一人公司有限责任的经济分析——兼论我国新公司法中一人公司

从经济法分析的角度来看,有限责任可降低一人公司筹集资金成本、鼓励有发展价值企业、降低股东与债权人之间就责任制度协商的成本、促进投资人投资,在一人公司中维持有限责任符合效率原则。我国新承认之一人公司在有限责任上存在若干问题,有待进一步改进。     

公司治理与大股东利益侵占——桂林集琦药业股份有限公司案例研究

以“桂林集琦”为案例,以此来了解一些公司的治理情况,以及其对企业经营的一些重大影响。与国外成熟资本市场不同的是,我国非流通股和国有股的特殊制度背景,恶化了大小股东之间的利益冲突。大股东通过股权融资、占用资金、现金股利、资产交易、担保等多种方式攫取利益。     

破产管理人追收股东出资的规范进路

破产管理人在履行职责过程中需兼顾各方主体利益，明确破产管理人作为适格原告的诉讼主体地位有助于彰显其独立性和自主性。在破产债权总额小于未缴、抽逃出资数额的情形中，管理人以债权总额追收股东出资具有一定的正当性。若有限责任公司股东未届出资期限即转让未缴足额出资的股权，应以受让人为追收出资的确定对象，以原股东为限定条件下承担出资担保责任的连带主体。同时参考有限责任公司的规范路径，认定符合违法性要件的股份有限公司股东与受让人的出资责任。相应地，需修订破产法和公司法的相关规定，构建配套制度。     

The responsible shareholder: a case study

Shareholders are sometimes considered to be, in moral terms, the owners of a company, they are after all the carriers of the residual liabilities and bear a higher proportion of the financial risk. However, in company law, the shareholders' responsibility is limited, and in financial terms shareholders are only liable up to the fully paid value of the share certificate. Moreover, when the shares are sold, the responsibility and risk are transferred completely to the new bearer of the shares. Whether this gap in moral and legal perceptions can be judged to be satisfactory in business ethics terms is a moot point and will be partly explored in this case study which seeks to analyse the shareholder's responsibility towards a firm in which they own shares. The case study company chosen as a vehicle to explore these issues is that of Turner & Newall; a company that subjected its employees, communities and customers to a major health hazard – asbestosis. This paper will use the Turner & Newall archive materials to illustrate the moral hazards that can arise for shareholders. In particular it will examine the ethical responsibilities of shareholders towards those stakeholders who were exposed to the dangers of asbestos. This case is a significant test of the veracity of the legal system of company control, and exposes the ineffectiveness of that system in accountability terms. The case study also deals with specific issues that arose in the asbestos crisis, as well as with more general issues in our present system of corporate governance and shareholder responsibilities.     

论有限责任公司夫妻股权的法律结构：基于信托的视角

有限责任公司夫妻股权具有夫妻财产和公司股权的双重团体结构，二者的“嵌套”引起解释论矛盾，合理的解决路径是将股东身份和股权利益进行分离。信托结构是理解夫妻股权关系的一个可行的样本。夫妻股权结构基本符合财产独立性和信义义务等信托的形式要求，且二者均具有区隔财产管理与家庭生活、分离财产管理意志、提高财产利用效率、降低交易成本的功能。根据与信托的类比解释，登记于夫妻一方名下的股权，登记方的单方处分为有效处分，但处分结果受信义义务的制约。在离婚财产分割中，夫妻双方可就有限责任公司股权达成信托式协议，并通过无表决权股或设立股权信托的方式处理股权。在股权继承中，在世配偶成为有限责任公司股东需经其他股东过半数同意，若其他股东不同意，需在无表决股权、股权信托、股权收购中选择其一以保障在世配偶的权利。     

不同成长机会下的上市公司股权结构、资本结构与公司绩效——以A股流通服务业上市公司为例

文章以我国流通服务业上市公司为研究样本,分析了上市公司资本结构和股权结构对公司绩效的影响,以及成长机会在其中的调节作用.研究结果表明流通服务业上市公司第一大股东持股比例、第二到第十大股东持股比例、长期负债资本比对公司绩效存在显著正向影响;国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率对公司绩效存在显著负向影响.随着公司成长机会的增加,第二到第十大股东持股,非国有法人股持股对公司绩效正向影响作用增强;而第一大股东持股比例、国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率与长期负债资本比对公司绩效的影响并不随着公司成长性的变化而变化.文章研究对于流通服务业上市公司股权结构和资本结构优化提供了有益的启示.     

浅析企业负债经营的利与弊

负债经营是现代企业发展的必然选择.但同时企业负债经营又是一把"双刃剑".一方面,负债经营,可以弥补企业资金,有效降低企业平均资金成本,蛤企业带来"财务杠杆效应",但另一方面,受利息和资金利润率的影响,"财务杠杆效应"会有负面作用,尤其是过渡负债可能引起股东和债权人之问的冲突.因此,合理有效地负债是企业负债经营的核心问题.企业必须合理运用资金,才能创造更多的经济效益,实现核裂变式的快速发展.     

论股东平等与股份平等的背离与回归

股东平等与股份平等的背离是大小股东闯权益失衡、公司治理效率低下的重要原因。股东有限责任和资本多数决为其提供理论基础和制度支持。从股份平等向股东平等的回归是法律的形式正义和实质正义、民商法公平和效益价值原则间的冲突和妥协的外在表现。寻求股东之间的实质平等是实现正义价值的基本前提。     

物流快递公司社会责任研究

物流快递公司社会责任包括法律责任、经济责任和道德责任。公司是以营利为目的的法人,其存在的根本目的是最大可能地创造社会财富,因此经济责任是第一位的社会责任;公司营利必须遵守国家法律,因此公司应当承担法律责任;公司承担道德责任在本质上是社会发展的需要,也是公司自身利益的需要,在根本上两者是一致的。     

股权制衡与机构投资者参与的公司治理效应

作为公司治理结构的核心,产权安排(股权结构)一直是理论界和学术界关注的焦点。本文通过构造理论模型,将机构投资者引入上市公司控制权竞争与股权制衡之中,从而得到最优的股权结构。本文的研究发现:在机构投资者参与股权制衡过程中,如果机构投资者的监督能力比较强,监督成本比较低,则机构投资者应该拥有更多的股份;随着法制的改善,机构投资者最优持股应该增加;股权制衡结构下,机构投资者持股随着整体大股东持股比例的提高而提高。     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and firm cash dividends

The study examines how share pledging behavior of controlling shareholder affects the corporate payout policy using the unique setting of Chinese market from 2008 to 2015. According to the study result, cash dividend payments for firms with shares pledged by controlling shareholders are significantly decreased relative to those without shares pledged, and the effect is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), firms with more related party transactions, and pledged shares with more magnitude, frequencies and maturity. Overall, these findings suggest that induced by the share pledging activity, controlling shareholders can obtain private benefits without considering benefits of outside shareholders.     

银行对票据不当付款的责任承担

银行在发生不当付款情况时承担的责任主要分为合同责任和侵权责任,这种责任的区分在司法实践中具有意义重大,不但涉及到案件的案由确定,而且还涉及适用法律、赔偿范围和举证责任等许多问题。对此类案件不能笼统分析,要区分是单独行为还是共同行为。前者,银行与债务人之间就形成不了真正的连带责任;后者,银行应该在侵害债权范围之内,与债务人承担连带责任。这样才能彰显法律的严谨性。     

Interaction Approach and Liabilities: A Case Analysis of Start-Up Firms

ABSTRACT

Purpose: Start-up firms have to face some key challenges due to liabilities related to processes that are external to the organization, such as establishing relationships with customers, suppliers and other relevant actors. The purpose of the article is to understand how liabilities, namely newness, smallness, foreignness and outsidership, are related to each other in start-ups, and what are the main liabilities perceived/experienced by start-ups and their counterparts, using an interactive perspective.

Methodology: The article uses a case study methodology and proposes 3 cases of start-ups firms and their counterparts. Cases are built using multiple data-sources, both primary and secondary.

Findings: The article highlights the role of “heritage” left by the membership in the network. This “network heritage” means that some aspects of the network are pre-existing, in terms of previous and long lasting relationships with other actors. In this sense, the network in which the firm connects pre-exists and mitigates the existence of liabilities that come into play in the processes of interdependence with other actors. This provides a perspective of liabilities, specifically the liability of newness, as an asset in the sense that newness depends on a “short story,” without constraints of a “longer story” as that of competitors in the network. The liability of newness is an asset in terms of flexibility, customized offer and innovative content.

Originality/value/contribution: The main contribution of the article lies in taking an interactive perspective on start-ups and liabilities, analyzing the interaction processes taking place between the new venture and the surrounding network of essential actors.

Practical implications: Liabilities arise and can be overcome in the processes of interaction, which therefore can have an ambivalent role: fertile ground for the manifestation of liabilities but also the context for its overcoming/conversion of liabilities into assets. Entrepreneurs and managers should consider newness and smallness as positive attributes for other actors in the processes of interaction, as a potential generator of value. Such a perception of newness as an asset depends on two factors: the presence or absence of an organization-mother that limits the perception of newness as a liability; the sector in which the new company develops, if dynamic and innovative or still tied to traditional and consolidated processes where the experience, “history” and “heritage” of the firm are sources of legitimacy.     

Stakeholder Duties: On the Moral Responsibility of Corporate Investors

Stakeholder theory usually focuses on the moral responsibility of corporations towards their stakeholders. This article takes the reverse perspective to shed light on the moral responsibility of stakeholders??specifically, investors or ??financiers??. It explicates a distinction between two types of financiers, creditors and shareholders. Many intuitively judge that shareholders have greater or more extensive moral responsibility for the actions of the corporations they invest in than do bondholders and other creditors. Examining the merits of possible arguments for or against treating owners and creditors differently elucidates which arguments can support the moral duties of investors generally, and different duties for different groups of investors specifically. The paper considers three possible lines of arguments, rooting investors?? responsibility, respectively, in how they enable corporate conduct, how they benefit from it, and to what extent they are complicit in it. The paper argues that a notion of complicity is the only tenable ground for holding investors liable; sketches an account of complicity based on the recent philosophical literature on collective intention and collective action; and concludes that shareholders but not creditors can generally be seen as complicit on this account.     

股权自由转让原则之限制规定的法律分析

股权转让又称股份转让,是指股东将其对公司所有之股权转移给受让人,由受让人继受取得股权而成为公司新股东的法律行为。股权转让不单是股权转让人与股权受让人之间的合同行为,同时又涉及到公司、其他股东及债权人的利益,因此而受到各种各样的限制。我国立法对此规制不健全,故有必要对股权转让的限制规定问题加强研究并尽快完善立法。     

论合作社的法人地位与社员的责任形式——对当前学界有关合作社法人地位研究的反思

国外的合作社法几乎都赋予合作社以法人地位,但这不能作为合作社在我国获得法人地位的充分理由。在我国,财产独立与社员的责任形式独立是合作社获得法人地位的核心标准。在对无限责任的社会认同程度、商事组织立法价值的重大转变以及社员有限责任的社会价值的充分考量下,社员应对合作社的债务承担有限责任,合作社应由法律统一授予法人资格。     

SHAREHOLDER RISK MEASURES

The aim of this paper is to put forward a new family of risk measures that could guide investment decisions of private companies. But at the difference of the classical approach of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath and the subsequent extensions of this model, our risk measures are built to reflect the risk perception of shareholders rather than regulators. Instead of an axiomatic approach, we derive risk measures from the optimal policies of a shareholder value‐maximizing company. We study these optimal policies and the related risk measures that we call shareholder risk measures. We emphasize the fact that due to the specific corporate environment, in particular the limited shareholders' liability and the possibility to pay out dividends from cash reserves, these risk measures are not convex. Also, they depend on the specific economic situation of the firm, in particular its current cash level, and thus they are not translation invariant. This paper bridges the gap between two important branches of mathematical finance: risk measures and optimal dividends.     

Contribution of the Management System and the Institutional Framework to the Efficiency of Values-Based Management

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud.     

金融结构演变、货币政策与银行风险承担异质性

基于2002-2017年165家银行的面板数据,本文采用可行广义最小二乘(FGLS)方法实证检验金融结构演变视角下货币政策对银行风险承担渠道的影响。研究发现:金融结构的变化对银行风险承担具有显著影响,随着直接融资占比的上升,银行资产端风险承担显著减少,但负债端风险承担显著增加;控制住金融结构的作用之后,货币政策对银行资产端风险承担和负债端风险承担也具有显著的异质性影响,具体来说,价格型货币政策的紧缩使得银行资产端风险承担显著减少而导致银行负债端风险承担显著增加,数量型货币政策的紧缩则使得银行资产端风险承担和负债端风险承担同时减少;此外,货币政策与金融结构对银行风险承担具有显著的交互影响,随着直接融资占比的上升,价格型货币政策工具对银行资产端风险承担的影响减弱,对银行负债端风险承担的影响没有表现出显著变化,数量型货币政策工具对银行资产端风险承担和负债端风险承担的影响都受到削弱。研究结论的政策含义对货币当局、监管部门以及商业银行都具有重要意义。     

Shareholder voting rights in early American corporations

In early American corporations, the power of large shareholders was frequently limited by voting rules that partially disenfranchised them. In particular, stock held in an individual's name was granted a number of votes per share that decreased with the number of shares held. Using data from the corporations created in New York up to 1825, this paper analyses the use of these ‘graduated’ voting rights. Consistent with the view that they were intended to help small investors protect themselves against the predations of controlling shareholders, the data indicate that graduated voting rights were imposed in industries that attracted small investments from ordinary households. The results highlight the importance of concerns over the controlling influence of large shareholders in early corporate governance.