AN OPTIMAL TAX TREATMENT OF LEVIATHAN*

This paper constructs a model in which taxation and public expenditure decisions are made by two decision makers: a “benevolent planner,” who treats all consumers equally in the measurement of welfare; and a “Leviathan planner,” who places more weight on the utilities of “favored consumers.” The benevolent planner can restrict the Leviathan planner's power to tax, but cannot control the allocation of expenditures between desirable public goods and income transfers to favored consumers. Several types of tax restrictions are shown to be welfare-improving from the benevolent planner's viewpoint. These restrictions include a reduction in the size of the tax base, although administrative costs already prevent the Leviathan planner from taxing all commodities.     

The nature and limits of Gary Becker’s theory of racial discrimination

To what extent does Gary Becker’s model of discrimination capture “the essence of prejudice and discrimination”? After providing a general outline of Becker’s original model and summarizing some subsequent developments, this paper takes a critical perspective on the model to suggest that the absence of imperfect information in his approach unhelpfully limits its explanatory power. Instead, an approach that allows for the possibility of genuine error and draws on Adam Smith’s analysis of the impact of markets on one’s moral sense offers a deeper, more realistic understanding of what it means for people to express their prejudice (or not) through their choices.     

Deprivation and the Dimensionality of Welfare: A Variable‐Selection Cluster‐Analysis Approach

We approach the problems of measuring the dimensionality of welfare and that of identifying the multidimensionally poor, by first finding the poor using the original space of attributes, and then reducing the welfare space. The starting point is the notion that the “poor” constitutes a group of individuals that are essentially different from the “non‐poor” in a truly multidimensional framework. Once this group has been identified through a clustering procedure, we propose reducing the dimension of the original welfare space using recent blinding methods for variable selection. We implement our approach to the case of Latin America based on the Gallup World Poll, which contains ample information on many dimensions of welfare.     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

Social evaluations when populations differ in size

Assessments of “social welfare” do not usually take into account population sizes. This can lead to serious social evaluation flaws, particularly in contexts in which policies can affect demographic growth. We develop in this paper a little‐known though ethically attractive approach to correcting the flaws of traditional social evaluations, an approach that is sensitive to population sizes and that is based on critical‐level generalized utilitarianism (CLGU). Traditional CLGU is extended by considering arbitrary orders of welfare dominance and ranges of “poverty lines,” as well as values for the “critical level” of how much a life must be minimally worth to contribute to social welfare. We apply these social evaluation methods to rank Canada across 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006 and to estimate normatively and statistically robust lower and upper bounds of critical levels over which these rankings can be made.     

Public infrastructure for production and international trade in a small open economy: a dynamic analysis

This paper develops a dynamic trade model with a stock of public infrastructure, which has a property of “unpaid factor of production”. We show that a country with a smaller (larger) labor endowment tends to become an exporter of a good whose productivity is more (less) sensitive to the stock of public infrastructure. We also show that after the opening of trade, the labor-scarce country becomes unambiguously better off but the labor-abundant country may become worse off. Overall, these results contrasts with those obtained in the case of public intermediate goods with a “creation of atmosphere” property.     

Endogenous enclosure in North-South trade

Abstract .  We show that the second-best case against the optimality of free trade remains valid in the face of a well-targeted, but costly, policy response. Trade between a North, where property rights can be enforced at relatively low cost, and an otherwise identical South, yields trade patterns and welfare results nearly identical to those previously shown to arise if North and South differ exogenously in the extent of control over resources. Both nations respond optimally to world prices, and the opening of trade leads to the development of property rights in the South. Nonetheless, for a set of world prices bounded by the South's autarky price, the South is better off under autarky and is made worse off by each increase in its export price.     

Belief flipping in a dynamic model of statistical discrimination

The literature on statistical discrimination shows that ex-ante identical groups may be differentially treated in discriminatory equilibria. This paper constructs a dynamic model of statistical discrimination and explores what happens to the individuals who nonetheless overcome the initial discrimination. If an employer discriminates against a group of workers in her initial hiring, she may actually favor the successful members of that group when she promotes from within the firm. The worker's welfare implications (i.e. who benefits from an employer's discriminatory hiring practices) are unclear. Even though agents face discrimination initially, some may be better off because of it.     

Striking a balance: Optimal tax policy with labor market duality

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where employers may avoid making social security contributions by offering some workers “secondary contracts.” When calibrated using aggregate tax revenue data, the model delivers estimates of secondary “off the books” employment that are consistent with survey evidence for the EU14 and United States. We investigate the fiscal and welfare effects of varying the avoidable and unavoidable shares of labor income tax while keeping the total wedge constant, and find that increasing the employer component raises hours worked, output, and welfare. Partial labor tax evasion makes tax revenues more elastic, but full tax compliance need not be a welfare enhancing policy mix.     

“GATT‐think” with Asymmetric Countries*

We argue that a trade agreement which conforms to GATT’s reciprocity rule benefits the (stronger) less trade‐dependent country at the expense of the (weaker) more trade‐dependent country. Reciprocity is so unfavorable to the weaker country that it may be worse off under reciprocity than under the Nash‐ bargaining solution, a “power‐based” approach to trade negotiations that reflects power asymmetries among trading partners. Our results question Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999 , 2000 ) view of reciprocity as a rule that “serves to mitigate the influence of power asymmetries on negotiated outcomes.”     

WHO BENEFITS FROM PRICING REGULATIONS WHEN ECONOMIC SPACE MATTERS?

Reinterpreting Hwang‐Mai (AER, 1990) by both simplifying and generalizing their analysis in terms of two key demand parameters representing income and market size, we probe the welfare effects of spatial price discrimination to determine how robust the previous welfare findings in the literature are. Endogenous location matters when a monopolist chooses asymmetric location under different pricing schemes. If he/she remained at the same location, outcomes of fixed and endogenous location models must be analytically the same. Endogenous and different location changes outcomes radically. When non‐discriminatory pricing regulations benefit the poor, different transportation burdens mean that the rich become poor, even worse off than the ex‐poor, and the society becomes worse off accordingly.     

Medicare for all or medicare for none? A macroeconomic analysis of healthcare reform

In this study, I develop a novel general equilibrium life cycle model composed of finitely-lived households that differ according to age, skill level, and access to employer-provided health insurance. After introducing a “Medicare for all” health insurance system to the model, I examine how the welfare response to this policy change will differ according to household characteristics. Then, I compare this system to a completely privatized health insurance system that achieves universal health insurance coverage through the creation of utilization-based premium subsidies. In general, both systems tend to improve the welfare of young households at the expense of old households. However, when using average value-of-life as the primary measure of welfare, Medicare for all either benefits unskilled households at the expense of skilled households, or makes both worse off. In contrast, the privatized system improves the average value-of-life of all household groups, regardless of skill level or prior access to employer-provided health insurance.     

“Better off,as judged by themselves”: a comment on evaluating nudges

Many nudges are designed to make people better off, as judged by themselves. This criterion, meant to ensure that nudges will increase people’s welfare, contains some ambiguity. It is useful to distinguish among three categories of cases: (1) those in which choosers have clear antecedent preferences, and nudges help them to satisfy those preferences (often by increasing “navigability”); (2) those in which choosers face a self-control problem, and nudges help them to overcome that problem; and (3) those in which choosers would be content with the outcomes produced by two or more nudges, or in which ex post preferences are endogenous to nudges, so that without additional clarification or work, the “as judged by themselves” criterion does not identify a unique solution for choice architects. Category (1) is self-evidently large. Because many people agree that they suffer self-control problems, category (2) is large as well. Cases that fall in category (3) create special challenges, which may lead us to make direct inquiries into welfare or to explore what informed, active choosers typically select.     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

Heterodox Economic Thinking and Public Policy

Research on innovation and entrepreneurship policy (IEP) is almost exclusively concerned with the instrumental question of which policy measures are most effective in promoting “productive” entrepreneurial activities. The positive (political economy) and normative (welfare) dimensions are largely neglected. I focus on the latter, asking what could be a plausible normative rationale for innovation policy beyond the simple invocation of “growth” and the related use of orthodox criteria (such as “market failure”). This is a non-trivial issue, given (i) the ambiguous welfare implications of innovation in general, and (ii) the fact that standard notions of welfare cannot be consistently applied in an entrepreneurial, “Schumpeterian” economy. I suggest a dynamic criterion according to which IEP should ensure that individuals are able to engage in effective preference learning over time. This reconstruction of the normative basis of innovation policy helps clarify several contentious issues, among which are the desirability of selfemployment and the role of social security arrangements.     

LOOKING AT THE “POPULATION PROBLEM” THROUGH THE PRISM OF HETEROGENEITY: WELFARE AND POLICY ANALYSES*

Upon introducing heterogeneity and dynamics into a model of the demand for children, a problem of optimal population is defined and analyzed. It is shown that from the perspective of social welfare, better‐educated individuals produce too few children while less‐educated individuals produce too many children and all individuals invest too little in the education of their children. The impact of several policy tools geared at addressing the “population problem” is investigated, in particular how child allowances and other tax‐subsidy policies can be harnessed to enhance welfare, and how and why early childhood education programs can mitigate the “population problem.”     

Welfare Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Cost Saving vs. Signaling

We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However, if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off.     

A dynamic‐efficiency rationale for public investment in the health of the young

In this paper we assume away standard distributional and static‐efficiency arguments for public health and instead seek a dynamic efficiency rationale. We study a lifecycle model wherein young agents make health investments to reduce mortality risk. We identify a welfare rationale for public health under dynamic efficiency and exogenous mortality even when private and public investments are perfect substitutes. If health investment reduces mortality risk but individuals do not internalize its effect on the life‐annuity interest rate, the “Philipson‐Becker effect” emerges; when the young are net borrowers, this works together with dynamic efficiency to support a role for public health.     

Why equity cannot be separated from efficiency: the welfare economics of progressive social pricing

Applied neoclassical microeconomists maintain that when profits are constrained, and average costs are higher than marginal costs, Ramsey “inverse elasticity” pricing optimizes static consumer welfare. However, when weighted, instead of unweighted, consumer surplus aggregation is used, the Ramsey pricing rule becomes a “progressive social pricing rule,” which suggests that under plausible conditions “direct-elasticity” rather than “inverse-elasticity” pricing is consumer welfare optimal.     

On the voluntary provision of “weakest‐link” public goods: The case of private information

We characterize equilibria in a private‐provision public‐good game where individuals are allowed arbitrary contribution levels and the level of the public good equals the least contribution made by an individual. Equilibrium comparative statics are derived for the interim Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. First, improvements in the cost distribution of even only one player benefit all. Second, even with such “weakest‐link” public goods, for which greater similarity of preferences would seem to facilitate coordination, decreased heterogeneity can actually decrease payoffs. Indeed, increasing the riskiness of cost distributions has an ambiguous effect on welfare. Two mechanisms are provided for improving equilibrium payoffs: Technology transfer and cheap‐talk communication. While substantial welfare gains are possible, examples show that (a) technology transfer may be futile if a “regularity” condition is not satisfied and (b) cheap talk may be useless if the language for communication is not sufficiently rich.