Unemployment,tariffs and the theory of international trade

In this paper, we introduce diminishing returns to scale in Brecher's model of international trade with unemployment and then investigate some issues embodied in the theory of international trade. Our principal results are that tariffs need not improve a country's terms of trade and that capital accumulation also need not result in a predictable change in the terms of trade.     

Factor tariffs and income

This article examines a tariff on an imported factor of production in a small, open economy with two domestic factors. Suppose the imported factor is intensive in export production, and labor in import competing production. The factor tariff would reduce export production and trade, but raise the wage. The flexibility afforded by the three factors raises the possibility that import spending might fall more than the decrease in output. That is, the factor tariff could raise income. Inelastic demand for the imported factor and a high labor share of income favor increased income.     

Informality,tariffs and wealth

This article analyzes the interaction between changes in tariff protection, informality, inequality and aggregate income. First, we describe some new empirical evidence on informality, the formal/informal wage gap and trade openness in Latin American countries. Then we present a simple model characterized by three (empirically based) assumptions: (1) agents consume both formal and informal goods; (2) the government uses tariff revenues to purchase formal goods; (3) informality is a voluntary phenomenon. The model predicts that tariff reduction increases informality and wage inequality and that the maximization of income requires a positive level of tariff protection. The model's results are shown to be consistent with the empirical evidence concerning Latin American countries.     

Endogenous tariffs and economic transformation

There is a widespread consensus that trade policy reforms in the successor states of the former Soviet Union in general and in Russia in particular are subject to major obstacles which are larger than in Central and Eastern European transformation countries. The following paper discusses some crossroad decisions facing the implementation of Russian trade policies and analyses the major external constraints facing the Russian economy in this regard. Paper presented at the German-Russian Conference on “New Developments in Economic Theory and Policy”, 5–7 October 1994, organised by the Institut für Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften at the University of Bonn and convened by the Faculty of Economics, Humboldt University Berlin. The paper reports on research undertaken in a project on the prerequisites for integrating the former Soviet Union into the world economy. Financial support received from the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged.     

Discriminatory tariffs and international negotiations

Recent research has highlighted the efficiency of the MFN principle within the GATT/WTO structure. This paper analyzes the exception made to MFN within Article XXIII that allows discriminatory punishment for deviations from the agreement. We argue that, in the absence of collusion, the MFN exception reduces the severity of punishment and thus lowers the level of cooperation that can be achieved by the agreement. However, discriminatory punishment may still be beneficial as we show that it reduces the problems associated with the potential for renegotiation during the punishment phase. Finally, we argue that our results are also applicable to the question of whether to use trade policy sanctions as a means of enforcing agreements covering domestic policies.     

On the functional relationship between tariffs and welfare

This paper uses a model of trade in two commodities between two countries to establish the following proposition. If the foreign offer curve has no points of inflection and if for each home rate of duty the equilibrium most favorable to the home country is selected (or else there is only one equilibrium), then as the rate of duty increases from zero, home welfare first rises then declines while foreign welfare steadily falls.     

Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs

An emerging literature has demonstrated some unique characteristics of trade in differentiated products. This paper contributes to the literature by postulating that differentiated products may be subject to greater tariff evasion due to the difficulties associated with assessing their quality and price. Using product-level data on trade between Germany and 10 Eastern European countries during 1992-2003, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. We show that the trade gap, defined as the discrepancy between the value of exports reported by Germany and the value of imports from Germany reported by the importing country, is positively related to the level of tariff in 8 out of 10 countries. Further, we show that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff level is greater for differentiated products than for homogeneous goods. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.4% increase in the trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 1.7% increase in the case of differentiated products. Finally, the data indicate that tariff evasion takes place through misrepresentation of the import prices rather than underreporting of quantities or product misclassification.     

Endogenous tariffs and trade adjustment assistance

This paper examines whether trade adjustment assistance is an effective tool for blunting political opposition to trade liberalization. The traditional argument is that adjustment assistance bribes labor unions so that they will accept reduced tariff protection. In this way, a trade adjustment assistance program should help the government lower tariffs and increase social welfare. This paper introduces trade adjustment assistance into a political economy model of endogenous tariff formation. The model shows that adjustment assistance reduces policy makers’ incentives to press for trade liberalization and may slow down the pace of reform and lower social welfare under certain plausible conditions.     

依法征管应收尽收--访海关总署关税司副司长刘石桥

今年上半年,全国海关征收关税和进口环节税净入库1136亿元,比去年同期减少92亿多元,下降7.52%,这是海关税收经过连续3年的大幅度增长后,首次出现负增长.本刊记者为此专门走访了海关总署关税司副司长刘石桥.     

Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs

An emerging literature has demonstrated some unique characteristics of trade in differentiated products. This paper contributes to the literature by postulating that differentiated products may be subject to greater tariff evasion due to the difficulties associated with assessing their quality and price. Using product-level data on trade between Germany and 10 Eastern European countries during 1992–2003, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. We show that the trade gap, defined as the discrepancy between the value of exports reported by Germany and the value of imports from Germany reported by the importing country, is positively related to the level of tariff in 8 out of 10 countries. Further, we show that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff level is greater for differentiated products than for homogeneous goods. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.4% increase in the trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 1.7% increase in the case of differentiated products. Finally, the data indicate that tariff evasion takes place through misrepresentation of the import prices rather than underreporting of quantities or product misclassification.     

The non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas under retaliation

This note shows the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas when foreign retaliation is allowed for. Using a Cournot-Johnson type of retaliation mechanism it is shown that, contrary to the case of tariffs, quota retaliation will lead to the elimination of international trade between the countries involved.     

Optimal tariffs,optimal taxes and economic development

Cross-section and time-series data suggest that nations substitute income taxes for tariffs as they develop. This paper confronts the data within the context of a two-country open-economy endogenous growth model in which public expenditure is financed by an optimal tariff and income tax. When the latter is subject to administrative costs, the model predicts that the government will optimally substitute the income tax for the tariff as output rises along the transition. The model is calibrated and a simulation yields time paths for the shares of total government revenue derived from the tariff and the income tax that are consistent with the data.     

21世纪海关之我见：以日本海关为例

为了应对国际环境和国内事务的快速变化,世界各国海关的职能都在逐渐增强。而要应对跨境犯罪组织、恐怖分子、大规模杀伤性武器（WMD）扩散、洗钱等问题时,仅靠一国海关部门的努力是不够的。世界各国海关应该相互合作以确保全球可持续发展。     

Network externalities,transport costs,and tariffs

This article formulates a reciprocal market model of international duopoly with network externalities to reconsider welfare effects of reductions in transport costs and tariffs. Depending on the magnitude of network externalities, we show two possibilities. One of them, which emerges under strong network externalities, illustrates that freer trade unambiguously improves welfare for any initial level of trade barriers. This finding provides an affirmative evaluation of freer trade.     

Price equivalent tariffs and quotas under a domestic monopoly

Price-equivalent import tariffs and quotas are compared when domestic production is controlled by a monopolist, say an agricultural marketing board with the power to restrict domestic supply, under endogenous terms of trade. Welfare comparisons boil down to sourcing costs comparisons. Quotas tend to dominate at high domestic prices, ad valorem tariffs at intermediate prices and specific tariffs at low domestic prices. Welfare maxima are achieved with more restrictive policies than under perfect competition. These results rationalize separate negotiations for sensitive products in the Doha Round and the setting of tariff-rate quotas that mimic import quotas for these products. Finally, in ascertaining the robustness of our policy ranking to the choice of variable anchoring the comparisons, we found that specific tariffs unambiguously dominate ad valorem tariffs and quotas when government revenue or imports anchor the comparisons. However, some quota revenues and import levels cannot be achieved with tariffs.     

中亚区域海关合作

中亚区域经济合作（central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation,CAREC）始于1997年,是由亚洲开发银行倡导并建立的区域经济合作机制,重点推进交通、能源、贸易便利化和贸易政策领域的合作,旨在促进中亚地区的经济合作。目前成员国包括阿富汗、阿塞拜疆、哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、蒙古和中国。     

世贸组织《海关估价协议》对我国海关估价的影响及对策

我国即将入世。入世后,我国将按照世界贸易组织《海关估价协议》的要求实施有关海关估价的规定。本文介绍了这一协议的内容,分析了入世后实施上述协议可能对我国海关估价造成的影响,提出了进一步规范我国海关估价的若干政策建议。     

Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter

This paper identifies a new terms-of-trade externality that is exercised through tariff setting. A North-South model of international trade is introduced in which the number of countries in each region can be varied. As the number of countries in one region is increased, each government there competes more aggressively with the others in its region, by lowering its tariff, to attract imports from the other region. In doing so, all countries in a region exert a negative terms-of-trade externality on each other, collectively undermining their own terms of trade and welfare. This externality can increase efficiency if the numbers of countries in both regions are increased simultaneously.