财政分权下地方政府卫生支出的竞争行为研究

分权体制框架下地级市政府在制定医疗卫生支出决策时往往会受到相邻城市相关策略的影响,从而引发城市间政府卫生支出的策略互动行为.文章选取了2007?2013年中国283个城市面板数据,运用动态空间面板模型检验了分权体制下地市级政府卫生支出的策略互动行为,并揭示出财政分权及其城市间空间策略互动对政府卫生支出的影响.研究发现,地市级政府在政府卫生支出上存在显著的互补型策略互动,这种效应在地理距离相近的同省区城市间更为显著.进一步分析发现,财政分权促进了政府卫生服务供给;而无论是短期还是长期,地市级政府间财政分权的策略互动对政府卫生支出产生明显的抑制作用,从而较好地解释了政府卫生支出比重徘徊不前的原因.由此,积极利用竞争、激励机制以及实现财政体制安排的优化变革来引导政府的卫生服务供给将是重要的政策选择.     

Sovereign Debt Capacity and the Distribution of Domestic Wealth: A Common Agency Model*

This paper proposes a stylized two‐period, two‐country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and local and foreign interest groups with conflicting preferences on debt repayment. Our main result is that in full lobby competition, when all interests are represented, the only equilibrium solution is repudiation and the consequent inability of government to access international capital markets. Conversely, when the ability to lobby depends on wealth, governments can access international credit up to a given maximum external debt capacity, determined by the skew in the distribution of domestic wealth.     

A MODEL FOR STANDARD SETTING: HIGH DEFINITION TELEVISION

This paper presents a model for high definition television (HDTV) standard setting that can be applied to other technologies. The analysis examines conflict and coordination in the standardization process at three levels: international, domestic, and market. While national governments and firms share common priorities, firms are more likely to require standardization than are governments but are less likely to achieve it unless side payments are possible. Collaboration in standard setting benefits all parties and should be encouraged by the government .     

出口退税是一项稳健的贸易政策吗?

出口退税作为一项被WTO允许的政策工具,为许多国家的政府所使用。本文在一个国际多市场寡头模型之中,研究出口退税的稳健性。主要结论如下:(1)如果本国政府的目标是最大化国家福利,那么,出口退税不是一项稳健的贸易政策;(2)如果本国政府关心收入分配,对于国家福利的不同组成部分赋予不同的权重,那么,如果政府过于关注本国企业利润,而不是本国消费者剩余和出口退税成本,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策;(3)本国政府过于关注本国企业利润的一个可能原因是,本国企业可以通过政治捐献去游说政府,制定对于自己有利的政策。那么,如果相对于国家福利而言,政府过于关注政治捐献,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策。     

Competition Among National Football Leagues. Does It Exist? Should We Regulate?

It is often supposed that the stakeholders of a national football league draw more satisfaction from their sport if the league is balanced, that is, if a large number of clubs have a reasonable chance of winning. This is the so‐called Competitive balance hypothesis. This hypothesis can be challenged, however, in the context of international competition like the European champions league. It could be that the utility of national leagues' stakeholders would be higher if the probability of victory for their nation's club at the international level were higher. If this were the case, a league's governing body intending to maximize the quality of the national league by making use of redistributive schemes would face a trade‐off between national competitive balance and international performance of the national representative club. We propose a simple microeconomic framework to model this trade‐off. If a non‐cooperative game exists among the national league governing bodies, whether it is a Nash or a Stackelberg one, this game would result in inefficient redistributive policies. We find ‘soft’ empirical evidence of such a competition among the big 5 football leagues in Europe. This result supports the idea of the creation of an international regulatory body. We derive the conditions under which the international regulatory body should ensure that the leagues' governing bodies implement redistributive schemes guaranteeing the respect of the national competitive balance. We also emphasize the risk of experiencing a drop in the quality of leagues if one of them becomes too big relatively to the others, what we call the tragedy of the wealthy.     

地方政府支出竞争与地区投资行为——中国式财政分权框架下的实证研究

中国财政分权体制下,地方政府间的财政支出竞争广泛存在。建立纳入财政支出分权、地方政府财政支出及支出竞争的企业投资决策计量模型。结论显示:地方政府财政支出横向竞争和纵向竞争对地区投资行为影响具有差异性并存在长期效应。为实现地方政府支出竞争的良性发展应将更多的资源投入到有利于提高地区整体投资环境的领域,同时继续完善中央和地方关系。     

Club governments versus representative governments

The paper compares the legal rules for private clubs with the constitutions of representative governments. Though both institutions are designed to provide public goods for their members they are organized quite differently. In clubs the power to grant power must not be delegated to the agents, while in representative governments it usually is. The design of representative governments is shown to be inconsistent with a contractarian view of the constitution. A nearly perfect laboratory case for a club government can be found in the example of Switzerland. In this country citizens are absolute sovereigns over their constitution. The Swiss do not have a constitutional court, but have developed instead a system of popular voting rights serving as a substitute for a judicial review by a constitutional court. Though this system does not work perfectly, it has relative advantages compared to a constitutional court which often tends to become a political decisionmaker. The author is indebted to Pio Baake, Peter Moser, and Richard E. Wagner for helpful comments.     

地方政府经济竞争下的企业负担——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文基于分权体制下政企之间的两阶段动态博弈模型以及在此基础上构建的计量模型,将地级市之间经济竞争程度与A股非金融类上市公司数据相匹配,验证了地方政府经济竞争程度与企业实际税负之间的关系。研究结果表明,当地方政府所面临的经济竞争程度越激烈时,其辖区内上市公司的实际税负越低。进一步分析发现,地方政府经济竞争对辖区企业的减税效应存在显著的地区、产业和所有制异质性;分位数回归发现,辖区企业处于不同税负强度时,地方政府经济竞争的减税效应也存在明显差异。在当前减税降费、让利于企的新时代背景下,本文的研究对落实减税降费政策和规范横向竞争中地方政府行为具有启示意义。     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

Competition, knowledge, and local government

This paper applies the insights of Austrian economics to an important issue in local political economy. Basic economic theory holds that greater competition produces superior outcomes in private goods markets. The same should be true in the ??markets?? for the output of local government. Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1980) show that interjurisdictional competition may serve as a potential restraint on the monopoly powers of local Leviathan and Tiebout (1956) shows that it may help lead to the production of efficient quantities of local public goods. However, other potential virtues of competition in the market for local collective goods have been largely ignored. This paper explores those other virtues as well as the neoclassical theoretical foundations of the Tiebout (1956) model, upon which much of this literature is based. This has public policy implications for local governments, which have taken on increased importance given the recent global movement towards more decentralized government.     

战略性新兴产业政策依赖性探析 ——来自地方政府补贴视角的实证检验

战略性新兴产业发展受到各级政府普遍扶持,扶持过程处处存在政府的影响,是研究政府行为的良好载体。为此,本文以战略性新兴产业为研究对象,以海克曼（Heckman）两步选择模型为基础分析地方政府补贴选择以及补贴实施机制,并考察其区域效应、省际效应及具体地区经济特征的影响。本文研究表明,地方政府行为具有多样性,其具有显著的扶持弱者行为取向,这是政策依赖的重要因素,这一影响机制受地区经济发展因素的影响,存在显著的区域差异。研究还表明,地方政府补贴行为具有较强的所有制类型偏好,中央国有企业受到补贴的概率、补贴数量及补贴程度显著低于其他所有制,其中蕴含着地方政府与中央国有企业之间的诸多问题。     

地方政府竞争、土地垄断供给与城市化发展失衡

文章基于地方政府竞争和土地垄断供给的双重视角,利用中国1999—2012年的省级面板数据,对人口城市化与空间城市化的发展失衡现象及其内在机理进行了系统研究。理论研究发现,地方政府间以经济增长和财政收入增加为导向的竞争机制,为地方政府偏重推进空间城市化、忽视推进人口城市化提供了内在激励,而土地的政府垄断供给则为地方政府通过经营土地来实施这种偏重空间城市化的行为提供了手段。这两个因素叠加在一起,导致了人口城市化与空间城市化的发展失衡。实证检验发现,地方政府间竞争越激烈,土地供给数量越多,人口城市化与空间城市化发展失衡的程度就越严重。这表明,地方政府竞争和土地垄断供给对城市化发展失衡确实存在显著正向影响。推进地方政府竞争模式和土地供给制度改革,是实现中国人口城市化与空间城市化均衡发展的有效途径。     

转移支付与地方财政支出扩张——基于异质性与空间外溢视角的分析

本文通过构建空间计量模型实证检验地方政府在转移资金分配中的策略竞争行为,从新的视角对地方财政支出扩张进行解读。研究发现转移支付的“粘蝇纸效应”受到地区间竞争的制约,一般性转移支付对地区间竞争存在显著制约,但专项转移支付的影响不明显;地方政府的竞争,不仅“患寡”,也“患不均”。要完善转移资金的使用效率,须考虑转移支付实施的结构差别,尤其应注意转移资金分配的非均衡效应对地方政府扩张的差异化激励。     

税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效

中国的财政分权改革激发了地方政府推进本地区经济发展的积极性,但不恰当的分权路径也加剧了地区间的税收竞争。本文运用空间滞后模型,对中国省际间的税收竞争与博弈行为进行检验。研究显示,省际间税收竞争反应函数斜率为负,这说明省际间在税收竞争中采取的是差异化竞争策略;同时也意味着地方政府目前对公共产品的偏好较低。而对省际间税收竞争增长绩效的格兰杰因果检验则显示,公共服务水平对地区经济增长率具有显著的促进作用,并且地方政府的征税努力与其财政充裕状况直接相关。为此,本文提出应加快地区基本公共服务的均等化和转移支付的法制化进程,努力打破数量型增长的政绩观,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

The future of fiscal federalism

For at least three decades after World War II, there was little interest in fiscal decentralization. Because of the large growth in public spending that took place during that period, a growth that was mainly focused at the central government level, this was a period characterized by fiscal centralization in most countries. Starting in the late 1970s, a reaction against large governments started. This reaction followed two distinct tracks: privatization and fiscal decentralization. The paper argues that these two tracks were almost two sides of the same coin and were largely mutually exclusive. They reflected similar concerns and objectives. In more recent decades, globalization has been creating global public goods or public “bads” and international activities that would require public attention or the action of a “world government”. Because no such government exists, its role is progressively being delegated to proxies, in the form of international organizations, agreements, treaties, accords and other forms of international understandings. The paper concludes that this development is likely to weaken over time the role of central governments. It also speculates that it may strengthen the importance of municipalities.     

中国地方政府间的企业所得税竞争研究* ——基于面板数据空间滞后模型的实证分析

中国地方政府没有独立的税收立法权,但仍然可以通过企业所得税优惠开展中国式税收竞争。本文在构建省级企业所得税优惠衡量指标的基础上,使用面板数据空间滞后模型分析表明,中国地方政府间存在无序的策略互补式税收竞争,并且在企业所得税名义税收优惠上的竞争比实际税收优惠更为激烈。中央政府有必要从企业所得税名义税收优惠入手,采取措施规范地方政府间的企业所得税竞争行为,但同时也应该保持税收优惠政策本身及其实施效果的连续性。     

Who is afraid of capital mobility? on taxation of labor income and the level of public services in an open economy

This paper deals with the effects of international capital mobility on the taxation of labor income and on the size of the public sector. It employs a model of the labor market where national trade unions set the wage level in their country and national governments set the tax rate of a proportional labor-income tax. The tax revenues are used to finance a public good and unemployment benefits. In this model, competition between the national trade unions caused by international capital mobility leads to full employment, and the governments supply the public good on the first best level. As no unemployment benefits have to be financed, the tax on labor income may decline with the introduction of capital mobility. These tax cuts may even overcompensate the unions for the wage decline.     

Privatization and Reformation*

This paper presents a simple model of a government contemplating the pre-sale reform of a public enterprise. While the government is less efficient at such reform than the eventual owner, failure to reform may be considered an indicator of low commercial value by potential purchasers. Consequently, the government may be unable to avoid socially wasteful restructuring if it wishes to maximize its net sales revenue. The results presented in this paper provide a number of insights and policy recommendations for governments embarking on a privatization program.     

Indeterminacy in a dynamic two-country model

The purpose of this paper is to show that indeterminacy can arise in a simple competitive two-country dynamic model of international trade, free of externalities, imperfect competition, and government intervention. This seemingly surprising result is based on an assumption that there is no international credit market. As will be shown later, the assumption implies that dynamic equilibrium paths of our two-country, therefore heterogeneous consumer, model are not generally Pareto-optimal.The paper is dedicated to Professor Mukul Majumdar on the occasion of his 60th birthday with great respect. We thank Takashi Kamihigashi, Tapan Mitra and Makoto Yano for their useful comments on the earlier version of this paper.     

Attracting private investment: Tax reduction,investment subsidy,or both?

This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.