Risk assessment for public–private partnership projects: using a fuzzy analytic hierarchical process method and expert opinion in China

Public–private partnerships (PPP) have been widely used in China to procure public facilities and services. Complicated problems in PPP projects in China arise because of a variety of risk factors. A proper risk assessment model is needed to identify risks and provide risk response strategies for future Chinese PPP projects. The fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (F-AHP) method provides the ability to solve complex risk assessment of PPP projects. Current risk assessment models are limited to PPP projects in specific countries and do not consider unique risks in China, especially political, economic, social, and legal risks. This paper designed a risk evaluation index system for PPP projects based on the Delphi expert investigation method, and then established an optimized risk evaluation model for PPP projects in China using the F-AHP method. The risks identified are confirmed by interviewing experts from Chinese local government departments, private enterprise, third-party intermediary consulting and regulatory agencies, and academic organizations. The results show that the risks that ranked among the top ten are closely related to China’s political and economic policies and relationships among stakeholders. It can be concluded that government authorities play a critical role in providing a favorable political, social, and economic environment and an effective institutional framework for PPP projects. Furthermore, it is also important to deal with relationships among stakeholders based on the public–private ‘win–win’ principle. This study provides risk response strategies, addressing key issues from eight aspects: an impeccable legal and regulatory framework; a central coordinating and regulating PPP authority; supportive governmental authorities; institutional capacity-building; favorable economic conditions and viability; community, partner, and moral accountability; clear division of responsibilities through contracts; and effective advisory management. These effective measures may be useful in reducing the adverse effects of risk for PPP projects in China.     

Innovative methods in assessing political risk for business internationalization

Political risk assessment, together with portfolio analysis, has become an important part of international business investment decision making. In this paper, by using different knowledge discovery techniques, we attempt to assess the relevance and actionability of ‘good governance’ indicators in political risk assessment. For that purpose, we have integrated good governance indicators data with political instability classification from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) research. From this study, two models that capture the intuitive reasoning of investors have been developed. The usefulness of the models has been evaluated by comparison with factual investment data. Our findings suggest that quantitative indicators of good governance may provide the basis for accurate and meaningful models for the assessment and prediction of political risk.     

Value for Money and Risk Relationships in Public–Private Partnerships: Evaluating Program‐based Evidence

Value for money – VfM (the provision of improved public infrastructure and services at lower cost) – is a central rationale for the deployment of public–private partnerships (P3s). However, it remains unclear how VfM is actually created in P3s. There are several issues that surround the ex ante evaluation conducted during P3 assessment, including: transparency of the process, engagement of stakeholders, potential restrictions on current and future public sector flexibility, and political influences that call into question the legitimacy of the process. This study examines these issues using Alberta's P3 projects executed since 2003, and interviews 35 key participants and stakeholders. The findings suggest that while the transfer of risk from the public to the private sector is a key driver of VfM, it may overstate the extent to which planning related risks can be transferred. This paper recommends enhanced VfM component disclosures and transparency as the evaluation process evolves. Furthermore, a more rigorous approach to risk conceptualisation and valuation should be adopted. Risk allocation should be about managing not only occurrence, but also impact of the risk factor. Finally, political interference must be moderated to allow for the optimal realisation of the best possible choices presented by P3 deployments.     

Risk at a turning point?

There is increasing recognition in comparative risk assessment of the intrinsic subjectivity of fundamental framing assumptions and the consequent necessity for active participation in analysis by all interested and affected parties. Despite this, there remains considerable inertia in the implementation of these insights in formal policy making and regulatory procedures on risk. Here, the issue seems as often to be seen as a need for better 'communication' and 'management' as for better analysis, with attention devoted as much to the classification of divergent public perspectives as to techniques for direct stakeholder participation. Pointing to the fundamental methodological problems posed in risk assessment by the conditions of ignorance and Arrow's impossibility, the present paper contends that public participation is as much a matter of analytical rigour as it is of political legitimacy. It is argued that straightforward techniques such as multi-criteria and sensitivity analysis, along with a formal approach to diversification across portfolios of 'less risky' options, may go some way toward addressing these apparently intractable problems.     

Firm-level political risk and corporate leverage decisions

This study examines the effects of firm-level political risk on firm leverage decisions and speed of adjustment. We uncover that firm-level political risk has a negative impact on a firm's total and long-term leverage. We also find that firms facing high political risk tend to prefer debts with short-term maturity. However, firm-level political risk is positively related to debt specialisation, suggesting that firms are more inclined to adopt fewer debt types when they face high political risk. Further analysis reveals that firms with high political risk are associated with a faster speed of adjustment to target than those with low political risk. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and the effects of financial crisis.     

CEO political preference and credit ratings

This study investigates whether a CEO's personal political ideology, as captured by his or her political contributions, is associated with a firm's credit ratings. Republican CEOs, we find, are associated with higher credit ratings, especially when their firms are headquartered in conservative areas. In addition, the link between political ideology and credit rating is more pronounced in firms that exhibit high financial distress or weak corporate governance. Changes in political ideology are associated with changes in credit rating. Our results support the behavior consistency, upper echelon, and social identity theories, as well as the risk acceptance hypothesis, and are robust to a number of alternative specifications as well as when alternate approaches and measures of credit risk are introduced. Using Republican CEOs as a proxy for conservative CEOs, our evidence implies that credit rating agencies justifiably view a CEO's political ideology and conservatism as indicative of corporate policies and, therefore, as an important determinant of the firm's credit ratings.     

Political Risk and Foreigners' Trading: Evidence from an Emerging Stock Market

This paper analyzes the impact of political risk on foreign investors' trading in emerging stock markets, market-wide and for industry portfolios, using quantified political risk ratings reported in the International Country Risk Guide and foreign flows data compiled by the Istanbul Stock Exchange. We also track the differential effect of political risk upgrades and downgrades. Political risk is shown to affect stock returns, net foreign flows, and macroeconomic variables. Foreigners' reaction to upgrades (downgrades) is slow (immediate) and smaller in magnitude. Foreigners' reaction to political risk varies with industry's sensitivity to market risk, except for the tourism sector, where their response is particularly salient. Local investors appear to provide liquidity to foreigners, who respond to information.     

Investment,leverage and political risk: Evidence from project-level FDI

Does capital structure influence firms' FDI capital expenditure decisions into countries with varying degrees of political risk? We explore this question using a novel dataset that matches 10,000 unique outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) projects with 1135 distinct U.S. firms over the period 2003–2014. We find that capital expenditures allocated to FDI projects are significantly lower for highly leveraged firms, in particular for firms with low growth opportunities. Firms also commit lower capital amounts to investments located in countries characterized by higher political risk. Furthermore, leverage and political risk interact with one another in determining the financial commitment of the FDI, with leverage exerting a significantly stronger negative effect on capital expenditures in countries where political risk is elevated. Our findings are consistent with the monitoring role of debt in curbing exposure to political risk in multinational firms' foreign operations, and corroborate the disciplinary role of leverage on firms' investment decisions.     

Firm-level political risk and debt choice

We examine the effect of firm-level political risk on debt choices and find: (i) firms with higher political risk display a preference for private debt over public debt; (ii) the magnitude of this preference varies with the aggregate policy uncertainty; (iii) politically risky firms indeed receive less favorable terms in the bond market. To explain such findings, we show that private lenders have several advantages in serving politically risky borrowers. First, to the extent that lenders cannot perfectly foresee the adoption of new government policies, private lenders' expertise in implementing the reorganization process is important to limit their potential loss. Second, politically risky borrowers must undertake significant operation adjustments facing rising policy uncertainty. Private lenders can gather accurate information and closely monitor these adjustments. Last, as the severity of political risk varies with aggregate policy uncertainty, there exists an implicit contract between a borrower and its relationship bank, whereby a borrower accepts less favorable terms during normal times in exchange for the bank's support during difficult times. Taken together, this study advances our understanding of how cross-sectionally heterogeneous political risk influences corporate debt choice.     

Accounting for Sovereign Risk When Investing in Emerging Markets

In theory, political risk is project‐specific and should be accounted for in the estimation of the expected investment cash flows. But in practice, the political risk associated with this type of investment is typically accounted for implicitly by adjusting the investment's required rate of return or the discount rate. As the authors discuss in the article, this approach disguises the specific assumptions being made about the risk of expropriation and so makes it difficult to assess this risk properly. While defending some aspects of current practice, the authors argue that corporate executives should consider some changes. For example, although a project analysis that is shared with the host government could incorporate a risk adjustment to the discount rate, the authors suggest that more explicit analysis of the anticipated risk of expropriation should be incorporated into the analysis of expected project cash flows. This analysis could involve making specific assumptions about the “term structure” of expropriation risk over the life of the investment. Finally, the authors note that the political risk of making investments in emerging economies can be managed to some extent. Investments can be structured in ways that reduce political risk by structuring project cash flows in ways that better align the incentives of the project sponsor and the government of the host country.     

Risk perceptions across the current political spectrum in Finland: a study of party members

Political party member perceptions of risk continue to attract a great deal of attention in current public discourse and media coverage, yet little research exists in terms of a comparative analysis of Finnish political parties’ views on the issue. Party members are in many ways a highly significant social group, one that exercises a great deal of decision-making power in modern civil societies. This article provides a novel and up-to-date look into the key areas of perceived risk held by the members of Finland’s political parties, in addition to a comparison of inter-party differences and similarities. The analysis is based on a unique survey data-set of the members of Finland’s six major political parties (N = 12,427). Included are the Finns Party, Centre Party, Left Alliance, Social Democratic Party, Green League and National Coalition Party. Together, these represent the political spectrum in Finland. Risk factors included primary categories dealing with various national, institutional, cultural and economic issues. Also included in the analysis was a look into whether length of party membership affects risk concern for the included issues. Findings showed that national and external risks were more of a concern for the Finns Party, while the Left and the Social Democrats considered economic issues a greater risk than did others. Furthermore, economic risk was most concerning to the left while external risks were generally viewed in line with the current centre-right administration. Some notable differences between old and new party members were also found. Findings emphasize the importance of understanding how political party members differ in their views of various societal risks while providing new points of comparison between those parties toward improved clarity of the national political landscape.     

Trust and the risk of consuming polluted water in Shanghai,China

It is commonly understood that political trust reduces public perceptions of various kinds of risk. However, this knowledge largely comes from research conducted in liberal democratic states, and so may have little explanatory power in China. Though it has an authoritarian government, China has enjoyed relatively high levels of political trust, and so is a unique case from which to advance knowledge about political trust and risk perception. We describe the relationship between risk perception and political trust in China through analysis of results from a survey of 5007 residents in Shanghai asking about people’s perceptions of the risk of consuming tap water (a key public good), and their levels of trust in the public water authorities. Findings reveal that political trust in general, and trust in the perceived fairness, honesty and capability of water authorities significantly reduces the perception of the risk of consuming tap water. This suggests that the inverse relationship between trust and risk perception applies regardless of whether a society is democratic or authoritarian.     

Political uncertainty and a firm's credit risk: Evidence from the international CDS market

Using a large sample of firms with single-name credit default swap (CDS) contracts in 30 countries, we document the evidence that political uncertainty, proxied by national election dummy, is positively related to firm-level credit risk. Specifically, this positive relation is more pronounced for the firms that have no political connection or poor international diversification, and in the countries with higher political uncertainty and lower investor protections. Further, by using a difference-in-differences approach, we find evidence to support idiosyncratic volatility and debt rollover channels through which political uncertainty affects the credit risk of individual firm.     

The Use of Postloss Financing of Catastrophic Risk

Catastrophic risk financing is a critical issue for many states. At the epicenter of the debate is the role of the state government in helping homeowners finance catastrophic storm risk. In general, states have used a variety of pre‐ and postloss strategies, including rate regulation, residual markets, guaranty funds, and postloss assessment structures. However, several states, including Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas have used strategies that involve potentially large postloss funding of hurricane risk. In some cases, the structure of the postloss financing mechanism is likely to create significant assessments and subsidies. This article examines the role of state government in catastrophe financing, focusing primarily on postloss financing methods. Specifically, the article provides a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the postloss catastrophe financing as well as the political forces that motivate the use of this approach. Further, given the potential magnitude of postloss assessments and related subsidies, we use the Florida homeowners market to illustrate the implications of the state's decisions. This allows for a concrete discussion of the impact and viability of postloss financing mechanisms.     

Federal Judge Ideology: A New Measure of Ex Ante Litigation Risk

Drawing on the political theory of judicial decision making, our paper proposes a new and parsimonious ex ante litigation risk measure: federal judge ideology. We find that judge ideology complements existing measures of litigation risk based on industry membership and firm characteristics. Firms in liberal circuits (the third quartile in ideology) are 33.5% more likely to be sued in securities class action lawsuits than those in conservative circuits (the first quartile in ideology). This result is stronger after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the Tellabs case. We next show that the effect of judge ideology on litigation risk is greater for firms with more sophisticated shareholders and with higher expected litigation costs. Furthermore, judicial appointments affect litigation risk and the value of firms in the circuit, highlighting the economic consequences of political appointments of judges. Finally, using our new measure, we document that litigation risk deters managers from providing long‐term earnings guidance, a result that existing measures of litigation risk cannot show.     

Bank political connections and performance in China

We examine the effects of bank’s political connection on bank performance and risk in China. We use hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to identify their political affiliations, and find that banks whose CEOs have former government experiences have higher return on assets, lower default risk, and lower credit risk. Additionally, politically connected banks have disproportionally higher performance when the CEOs previous worked in the same city where the current bank’s headquarter locates, had past banking experiences, spend more on entertainment and travel costs, and have higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the provincial or state level). These results suggest that politically connected banks have better access to lending to politically connected firms, which are high yield assets and more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our results offer a mechanism of political rent seeking, consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and political system.     

Political–security risk in the oil and gas industry: the impact of terrorism on risk management and mitigation

Oil and gas companies are experiencing an increase in terrorist attacks. The industry became a legitimate target for terrorist groups in the 1990s and the number of attacks have increased yearly, with a spike after the 9/11 attacks. In today’s interconnected world, political risk is not only about the relationship between the host government and the company. Oil and gas companies may experience risks on a transnational, national and human security level. The success of new investments often depends on the successful utilization of risk management strategies. This study focuses on the importance of political–security risk in the oil and gas industry. In January 2013, the oil and gas industry experienced one of its deadliest attacks at the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria, forcing firms to reconsider its focus on security management. Statoil undertook a thorough analysis of security at the site as well as of the company′s corporate security risk management. The report revealed a lack of focus on political–security risk. This study argues that political–security risk has not been used to its full potential in the oil and gas industry. The oil and gas industry has always focused on site security, but a broader more holistic approach to risk management has been lacking. As a result of the In Amenas incident, the industry has become more willing to have a new discussion on security and this has resulted in changes in the way companies operate.     

Policy Uncertainty and the Dual Role of Corporate Political Strategies

Firms use active political strategies not only to mitigate uncertainty emanating from legislative activity, but also to enhance their growth opportunities. We find that a firm's systematic risk (beta) can be hedged away by employing various political strategies involving the presence of former politicians on corporate boards of directors, contributions to political campaigns, and corporate lobbying activities. The hedging effect is greater when firms operate in more uncertain industries. In addition, active political strategies are associated with greater firm heterogeneity and make real options more value relevant as potential drivers of competitive advantages in uncertain environments.     

Predicting corporate governance in emerging markets

This paper investigates what predicts corporate governance in emerging markets. Specifically, we examine what predicts governance changes and the level of governance itself. To conduct this study, we utilize a unique dataset from AllianceBernstein that consists of monthly firm-level corporate governance ratings for 24 emerging market countries for almost seven years. Since the AllianceBernstein ratings are time-series data, they allow us to determine the direction of change in a firm’s corporate governance, and the timing of these changes. Using these data, we find two main results. First, as firms grow they are more likely to improve their governance. Second, the level of political risk where the firm resides is negatively and significantly related to the level of firm governance but positively and significantly related to changes in firm governance. Hence, firm governance is better in countries with lower political risk but firms are more likely to improve their governance in countries with higher political risk.     

Assessing the utility of risk management theory in the governance of new states: lessons from South Sudan

Abstract

South Sudan was born amid great hope for a country that boasted vast natural wealth. Inheriting a virtually lunar political and economic landscape, this hope quickly gave way under kleptocratic governance and corruption, a volatile political environment with recent horrendous violence, and the ensuing loss of oil revenues and cuts in foreign investment and aid. These current crises were based on a historical lack of effective and legitimate power: South Sudan, in reality, has historically existed as a geographical appellation, with a bare minimum of cohesive society and functional nation-state, but with far more potent of trans-historical interethnic antipathies among its fractious communities and competing regions. To date, the reasons for South Sudan’s quick failure are rooted in either the vague problems of newness (fragility) and/or missteps by its elites (risk). This article assesses the relevance of political risk management literature for guiding the governance of nascent states and seeks to establish some criteria for distinguishing generic weakness from the risky behavior of political elites in engendering state failure. It asks whether the political elites of South Sudan were thinking about risk prior to the crisis, and why this risk management was so flawed – if it existed in the first place. The challenge is not only in disciplining, codifying, and containering the future through law-like regulations – but in managing the hazardscapes and complex risk milieu, such as, triggers that activate blowups. Always politicians – and especially in South Sudan – do not think through these concepts, and if they do, things might go better.