Behavioral economics and climate change policy

The policy recommendations of most economists are based on the rational actor model. The emphasis is on achieving efficient allocation by insuring that property rights are completely assigned and that market failures are corrected. This paper takes the position that so-called behavioral “anomalies” are central to human decision-making and, therefore, should be the starting point for effective economic policies. This contention is supported by game theory experiments involving humans and closely related primates. This research suggests that the standard economic approach to climate change policy, with its focus on narrowly rational, self-regarding responses to monetary incentives, is seriously flawed.     

Behavioral economics: implications for regulatory behavior

Behavioral economics (BE) examines the implications for decision-making when actors suffer from biases documented in the psychological literature. This article considers how such biases affect regulatory decisions. The article posits a simple model of a regulator who serves as an agent to a political overseer. The regulator chooses a policy that accounts for the rewards she receives from the political overseer—whose optimal policy is assumed to maximize short-run outputs that garner political support, rather than long-term welfare outcomes—and the weight the regulator puts on the optimal long run policy. Flawed heuristics and myopia are likely to lead regulators to adopt policies closer to the preferences of political overseers than they would otherwise. The incentive structure for regulators is likely to reward those who adopt politically expedient policies, either intentionally (due to a desire to please the political overseer) or accidentally (due to bounded rationality). The article urges that careful thought be given to calls for greater state intervention, especially when those calls seek to correct firm biases. The article proposes measures that focus rewards to regulators on outcomes rather than outputs as a way to help ameliorate regulatory biases.     

Behavioral norms in the Islamic doctrine of economics: A critique

At the heart of the contemporary Islamic doctrine of economics lies a set of behavioral norms derived from the first Islamic society in seventh century Arabia. This paper demonstrates that these norms cannot be expected to serve as the spearhead of a drive for modern economic development. For one thing, the proposed norms are unlikely to enjoy widespread adherence in large societies where it is difficult to achieve a common perception of reality, elicit generalized altruism and overcome the free rider problem. Secondly, many Islamic norms are ambiguous, and some interfere with institutions designed to improve the workings of markets.     

Social economics and economics imperialism

Address delivered at a session on April 2, 1993 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics, Indianapolis, IN.     

Can neoclassical economics become social economics?

This essay has both a general and a specific purpose. Its general purpose is to pose the question: Can neoclassical economics be social economics? Its answer to this general question is: Yes, but only if it abandons its methodological soul; that is, by abandoning methodological individualism, positivism, and ahistoricism, and expressly and systematically adopting a methodological perspective which is holistic, normative, and historical. Its specific purpose is to identify and examine the major elements in the economics of one leading figure in the historical development of neoclassical economics who self-consciously attempted to combine, to paraphrase Schumpeter, a neoclassical head with a social economics heart: Alfred Marshall.     

女性主义经济学与中国经济学的本土化

经济学研究的是具体社会关系下人的理性行为以及人类行为造成的经济现象,因而具有强烈的人文性;而且,随着经济学研究领域的不断拓宽,人们已经开始引入了制度、文化等社会性因素,经济学的人文性已日益明显.正是基于这种人文性特征引发了人们对具体社会中人之理性的重新审视,以及对社会中人之行为的关注,并导致20世纪80年代之后女性主义经济学的勃兴;经济学领域的性别差异又进一步引发了社会性的思考,从而引发了对经济学本土化的探讨.事实上,不同社会文化下的经济学是有差异的,经济学本质上无法像自然科学那样科学化、客观化和通用化,而是具有强烈的本土化的色彩;而且,如果经济学理论没有本土化,就没有根植性,也就没有创新性,当然也就没有现代性和世界性.     

Urbanizing economics

Action takes place at a given time and place. As a science of human action, economics is, therefore, just as much about the spaces where real action occurs as it is about real time. The implications of real time for social order is better recognized than the significance of “action space.” The living city is the principal locus of action space and enabler of social change as well as the source of fundamental concepts in economic theory. Just as a loss of density and diversity in cities tends to retard dynamic discovery and development, the turn in economic theory in the mid-20th century toward static equilibrium reflected a move from an urban-based to a plantation-based conception of the economy—from the city to the farm. Some recent developments in network theory, game theory, and geography, however, can be interpreted as a re-urbanization of economics.

从经济学再到政治经济学:理解包容性增长

胡锦涛主席在亚太经合组织的两次会议上倡导包容性增长,其理论与现实意义深远。经济增长自经济学诞生以来就一直是经济研究的核心问题,经济学史上从政治经济学到经济学,再到最近新政治经济学的兴起实际上反映了人们对经济发展中的繁荣与公正、市场与政府的认知的深入过程。强调机会平等的包容性增长正是当下中国的政治经济学。从经济学发展过程审视政治与经济离合的演变有助于我们深入理解和研究包容性增长。     

The new institutional economics and its relevance to social economics

There has been a quiet revolution in economic theory, led by the New Institutionalists. Pioneered by Douglass C. North, this group argues that institutions are the main determinants of economic performance, yet neoclassical economics has no role for institutions. Contrary to many misconceptions, this theory of institutions can be integrated with neoclassical economics, leaving mainstream economic theory in tact, but broader and more relevant. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the main arguments of the New Institutionalists are summarized. Second, the bridge between institutions and social economics is explored. The article concludes by arguing that the New Institutional approach is fruitful, and that the theory will gradually be integrated with neoclassical economics, until the two merge into a single body of theory.     

Calhoun's constitutional economics

Calhoun's early speeches and writings argue for an expansive national government. His later works, most notablyA Disquisition on Government, argue for a strong version of states' rights, nullification, and secession. Earlier accounts of Calhoun's thought attribute this apparent contradiction to political expediency and opportunism. But I argue here that Calhoun's early nationalism was a reaction against the operation of multiple vetoes in the legislative process, requiring near unanimity to pass legislation. By 1825, however, Congress had evolved institutions that circumvented these vetoes, resulting in majoritarian redistribution. The later Calhoun opposed the legislation that followed from these circumventions and proposed an alternative form of unanimity, the concurring majority, as the appropriate corrective. An earlier version of this essay was prepared for a public lecture at Clemson University, to commemorate the Clemson University Centennial, October 18, 1989.