The Check's in the Mail: Why the United States Lags in the Adoption of Cost-Saving Electronic Payments

The United States payment system costs around $225 billion annually and checks account for 75% of all noncash payments. Other electronic payment methods (debit cards, automated clearing house direct deposits, and debits) cost only around one third to one half as much as a check. This paper outlines the main reasons why the shift from checks to cheaper electronic payments has been slow, much slower here than in other countries. We also forecast the future use of checks and electronic payments and end by discussing policy initiatives that may speed up this substitution process.     

Paulson's gift

We calculate the costs and benefits of the largest ever US government intervention in the financial sector announced during the 2008 Columbus-day weekend. We estimate that this intervention increased the value of banks’ financial claims by $130 billion (bn) at a taxpayers’ cost of $21–$44 billion with a net benefit between $86 and $109 bn. By looking at the limited cross section, we infer that this net benefit arises from a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy, which we estimate would destroy 22% of the enterprise value. The big winners of the plan were the bondholders of the three former investment banks and Citigroup, while the losers were JP Morgan shareholders and the US taxpayers.     

Benefits from a changing payment technology in European banking

An “output characteristics” cost function is used to identify payment sources of technical change in European banking and estimate associated benefits. As the share of electronic payments in 12 European countries rose from 0.43 in 1987 to 0.79 in 1999 and ATMs expanded while the number of branch offices was constant, bank operating costs are $32 billion lower than they otherwise might have been, saving 0.38% of the 12 nations’ GDP. Policies facilitating these changes (antitrust exemptions to weakly coordinate implementation of payment service pricing) would permit benefits to be more fully realized.     

Unintended consequences of the increased asset threshold for FDICIA internal controls: Evidence from U.S. private banks

We examine the unintended consequences of the 2005 increase from $500 million to $1 billion in the asset threshold for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) internal control reporting requirements. We focus on a test sample of banks that increased their total assets from between $100 million and $500 million prior to the change in regulation to between $500 million and $1 billion within two years following the change. These “affected” banks are no longer subject to the internal control requirements but would have been had the regulation not been changed. We hypothesize that these affected banks are likely to make riskier loans, which will increase the likelihood of failure during the crisis period. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Affected banks have higher likelihood of failure during the crisis period than banks from two different control samples. We also find that auditor reputation (i.e., whether the bank is audited by a Big 4 auditor or an industry specialist auditor) has a moderating effect on the likelihood of failure for these affected banks.     

A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions

In this paper we propose a framework for measuring and stress testing the systemic risk of a group of major financial institutions. The systemic risk is measured by the price of insurance against financial distress, which is based on ex ante measures of default probabilities of individual banks and forecasted asset return correlations. Importantly, using realized correlations estimated from high-frequency equity return data can significantly improve the accuracy of forecasted correlations. Our stress testing methodology, using an integrated micro–macro model, takes into account dynamic linkages between the health of major US banks and macro-financial conditions. Our results suggest that the theoretical insurance premium that would be charged to protect against losses that equal or exceed 15% of total liabilities of 12 major US financial firms stood at $110 billion in March 2008 and had a projected upper bound of $250 billion in July 2008.     

Institutional demand pressure and the cost of corporate loans

Between 2001 and 2007, annual institutional funding in highly leveraged loans went up from $32 billion to $426 billion, accounting for nearly 70% of the jump in total syndicated loan issuance over the same period. Did the inflow of institutional funding in the syndicated loan market lead to mispricing of credit? To understand this relation, we look at the institutional demand pressure defined as the number of days a loan remains in syndication. Using market-level and cross-sectional variation in time-on-the-market, we find that a shorter syndication period is associated with a lower final interest rate. The relation is robust to the use of institutional fund flow as an instrument. Furthermore, we find significant price differences between institutional investors’ tranches and banks’ tranches of the same loans, even though they share the same underlying fundamentals. Increasing demand pressure causes the interest rate on institutional tranches to fall below the interest rate on bank tranches. Overall, a one-standard-deviation reduction in average time-on-the-market decreases the interest rate for institutional loans by over 30 basis points per annum. While this effect is significantly larger for loan tranches bought by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), it is not fully explained by their role.     

Asset management and investment banking

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.     

Does being your bank’s neighbor matter?

This paper provides new evidence on the role of distance between banks and borrowers in bank lending. We argue that delegated monitors face higher costs of collecting information about nonlocal borrowers due to the difficulty of obtaining and verifying soft information over distances. Further, the higher information collection and monitoring costs associated with distance should be reflected in loan terms. Empirically, loan spreads are increasing in the distance between borrowers and lenders. Finally, banks are more likely to include covenant provisions or require collateral when lending to borrowers located far away.     

Payments Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems

What are the benefits provided by a payment system? What are the trade‐offs in public versus private payment systems and in restricted versus open payments arrangements? Modern payment systems encompass a variety of institutional designs with varying degrees of counterparty protection. We develop a framework that allows for an examination and comparison of payment systems, and specification of conditions leading to their adoption. We relate these conditions to the design of present large‐value payment systems (Fedwire, CHIPS, TARGET, etc.).     

Impact of FDICIA internal controls on bank risk taking

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005). We study the impact of these requirements on banks’ risk-taking behavior prior to the recent financial crisis and the consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.     

Particulate matter air pollution control programs in Japan — an analysis of cost savings in the absence of future remediation

The objectives of this study were to assess avoided economic costs (or anticipated ‘benefits’) of not implementing new environmental policies for particulate matter (PM) in Japan and compare these future benefits to estimates of future health risks developed in a separate analysis. The estimates for the benefits of avoided PM pollution control in the year 2010 were (1) $27 billion USD for stationary source controls, (2) $2.1 billion to $3.3 billion USD for diesel motor vehicle controls, (3) $41 million USD for governmental employee salaries, (4) $470 million USD for governmental financial assistance, (5) $510 million USD for special diesel vehicle control measures in Tokyo, and (6) $31 billion USD for total costs.

Using human health and productivity risks, calculated in a separate study to be $56 billion USD, the best net ratio of benefits to costs was 1.8 to 1. Inexpensive control options include road watering or paving for unpaved dirt roads and road vacuuming for paved roads. Intermediate options include differential road pricing, retrofitting diesel particulate filters, and reformulating diesel fuel. High cost options include adding particulate controls, such as wet scrubbers, baghouses, and electrostatic precipitators on uncontrolled stationary sources.     

TARP funds distribution and bank loan supply

This paper investigates the determinants of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds distribution to banks and the stimulus effect of TARP investments on credit supply in the economy. Using banks’ political and regulatory connections as instruments, this paper finds that TARP investments increased bank loan supply by an annualized rate of 6.36% for banks with below median Tier 1 capital ratios. This increase is found in all major types of loans and can be translated into $404 billion of additional loans for all TARP banks. On average, TARP banks employed about one-third of their TARP capital to support new loans and kept the rest to strengthen their balance sheets. Furthermore, there is little evidence that loans made by TARP banks had lower quality than those by non-TARP banks. In sum, this paper shows a positive stimulus effect of TARP on credit supply during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

A note on the price- and cost structure of retail payment services in the Swedish banking sector 2002

We estimate private costs in the Swedish banking sector for the production of payment services and investigate to what extent the price structure reflects the estimated cost structure. We find that (i) banks tend to use two-part tariffs but (ii) variable costs are poorly reflected in transaction fees towards both consumers and corporate customers. (iii) There exist large cross subsidies between different payment services, foremost from acquiring card payments to cash distribution to the public, while payment services as a whole are not subsidized.     

Liquidity-saving mechanisms

This paper studies the incentives of participants in a real-time gross settlement system with and without the addition of a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM). Participants in the model face a liquidity shock and different costs for delaying payments. They trade off the cost of delaying a payment against the cost of borrowing liquidity from the central bank. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the design of an LSM has important implications for welfare. In particular, parameters determine whether the addition of an LSM increases or decreases welfare.     

Credit Unions: A Theoretical and Empirical Overview

In 2009 there were over 49,330 credit unions across 98 countries with more than 184 million members and approximately $1,354 billion in assets. There is a great diversity within the credit union movement across these countries. This reflects the various economic, historic and cultural contexts within which credit unions operate. This paper traces the evolution of the credit union movement. It examines credit union objectives, and considers issues relating to efficiency, technology adoption, product diversification, merger, failure and demutualization. The regulatory environment within which credit unions operate is also explored under the themes of interest rate regulation, common bond requirements, taxation, deposit insurance and capital regulation. The overview also considers demutualization and the costs and benefits to credit unions of altering their organizational form.     

The nonprofit sector's $100 billion opportunity

Imagine what an extra $100 billion a year could do for philanthropic and other nonprofit institutions. According to a new study, the nonprofit sector could free that amount--maybe even more--by making five changes in the way it operates. The study asked two central questions: Does the sector's money flow from its source to its ultimate use as efficiently and effectively as possible? If not, where are the big opportunities to increase social benefit? According to former senator Bill Bradley and McKinsey's Paul Jansen and Les Silverman, nonprofits could save roughly $25 billion a year by changing the way they raise funds. By distributing funds more quickly, they could put an extra $30 billion to work. Organizations could generate more than $60 billion a year by streamlining and restructuring the way in which they provide services and by reducing administrative costs. And they could free up even more money--an amount impossible to estimate--by better allocating funds among service providers. The authors admit that making those changes won't be easy. The nonprofit world, historically seen as a collection of locally focused charities, has become an enormous sector, but it lacks the managerial processes and incentives that help keep the for-profit world on track. And when the baby boomers start to retire in less than a decade, public budgets will be squeezed even more than they are today. If the nonprofit sector is to help the nation cope with the stresses ahead, it must become more efficient and challenge its traditional concepts of stewardship.     

The economics of credit cards,debit cards and ATMs: A survey and some new evidence

This paper provides a critical survey of the large and diffuse literature on credit cards, debit cards and ATMs. We argue that because there are still many outstanding issues and questions about the pricing, use and substitutability of these payment mechanisms, that there are significant further opportunities for research in these areas. A large number of questions are examined in this survey, including the pricing of credit cards, the impact of networks on the provision and pricing of ATMs, as well as the tradeoffs that consumers make between different types of payment mechanism, including debit cards, credit cards and ATMs. Importantly, this paper is also amongst the first to provide new evidence on this latter question from bank level data (from Spain). We conclude that point of sale (debit card) and ATM transactions are substitutes, and that ATM surcharges impacts point of sale volume significantly.     

Regulate one service,tame the entire market: Credit cards in Turkey

In credit card markets banks provide both payment and credit services. Two regulations were recently enacted in the Turkish credit card market: one on payment services in 2005 and the other on credit services in 2006. By employing the well-known  and  method and a unique quarterly data set for 21 Turkish banks between 2002 and 2008, we investigate the extent of banks’ market power in the Turkish credit card market before and after the regulations. Unlike most of the existing literature, which considers competition and regulation for either credit or payment services and ignores the externalities between them, we consider the entire market by taking both services into account. Fixed effects estimations reveal that banks enjoyed collusive oligopoly power before the regulations. Although the first regulation did not have much impact, the second led to rises in both banks’ total revenues and competition in the entire market.     

Efficiency,technical change,and returns to scale in large US banks: Panel data evidence from an output distance function satisfying theoretical regularity

This paper provides parametric estimates of technical change, efficiency change, economies of scale, and total factor productivity growth for large banks (those with assets in excess of $1 billion) in the United States, over the period from 2000 to 2005. This is done by estimating an output distance function subject to theoretical regularity within a Bayesian framework. We find that failure to incorporate theoretical regularity conditions results in mismeasured shadow revenue and/or cost shares, which in turn leads to perverse conclusions regarding productivity growth. Our results from the regularity-constrained model show that total factor productivity of the large US banks grew at an average rate of 1.98% over the sample period. However, our estimates also show a clear downward trend in the growth rate of total factor productivity and our decomposition of the primal Divisia total factor productivity growth index into its three components – technical change, efficiency change, and economies of scale – indicates that technical change is the driving force behind this decline.     

Risk and concentration in payment and securities settlement systems

What drives the intraday patterns of settlement in payment and securities settlement systems? Using a model of the strategic interaction of participants in these systems to capture some stylized facts about the Federal Reserve's Fedwire funds and securities systems, this paper identifies three factors that influence a participant's decision on when to send transactions intraday: cost of intraday liquidity, extent of settlement risk, and system design. With these factors, the model can make predictions regarding the impact of policy on the concentration of transactions, amount of intraday overdrafts, central bank credit exposure, costs to system participants, and other risks.