Can Companies Use Hedging Programs to Profit from the Market? Evidence from Gold Producers*

In this article, the authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the hedging activities of 92 North American gold mining companies during the period 1989‐1999. The aim of the study was to answer two questions: (1) Did such hedging activities increase corporate cash flows? (2) And if yes, were such increases the result of management's ability to anticipate price movements when adjusting their hedge ratios? Although the author's answer to the first question is “yes,” their answer to the second is “no.” More specifically, the authors concluded that:

• ? During the 1989‐1999 period, the gold derivatives market was characterized by a persistent positive risk premium— that is, a positive spread between the forward price and the realized future spot price—that caused short forward positions to generate positive cash flows. The gold mining companies that hedged their future gold production realized an average total cash flow gain of $11 million, or $24 per ounce of gold hedged, per year, as compared to average annual net income of only $3.5 million. Because of the positive risk premium, short derivatives positions did not generate significant losses even during those subperiods of the study when the gold price increased.
• ? There was considerable volatility in corporate hedge ratios during the period of the study, which is consistent with managers incorporating market views into their hedging programs and attempting to time the market by hedging selectively. But after attempting to distinguish between derivatives activities designed to hedge and those designed to profit from a view, the authors conclude that corporate efforts to time the market through selective hedging were largely if not completely futile. In fact, the companies' adjustments of hedge ratios appeared to consistently lag instead of leading the market.

     

Static hedging and pricing American options

This paper utilizes the static hedge portfolio (SHP) approach of Derman et al. [Derman, E., Ergener, D., Kani, I., 1995. Static options replication. Journal of Derivatives 2, 78–95] and Carr et al. [Carr, P., Ellis, K., Gupta, V., 1998. Static hedging of exotic options. Journal of Finance 53, 1165–1190] to price and hedge American options under the Black-Scholes (1973) model and the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model of Cox [Cox, J., 1975. Notes on option pricing I: Constant elasticity of variance diffusion. Working Paper, Stanford University]. The static hedge portfolio of an American option is formulated by applying the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions on the early exercise boundary. The results indicate that the numerical efficiency of our static hedge portfolio approach is comparable to some recent advanced numerical methods such as Broadie and Detemple [Broadie, M., Detemple, J., 1996. American option valuation: New bounds, approximations, and a comparison of existing methods. Review of Financial Studies 9, 1211–1250] binomial Black-Scholes method with Richardson extrapolation (BBSR). The accuracy of the SHP method for the calculation of deltas and gammas is especially notable. Moreover, when the stock price changes, the recalculation of the prices and hedge ratios of the American options under the SHP method is quick because there is no need to solve the static hedge portfolio again. Finally, our static hedging approach also provides an intuitive derivation of the early exercise boundary near expiration.     

Hedging and Value in the U.S. Airline Industry

This article discusses the findings and practical import of the authors' study of the fuel hedging activity of 28 U.S. airlines during the period 1992‐2003. The aim of the study was to answer the following question: Does fuel hedging add value to the airlines and, if so, how? The airline industry provides a natural experiment for investigating the relation between hedging and value for a number of reasons: (1) the industry is by and large competitive and remarkably homogeneous; (2) airlines are exposed to a single, volatile input commodity—jet fuel—that represents a major economic expense for all competitors; and (3) fuel price increases cannot be easily passed through to customers because of competitive pressures in the industry. The results of the study show that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value. Those airlines that hedged their fuel costs had Tobin's Q ratios that were 5‐10% higher, on average, than those of airlines that did not hedge. What's more, the higher the proportion of future fuel requirements hedged, the larger the valuation premium. The authors' results also suggest that the main source of value added by hedging in the airline industry is its role in preserving the firm's ability to take advantage of investment opportunities that arise when fuel prices are high and airline operating cash fl ows and values are down. Consistent with this argument, the study finds that the value premium associated with hedging increases with the level of the firm's capital spending. The authors also report that the most active hedgers of fuel costs among the airlines are the larger firms with the least debt and highest credit ratings. This result is somewhat surprising, at least to the extent that smaller airlines are expected to have larger financial distress costs (as a percentage of firm value) and hence greater motive to hedge. One explanation is that the smaller airlines have lacked either sufficient resources or the strategic foresight to acquire a derivatives hedging capability. A second possibility—one that is consistent with the study's main findings—is that the largest airlines also have the highest costs of financial distress (even as a percentage of firm value) in the form of larger growth opportunities that could be lost as a result of high leverage and financial risk. In other words, only the largest airlines are typically able to buy distressed assets during periods of industry weakness; to the extent this is so, such firms may also have the most to gain from hedging.     

航空公司利用上海燃料油期货套期保值交易的战略研究——基于ECM-GARCH模型的实证分析

十二五规划中我国将航空业纳入了重点新兴产业,但是,近几年来航油价格剧烈波动给航空业及其相关产业发展带来较大风险。本文研究了航空公司利用上海燃料油期货交易对航空煤油进行套期保值的策略,基于2004—2012年现货和期货价格的日数据,采用ECM—GARCH模型测算出最优的套期保值比率为39．72％,能够帮助航空公司规避约15％的航油价格波动风险。本文认为,该策略在一定程度上能稳定企业收益,但绩效值略微偏低,这主要是由于危机时期,套期保值的绩效不仅与套保比率相关,还较大程度地受到汇率波动和宏观经济形势的影响。基于此,本文提出了新时期国有和民营航空公司进行套保交易的战略建议。     

A mixed C-vine copula model for hedging price and volumetric risk in wind power trading

When energy trading companies enter into long-term agreements with wind power producers, where a fixed price is paid for the fluctuating production, they are facing a joint price and volumetric risk. Since the pay-off of such agreements is non-linear, a hedging portfolio would ideally consist of not only forwards, but also a basket of e.g. call and put options. Illiquidity and an almost non-existent market for options challenge however the optimal hedging of joint price and volumetric risk in many market places. Here, we consider the case of the Danish power market, and exploit its strong positive correlation with the much more liquid German market to construct a proxy hedge. We propose a three-dimensional mixed vine copula to model the evolution of the Danish and German spot electricity prices and the Danish wind power production. We construct a realistic hedging portfolio by identifying various instruments available in the market, such as real options in the form of the right to transfer electricity across the border and the right to convert electricity to heat. Using the proposed vine copula to determine optimal hedging decisions, we show that significant benefits are to be drawn by extending the hedging portfolio with the proposed instruments.     

Exposure,hedging, and value: New evidence from the U.S. airline industry

For a variety of reasons, the U.S. airline industry is a natural sample to analyze the relation between corporate risk exposure, hedging policy, and firm value. First, we find that airline exposures to fuel prices are higher when fuel prices are high or when they are rising. Second, we analyze the relation between exposure coefficients and the percentage of next year's fuel requirement hedged by airlines. In response to higher fuel price levels, rising fuel prices, and higher levels of exposure to fuel prices, airlines tend to increase their hedging activity. Finally, we explore the previously documented jet fuel hedging premium illustrated in Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006). We find a positive hedging premium in our analysis; however, the interaction of hedging and exposure does not affect firm value. We conclude that airlines increasing hedging activity because of higher fuel price exposure are not valued higher compared to those airlines employing more stable hedging policies.     

Does Operational and Financial Hedging Reduce Exposure? Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry

We examine the effects of both financial and operational hedging on jet fuel exposure in the U.S. airline industry. Specifically, we investigate two operational hedging strategies: the extent to which airlines operate different aircraft types and the degree to which airlines operate fuel‐efficient fleets. We find that both financial and operational hedging are important tools in reducing airline exposure to jet fuel price risk. However, operational hedging strategies appear to be more economically important, which suggests that hedging with derivatives is more likely to be used to “fine‐tune” risk exposure, whereas operational choices have a higher order effect on risk exposure.     

Pre‐Issuance Hedging of Fixed‐Rate Debt

This article analyzes several corporate hedging strategies to manage interest rate risk on fixed‐rate debt prior to issuance. The authors start by considering these strategies using a highly stylized model: a binomial forward interest rate tree that, while simple in design, illustrates derivative pricing methodologies that are used in practice. Under a given rate volatility assumption, they demonstrate expected outcomes when entering a forward bond contract, a forward‐starting pay‐fixed interest swap, and a purchased option on that swap, as well as the “default” alternative of doing nothing. In principle, the decision of whether or not to hedge, as well as how to do so, depends on management's view of future interest rate volatility and degree of comfort with possible outcomes. The authors then assess the pros and cons of hedging strategies, with considerable emphasis on practical considerations. For example, while their theoretical model would allow an issuer to “lock” a specific debt issuance, in practice one can hedge only “benchmark” interest rate risk. The authors describe the use of both Treasury locks and forward‐starting swaps to address unexpected benchmark yield changes, and discuss how factors such as the time to issuance affect an issuer's choice of instrument. For instance, Treasury locks are typically used when the time to issuance is relatively short, while interest rate swaps are more common for longer times to issuance. The article also discusses circumstances in which a “do nothing” strategy may be preferable to other alternatives, as well as the disadvantages of issuing in advance. Finally, the authors describe the impact of financial accounting on different hedge strategies.     

An Empirical Comparison of Option‐Pricing Models in Hedging Exotic Options

This paper examines the empirical performance of various option‐pricing models in hedging exotic options, such as barrier options and compound options. A practical and relevant testing approach is adopted to capture the essence of model risk in option pricing and hedging. Our results indicate that the exotic feature of the option under consideration has a great impact on the relative performance of different option‐pricing models. In addition, for any given model, the more “exotic” the option, the poorer the hedging effectiveness.     

The Traditional Hedging Model Revisited with a Nonobservable Convenience Yield

This article examines the hedging of constrained commodity positions with futures contracts. We extend the study of Adler and Detemple (1988a, 1988b) to include a partial information framework where the convenience yield is not observable. As a consequence, futures prices depend on investor's beliefs regarding the value of the convenience yield, and every component of the hedge is impacted by these beliefs. We achieve a decomposition of the demand that clarifies the impact on the optimal hedge of the beliefs, the spot price and the risk‐free rate as well as the hedging horizon.     

The Valuation of Contingent Claims under Portfolio Constraints: Reservation Buying and Selling Prices

With constrained portfolios contingent claims do not generally havea unique price that rules out arbitrage opportunities.Earlier studies have demonstratedthat when there are constraints on the hedge portfolio,a no-arbitrage price interval for any contingent claim exists.I consider the more realistic case where the constraints are imposed on the total portfolio of each investor and define reservation buying and selling prices for contingent claims. I derive propertiesof these prices, show how they can be computed numerically, and study two simple examples in which the reservation prices and the corresponding hedging strategies are compared to the Black–Scholes setting.     

Static hedging and pricing American knock-in put options

This paper extends the static hedging portfolio (SHP) approach of  and  to price and hedge American knock-in put options under the Black–Scholes model and the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model. We use standard European calls (puts) to construct the SHPs for American up-and-in (down-and-in) puts. We also use theta-matching condition to improve the performance of the SHP approach. Numerical results indicate that the hedging effectiveness of a bi-monthly SHP is far less risky than that of a delta-hedging portfolio with daily rebalance. The numerical accuracy of the proposed method is comparable to the trinomial tree methods of  and . Furthermore, the recalculation time (the term is explained in Section 1) of the option prices is much easier and quicker than the tree method when the stock price and/or time to maturity are changed.     

How Firms Should Hedge

Substantial academic research explains why firms should hedge,but little work has addressed how firms should hedge. We assumethat firms can experience costly states of nature and deriveoptimal hedging strategies using vanilla derivatives (e.g.,forwards and options) and custom "exotic" derivative contractsfor a value-maximizing firm facing both hedgable (price) andunhedgable (quantity) risks. Customized exotic derivatives aretypically better than vanilla contracts when correlations betweenprices and quantities are large in magnitude and when quantityrisks are substantially greater than price risks. Finally, wediscuss how our model may be applied in practice.     

Does Risk Management Add Value? A Survey of the Evidence

The fact that 92% of the world's 500 largest companies recently reported using derivatives suggests that corporate managers believe financial risk management can increase shareholder value. Surveys of finance academics indicate that they too believe that corporate risk management is, on the whole, a valueadding activity. This article provides an overview of almost 30 years of broadbased, stock‐market‐oriented academic studies that address one or more of the following questions:

• ? Are interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks reflected in stock price movements?
• ? Is volatility in corporate earnings and cash flows related in a systematic way to corporate market values?
• ? Is the corporate use of derivatives associated with reduced risk and higher market values?

The answer to the first question, at least in the case of financial institutions and interest rate risk, is a definite yes; all studies with this focus find that the stock returns of financial firms are clearly sensitive to interest rate changes. The stock returns of industrial companies exhibit no pronounced interest rate exposure (at least as a group), but industrial firms with significant cross‐border revenues and costs show considerable sensitivity to exchange rates (although such sensitivity actually appears to be reduced by the size and geographical diversity of the largest multinationals). What's more, the corporate use of derivatives to hedge interest rate and currency exposures appears to be associated with lower sensitivity of stock returns to interest rate and FX changes. But does the resulting reduction in price sensitivity affect value—and, if so, how? Consistent with a widely cited theory that risk management increases value by limiting the corporate “underinvestment problem,” a number of studies show a correlation between lower cash flow volatility and higher corporate investment and market values. The article also cites a small but growing group of studies that show a strong positive association between derivatives use and stock price performance (typically measured using price‐to‐book ratios). But perhaps the nearest the research comes to establishing causality are two studies—one of companies that hedge FX exposures and another of airlines' hedging of fuel costs—that show that, in industries where hedging with derivatives is common, companies that hedge outperform companies that don't.     

Portfolio Insurance Strategies when Hedging Affects Share Prices

Option-based portfolio insurance can result in coordinated buying and selling, which destabilizes markets such that hedgers fail to achieve their objective. Gennotte and Leland (1990) show portfolio insurance strategies can have an impact on price movements. Ramanlal and Mann (1996) show how price movements, in turn, can alter hedging strategies. In this paper, we combine these separate effects and develop an equilibrium, executable hedging strategy. This hedging strategy requires less rebalancing than traditional portfolio insurance; more important, it achieves downside protection with a less destabilizing impact on security prices.     

Don't Waste a Free Lunch: Managing the Advance Refunding Option

A callable municipal bond issue funding a new project is usually eligible for “advance refunding”—that is, refunding between the issue date and the call date. Such refunding is accomplished by issuing new bonds, and investing the proceeds in an escrow portfolio of Treasury securities whose cash flows pay off the outstanding issue until the call date, when the old bonds are retired. Under favorable market conditions, advance refunding enables a municipality to lock in lower interest rates prior to the call date; waiting until that date would expose the issuer to the risk of higher rates. The right to advance refund is an option whose value depends not only on the issuer's borrowing rate, but also on Treasury rates, which determine the cost of the escrow portfolio. What makes this option (referred to by the authors as the “ARO”) unusual is that it is effectively a free lunch for the issuer. While investors pay a lower price for a callable bond, the price is not affected by the bond's eligibility for advance refunding. The free lunch is demonstrable when the yield of the escrowed Treasuries is higher than the issuer's funding rate to the call date. In such cases, the present value of the cash flows to the call date (which is how the market prices a deep‐in‐the‐money callable bond) exceeds the cost of the escrow. This excess effectively enables the issuer to retire the bonds below their fair market value. Another manifestation of the free lunch offered by advance refunding transaction occurs when the savings exceed the expected value of waiting—that is, when the value of the call option is less than the currently realizable savings. One important consideration when deciding whether and when to advance refund is that the ARO can be exercised only once in an issue's refunding life‐cycle. If an issue is advance refunded, its replacement cannot be. But if an issue is refunded once it becomes callable, the ARO stays alive in the replacement issue. In this article, the authors develop an analytical framework to help issuers deal with this problem. First, they explore how the value of the ARO depends on coupon, maturity, time to call, and prevailing Treasury rates. Then they use the results to make a recommendation about the advance refunding decision: act now or wait? To answer this question, the authors extend the standard measure of refunding efficiency to incorporate the ARO of the replacement issue. Incorporating the ARO of the replacement issue slows down the signal to advance refund, whereas failure to do so could lead to a suboptimal decision. Near the call date, issuers may be better off locking in savings with a hedge rather than sacrificing the eligibility of the replacement issue for advance refunding.     

Financial Management Association Roundtable on Stock Market Pricing and Value‐Based Management

A group of academics and practitioners addresses a number of questions about the workings of the stock market and its implications for corporate decision‐making. The discussion begins by asking what the market wants from companies: Is it mainly just steady increases in earnings per share, which are then “capitalized” by the market at the current industry P/E multiple to produce a higher stock price? Or does the market pay attention to the “quality,” or sustainability, of earnings? And are there more revealing measures of annual corporate performance than GAAP earnings—measures that would provide investors with a better sense of companies' future cash‐generating capacity and returns on capital? The consensus was that although many investors respond uncritically to earnings numbers, the most sophisticated and influential investors consider far more than current earnings when pricing stocks. And although the stock market is far from omniscient, the heightened scrutiny of companies resulting from the growth of hedge funds, private equity, and investor activism of all kinds appears to be making the market “more efficient” in building information into stock prices. The second part of the discussion explored the implications of this view of the market pricing process for corporate strategy and the evaluation of major investment opportunities. For example, do acquisitions have to be “EPS‐accretive” to be value‐adding, or is there a more reliable means of assessing an investment's value added than pro forma EPS effects? Does the DCF valuation method always offer a better guide to value than the method of comparables used by many Wall Street dealmakers? And under what circumstances are the relatively new real options valuation approaches likely to provide a significant advantage over conventional methods? The main message offered to corporate practitioners is to avoid letting cosmetic accounting effects get in the way of value‐adding investment and operating decisions. As the corporate record on acquisitions makes painfully clear, there is no guarantee that an accretive deal will turn out to be value‐increasing (in fact, the odds are that it will not). As for choosing a valuation method, there appears to be a time and place for each of the major methods—comparables, DCF, and real options—and the key to success is understanding which method is best suited to the circumstances.     

Consumption and Hedging in Oil‐Importing Developing Countries

We study the consumption and hedging strategy of an oil‐importing developing country that faces multiple crude oil shocks. In our model, developing countries have two particular characteristics: their economies are mainly driven by natural resources and their technologies are less efficient in energy usage. The natural resource exports can be correlated with the crude oil shocks. The country can hedge against the crude oil uncertainty by taking long/short positions in existing crude oil futures contracts. We find that both inefficiencies in energy usage and shocks to the crude oil price lower the productivity of capital. This generates a negative income effect and a positive substitution effect, because today’s consumption is relatively cheaper than tomorrow’s consumption. Optimal consumption of the country depends on the magnitudes of these effects and on its risk‐aversion degree. Shocks to other crude oil factors, such as the convenience yield, are also studied. We find that the persistence of the shocks magnifies the income and substitution effects on consumption, thus also affecting the hedging strategy of the country. The demand for futures contracts is decomposed in a myopic demand, a pure hedging term and productive hedging demands. These hedging demands arise to hedge against changes in the productivity of capital due to changes in crude oil spot prices. We calibrate the model for Chile and study to what extent the country’s copper exports can be used to hedge the crude oil risk.     

THE HISTORY OF FINANCE: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

In this account of the evolution of finance theory, the “father of modern finance” uses the series of Nobel Prizes awarded finance scholars in the 1990s as the organizing principle for a discus‐sion of the major developments of the past 50 years. Starting with Harry Markowitz's 1952 Journal of Finance paper on “Portfolio Selection,” which provided the mean‐variance frame‐work that underlies modern portfolio theory (and for which Markowitz re‐ceived the Nobel Prize in 1990), the paper moves on to consider the Capi‐tal Asset Pricing Model, efficient mar‐ket theory, and the M & M irrelevance propositions. In describing these ad‐vances, Miller's major emphasis falls on the “tension” between the two main streams in finance scholarship: (1) the Business School (or “micro normative”) approach, which focuses on investors ‘attempts to maximize returns and cor‐porate managers’ efforts to maximize shareholder value, while taking the prices of securities in the market as given; and (2) the Economics Depart‐ment (or “macro normative”) approach, which assumes a “world of micro optimizers” and deduces from that assumption how the market prices actually evolve. The tension between the two ap‐proaches is resolved, and the two streams converge, in the final episode of Miller's history–the breakthrough in option pricing accomplished by Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, and Rob‐ert Merton in the early 1970s (for which Merton and Scholes were awarded the Nobel Prize in 1998, “with the late Fischer Black everywhere ac‐knowledged as the third pivotal fig‐ure”). As Miller says, the Black‐Scholes option pricing model and its many successors “mean that, for the first time in its close to 50‐year history, the field of finance can be built, or…rebuilt, on the basis of ‘observable’ magnitudes.” That option values can be calculated (almost entirely) with observable vari‐ables has made possible the spectacu‐lar growth in financial engineering, a highly lucrative activity where the prac‐tice of finance has come closest to attaining the precision of a hard sci‐ence. Option pricing has also helped give rise to a relatively new field called “real options” that promises to revolu‐tionize corporate strategy and capital budgeting. But if the practical applications of option pricing are impressive, the op‐portunities for further extensions of the theory by the “macro normative” wing of the profession are “vast,” in‐cluding the prospect of viewing all securities as options. Thus, it comes as no surprise that when Miller asks in closing, “What would I specialize in if I were starting over and entering the field today?,” the answer is: “At the risk of sounding like the character in ‘The Graduate,’ I reduce my advice to a single word: options.”     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.