一种“新型”的关税同盟——混合型关税同盟

国际经济学界流行的看法,即认为贸易转移型关税同盟既可导致贸易创造又可导致贸易转移,是不正确的,这种所谓的贸易转移型关税同盟实际上是一种混合型关税同盟。一个混合型关税同盟包含了一个纯贸易创造型关税同盟和一个纯贸易转移型关税同盟,关税同盟的建立能否给某个加盟国带来福利的增加,取决于这两股相反作用力的相对强弱,若贸易创造大于贸易转移,则福利增加,反之则相反,若两者相当,则还能出现福利不变的情况。     

UNIONIZATION AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

This article examines the effect of unionization on welfare and trade policy using a model of duopolists competing in a third market. The traditional result that the presence of a union necessitates a stronger strategic trade policy to reach the optimal level of welfare hinges on the mode of competition. With Bertrand duopolists, a union can be welfare-improving; it can also lead to a weaker trade policy, or even reverse the direction of the optimal policy. Our results highlight the importance for trade policy of understanding the nature of firm behavior and the institutional features of the labor market.     

Unions, competition and international trade in general equilibrium

We develop a two-country, multi-sector model of oligopoly in which unionised and non-unionised sectors interact in general equilibrium. The model is used to study the impact of trade liberalisation, deunionisation and firm entry on wages in unionised and non-unionised sectors, and on welfare. We find that a shift from autarky to free trade increases non-union wages and welfare, whereas the effect on union wages is ambiguous. We also show that partial deunionisation leads to higher wages in both unionised and non-unionised sectors, but only increases welfare when the proportion of unionised sectors is sufficiently low. Finally, wages in non-unionised sectors necessarily increase with firm entry, while the response of union wages and welfare depends on the trade regime.     

To be or not to be in monetary union: A synthesis

Monetary union can benefit countries suffering from policy credibility problems if it eliminates the inflation bias and also allows for more efficient management of certain shocks. But it also carries costs as some stabilization may be feasible even in the absence of credibility, and this may be more than what an individual country can hope for in a monetary union. In this paper, we combine the stabilization and credibility branches of the currency union literature and construct a simple welfare criterion that can be used to evaluate alternative monetary arrangements. We produce examples where monetary union may be welfare improving even for low-modest levels of inflation bias (2-3%) as long as business cycles are not too a-synchronized across countries.     

On necessarily welfare-enhancing free trade areas

The well-known Kemp-Vanek-Ohyama-Wan proposition establishes that if two or more countries form a customs union (CU) by freezing their net external trade vector through a common external tariff and eliminating internal trade barriers, the union as a whole and the rest of the world cannot be worse off than before. Owing to the fact that a Free Trade Area (whose member countries impose country specific external tariff vectors) does not equalize marginal rates of substitution across its member countries (in contrast to a CU), the literature has been unable to provide a parallel demonstration regarding welfare improving Free Trade Areas (FTAs). The present paper eliminates this gap. In extending the result to the case with intermediate inputs, the paper also sheds new light on the rules of origin required to support such necessarily welfare enhancing FTAs. We show here that provided no trade deflection is permitted, all that is required by way of rules of origin is that the goods produced within the union - whether final or intermediate - be allowed to be traded freely. The proportion of domestic value added in final goods does not enter as a criterion in the rules of origin.     

Grenzen gewerkschaftlicher Verbraucherpolitik Anmerkungen zu Tonners Beitrag

The limits of trade union consumer policy — Remarks on the preceding paper by Tonner. In this contribution, the author discusses the limits that are set for trade unions when entering the consumer policy arena. Three levels of varying intensity with respect to the engagement in consumer politics are distinguished. The trade union movement can act as (a) the occasional representative of consumer interests; (b) the chief representative of specific consumer groups; (c) the chief representative of the general consumer interest. Arguments are stated in support of the view that the aspiration of trade unions to represent the general consumer interest cannot, within a democratically, pluralistically ruled society, be legitimated. To guard the specific consumer interests of their membership is a perfectly legitimate task for trade unions. Because of the interpersonal conflicts that arise it is, however, not in the interest of either employees or consumers that trade unions act as chief consumer advocates even for these specific interests. There is reason to believe that all sides are best served if trade unions devote themselves primarily to the representation of employee interests and only occasionally concern themselves with consumer affairs.     

Feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism

Recent research shows that the GATT/WTO negotiating rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inefficient. Global free trade, in particular, is unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, if governments have political motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare-superior equilibrium. The reason is that, when members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another, they tend to reduce their multilateral tariffs as well. Once we account for these endogenous changes—and only then—we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative (but political) world. Regional integration can, however, harm outsiders.     

Private Regulation and Trade Union Rights: Why Codes of Conduct Have Limited Impact on Trade Union Rights

Codes of conduct are the main tools to privately regulate worker rights in global value chains. Scholars have shown that while codes may improve outcome standards (such as occupational health and safety), they have had limited impact on process rights (such as freedom of association and collective bargaining). Scholars have, though, only provided vague or general explanations for this empirical finding. We address this shortcoming by providing a holistic and detailed explanation, and argue that codes, in their current form, have limited impact on trade union rights due to (i) buyers paying lip service to trade union rights, (ii) workers being treated as passive objects of regulation in codes of conduct, (iii) auditing being unable to detect and remediate violations of trade union rights, (iv) codes emphasizing parallel means of organizing, (v) suppliers having limited incentives for compliance, and (vi) codes being unable to open up space for union organizing when leveraged in grassroots struggles. Our arguments suggest that there is no quick fix for codes’ limited impact on trade union rights, and that codes, in their current form, have limited potential to improve trade union rights. We conclude by discussing ways in which codes of conduct, and private regulation of worker rights more generally, could be transformed to more effectively address trade union rights.     

(De)Unionization,Trade Liberalization and Selection

The effects of union bargaining power and trade liberalization on industry selection are analysed within a two‐country heterogeneous‐firm model with firm‐specific unions and inter‐country asymmetries in size and union power. Union bargaining power is shown to have more nuanced effects on efficiency and welfare than what typically suggested by conventional wisdom. While the higher wages resulting from an unfavourable union power differential harm firms' competitiveness, by reinforcing standard market access mechanisms, they give rise to aggregate demand effects that can act as a catalyst for industry and result in a pro‐variety effect.     

CAPITAL INFLOW UNDER VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT

This paper investigates the welfare consequence of exogenous capital inflow for the host country when the source country implements ‘voluntary export restraint’. In an imperfectly competitive market with an increasing returns to scale (IRS) sector, we show the possibility of welfare immiserization. Two channels are identified leading to immiserization. First, and this is direct, resource reallocation following capital inflow can squeeze the underproduced sector and reduce welfare. Second, contraction of the IRS sector can raise the return to capital, even when the price of the capital‐intensive importable falls unambiguously. Thus, even with an improvement in commodity terms of trade, the factor terms of trade can worsen and reduce welfare.     

Trade and the enforcement of environmental property rights

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between trade and the regulation of what are otherwise open-access resources when enforcement of property rights is costly. When enforcement costs are significant, environmental property rights are only adopted and enforced when the potential resource rents exceed the regulatory cost. Since trade affects the magnitude of these rents, trade can affect the willingness to regulate. One of the most striking consequences of the presence of an enforcement cost is that the decision to liberalize trade, even at autarkic prices, can result in a switch in the regulatory regime and potentially reduce economic welfare.     

Tariffs and the most favored nation clause

In an n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (n≥3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion. Under linear demand, MFN adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable. High cost countries refuse reciprocal MFN adoption with other countries and also lose even if others engage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves.     

A Meta‐Analysis of General and Partial Equilibrium Simulations of Trade Liberalisation under the Doha Development Agenda

Model‐based simulation of welfare effects is commonly used to make a case for trade liberalisation and to inform participants and stakeholders in trade negotiations. However, the simulated welfare effects of trade liberalisation vary greatly, even across studies that model similar liberalisation scenarios. This undermines confidence in the reliability of model‐based simulations. A meta‐analysis of over 100 studies that model WTO Doha Development Agenda trade negotiation outcomes is employed to identify characteristics of models, databases and liberalisation experiments that influence simulated welfare effects. Meta‐regressions produce plausible results and explain a significant proportion of the variation in simulated welfare effects in a representative sample of Doha Development Agenda trade liberalisation studies. Results also reveal that many quantitative trade policy simulation studies fail to adequately document the assumptions and data on which they are based.     

A strategic and welfare theoretic analysis of free trade areas

We construct a three-country model to determine how the formation of free trade areas (FTAs) affects optimal tariffs and welfare. We find that, at constant rest of the world (ROW) tariffs, the adoption of internal free trade induces union members to reduce their external tariffs below the Kemp-Wan [J. Int. Econom. 6 (1976) 95-97] level, and causes ROW's terms of trade to improve and its welfare to rise. When ROW also behaves optimally, its policy response to the formation of the FTA is to raise tariffs. Generally, FTA members prefer to liberalize internal trade partially and find regional integration appealing only if their collective size is sufficiently large. We also demonstrate how FTAs may undermine the attainment of global free trade.     

Time consistent export quotas in an oligopolistic world market

We investigate the strategic behavior between exporting countries that face endogenous terms of trade on the world market. In a non-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex-ante optimal export quota is not time consistent as the ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign import demand curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. However, we show that the exporters’ inability to irrevocably commit to their quota may be welfare superior to the precommitment solution. If exporters can sell forward a proportion of their exports before production decisions are made, they will do so even though, in equilibrium, it may decrease welfare compared to a situation in which forward markets do not exist. Moreover, the equilibrium with forward markets is welfare inferior to the commitment equilibrium for exporters.     

Reputation-based pricing and price improvements

Dealers often offer price improvements, relative to posted quotes, to their clients. In this paper, we propose an explanation to this practice. We also analyze its effects on market liquidity and traders’ welfare. Enduring relationships allow dealers to avoid informed trades by offering price improvements to clients who do not trade with the dealer when they are informed. A dealer never observes whether a specific client is informed or not but he can avoid informed orders by conditioning his offers on past trading profits. Cream-skimming of uninformed order-flow increases the risk of informed trading for dealers without a relationship. Thus, authorizing price improvements increases bid-ask spreads and impairs the welfare of investors without a relationship. It may even decrease the welfare of investors who develop a relationship as they sometimes need to trade at posted quotes. The model predicts a positive relationship between (a) the price improvements granted to a specific investor and past trading profits with this investor or (b) the frequency of price improvements and bid-ask spreads.     

Productivity, terms of trade and the ‘home market effect’

This paper analyzes the international transmission and welfare implications of productivity gains and changes in market size when macroeconomic adjustment occurs both along the intensive margin of trade (changes in the relative price of existing varieties of tradable goods) and the extensive margin (creation and destruction of varieties). We draw a distinction between productivity gains that enhance manufacturing efficiency and gains that lower the cost of firms' entry and of product differentiation. Countries with lower manufacturing costs have higher GDP but supply their products at lower international prices. Instead, countries with lower entry costs supply a larger array of goods at improved terms of trade. Output growth driven by demographic expansions, as well as government spending, is associated with an improvement in international relative prices and firms' entry. While trade liberalization may result in a smaller array of goods available to consumers, efficiency gains from deeper economic integration benefit consumers via lower goods prices. The international transmission mechanism and the welfare spillovers vary under different asset market structures, depending on trade costs, the elasticity of labor supply, and consumers' taste for varieties.     

Interacting factor endowments and trade costs: A multi-country,multi-good approach to trade theory

We provide a synthetic analysis of the different ways in which countries participate in the world economy. Classic trade questions are reconsidered by generalizing a factor-proportions model to multiple countries, multiple goods or multi-stage production, and country-specific trade costs. Each country's production specialization, trade and welfare is determined by the interaction between its relative endowment and its trade costs. We consider the effects of allowing one good to ‘fragment’ into component and assembly production. The volume of trade and welfare levels are higher with fragmentation for most countries, although for many countries these variables fall with fragmentation.     

Aggregate scale economies, market integration, and optimal welfare state policy

Using a two-sector-two-country model with aggregate scale economies and unionisation, we show that optimal welfare state policy entails positive levels of unemployment benefits under free-trade and capital mobility. In this setting, economic integration does not reduce the revenue raising capacity of governments and thus does not lead to a race-to-the-bottom in social standards. Instead, trade and capital flows interact with welfare state policies in increasing welfare even when each government acts independently (non-cooperatively) in determining its optimal welfare payment. Cooperation is shown to improve upon non-cooperative outcomes by raising both the generosity of the welfare state and aggregate welfare.     

Interacting factor endowments and trade costs: A multi-country, multi-good approach to trade theory

We provide a synthetic analysis of the different ways in which countries participate in the world economy. Classic trade questions are reconsidered by generalizing a factor-proportions model to multiple countries, multiple goods or multi-stage production, and country-specific trade costs. Each country's production specialization, trade and welfare is determined by the interaction between its relative endowment and its trade costs. We consider the effects of allowing one good to ‘fragment’ into component and assembly production. The volume of trade and welfare levels are higher with fragmentation for most countries, although for many countries these variables fall with fragmentation.