The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management

This paper studies the role of securitization in bank management. I propose a new index of “bank loan portfolio liquidity” which can be thought of as a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, where the weights reflect the composition of a bank loan portfolio. I use this new index to show that by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into liquid funds, securitization reduces banks' holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Furthermore, securitization provides banks with an additional source of funding and makes bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. By extension, the securitization weakens the ability of the monetary authority to affect banks' lending activity but makes banks more susceptible to liquidity and funding crisis when the securitization market is shut down.     

Did SFAS 166/167 decrease the information asymmetry of securitizing banks?

Beginning in 2010, mandated Financial Accounting Standards No. 166 and 167 (SFAS 166/167) changed the consolidation rules of securitization entities and required more information about their securitization activities. I find that securitizing banks experienced a decrease in information asymmetry from the pre- to the post-SFAS 166/167 periods, and that more visible securitizing banks are less sensitive to SFAS 166/167. These inferences are robust to a number of sensitivity analyses. This study is one of the first to provide evidence of the effects of SFAS 166/167 on the information asymmetry of securitizing banks.     

Do bank managers use securitization gains to smooth earnings in the post- FAS 166/167 period?

Previous literature has documented that securitization gains were used for income smoothing in the era before FAS 166 and FAS 167,¹ which tightened the requirements for sale accounting for securitizations. Using securitizing bank holding companies, we examine whether FAS 166/167 has reduced this income smoothing behavior. Our findings include two facets. First, at the aggregate level, time series statistics show that both the frequency of non-zero securitization gains reported and the magnitude of reported securitization gains are significantly reduced in the post- FAS 166/167 period. Second, at the firm level, our regression results indicate that even though the extent of this income smoothing behavior decreased after the issuance of FAS 166/167, securitization gains continue to be used to smooth earnings by securitizing banks in the post-FAS 166/167 period. Overall, our findings convey that FAS 166/167 has reduced the securitization gains recorded by banks but that after the regulation, banks still use securitization gains to smooth earnings.     

Securitization and Banks’ Equity Risk

This research explores the effects of securitization on the market’s perception of banks’ risk exposure between 2002 and 2007. Our results show that, contrary to some prior evidence in the literature, securitizing banks actually had lower systematic betas until 2007. We find no evidence of increasing idiosyncratic risk with securitization. We identify significant structural break in 2007, when securitizing banks experienced jumps in both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Finally, we confirm the general belief that larger banks tend to have higher systematic risk and lower idiosyncratic risk because of diversification.     

Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with Chinese state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms have a greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks. These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer bank discrimination for political reasons, they tend to address their financing disadvantages by building economic bonds with banks. We also find that among non-state-owned firms, those that hold significant bank ownership have lower interest expenses, and are less likely to increase cash holdings but more likely to obtain short-term loans when the government monetary policy is tight. These results suggest that the firms building economic bonds with banks can enjoy benefits such as lower financial expenses and better lending terms during difficult times. Finally, we find that non-state-owned firms with significant bank ownership have better operating performance. Overall, we find that firms can reduce discrimination through holding bank ownership.     

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

This research examines the effects of securitization on the bank's risk exposure both in terms of individual expected shortfall and marginal expected shortfall as a measure of systemic risk. The relationship between securitization activity and tail risks is especially relevant in light of the consequences for financial stability, both for the individual securitizing banks and for the market as a whole, as the financial crisis 2007–2008 reveals. By using a sample of Italian listed banks over the period 2000–2009, we find that securitizing banks have, on average, higher expected losses in case of extreme events. This adds new evidence on the main findings in the literature that focused on the evidence that risk transfer through securitization is relatively insignificant compared to the risk retained by the originating bank. We show that this risk retention is in terms of an increase of tail risk. We also find that securitization increases the probability of banks to become “systemically” riskier, but we find no difference when comparing the pre-crisis with the post-crisis period. This suggests that the systemic exposures of Italian banks are still as high as before the crisis with severe implications for financial stability.     

Securitization and optimal foreclosure

Does securitization distort the foreclosure decisions of non-performing mortgages? In a model of mortgage-backed securitization with an endogenous foreclosure policy, we find that the securitizing bank adopts a tougher foreclosure policy than the first-best, despite resulting in higher loan losses. This is optimal because foreclosure mitigates the adverse selection problem in securitization by making the optimal security, a risky debt, less information-sensitive. We further show that policies that limit mortgage foreclosure would discourage the bank’s ex ante screening effort, reducing the quality of securitized mortgages. Our model yields novel testable predictions on the effect of mortgage securitization on foreclosure rates, loan performance, and mortgage servicing.     

Securitization and systematic risk in European banking: Empirical evidence

Using a unique dataset of 592 cash and synthetic securitizations issued by 54 banks from the EU-15 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997 to 2007 this paper provides empirical evidence that credit risk securitization has a positive impact on the increase of European banks’ systematic risk. Baseline results hold when comparing estimated beta coefficients with a control group of similar non-securitizing banks. Building several sub-samples we additionally find that (a) the increase in systematic risk is more relevant for larger banks that repeatedly engage in securitization, (b) securitization is more important for small and medium financial institutions, (c) banks have a higher incentive to retain the larger part of credit risk as a quality signal at the beginning of the securitization business in Europe, and (d) the overall risk-shifting effect due to securitization is more distinct when the pre-event systematic risk is low.     

Effects of securitization and covered bonds on bank stability

This paper empirically investigates the relationship of securitization and covered bonds with bank stability and highlights that this relationship varies with the level of a bank's involvement in a specific instrument. The study uses the data from 46 securitizing and covered bond issuing listed banks in Europe for 2000–2014. The initial results show that some banks have been heavily involved in securitization activity, while covered bond issuance does not go beyond a certain limit. The results obtained using a quadratic model and a generalized additive model show a U-shaped relationship between securitization and systemic risk of banks. However, some interesting results are obtained for covered bonds. Initial results do not show a significant impact of covered bonds on systemic risk, but further analysis shows the presence of a size effect. The systemic risk of smaller banks increases after the issuance of covered bonds, while larger banks remain unaffected. The study does not support imposing uniform limits on covered bond issuance; rather such limits should be linked to the bank size. However, some regulatory framework is needed to limit banks’ involvement in securitization.     

Credit Card Securitization and Regulatory Arbitrage

This paper explores the motivations and desirability of off-balance sheet financing of credit card receivables by banks. We explore three related issues: the degree to which securitizations result in the transfer of risk out of the originating bank, the extent to which securitization permits banks to economize on capital by avoiding regulatory minimum capital requirements, and whether banks' avoidance of minimum capital regulation through securitization with implicit recourse has been undesirable from a regulatory standpoint. We show that regulatory capital arbitrage is an important consequence of securitization. The avoidance of capital requirements could be motivated either by efficient contracting or by safety net abuse. We find that securitizing banks set their capital relative to managed assets according to market perceptions of their risk, and seem not to be motivated by maximizing implicit subsidies relating to the government safety net when managing their risk. This evidence is more consistent with the efficient contracting view of securitization with implicit recourse than with the safety net abuse view.     

What explains the low profitability of Chinese banks?

This paper analyzes empirically what explains the low profitability of Chinese banks for the period 1997–2004. We find that better capitalized banks tend to be more profitable. The same is true for banks with a relatively larger share of deposits and for more X-efficient banks. In addition, a less concentrated banking system increases bank profitability, which basically reflects that the four state-owned commercial banks – China’s largest banks – have been the main drag for system’s profitability. We find the same negative influence for China’s development banks (so-called Policy Banks), which are fully state-owned. Instead, more market-oriented banks, such as joint-stock commercial banks, tend to be more profitable, which again points to the influence of government intervention in explaining bank performance in China. These findings should not come as a surprise for a banking system which has long been functioning as a mechanism for transferring huge savings to meet public policy goals.     

Herding behaviour in the Australian loan market and its impact on bank loan quality

We examine the effect of herding behaviour on the credit quality of bank loans in Australia. We find that bank herding varies with different types of loans. It tends to be more prevalent in owner‐occupied housing loans and credit cards than other types of loans. During the global financial crisis period, herding in owner‐occupied housing loans was most pronounced due to the flight‐to‐quality phenomenon in the housing sector. Furthermore, we find that the big four banks tend to herd more than smaller and regional banks. Bank herding behaviour is countercyclical, as it is negatively related to real GDP growth and the cost of funding but is positively related to market risk. Regulatory capital requirements may also encourage herding as banks are required to hold less risk‐weighted capital for residential loans. Most importantly, bank herding is related to higher impaired assets and therefore lower loan quality. Our findings may have implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?

Following the debate on the role of credit risk transfer (CRT) in exacerbating the 2007–2009 crisis, this paper investigates the usage and effects of loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives in U.S. commercial banks over the last decade, with special emphasis on the financial crisis. We find that in times of severe funding constraints, the need to raise financial resources becomes the principal incentive behind CRT. We document some beneficial effects of CRT on the economy, since the funds released through CRT are subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply, also in recession. However, we report higher overall riskiness in banks that engage intensively in loans sales and securitization, which translates into higher default rates during the crisis. Interestingly, the benefits and drawbacks of CRT are much stronger for loan sales and securitization than for credit derivatives.     

Securitization and the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission

This paper shows that the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission is stronger for US banks that securitize their assets. This finding is different, in spirit, from the widely-found negative relationship between financial development and the strength of the lending channel of monetary transmission. Focusing on the balance sheet channel, and using bank-level observations, we find that securitizing banks are more sensitive to borrowers’ balance sheets and that monetary policy has a greater impact on this sensitivity for securitizing banks. The optimality conditions from a simple partial equilibrium framework suggest that the positive effects of securitization on policy effectiveness could be due to the high sensitivity of security prices to policy rates.     

Effect of collateral characteristics on bank performance: Evidence from collateralized stocks in Taiwan

Taiwanese law requires directors of listed firms to disclose their stocks collateralized at banks creating the possibility of examining the characteristics of collateralized stocks and their influence on bank performance. This study demonstrates that the risk (value) attributes of collateralized stocks increase (reduce) bank efficiency yet reduce (increase) bank profits. Government-owned banks but not private banks require sufficiently high margins to prevent stock loans from non-performing. Furthermore, banks charge higher interest to cover the non-performing risk. Directors who lack funds, hold high turnover stocks, and/or have weak relationships with their banks prefer to collateralize their stocks at private banks.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).     

The Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio and bank net interest margins

The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is a new Basel III liquidity requirement designed to limit funding risk arising from maturity mismatches between bank assets and liabilities. This study explains the NSFR and estimates this ratio for banks in 15 countries. Banks below the ratio need to increase stable sources of funding and to reduce assets requiring funding. The most cost-effective strategies to meet the NSFR are to increase holdings of higher-rated securities and to extend the maturity of wholesale funding. These changes reduce net interest margins by 70–88 basis points on average, or around 40% of their year-end 2009 values. Universal banks with diversified funding sources and high trading assets are penalized most by the NSFR.     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

The determinants of interest margins and their effect on bank diversification: Evidence from Asian banks

An endogenous switching regression model is employed for this study, categorizing the banks into regimes of high and low degrees of diversification, with our results indicating that net interest margins can be less sensitive to fluctuations in bank risk factors for functionally diversified banks as compared to more specialized banks. In turn, this implies that by diversifying their income sources, these banks can reduce the shocks to net interest margins arising from idiosyncratic risk. Our results show that prior findings can hold when the banks are located in a regime with a low degree of diversification.