fully anticipate future performance. We find that a CEO’s stock-based compensation strengthens the association between current returns and future earnings, indicating that more information about future earnings is reflected in current stock prices. In addition, we find that the positive effect is weaker for firms that have a high level of signed discretionary accruals or a low management forecast frequency. Overall, our study suggests that on average, equity-based compensation improves the informativeness of stock prices about future earnings, while opportunistic discretionary accruals or lowered earnings guidance hamper this improvement.     

Family ownership,corporate governance,and top executive compensation

In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non‐executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Market value,market share,and mergers: Evidence from a panel of U.S. firms

Improving shareholder value has often been cited as a merger determinant. Because mergers create larger firms and less competition, they may increase shareholder value through higher market share and stock‐market value. We investigate merger impacts on firms' stock‐market value and market share. We construct panel data from 4 different data sources on public merging and non‐merging U.S. manufacturing firms for 1980–2003. Instrumental variables and factors such as R&D, patents, and citations control for endogeneity. We find that mergers are positively correlated with stock‐market value and market share.     

Effect of non‐IFRS earnings reporting guidelines on underlying earnings reporting quality: The case of Australian listed firms

This study investigates Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 firms in the post–Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) period (2011–2014) to examine how listed firms follow the non–International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) earnings reporting guidelines issued by ASIC to communicate underlying earnings reporting quality. We find that firms that do not comply with the ASIC guidelines have lower underlying earnings reporting quality than do firms that comply with these guidelines. Firms that do not follow the ASIC guidelines are found to exclude income‐increasing underlying earnings adjustments to make underlying earnings appear more profitable than IFRS earnings when they miss earnings targets or make current losses, and that they report underlying earnings opportunistically by excluding recurring expenses that persist into future operating earnings. Unlike ASIC non‐compliance firms, ASIC compliance firms attempt to act as responsible reporters by reporting underlying earnings in a responsible manner to demonstrate a judicious use of discretion in informing shareholders. Further, we find that underlying earnings reported by non‐compliance firms are less value‐relevant than underlying earnings reported by compliance firms.     

Multinationals' Offshore Operations,Tax Avoidance,and Firm‐Specific Information Flows: International Evidence

Using a large sample of multinational enterprises (MNEs) over the period 1999–2009, this study investigates whether and how offshore operations via offshore financial centers (OFCs) impact the extent to which firm‐specific information is incorporated into stock price, relative to common information. Our analyses show that, irrespective of whether a firm is a Type I offshore firm (directly having headquarters registered in OFCs) or a Type II offshore firm (indirectly setting up subsidiaries in OFCs), the amount of firm‐specific information flowing into stock price is lower for offshore firms than for non‐offshore firms. We also find that as offshore firms become more aggressive in their tax avoidance strategies, their stock prices impound a lower amount of firm‐specific information relative to common information. Finally, we find that a strong offshore proclivity also deters firm‐specific information flows, thereby driving up stock price synchronicity. Our results suggest that the opaque and complex nature of business and financial transactions in OFCs, coupled with their institutional characteristics, that is, weak and flexible legal enforcement, zero or extremely low taxation, and low litigation risk, provide offshore firms with not only stronger incentives but also the opportunities and means to adopt opaque disclosure policies and aggressive earnings management.     

Do voluntary disclosures of bad news improve liquidity?

Can managers improve market liquidity and lower the cost of capital by providing voluntary earnings guidance? This study examines the impact of profit warnings on market liquidity and finds that voluntary disclosure of bad news actually improves market liquidity. By conducting an empirical study over the period 1995–2010 on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed firms, we find that firms that issue profit warnings show enhanced market liquidity during the post-announcement period. We show that profit warnings reduce information asymmetry and lower bid-ask spreads and increase trading volumes. These results are invariant to daily (short run) and monthly (long run) data after controlling for firm specific attributes. The results have major corporate policy implications. By voluntarily disclosing negative earnings guidance by managers, firms will experience significant improvement in market liquidity, thereby lowering the cost of capital. Our results are even more profound for firms that release bad news with extremely negative stock market impact. In other words, voluntary disclosure of bad news is good for market liquidity.     

Shareholder Heterogeneity and Conflicting Goals: Strategic Investments in the Japanese Electronics Industry

This article investigates the effects of the changing institutional environment on strategic orientations of Japanese electronics firms during the 1990s. We examine the effects of three different types of shareholders on strategic directions of their invested firms. The first one, foreign portfolio investors, characterizes the emerging influence that pressed for change in corporate strategies. The two domestic shareholders, corporate investors and financial institutions, represent the conventional forces for continuity. Between the two domestic forces, though, while corporate investors attempted to maintain status quo, financial institutions have shifted towards market‐oriented behaviour of investment. Specifically, we explore: (1) the influence of each type of shareholder on a firm's diversification strategy and capital commitment; and (2) the moderating effects of firm performance on the relationships between ownership structure and strategic choices. The results suggest that foreign investors prefer the focused product portfolio and conservative capital commitment. They also prefer the reduction of capital investment when the financial performance of their invested firms is poor. Domestic financial institutions are now similarly sensitive to the performance of their invested firms when those firms make strategic investments. By contrast, domestic corporate shareholders remain indifferent to performance, while they aim to maintain relational business ties with invested firms.     

Securities Regulation, the Timing of Annual Report Release, and Market Implications: Evidence from China

Using a sample of earnings announcements of Chinese firms in the fiscal years 1994–1999, covering the periods before and after the introduction of a regulation to stagger the release of annual reports, we reassess the relation between earnings news and the timing of earnings announcements. We find that even though the reporting lag has significantly shortened as a result of the regulation, the pattern whereby good news is announced earlier than bad news persists. We then examine the behavior of stock prices before earnings announcements and find some indication of information leakage. These findings suggest that the regulation had the expected effect of reducing reporting delay and earnings release clustering. Yet, it did not appear to reduce the extent of the pre‐announcement leakage of information.