The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum

Recent studies of the linkages between the wealth of nations and the institutions of governance suggest that concentrating political power in a monarchy or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and, moreover, that while power-diffusing reforms can enhance the wellbeing of society in general, opposition by groups benefiting from the status quo is predictable. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution that, despite promises made by their new chief executive, would not have lessened the powers of the presidency. Using a unique, constituency-level dataset on the referendum vote, we estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and find that ethnic groups’ voting decisions are influenced by their expected gains and losses from constitutional change. The results also highlight the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power-diffusion process, and thus establish a channel through which ethnic fragmentation adversely impacts economic development.     

Integration,Diversity, Plurality: Territorial Governance and the Reconstruction of Legitimacy in a European ‘Postnational’ State

This article deals with the European ‘legitimacy crisis’ from a neglected perspective, looking at ‘Europe’ not primarily as a set of formal (or formalisable) institutions, but rather as an emergent, policy-driven institutional construct. In this perspective, European integration may be very much seen as the outcome of the policies that are enacted in the European supra-national arena as well as of the way such policies are continuously reinterpreted, renegotiated and re-enacted in the different arenas of its multi-level polity. What is at stake in adopting a policy approach to the European legitimacy issue is, hence, a critical appraisal of development of processes of ‘institutionalisation of Europe’ that range far beyond issues of constitutional design. A crucial consequence is the need to ‘spatialise’ discourse on European reforms. The conclusion is a plea for an integration model for Europe not only constitutionally respectful of diversity, but constitutively enhancing diversity, and for an approach to policy reforms acting upon a ‘political geography of differences’.     

The initiative,referendum, and distribution of income: An empirical analysis of Swiss cantons

This study examines how direct democratic institutions affect income distribution before and after taxes. Based on a panel of Swiss cantons from 1945 to 2014, we test the effects of the constitutional reforms of direct democratic instruments. Our findings show that better voter access to the initiative induces policy shifts that significantly decrease top incomes and benefit the upper middle class. For the popular referendum we do not find such effects. The income effects of direct democracy are not a consequence of shifts in fiscal redistribution, but rather result from policy changes affecting pre-tax incomes.     

The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity in loan approval: A Bayesian estimation with data from a laboratory field experiment

Microfinance targets women and uses loan provision as a tool for empowerment, which translates into better household nutrition, improved education, and a scale down of domestic violence. However, ethnic discrimination in microfinance may exist in countries with a segregated indigenous population. We assessed this possibility with a field experiment in Bolivia. The controlled laboratory experiment evaluated whether credit officers rejected microloan applications based on the interaction effect of ethnicity and gender of potential borrowers. Point estimates of a Bayesian mixed‐effects logistic regression, estimated with the experimental data, indicate that nonindigenous women have double the chance of loan approval, but indigenous women have only 1.5 times the chance of loan approval when compared with men. While the findings about gender are limited, the evidence for the interaction of gender and ethnicity is more robust and suggests the existence of positive taste‐based discrimination favorable for nonethnic women in Bolivia. We conclude that the affirmative actions towards women promoted by development agencies and microfinance institutions must not overlook ethnicity as an important factor for financial policies of sustainable development. In practice, these policies should be aimed at identifying and reducing both social desirability bias and the structural barriers to financial inclusion that indigenous women may face when trying to obtain access to a loan.     

Tuition increases Geaux away? Evidence from voting on Louisiana’s amendment 2

In many states, public institutions of higher education have the autonomy to raise tuition. This has not been the case in Louisiana since a 1995 constitutional amendment required a two-thirds majority of the state legislature for any tuition increase. In November of 2016, voters in Louisiana rejected Amendment 2, a constitutional amendment that would have given state institutions of higher education autonomy in setting tuition. We examine parish-level voting on Amendment 2 using an empirical political economy model and find that parishes with a greater percentage of African-Americans and university employees were more likely to vote yes. Student enrolment at public institutions seemingly did not play a role in Amendment 2 losing.     

Does ethnic diversity decrease economic interactions? Evidence from exchange networks in rural Gambia

Using a unique dataset collected in 59 rural Gambian villages, we study how ethnic heterogeneity is related to the structure of four economic exchange networks: land, labour, inputs and credit. We find that different measures of village‐level ethnic fragmentation are mostly uncorrelated with network structure. At a more disaggregated level, household heads belonging to ethnic minorities are not less central than those from the predominant ethnicity in any of the networks and, at the dyadic level, the fact that two households share ethnicity is not an economically significant predictor of link formation. Our results indicate that, in the particular setting of our study, the structure of the exchange networks is better defined by other variables than ethnicity and that ethnic heterogeneity is unlikely to be a driver for sub‐optimal economic exchanges.     

European influence and economic development

The development accounting literature identifies political institutions as fundamental development determinants. Forms of government or executive constraints are thought to shape economic institutions (e.g., property rights) that provide necessary incentives for economic growth. One strand of the literature suggests that European influence is a crucial economic development determinant, presumably through the adoption of European institutions. But how exactly did European influence in the distant past induce positive economic outcomes today? Previous approaches rely on “language,” “settler mortality,” “legal origins” or the “number of European settlers” as indirect proxies of European influence. We propose a direct and quantifiable mechanism: the adoption of European constitutional features. We construct a dataset of all constitutional dimensions from 1800–2008 for all countries and find that nations experience growth accelerations after adopting features of European constitutions. The growth effects are influenced (negatively) by periods of political turmoil, but they are independent of colonial backgrounds. These results show how European influence may have fostered growth, and they imply that countries were able to overcome adverse initial conditions over the last 200 years by adopting European constitutional features. Our constitutional dataset is sufficiently detailed to identify the specific dimensions of European constitutions that matter most for development: legislative rules and specific provisions that curtail executive powers.     

We start from here

As James Buchanan often asserted, in constitutional design “we start from here” which is to say we design a constitution to fit the institutions, social practices and so forth that we already have. Comparison of the complicated case of the US constitution and the failed attempt at constitutionalism in contemporary Egypt suggest that many societies are not yet ready for serious constitutional design. The English civil wars were about religion; the US constitution ignores religion and thereby avoids the grim conflict of church and state.     

Poverty among ethnic minorities: the transition process,inequality and economic growth

This article investigates the process of reducing poverty in ethnic minority households. Using two recent Vietnam household surveys, we find that ethnic minority households are more likely to be persistently poor and less likely to be persistently non-poor than ethnic majority households. The within-group component generated by the variation in income within each ethnicity group explains more than 90% of the change in total inequality. Income redistribution plays an important role in decreasing the poverty gap and decreasing poverty severity. Different ethnic groups have different poverty patterns, which should be noted when designing policies to alleviate poverty and inequality.     

Budgetary institutions and fiscal discipline: Edmund Burke's insightful contribution

Recent developments in the political economy of public finance literature have focused on the features of budgetary institutions that facilitate budgetary discipline — a sub-discipline of constitutional economics. In this literature, there has been no attempt to trace the development of economic thought on the relationship between budgetary institutions and fiscal discipline. This may be because debt accumulation in peacetime is seen as a late twentieth-century phenomenon. As a result, Edmund Burke's contribution, in his speech ‘On Economical Reform’, seems to have been forgotten. This paper highlights Burke's contribution and identifies the extent to which it captures those features of budgetary institutions that are currently recognized as facilitating budgetary discipline.     

The self-organisation of strategic alliances

This paper is based upon an analysis of various experiences of electronic commerce. It analyzes the role of private institutions in the organization of systems of transactions. Private institutions take place between public institutions (that are insufficiently specialized) and inter-individual governance structures (that do not benefit from scale and cognitive economies). These private institutions are very diverse and the paper points out the various types of services provided by diverse institutions depending on their constitutional mode.

While various possible institutional frameworks have very different features in terms of coordination, there is no most efficient institutional environment. Moreover, the emergence process of these institutional framework strongly influences their ability to survive. Very different institutional frameworks can therefore organize electronic trade quite differently in the various industries     

Constitutionalism and credibility in reforming economies1

There has been relatively little investigation of the effect of constitutional transformations on the economic transition in post‐communist countries. We develop a simple signalling model in which constitutionalism – a commitment to limit political power and provide judicial defence of basic rights – reinforces the credibility of pro‐market candidates’ electoral promises and boosts public support for economic reforms. These findings are tested using opinion poll data on public support for reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the former Soviet Union, in the 1990s. In a two‐stage procedure we show that public support for market reforms is higher in countries where incumbents have taken deliberate steps to increase political accountability and judicial independence. Public support also spurs actual economic reform.     

Dual-track Ownership Reforms: Lessons from Structural Change in China, 1978‐1997

The dual-track approach is characteristic of evolutionary reforms in China. The most important aspect of this dualism has been the reform of the ownership structure. On the one track, new, basically market-oriented institutions emerged in a parallel economy comprising non-state enterprises. On the other track, stateowned enterprises were retained and reforms were restricted to conservative policy changes bringing minor productivity-enhancing measures. In order to highlight the performance of the two tracks, a widely neglected indicator is employed to check the performance of enterprises: namely a structural comparison of the resource reallocation processes of both tracks over time. It becomes clear that structural adjustment was basically generated by the new track. In addition, it is shown that the increasing competition from the new track will not accelerate structural adjustment of the old track as long as institutional reforms of SOEs are not significantly extended.     

The problem of constitutional legitimation: what the debate on electoral quotas tells us about the legitimacy of decision-making rules in constitutional choice

Proponents of electoral quotas have a ‘dependent interpretation’ of democracy, i.e. they have formed an opinion on which decision-making rules are fair on the basis of their prior approval of the outcomes these rules are likely to generate. The article argues that this position causes an irresolvable problem for constitutional processes that seek to legitimately enact institutional change. While constitutional revision governed by formal equality allows the introduction of electoral quotas, this avenue is normatively untenable for proponents of affirmative action if they are consistent with their claim that formal equality reproduces biases and power asymmetries at all levels of decision-making. Their critique raises a fundamental challenge to the constitutional revision rule itself as equally unfair. Without consensus on the decision-making process by which new post-constitutional rules can be legitimately enacted, procedural fairness becomes an issue impossible to resolve at the stage of constitutional choice. This problem of legitimation affects all instances of constitutional choice in which there are opposing views not only about the desired outcome of the process but also about the decision-making rules that govern constitutional choice.     

From paradoxes to social rules,or: How economics repeats itself

There is an analogy of how the paradox of aggregation (Arrow impossibility theorem) and the paradoxa of individual behavior (people decide inconsistently) have been approached in mainstream research. In both cases it is disregarded that paradoxa are part of social reality. A constitutional approach focussing on rules and institutions promises to yield more fruitful insights.     

新疆少数民族就业困难群体成因分析——基于结构方程模型的视角

增加少数民族就业困难人员就业是改善新疆少数民族民生的一条重要途径。本文运用结构方程模型（SEM）对少数民族就业困难群体形成的原因进行了分析。结果显示：减轻家庭负担、减少对社保机构的依赖可以改善少数民族就业困难的状况。因而,应通过加大少数民族农村富余劳动力转移力度、加强其自身语言技能水平以及强化职业教育、培育少数民族特色产业等途径帮助少数民族群众就业。     

Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?

Many countries since 1990 have adopted semi-presidential constitutions, which are often considered to be problematic, primarily because of the potential for conflict between the assembly-supported government and the popularly elected president. Such conflicts are said to lead to unstable governments, policy paralysis and the eventual undermining of the democratic regime. Using data for all parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1946 and 2006, we examine the effect of semi-presidential constitutions on the duration of prime ministers’ tenure in office, government accountability with respect to economic outcomes, and democratic survival. We also examine (for a smaller sample of post-communist countries) the impact of these constitutions on the progress of structural reforms. We find that the observed higher instability of prime ministers in semi-presidential democracies is more due to the electoral system than to the presence of a popularly elected president. We also find that semi-presidential constitutions have little impact on the government’s accountability to economic outcomes and on the survival of democratic regimes. Finally, we find that neither a weak president nor a weak government is optimal for the progress of economic reforms in post-communist countries. Regarding economic reforms, the optimal allocation of constitutional powers between the president and the government grants both significant powers.     

Constitutional safeguards against centralization in federal states: An international cross-section analysis

This paper contains an international cross-section analysis of the share of central government expenditure in total government expenditure for a sample of about 50 countries and a subsample of 23 industrial countries in 1989–91. The expenditure shares, their changes and the unexplained residuals for each country are reported in Table 1. As the analysis demonstrates, the share of central government is significantly lower, if income per capita and the country's area are large and if it is a federal state. The explanatory power of the equation rises considerably if the binary dummy for federalism is replaced by quantitative constitutional variables. The most powerful single explanatory variable is the age of the constitutional court in the complete sample or the constitutional court's independence of union institutions in the sample of industrial countries. The equation's explanatory power (adjusted for degrees of freedom) can be raised by allowing also for the degree of control which provincial institutions have over the constitution and over the second chamber and by taking into account whether an increase in federal tax rates requires a popular referendum. Other types of constitutional referenda and the relative age of the federal constitution do not seem to matter. Among the federal states, the share of central government is much larger than predicted in the United States and Mexico, and it is much smaller than predicted in Argentina and Canada. The constitutional variables are particularly helpful in explaining the relatively small share of central government in Switzerland, Malaysia, Germany and Austria. The last section draws conclusions for the design of constitutions with some special applications to the European Union.     

Window of Opportunity Opens: Asian and American Views of the International Economic Architecture

This paper compares US and Asian views of the international economic architecture including Asia's evolving regional institutions. Lessons from the global financial crisis are used to assess reforms of the financial institutions better to prevent and manage future crises. While G-20 leaders have increased the resources of the International Monetary Fund, much work remains to restore its legitimacy and independence and to define clearly the Financial Stability Board's mandate to strengthen financial oversight and regulation. The paper critiques proposals for a global super-regulator and concludes that while the global architecture is important, the tests of its success will be fewer government actions to self-insure and the willingness to heed warnings of future problems and take timely corrective actions.