Outsourcing in the International Mutual Fund Industry: An Equilibrium View

We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in‐house funds, in‐house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually (57% of the expense ratio). We attribute this result to preferential treatment of in‐house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross‐trades, especially at times when in‐house funds face steep outflows and require liquidity. We explain preferential treatment with agency problems: it increases with the subcontractor's market power and the difficulty of monitoring the subcontractor, and decreases with the subcontractor's amount of parallel in‐house activity.     

Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

We study compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers using hand‐collected data of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds. Variations in the compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. The likelihood of explicit performance‐based incentives is positively correlated with the intensity of agency conflicts, as proxied by the advisor's clientele dispersion, its affiliations in the financial industry, and its ownership structure. Investor sophistication and the threat of dismissal in outsourced funds serve as substitutes for explicit performance‐based incentives. Finally, we find little evidence of differences in future performance associated with any particular compensation arrangement.     

Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational,Governance, and Financial Engineering

Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.     

The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Incentives

Hedge funds display several interesting characteristics that may influence performance, including: flexible investment strategies, strong managerial incentives, substantial managerial investment, sophisticated investors, and limited government oversight. Using a large sample of hedge fund data from 1988–1995, we find that hedge funds consistently outperform mutual funds, but not standard market indices. Hedge funds, however, are more volatile than both mutual funds and market indices. Incentive fees explain some of the higher performance, but not the increased total risk. The impact of six data-conditioning biases is explored. We find evidence that positive and negative survival-related biases offset each other.     

Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments

This study analyzes the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds in response to their relative performance over the 1992 to 1999 period. Our results show that managers of funds whose performance is closer to that of the top performing funds have greater incentives to increase their portfolios' risk than managers at the top who exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. The evidence suggests that termination risk imposes a constraint on the risk taking behavior of under-performing fund managers and the winner takes all phenomenon generates a strong incentive for the fund managers to be the top manager. We also analyze the difference in the risk taking behavior of funds managed by multiple managers and single managers.     

CONTROL: GETTING IT AND KEEPING IT IN BUSINESS PROCESS OUTSOURCING

Proposals to outsource corporate functions often meet with resistance because of control issues and concerns about proprietary information. But proponents of outsourcing are quick to note that many of these reservations dwell on perceptions and apprehensions, rather than on the track record of outsourced projects. In fact, veterans of successful arrangements observe that outsourcing frees up valuable management time and thus enables an enhanced form of control.
The key is to supplement direct, supervisory control mechanisms like service control agreements and performance tracking with indirect, enabling controls—senior team affiliation, performance visibility, interface management, and employee allegiance—and then lay the groundwork for these enabling controls early in the outsourcing relationship. Rather than getting locked into static controls, forward-looking managers adopt a broad control framework to go beyond achieving the expected improvements and create the potential to add new value. The result is an outsourcing relationship that can accommodate change, move in a new direction, and seize emerging opportunities.     

Elections and Discretionary Accruals: Evidence from 2004

We examine the accrual choices of outsourcing firms with links to U.S. congressional candidates during the 2004 elections, when corporate outsourcing was a major campaign issue. We find that politically connected firms with more extensive outsourcing activities have more income‐decreasing discretionary accruals. Further, relative to adjacent periods, the evidence is concentrated in the two calendar quarters immediately preceding the 2004 election, consistent with heightened incentives for firms to manage earnings during the election season. The incentives can be attributed to donor firms' concerns about the potentially negative consequences of scrutiny over outsourcing for themselves and for their affiliated candidates.     

Incentives and Endogenous Risk Taking: A Structural View on Hedge Fund Alphas

Hedge fund managers are subject to several nonlinear incentives: performance fee options (call); equity investors' redemption options (put); and prime broker contracts allowing for forced deleverage (put). The interaction of these option‐like incentives affects optimal leverage ex ante, depending on the distance of fund‐value from the high‐water mark. We study how these endogenous effects influence performance measures used in the literature. We show that reduced‐form measures that do not account for these features are subject to economically significant false discovery biases. The result is stronger for low‐quality funds. We propose an alternative structural methodology for conducting performance attribution in hedge funds.     

Sourcing parts of complex products: evidence on transactions costs, high-powered incentives and ex-post opportunism

This paper revisits evidence on the correlates of sourcing decisions in the US auto industry to see whether adoption of new contracting terms and early involvement of suppliers in design activities (e.g. “relational contracting”) yields different results as compared to previous findings. Previous studies find that US auto firms insource complex parts that require investments in specific assets. Absent large differences in production costs, the results suggest that transactions costs associated with external suppliers exceed transactions costs associated with internal suppliers (e.g. loss of high powered incentives). Using data on 156 sourcing decisions for process tooling (dies) of a new car program we find that under the new relational contracting regime, transaction cost theory continues to have explanatory power for sourcing decisions; however, attributes that favored insourcing in previous studies favor outsourcing in this setting. Moreover, more complex subassemblies are associated with fewer distinct suppliers than expected — evidence of a tendency to co-locate decision rights to reduce transactions costs related to system interactions. After controlling for transaction characteristics that are associated with the sourcing decision, we find no evidence that outsourcing is associated with increased ex post opportunism by the firm (e.g. agreement about contract completion); however, outsourced parts are submitted by suppliers for evaluation significantly later than insourced parts (e.g. delivery holdup).     

Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.     

银行金融服务外包国际监管的比较研究

全球金融机构逐渐将原先自行承担的业务转交外包服务提供商完成,在这种情况下,金融机构如何控制业务的风险,如何知道自己的业务符合监管的要求是迫切需要解决的问题。本文首先分析金融服务外包所带来的风险,进而对世界上10个国家和地区的监管法律法规进行比较研究,并得出相应的政策建议。希望本文的研究结果能够对我国制定金融服务外包指引提供值得借鉴的经验。     

Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives

Under the principal-agent framework, we study and compare different compensation schemes commonly adopted by hedge fund and mutual fund managers. We find that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal to the symmetric performance fee structure. However, the use of high water mark (HWM) mitigates the suboptimality, though to a very limited extent. Both our theoretical models and simulation results show that HWM will induce more managerial efforts only when a fund is slightly under the water but it will unfavorably dampen incentives when a fund is too deep under the water and when the manager’s skill is poor. Allowing managers to invest personal wealth in their own funds, however, helps align interests and provides positive managerial incentives.     

What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers’ Incentives

We ask whether mutual funds’ flows reflect the incentives of the brokers intermediating them. The incentives we address are those revealed in statutory filings: the brokers’ shares of sales loads and other revenue, and their affiliation with the fund family. We find significant effects of these payments to brokers on funds’ inflows, particularly when the brokers are not affiliated. Tracking these investments forward, we find load sharing, but not revenue sharing, to predict poor performance, consistent with the different incentives these payments impart. We identify one benefit of captive brokerage, which is the recapture of redemptions elsewhere in the family.     

Do machines beat humans? Evidence from mutual fund performance persistence

We study the performance persistence of quantitative actively managed US equity funds. We show that the persistence of quantitative funds originates from poor performers and that there are reversals at the top of the performance scale, which is no different from the widely accepted evidence in the mutual fund literature. When testing for differences in performance persistence between quantitative and non–quantitative funds, we find no differences for poorly performing funds, but we observe significantly more reversals for quantitative funds at the top of the performance distribution. We also find that the differences in performance persistence are not explained by differences in flow–induced incentives to generate alpha, as there is no heterogeneity in investors preferences when allocating capital to these funds. Overall our results are consistent with machines having less skill than their human counterparts.     

How Investors Interpret Past Fund Returns

The literature documents a convex relation between past returns and fund flows of mutual funds. We show this to be consistent with fund incentives, because funds discard exactly those strategies which underperform. Past returns tell less about the future performance of funds which discard, so flows are less sensitive to them when they are poor. Our model predicts that strategy changes only occur after bad performance, and that bad performers who change strategy have dollar flow and future performance that are less sensitive to current performance than those that do not. Empirical tests support both predictions.     

Outsourcing accounting information systems: Evidence from closed-end mutual fund families

This study examines the factors associated with the decision of closed-end funds to outsource their accounting information systems. Using data from 2010 and 2011, we find that the outsourcing decision is made by groups of funds with common service providers (called “fund families”), rather than by individual funds. Our results indicate that fund families containing a larger number of funds and older fund families are less likely to outsource their accounting functions. These types of fund families may have greater internal economies of scale, diminishing the potential cost savings from outsourcing. We also find that fund families with more good-faith-valued assets are less likely to outsource accounting information systems than those with more market-valued assets. Valuing these good-faith-valued assets is both an important investment-management process and a key accounting task, reducing the need to outsource accounting to focus managers on their core competency. This study is of potential importance to investors and regulators in evaluating closed-end funds' decisions on outsourcing accounting functions.     

The coming commoditization of processes

Despite the much-ballyhooed increase in outsourcing, most companies are in do-it-yourself mode for the bulk of their processes, in large part because there's no way to compare outside organizations' capabilities with those of internal functions. Given the lack of comparability, it's almost surprising that anyone outsources today. But it's not surprising that cost is by far companies' primary criterion for evaluating outsourcers or that many companies are dissatisfied with their outsourcing relationships. A new world is coming, says the author, and it will lead to dramatic changes in the shape and structure of corporations. A broad set of process standards will soon make it easy to determine whether a business capability can be improved by outsourcing it. Such standards will also help businesses compare service providers and evaluate the costs versus the benefits of outsourcing. Eventually these costs and benefits will be so visible to buyers that outsourced processes will become a commodity, and prices will drop significantly. The low costs and low risk of outsourcing will accelerate the flow of jobs offshore, force companies to reassess their strategies, and change the basis of competition. The speed with which some businesses have already adopted process standards suggests that many previously unscrutinized areas are ripe for change. In the field of technology, for instance, the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute has developed a global standard for software development processes, called the Capability Maturity Model (CMM). For companies that don't have process standards in place, it makes sense for them to create standards by working with customers, competitors, software providers, businesses that processes may be outsourced to, and objective researchers and standard-setters. Setting standards is likely to lead to the improvement of both internal and outsourced processes.     

The Influence of Institutional Constraints on Outsourcing

Drawing on transaction cost economics and institutional theory we argue that the effects of institutional constraints on the transaction costs of outsourcing vary systematically with the type of service outsourced and the ownership structure of the outsourcing firm. Using data from hospitals, we demonstrate that these effects lead to a higher extent of outsourcing of nonclinical compared to clinical services, and larger outsourcing response of nonclinical services to cost pressures from managed care. Further, the effects of ownership structure and associated governance mechanisms on institutional constraints are reflected in the empirical results as cross‐sectional variations in the extent to which outsourcing is invoked as a response to cost pressures by hospitals of different ownership.     

Leaning for the Tape: Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds

We present evidence that fund managers inflate quarter-end portfolio prices with last-minute purchases of stocks already held. The magnitude of price inflation ranges from 0.5 percent per year for large-cap funds to well over 2 percent for small-cap funds. We find that the cross section of inflation matches the cross section of incentives from the flow/performance relation, that a surge of trading in the quarter's last minutes coincides with a surge in equity prices, and that the inflation is greatest for the stocks held by funds with the most incentive to inflate, controlling for the stocks' size and performance.     

Fund managers' herding and the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance

This study provides a new explanation for the weak sensitivity of investors' flows to poor fund performance based on fund managers' incentives to herd from career concerns. We show that a manager's decision to trade with (against) the herd decreases (increases) significantly investors' willingness to redeem capital from underperforming funds. We argue that this differential investor reaction to poor performance conditional on herding explains the lower termination risk identified among herding managers. We also find that financial intermediaries do not mitigate this sub-optimal investors' response. Our findings support the view that underperforming funds can retain larger payoffs if they herd.