Do Criminal Sanctions Deter Insider Trading?

Many developed markets have taken what appears to be a tough stance on illegal insider trading through the use of criminal sanctions. Although criminal sanctions represent a much greater penalty than civil sanctions, the higher burden of proof required makes their enforceability weaker. This trade off between severity and enforceability makes the impact of criminal sanctions ambiguous. We empirically examine this issue by studying the deterrence of insider trading following the introduction of criminal sanctions in a developed market. Significant changes in sanction regimes are rare, especially when criminal sanctions are introduced without other changes. In February 2008, New Zealand introduced criminal sanctions for insider trading. This change of law offers a unique setting in which to examine the deterrence effect of criminalization. Using measures for the cost of trading, degree of information asymmetry, and probability of informed trading, we find that the enactment of this law led to a worsening in these measures. These findings suggest that the weaker enforceability of criminalization outweighs the associated increased severity of the penalties in New Zealand.     

Do Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?

Using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, we study how measures of adverse selection respond to informed trading. We find that on days when activists accumulate shares, measures of adverse selection and of stock illiquidity are lower, even though prices are positively impacted. Two channels help explain this phenomenon: (1) activists select times of higher liquidity when they trade, and (2) activists use limit orders. We conclude that, when informed traders can select when and how to trade, standard measures of adverse selection may fail to capture the presence of informed trading.     

Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?

Algorithmic trading (AT) has increased sharply over the past decade. Does it improve market quality, and should it be encouraged? We provide the first analysis of this question. The New York Stock Exchange automated quote dissemination in 2003, and we use this change in market structure that increases AT as an exogenous instrument to measure the causal effect of AT on liquidity. For large stocks in particular, AT narrows spreads, reduces adverse selection, and reduces trade‐related price discovery. The findings indicate that AT improves liquidity and enhances the informativeness of quotes.     

Pick Your Poison—Fragmentation or Market Power? An Analysis of RegNMS,High Frequency Trading,and Securities Market Structure

The publication of Michael Lewis's has intensified an already contentious debate over high frequency trading (HFT). But the causes that have given rise to HFT are more complicated—and the general economic consequences far more positive—than at least the popular accounts (including Lewis's own) of the book would suggest. While directing much of its attention to the powerful computers and “predatory” potential of HFT, the “media” version of Lewis's book has all but ignored the fundamental driver of such activity: the implementation in 2007 of SEC Regulation NMS, which required all exchanges to direct their orders to the exchanges with the best prices. Before RegNMS, U.S. equity trading was largely dominated by NYSE and Nasdaq. The major exchanges' effective “ownership” of their order flow gave exchange specialists significant edges in trading. RegNMS has resulted in the proliferation of competing stock exchanges, which in turn has dramatically reduced both trading costs and the economic franchise value enjoyed by institutional traders associated with the previously dominant exchanges. The balance of evidence strongly indicates that the cost of trading has declined for retail traders and investors. The big losers have been the previously advantaged wholesale traders. HFT is simply one of the outcomes of the new, more competitive trading environment created by Regulation NMS.     

Do managers seek control and entrenchment?

A unique dataset of post-IPO thrifts with heterogeneous initial insider ownership allows us to use revealed preferences to determine the level of ownership insiders believe to be optimal. We find strong evidence that insider ownership converges to the 20% to 30% range, whether insiders begin with diffuse or concentrated ownership. This range of ownership has been found consistent with entrenchment and control in the literature. Our results are robust to a battery of variables related to insider ownership such as moral hazard, adverse selection, market timing, insider characteristics, and firm characteristics. Furthermore, we find that managers with diffuse ownership accumulate shares most aggressively during the period of regulatory anti-takeover protection, consistent with an entrenchment motive. We find that managers with above-average pay are more likely to seek higher ownership, consistent with the existence of private benefits of control. Finally, we find that insider ownership determines equity issuance, leverage, and share liquidity in ways consistent with expected accumulation or reduction in insider ownership for control purposes.     

Does Risk Sharing Motivate Interdealer Trading?

We use unique data from the London Stock Exchange to test whether interdealer trade facilitates inventory risk sharing among dealers. We develop a methodology that focuses on periods of extreme inventories—inventory cycles. We further distinguish between inventory cycles that are unanticipated and those that are anticipated because of worked orders. The pattern of interdealer trade during inventory cycles matches theoretical predictions for the direction of trade and the inventories of trade counterparts. We also show that London dealers receive higher trading revenues for taking larger positions.     

2013 Nobel Prize Revisited: Do Shiller's Models Really Have Predictive Power?

The authors take a critical view of the investment approach advocated by recent Nobel laureate Robert Shiller. A critic of efficient markets theory, Shiller has proposed that investors, when attempting to determine whether the S&P Index is under‐ or overvalued, should use a P/E ratio whose denominator is the 120‐month moving average of the company's EPS. But the authors find that such an approach does not provide consistently superior insights to those provided by conventional PEs—and that, for example, the use of both conventional and Shiller PE multiples would have indicated a highly overvalued S&P not only in early 2000—before the bursting of the dotcom bubble—but also in 1996, when Fed Governor Greenspan spoke prematurely of “irrational exuberance.” The authors also show that both the Shiller PE and the conventional PE ratios fail a critical statistical test: they are not mean‐reverting—and as a consequence, both ratios can be expected to indicate either undervaluation or overvaluation for very long periods of time. Complicating matters, current earnings are useful to investors in predicting future stock prices only insofar as they provide a reliable guide to future earnings and cash flows. And as one would expect in competitive capital markets, even perfect foreknowledge of future earnings is not likely to be much help since, according to the authors' analysis, five‐year earnings explain on average less than 20% of the variation in prices over consecutive five‐year periods.     

Insightful Insiders? Insider Trading and Stock Return around Debt Covenant Violation Disclosures

This study asks whether insider trading associates with an information advantage around first‐time debt covenant violation disclosures in SEC filings, which potentially results from early access to information about the debt covenant violation disclosure. We document two results. First, we find net insider selling up to 12 months before a debt covenant violation disclosure, which precedes investors' negative returns before disclosure; and net insider buying up to 12 months after disclosure, which precedes investors' positive returns after disclosure. Second, we show that net insider trading one to two months before and after the violation disclosure associates predictably with investors' short‐term reaction to the covenant violation announcement.     

Smoking hot portfolios? Trading behavior,investment biases,and self-control failure

Self-control is a personality trait that explains undersaving and nonparticipation decisions. We show that self-control failure also affects trading behavior among individuals on capital markets. We use smoking as the most socially accepted example of self-control failure among 13,644 German brokerage clients and compare the trading behavior of 3,553 smokers and 10,091 nonsmokers. Smokers are associated with a higher portfolio turnover unexplained by financial sophistication or wealth effects. Self-control failure also exacerbates overconfidence, social contagion, sensation seeking, and attention grabbing. Overall, self-control failure is costly because it increases the gap between gross and net returns of smokers relative to nonsmokers.     

When Do International Operations Lead to Improved Performance? An Analysis of Property‐Liability Insurers

In recent decades, insurers have been increasing their exposure to international markets. This article seeks to investigate the relationship between property-liability insurers' international operations and their risk-adjusted returns using cross-section and time-series data for the years 1992 through 2000. Our findings indicate that the relationship between international operations and performance is contingent upon the degree of product diversification. Insurance companies with focused operations in terms of product lines achieve higher risk-adjusted performance as they increase their exposures to international markets. However, insurers who are highly diversified across product lines face declining returns with greater exposure to international markets.     

Do Analysts Influence Corporate Financing and Investment?

We examine whether abnormal analyst coverage influences the external financing and investment decisions of the firm. Controlling for self-selection bias in analysts' excessive coverage, we find that firms with high (low) analyst coverage consistently engage in higher (lower) external financing than do their industry peers of similar size. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage overinvest and realize lower future returns than do firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts favor the coverage of firms that have the potential to engage in profitable investment-banking business.     

Is Proprietary Trading Detrimental to Retail Investors?

We study the conflict of interest that arises when a universal bank conducts proprietary trading alongside its retail banking services. Our data set contains the stock holdings of every German bank and those of their corresponding retail clients. We investigate (i) whether banks sell stocks from their proprietary portfolios to their retail customers, (ii) whether those stocks subsequently underperform, and (iii) whether retail customers of banks engaging in proprietary trading earn lower portfolio returns than their peers. We present affirmative evidence for all three questions and conclude that proprietary trading can, in fact, be detrimental to retail investors.     

Stock Market Anomalies: What Can We Learn from Repurchases and Insider Trading?

We examine whether managers’ trading decisions (both at a firm and personal level) are correlated with trading strategies suggested by the operating accruals and the post-earnings announcement drift (SUE) anomalies. We discuss advantages and disadvantages of the use of managerial trading activity to infer managers’ private valuation about their own securities. Our results provide corroborative evidence for the accruals anomaly, i.e., managers’ repurchase and insider trading behavior varies consistently with the information underlying the operating accruals trading strategy. On the other hand, we do not find corroborative evidence for the SUE anomaly.

Do state visits affect cross-border mergers and acquisitions?

This paper studies the relation between state visits and cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. Based on 1161 state visits and 11,531 cross-border acquisitions, we find that corporations from visiting countries are more likely to acquire corporations in countries hosting the visit. Domestic acquisitions in the host country or M&As with non-visiting countries are not elevated. Evidence from instrumental variable analysis points towards a causal effect of state visits on M&A activity. Further analysis shows that the elevated M&A activity originating from visiting countries can be attributed to business networking and a reduction in investment uncertainty and cultural barriers.     

Do institutional ownership and innovation influence idiosyncratic risk?

Business decisions influence the level of idiosyncratic risk. Several factors that contribute to idiosyncratic risk must be explored. Therefore, we examine the impact of innovation and institutional ownership on idiosyncratic risk for NYSE- and NASDAQ-listed firms. The sample contains 30,888 firm-year observations based on annual data from 2003 to 2016. We use a dynamic panel approach to address potential endogeneity difficulties when analyzing the results. Large-scale innovation activity, institutional investors, and innovation reduce idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, the interactions between institutional investors and high-level ownership stakeholders considerably minimize idiosyncratic risk. Our study demonstrates that the degree to which firms adopt innovation and institutional ownership may affect firm-specific hazards.     

Do Firms Decouple Corporate Governance Policy and Practice?

We test whether Thai listed firms with higher levels of good governance policy adoption are less likely to violate listing rules and laws designed to protect shareholders. Our results suggest that firms on average implement, substantively as opposed to symbolically, recommended governance policies, as violations occur less frequently among firms with higher governance policy adoption scores. However, we also find evidence of symbolic governance among a small group of ‘talk‐only’ firms that issue statements about governance while lagging in the adoption of policies related to shareholder rights and the board of directors.     

When and Why Do Takeovers Lead to Fraud?

This paper develops a model explaining how acquisitions of controlling block ownership can facilitate post‐takeover fraud by new managers when investor protection is poor. Based on disclosures of embezzlement or breach of fiduciary duty in Korean firms, we find that the probability of explicit looting in takeover targets is 13%, almost five times as large as a matched sample of non‐targets. Post‐takeover frauds are primarily driven by transfers of minority blocks, while the corresponding probability in majority acquisitions is statistically indistinguishable from the non‐targets. These findings may explain why minority acquisitions of controlling blocks are popular under poor investor protection.     

Paper profits or real money? Trading costs and stock market anomalies in country ETFs

Are the quantitative equity strategies for country selection robust to implementation costs? To answer this question, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the country-level strategies so far. We review, classify, and replicate 120 equity anomalies within a sample of 42 country equity indices for the years 1996–2017. Next, using ETF price and spread data, we test the effect of real-life conditions and trading costs on the anomaly performance. We also examine three cost-mitigation strategies: infrequent rebalancing, capitalization-based weighting, and focus on low-cost securities. We find that 46% of the long-only monthly rebalanced anomaly portfolios display significant alphas, concentrated strongly among strategies based on value, momentum, and liquidity. The effect of transaction costs proves largely lethal to returns, leaving only a handful of anomalies profitable. Less frequent rebalancing (annually) helps to regain the effectiveness of the strategies, increasing the monthly alphas on the long-only anomaly portfolios to 0.44% on average.