Symposium on Financial Institutions

Financial institutions are the topic of the 2003 Eastern Finance Association Symposium. The symposium papers illustrate the importance of bank research for improving our understanding of both financial and nonfinancial firms. Benston begins the symposium with an overview of banking. Three papers consider different aspects of banks' commercial lending: Frame, Padhi, and Woosley; Gottesman and Roberts; and Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux. Next, DeYoung and Rice analyze increases in bank's increased noninterest income. Finally, two papers illustrate the benefits of using banking data: Hasan and Wall, in examining the management of financial reporting, and Sfiridis and Daniels, in examining the implications of different organizational forms.     

Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of Implicit Subsidies on Estimates of Scale Economies for Banks

We examine whether “too‐big‐to‐fail” (TBTF) factors affect estimates of scale economies for large banks. From a standard model of bank production that does not control for any TBTF factors, we find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks. We then control for TBTF factors by using a measure of the “implicit subsidy” that emerges from a reduction in TBTF banks’ funding costs due to investor expectations of government support. We do this in two ways: first, we estimate scale economies from an augmented model of bank production that employs a proxy for the counterfactual price of debt that banks would face in the absence of any TBTF funding cost advantage; second, we estimate scale economies from a model of bank production that is estimated only for a sample of banks considered unlikely to be TBTF. After controlling for TBTF factors using either method, we no longer find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks. These results suggest that estimated scale economies for large banks are affected by TBTF factors.     

Safety‐Net Losses from Abandoning Glass–Steagall Restrictions

This paper evaluates the redistribution of gains surrounding regulatory relaxations in 1996 and 1997 and ultimate passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999. Gains in financial institution stocks may come from projected increases in efficiency, increases in the bargaining power of financial institutions, or greater access to the federal safety net. For customers seeking improved access to capital markets, gains in efficiency should result in increased benefits, but increases in bank bargaining power could increase funding costs and/or decrease capital market access. Customers may also lose as taxpayers who support the federal safety net. This paper finds evidence of potential taxpayer losses and increased bank bargaining power, especially vis‐à‐vis credit‐constrained customers for whom safety‐net subsidies are unlikely to be shifted forward. The stock prices of credit‐constrained customers declined during FSMA event windows and in event windows associated with regulatory relaxations.     

系统重要性金融机构的国际监管趋势浅析

系统重要性金融机构的监管已经成为当前国际金融改革的一个重要组成部分。国际金融组织和各国金融监管机构正致力于降低其道德风险,终结大型金融机构“过大而不能倒”的局面。我国的监管需要从中国的国情和实际出发,不断完善宏观审慎管理框架,建立健全金融基础设施,积极参与国际游戏规则的制定,为防范系统性风险和维护金融稳定做出不懈努力。     

Regulatory Capital Charges for Too‐Connected‐to‐Fail Institutions: A Practical Proposal

The recent financial crisis has highlighted once more that interconnectedness in the financial system is a major source of systemic risk. I suggest a practical way to levy regulatory capital charges based on the degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions. Namely, the charges are based on the institution's incremental contribution to systemic risk based on a risk budgeting approach. The imposition of such capital charges could go a long way towards internalizing the negative externalities associated with too‐connected‐to‐fail institutions and providing managerial incentives to strengthen an institution's solvency position, and avoid too much homogeneity and excessive reliance on the same counterparties in the financial industry.     

Too big to fail: Measures,remedies, and consequences for efficiency and stability*

This paper evaluates whether reform efforts addressing “too big to fail” actually enhance the stability of the financial system, and whether trade‐offs exist between stability and efficiency. We also present and discuss various measures of bank size and complexity since such measures are essential for implementing appropriate corrective remedies. As we will show, there are no unambiguous measures of size or complexity that can fully capture a bank's contribution to systemic risk. Their effects on efficiency are also impossible to capture with certainty. While we recognize the need for additional research and empirical evidence, we do identify weaknesses and strengths of proposed and implemented reforms that could have consequences for bank stability and efficiency.     

系统重要性金融机构监管改革国际进展与我国的对策

在金融体系中,系统重要性金融机构（S]FI）由于规模大、交易对手多、业务联系广等原因,一旦出现问题就会引发系统性风险,影响金融稳定。全球金融危机后,国际社会加大了对SIFI监管政策的研究,确定了识别和评估SIFI的方法,推出了一系列对SIFI强化监管的政策措施,公布了全球系统重要性银行（G—SIB）名单。美国、欧盟和英国在金融监管改革中,均加强了对sIFI的监管。我国的中国银行已入选G—SIB,未来还会有大型银行加入G—SIB之列。面对新的形势,客观上需要参照国际社会对SIFI监管的政策新规,完善我国sIFI监管措施。     

Institutions and Bank Behavior: Legal Environment,Legal Perception,and the Composition of Bank Lending

This paper explores how the legal environment affects bank behavior in 20 transition economies. Based on a newly constructed data set we find that banks’ loan portfolio composition depends on the legal environment. If banks operate in a well‐functioning legal environment they lend relatively more to SMEs and provide more mortgages. On the other hand, banks lend more to large enterprises and to the government if the legal system is unsound. As a transmission channel we identify the banks’ willingness to accept collateral which depends on the bankers’ perceptions of the prevailing laws regarding collateral.     

Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans

Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests has an inverted U‐shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors.     

Bank Bonuses and Bailouts

This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bailouts. If there is a risk‐shifting problem, bailout expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bailout perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare‐maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers' liability can be counterproductive.     

The Determinants of Financial Structure: New Insights from Business Start‐ups

Business start‐ups lack prior history and reputation, face high failure risk, and have highly concentrated ownership. The resulting information and incentive problems, combined with entrepreneurial private benefits of control, affect initial financing decisions. This paper examines simultaneously the impact of these issues on leverage, debt mix and maturity. We find that start‐ups with high adverse selection and risk shifting problems contract less bank debt but compensate with other debt sources. Start‐ups in growing industries have lower leverage, but raise more bank debt. Entrepreneurs with large private control benefits contract less but longer term bank loans to lower the default probability.