Who Benefits from Workers with General Skills? Countervailing Incentives in Labour Contracts

In a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard the impact of the agent's transferable human capital on incentives is analysed. It is shown that under asymmetric information the employer (principal) prefers a worker (agent) with general skills to a similarly productive worker with firm‐specific skills although the reservation utility of a worker with general (i.e. marketable) skills is higher. The principal's information costs are lower when workers have general skills than in the case where workers possess only firm‐specific human capital because of countervailing incentives. The optimal contract for workers with general skills differs from the standard screening contract in that it involves pooling.     

RISK-AVERSION BEHAVIOR IN CONSUMPTION/INVESTMENT PROBLEMS1

In this paper, we study the risk-aversion behavior of an agent in the dynamic framework of consumption/investment decision making that allows the possibility of bankruptcy. Agent's consumption utility is assumed to be represented by a strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable function in the general case and by a HARA-type function in the special case treated in the paper. Coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion are defined to be the well-known curvature measures associated with the derived utility of wealth obtained as the value function of the agent's optimization problem. Through an analysis of these coefficients, we show how the change in agent's risk aversion as his wealth changes depends on his consumption utility and the other problem parameters, including the payment at bankruptcy. Moreover, in the HARA case, we can conclude that the agent's relative risk aversion is nondecreasing with wealth, while his absolute risk aversion is decreasing with wealth only if he is sufficiently wealthy. At lower wealth levels, however, the agent's absolute risk aversion may increase with wealth in some cases.     

OPTIMAL TIMING FOR AN INDIVISIBLE ASSET SALE

In this paper, we investigate the pricing via utility indifference of the right to sell a non‐traded asset. Consider an agent with power utility who owns a single unit of an indivisible, non‐traded asset, and who wishes to choose the optimum time to sell this asset. Suppose that this right to sell forms just part of the wealth of the agent, and that other wealth may be invested in a complete frictionless market. We formulate the problem as a mixed stochastic control/optimal stopping problem, which we then solve. We determine the optimal behavior of the agent, including the optimal criteria for the timing of the sale. It turns out that the optimal strategy is to sell the non‐traded asset the first time that its value exceeds a certain proportion of the agent's trading wealth. Further, it is possible to characterize this proportion as the solution to a transcendental equation.     

Trading under the proof-of-stake protocol – A continuous-time control approach

We develop a continuous-time control approach to optimal trading in a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain, formulated as a consumption-investment problem that aims to strike the optimal balance between a participant's (or agent's) utility from holding/trading stakes and utility from consumption. We present solutions via dynamic programming and the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations. When the utility functions are linear or convex, we derive close-form solutions and show that the bang-bang strategy is optimal (i.e., always buy or sell at full capacity). Furthermore, we bring out the explicit connection between the rate of return in trading/holding stakes and the participant's risk-adjusted valuation of the stakes. In particular, we show when a participant is risk-neutral or risk-seeking, corresponding to the risk-adjusted valuation being a martingale or a sub-martingale, the optimal strategy must be to either buy all the time, sell all the time, or first buy then sell, and with both buying and selling executed at full capacity. We also propose a risk-control version of the consumption-investment problem; and for a special case, the “stake-parity” problem, we show a mean-reverting strategy is optimal.     

Dynamic Agency and Investment Theory under Model Uncertainty

We extend dynamic agency and investment theory by incorporating model uncertainty. As concerns regarding model uncertainty induce a trade‐off between incentives and ambiguity sharing, the principal tends to delay the cash payout to the agent. We find model uncertainty lowers the firm value, the average q and marginal q, where q is defined as the ratio between a physical asset's market value and its replacement value. Furthermore, model uncertainty leads to insufficient investment, which provides an alternative explanation for under‐investment. Finally, the optimal pay‐performance sensitivity of the agent's continuation value to the firm's output is state dependent and exceeds the lower bound when it is close to the payout boundary.     

Optimal hedging of contingent exposure: the importance of a risk premium

The focus of this article is how a non‐zero risk premium affects an economic agent's optimal hedging decision when exposed to a nonmarketed event. The analysis is not confined to the optimal use of one particular hedging instrument, rather, the optimal payoff based on the agent's preferences is derived. We show, for various preferences, how the size of a risk premium affects the degree of nonlinearity in the optimal hedging instrument. This result is in contrast to known results for contingent exposure in the case of a zero risk premium. We demonstrate an inefficacy of the approach of confining the analysis to one particular hedging instrument in the case of standard exposure. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 20:823–841, 2000     

HOPE,FEAR, AND ASPIRATIONS

We propose a rank‐dependent portfolio choice model in continuous time that captures the role in decision making of three emotions: hope, fear, and aspirations. Hope and fear are modeled through an inverse‐S shaped probability weighting function and aspirations through a probabilistic constraint. By employing the recently developed approach of quantile formulation, we solve the portfolio choice problem both thoroughly and analytically. These solutions motivate us to introduce a fear index, a hope index, and a lottery‐likeness index to quantify the impacts of three emotions, respectively, on investment behavior. We find that a sufficiently high level of fear endogenously necessitates portfolio insurance. On the other hand, hope is reflected in the agent's perspective on good states of the world: a higher level of hope causes the agent to include more scenarios under the notion of good states and leads to greater payoffs in sufficiently good states. Finally, an exceedingly high level of aspirations results in the construction of a lottery‐type payoff, indicating that the agent needs to enter into a pure gamble in order to achieve his goal. We also conduct numerical experiments to demonstrate our findings.     

The Impact of Personality Variables,Prior Experience,and Training on Sales Agents' Internet Utilization and Performance

ABSTRACT

Emerging literature on the impact of the Internet on business-to-business (B2B) marketing has primarily focused on examining this issue from the perspective of manufacturers and buyers. This study focuses on the sales agent, a third prominent actor in B2B markets, and tests a conceptual model that relates a sales agent's personality, demographic, and user-situational constructs to that sales agent's Internet utilization for selling activities. Further, the model tested in this study relates a sales agent's Internet utilization to perceived sales performance. Findings in this study indicate that internal locus of control, learning orientation, and sales related Internet training relate positively to a sales agent's Internet utilization, and that a sales agent's age relates negatively to Internet utilization. Further, the results support a positive relationship between a sales agent's Internet utilization and sales performance. This study emphasizes that the Internet can be a productive tool for sales agents. The implications of the results of this study for sales agents with respect to training and recruitment are discussed and avenues for future research are suggested.     

Consumers engaged in a member-gets-member campaign: an agency perspective

In this article, the use of member-gets-member-campaigns is perceived as an agency problem: the agent (a consumer) is going to take some action on the principal's behalf (a manufacturer). However, before the principal decides to engage the agent in their member-gets-member campaign, the principal needs to know whether a particular agent has the appropriate characteristics and whether the agent will have the proper motivations to behave in accordance with the principal's goals. Moreover, the principal needs to know how the agent's ideas and behaviour can be changed. In this article, concepts from opinion leadership, social network theory and attitude research are used to test and evaluate the characteristics of the agent, who voluntarily participated in a member-gets-member campaign of a large producer of several brands of dog food. The outcomes show that agents that participate in the member-gets-member campaigns have characteristics which might be desirable for the manufacturer: these agents are opinion leaders and have a positive brand attitude. To some extent, these agents also ask permission from the consumer whether they are allowed to make them members and seek membership from people with whom they have close ties. The results also show that the agents positively respond to incentives used by the manufacturer. In general, the agents are not motivated to oversell the membership to the consumers.     

Convex duality for Epstein–Zin stochastic differential utility

This paper introduces a dual problem to study a continuous‐time consumption and investment problem with incomplete markets and Epstein–Zin stochastic differential utilities. Duality between the primal and dual problems is established. Consequently, the optimal strategy of this consumption and investment problem is identified without assuming several technical conditions on market models, utility specifications, and agent's admissible strategies. Meanwhile, the minimizer of the dual problem is identified as the utility gradient of the primal value and is economically interpreted as the “least favorable” completion of the market.     

An Empirical Investigation of the Formation and Implications of the Organizational Buyer's Strategic and Tactical Roles

Although research in organizational buying behavior has alluded to the importance of the purchasing agent's enacted role in the development and execution of an organization's procurement related activities, there exists little corresponding empirical evidence. This paper examined the buyer's self-perceived role, factors that affect its formation, and the impact that a buyer's role definition has on various aspects of buying behavior. Cluster analysis is employed to differentiate among purchasing agents based on their perceived participation in various stages of the purchasing decision process. Different patterns of behavior emerge from the five empirically derived clusters. These differences are presented and the managerial implications are discussed.     

Hedging nontradable risks with transaction costs and price impact

A risk‐averse agent hedges her exposure to a nontradable risk factor U using a correlated traded asset S and accounts for the impact of her trades on both factors. The effect of the agent's trades on U is referred to as cross‐impact. By solving the agent's stochastic control problem, we obtain a closed‐form expression for the optimal strategy when the agent holds a linear position in U. When the exposure to the nontradable risk factor is nonlinear, we provide an approximation to the optimal strategy in closed‐form, and prove that the value function is correctly approximated by this strategy when cross‐impact and risk‐aversion are small. We further prove that when is nonlinear, the approximate optimal strategy can be written in terms of the optimal strategy for a linear exposure with the size of the position changing dynamically according to the exposure's “Delta” under a particular probability measure.     

Using animated agents in learner‐controlled training: the effects of design control

Animated agents have the potential to increase engagement and learning during online training by acting as personalized tutors. However, little is known about the conditions that make these agents most effective. In this study, 183 e‐learners completed a Microsoft Excel training course. Approximately half were assigned an agent with predetermined features. The others were allowed to choose their agent's appearance, personality, feedback style or all of the above features. Offering multiple choices increased learning. Unexpectedly, choice of feedback style alone decreased self‐efficacy. Choosing the agent's appearance increased self‐efficacy and the number of training modules completed. Overall, this study expands the learner control literature, identifying a new form of learner control that has some beneficial effects on knowledge acquisition.     

STABILITY OF THE EXPONENTIAL UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO PREFERENCES

This paper studies stability of the exponential utility maximization when there are small variations on agent's utility function. Two settings are considered. First, in a general semimartingale model where random endowments are present, a sequence of utilities defined on converges to the exponential utility. Under a uniform condition on their marginal utilities, convergence of value functions, optimal payoffs, and optimal investment strategies are obtained, their rate of convergence is also determined. Stability of utility‐based pricing is studied as an application. Second, a sequence of utilities defined on converges to the exponential utility after shifting and scaling. Their associated optimal strategies, after appropriate scaling, converge to the optimal strategy for the exponential hedging problem. This complements Theorem 3.2 in [Nutz, M. (2012): Risk aversion asymptotics for power utility maximization. Probab. Theory & Relat. Fields 152, 703–749], which establishes the convergence for a sequence of power utilities.     

外部审计、债务期限结构选择与审计治理效应

外部审计通过鉴证可以降低委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称,能够在一定程度上缓解各方的代理冲突,是公司治理机制的重要组成部分。以2007—2010年中国上市的A股非金融类公司为样本,实证研究外部审计对上市公司债务期限结构选择的影响,结果表明:外部审计对上市公司债务期限结构选择产生了显著影响,当上市公司被出具无保留意见时,更容易得到长期债务;被四大事务所审计的上市公司,更容易获得长期债务;中国的外部审计发挥了应有的公司治理职能,保护了债权人的利益。     

Facing a Biased Adviser While Choosing a Retirement Plan: The Impact of Financial Literacy and Fair Disclosure

Buying a retirement saving plan in Israel involves meeting with an agent whose interests may differ from those of his or her customers. The aim of the present study was to explore the effect of the advice given by the agent, along with that of two further factors: a fair disclosure statement regarding the agent's conflict of interest, and the customer's degree of financial literacy. Two experiments conducted among undergraduate students in Israel showed that customers mostly follow the agent's recommendation, even against their best interest, and despite the presence of a fair disclosure statement. Only participants with high financial literacy, who received a disclosure statement, did examine the alternatives closely and rejected the advice when the recommendation was damaging. We also ruled out the existence of a negative psychological reactance response to a disclosure statement that would work to the detriment of financially literate participants.     

Learning to export from neighbors

This paper studies how learning from neighboring firms affects new exporters' performance. We develop a statistical decision model in which a firm updates its prior belief about demand in a foreign market based on several factors, including the number of neighbors currently selling there, the level and heterogeneity of their export sales, and the firm's own prior knowledge about the market. A positive signal about demand inferred from neighbors' export performance raises the firm's probability of entry and initial sales in the market but, conditional on survival, lowers its post-entry growth. These learning effects are stronger when there are more neighbors to learn from or when the firm is less familiar with the market. We find supporting evidence for the main predictions of the model from transaction-level data for all Chinese exporters over the 2000-2006 period. Our findings are robust to controlling for firms' supply shocks, countries' demand shocks, and city-country fixed effects.     

政治关联与公司治理有效性——基于上市公司证券违规的数据

管理者政治关联在强化企业竞争优势的同时,也会弱化公司治理机制的有效性.本文基于公司违规行为发生及管理者被迫离职两个方面,利用Bivariate Probit模型和Logit模型研究管理者政治关联对公司治理有效性的影响.研究发现,拥有政治关联的管理者所在企业更加倾向发生违规行为,尤其是民营企业;管理者的政治关联能够降低其违规行为被稽查处理的可能性,尤其是国有企业.政治关联有助于管理者建立职位壕沟,降低管理者被迫离职的概率;而企业违规行为被稽查后,管理者被迫离职的可能性将显著提高.文章的研究结果证明,管理者政治关联会弱化企业发生违规行为的事前监管,同时也会降低企业违规行为的稽查在事后监管中的公司治理效果.     

A NOTE ON THE QUANTILE FORMULATION

Many investment models in discrete or continuous‐time settings boil down to maximizing an objective of the quantile function of the decision variable. This quantile optimization problem is known as the quantile formulation of the original investment problem. Under certain monotonicity assumptions, several schemes to solve such quantile optimization problems have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we propose a change‐of‐variable and relaxation method to solve the quantile optimization problems without using the calculus of variations or making any monotonicity assumptions. The method is demonstrated through a portfolio choice problem under rank‐dependent utility theory (RDUT). We show that this problem is equivalent to a classical Merton's portfolio choice problem under expected utility theory with the same utility function but a different pricing kernel explicitly determined by the given pricing kernel and probability weighting function. With this result, the feasibility, well‐posedness, attainability, and uniqueness issues for the portfolio choice problem under RDUT are solved. It is also shown that solving functional optimization problems may reduce to solving probabilistic optimization problems. The method is applicable to general models with law‐invariant preference measures including portfolio choice models under cumulative prospect theory (CPT) or RDUT, Yaari's dual model, Lopes' SP/A model, and optimal stopping models under CPT or RDUT.     

Labor Productivity in the Efficiency-Wage Model: A Consideration of the Firm's Death Rate

It is inappropriate to equate the "representative firm" with the typical firm, particularly for economies which consist of small enterprises where a large number of jobs are created or disappear as establishments are born or die. If workers care about the job disappearance risk, their utility and effort offered will be influenced by the death rate of firms. This paper sets out an efficiency-wage model and takes the probability of the firm's closure into account. By extension, it is shown that equilibrium labor productivity is plausibly procyclical under certain circumstances, which is consistent with the stylized facts observed in many countries.