Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation

We consider house allocation without endowments. We show that there is a unique maximal domain including all strict preferences on which efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness are compatible. A preference relation belongs to the unique maximal domain if it is a strict descending ranking of houses to a certain house and indifference holds over it and the remaining houses. We also show that on this domain mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are the only rules satisfying efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D63, D71.     

Simple Strategy-Proof Approximately Walrasian Mechanisms

This note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the Walrasian mechanism. It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in finite exchange economies (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones for large economies. These mechanisms provide new insights on the well-know trade-off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D50, D71, D78.     

Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges

Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-Cartesian ranges, we give a partial answer to the major open question left unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an additional condition, called the intersection property [Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997)].Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71.     

Discrete Choice with Social Interactions

This paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioural outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects. We study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behaviour of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking. Laws of large numbers are generated in such environments. Multiplicity of equilibria in these models, which are equivalent to the existence of multiple self-consistent means for average choice behaviour, will exist when the social interactions exceed a particular threshold. Local stability of these multiple equilibria is also studied. The properties of the noncooperative economy are contrasted with the properties of an economy in which a social planner determines the set of individual choices. Finally, a likelihood function based on the theoretical model is given and conditions for the econometric identifiability of the model are established.     

社会互动与投资选择

个体的投资选择是否受到社会互动的影响?社会互动的作用机制是什么?采用2005年中国12城市投资者行为调查数据,本文发现,总体而言,社会互动推动了个体当前和未来期望对银行存款、外汇、股票、债券、期货、基金、借出、做生意、保险金、收藏品、房地产、理财产品、彩票等投资项目的参与。社会互动的积极作用主要是通过个体遵循参考群体成员的投资选择所体现的社会规范来实现的。此外,内生互动带来的感受交流和信息获得分别推动了个体当前对保险金和未来期望对债券的投资,而情景互动降低了个体未来参与股市的期望。     

Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies

In his pioneering article, (in “Decision and Organization” (C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, Eds.), pp. 297-336, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972) Hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods, provided that the domain includes a sufficiently wide class of classical preferences. In this article, we extend his result to pure exchange economies with any finite number of agents and goods. We establish that (i) there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule on the class of classical, homothetic, and smooth preferences; and (ii) there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and symmetric rule on the same class of preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D78, D71, C72.     

Acyclic Probabilistic Social Decision Functions

Social decision functions that incorporate elements of chance are often employed when equity considerations are of importance. The papers main result shows that in this extended framework acyclicity of the social preference relation implies the existence of at least one individual who has the ability to randomly veto a critical number of pairs of alternatives.     

Hierarchical Arrow Social Welfare Functions

Supported by SNF Grant No: DMS 8803556.     

社会选择的实证之维——当代西方实证社会选择理论评述

当代行为经济学和实验经济学领域的研究越来越关注社会公平正义问题。实证社会选择理论从实证角度研究人们对于公平分配的观念,体现了当代规范经济学与实证经济学的有机结合。在长期大量的实证研究的基础上,实证社会选择理论检验了关于分配正义的很多基础理论,得到了一些重要发现。实证社会选择理论的研究,对于中国的经济学理论建设和改革实践,也具有重要的启发价值和参考意义。     

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences

Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterization of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin (Public Choice35 (1980), 437-455). Thereby, the work of Moulin (1980) is extended to the probabilistic framework. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D81.     

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper establishes that any strategy-proof (in the sense of A. Gibbard, Econometrica45 (1977), 665-681) and unanimous mechanism must be a random dictatorship. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D71, H40, C60.     

政治学视角下的社会选择理论:一个前提性的梳理

基于社会选择理论之于民主理论的重要意义,以及国内政治学界相关研究的缺失,尤其是对社会选择理论本身缺乏清晰的认识,本文试图从宏观上厘清社会选择理论独特的研究对象和研究方法,并有意识地从政治学角度辨明其与博弈论、理性选择理论、公共选择理论之间的关系,以期为日后就社会选择理论之于民主理论的挑战和意义展开实质性研究做一个前提性的准备.     

防操纵性社会选择机制设计

在分析防策略投票理论研究现状的基础上,构建了防操纵性社会选择机制的设计框架,提出了防操纵性社会选择机制设计所需要解决的问题,并给出了解决问题的思路。     

Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice

Two distinct approaches can be identified in the new welfare economics. The school of thought based on the compensation principles attempted to see what can be said about social welfare without making interpersonal comparisons of well-being by extending the applicability of the Pareto principle through hypothetical compensatory payments between gainers and losers. The Bergson-Samuelson school of thought introduced the social welfare function as a formal method of introducing a Pareto-inclusive ethical belief on social welfare, whose policy implications we should theoretically explore. Synthesising these two approaches, this paper identifies a condition under which the new welfare economics is logically impeccable.     

Decomposable measures of income tax progressivity

A class of decomposable income tax progressivity indices is defined by using a family of generalized entropy measures. For demonstration, changes in income tax progressivity in the United States are studied over time.     

充分发挥哲学社会科学的社会功能

江泽民总书记在８月７日阐述新时期知识分子重要地位和作用的重要讲话中，从四个方面反复重申了哲学社会科学与自然科学“同样重要”。相信在今后建设有中国特色社会主义事业的发展进程中这个讲话将发挥越来越重要的作用。强调哲学社会科学与自然科学“同样重要”，根本原因在于我国的改革开放和现代化建设迫切需要哲学社会科学充分发挥它的社会功能。哲学社会科学和自然科学本来就是人类认识世界和改造世界的重要工具，是把人类文明不断推向前进的两个相辅相成、相互促进的车轮，它们的研究能力和成果都是综合国力的重要组成部分。因此，如…     

社会工作在我国的发展及其功能分析

西方现代社会演进的历程表明,社会的迅速变迁必将造成社会结构的失调,并引发诸多社会问题。社会必须创造一种新的机制来应对这些问题,以保障社会稳定、有序和正常的运作。社会工作伴随工业化引发的大量问题而产生,同时,也会适应社会需要而不断演变和发展。随着我国社会保障和社会福利制度的逐步建立,社会工作必将成为维持社会正常运作、造福于民的不可或缺的职业(或工具);必将对我国现代社会持续、和谐发展,发挥"恢复、预防、发展"的基本功能。     

社会保障制度的经济功能

论文结合实际，阐述了完善的社会保障制度对我国经济结构调整、产业升级、促进消费、深国企业改革、健全宏观调控系以及收入分配、社会稳定等方面的促进作用，指出社会保障制度是我国深化改革、发展经济、安邦兴国的重要条件，为此，政府应加快改革，早日建立完善的社会保障制度。     

The Effect of Underclass Social Isolation on Schooling Choice

This paper models underclass social isolation as the loss of high-income role models and then studies the plausible conjecture that this isolation depresses the level of schooling chosen by underclass youth. It is found that although this conjecture stands in roughly calibrated simulations, it is not a theoretical necessity. The paper also shows that the introduction of more representative role models during university can polarize underclass youth and that income support programs depress schooling choice through a distinct and reinforcing channel.     

建立社会保障制度的道德选择

在建立社会保障制度时,我们必须对其道德选择进行思考。因为道德上的考虑不仅影响社会保障的规模和结构,而且影响社会保障的形式。本文所作的思考,主要包括对人性的假设,对公平的理解以及对权利的界定。对人性的假设是建立社会保障制度的起点;对公平的理解有助于我们在建立社会保障制度时对公平和效率作出权衡;对权利的界定可以帮助我们选择采取何种支付方式建立社会保障制度。