How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects*

The government wants an infrastructure‐based public service to be provided. First, the infrastructure has to be built; subsequently, it has to be operated. Should the government bundle the building and operating tasks in a public–private partnership? Or should it choose traditional procurement (i.e., delegate the tasks to different firms)? Each task entails unobservable investments to come up with innovations. It turns out that, depending on the nature of the innovations, bundling can either stimulate or discourage investments. Moreover, we find that if renegotiation cannot be prevented, public–private partnerships might lead the government to deliberately opt for technologically inferior projects.     

Endogenous protection of R&D investments

Abstract .  We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R&D investments from spilling over to competitors. We show that, contrary to findings in most of the literature, the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R&D investments. Consequently, as long as the R&D spillovers are not too strong, firms decide to let their R&D knowledge flow. Since, as we show, welfare is higher when R&D spillovers are present, it follows that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge could be welfare-enhancing.     

Firm value in commonly uncertain times: the divergent effects of corporate governance and CSR

Economic uncertainty disrupts firms’ ability to create value. Most related literature examines how various organizational characteristics affect value under extreme conditions – the global financial crisis. However, recent work in quantifying economic uncertainty now makes it possible to take a more nuanced approach in investigating the conditions under which this value reduction can be mitigated during more ‘commonly uncertain’ periods. In this paper we analyze the effects of corporate governance mechanisms and social responsibility investments on Tobin’s q across 13 years and 40 countries. Evidence suggests that shareholder-centric corporate governance policies restrict board and executive flexibility during uncertain times, and therefore stifle their ability to react effectively to adverse macroeconomic changes. We also find that CSR initiatives serve as insurance in that they preserve value under uncertainty by acting as a reservoir of social capital.     

DOES BIG GOVERNMENT HURT GROWTH LESS IN HIGH‐TRUST COUNTRIES?

Social trust is linked to both public sector size and to economic growth, thereby helping to explain how some countries combine high taxes with high levels of economic growth. This paper examines if social trust insulates countries against the negative effects of public sector size on growth, documented in several studies. We note that the effect is theoretically ambiguous. In panel data from 66 countries across 40 years, we find no robust evidence of insulation effects: when excluding countries with uncertain trust scores, our results suggest that big government hurts growth also in high‐trust countries, and that the mechanism is by lowering private investments. (JEL H10, O11, P16, Z10)     

Information technology investment strategies: a review and synthesis of the literature

In spite of high importance of information technology (IT) investments, managers do not have sufficient guidelines to formulate IT investment strategy of a firm. In this paper, we review the literature to determine the factors that influence the IT investment strategy. The concept of IT investment strategy so far considered two domains: intensity and proactiveness; we enhance this concept by adding the domain of investment focus. Through this review, we made an attempt to answer three strategic questions related to IT investments: (i) level of investment that a firm should make in IT, that is, investment intensity; (ii) areas of firm where these investments should be more focused, that is, investment focus; and (iii) timing of investment, that is, whether to be an early mover in adopting IT or whether to invest relatively late compared to competitors.     

Is the value of environmental goods sensitive to the public funding scheme? Evidence from a marine restoration programme in the Black Sea

In this paper, we conduct choice experiments in Turkey and Ukraine on the valuation of a marine restoration programme in the Black Sea, to examine whether the value of environmental goods is sensitive to the source of public financing. We contribute to the debate on the optimal composition of public expenditure, an issue that can be controversial in times of financial crises. We discriminate between two funding regimes through the reallocation of public spending. The first proposes financing the marine restoration programme by reducing public expenditure for investments in renewable energy, and the second by reducing public expenditure for civil servants’ training. The results reveal that the marginal value of public money depends on the funding source. Furthermore, attribute values are sensitive to the trade-off implied by the funding scheme. The magnitude of the results differs in the two countries considered, because of their heterogeneity in political and cultural dimensions.     

Voluntary Environmental Investment and Responsive Regulation

Instances of corporate voluntary environmental investments have been rising in recent years. Motivations for such activities include corporate image building, regulatory preemption, and production cost savings. While some of these investments arise from industry attempts to set environmental standards where none currently exist, many investments seem to be aimed at reducing the costs of complying with existing regulations. Using a simple game-theoretic model, we investigate firm motivations for, and welfare consequences of, these types of voluntary investments by focusing on the role regulatory enforcement might play. We find that such investments unambiguously increase when an enforcement regulator acts as a Stackelberg follower (a regulatory structure we refer to as responsive regulation) in setting its monitoring and enforcement strategy. These additional investments may be socially undesirable, necessitating a restructuring of non-compliance penalties.     

The impact of public R&D investments on patenting activity: technology transfer at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ABSTRACT

This paper presents estimates of the impact of public R&D on patenting activity at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Using a time series of public sector agency data, we estimate the per-capita R&D elasticity of new patent applications using a knowledge production function framework model that is an expanded version of what other scholars have used with private sector data. New patent applications are an important step in the technology transfer activities of a federal agency. We estimate this elasticity to be about 2.0. This elasticity value represents an initial estimate of the impact of EPA’s R&D investments on its technology transfer activity.     

Boosting tourism's contribution to growth and development: Analysis of the evidence

The tourism sector's contribution to economic development depends upon complex and dynamic socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional factors. Policymakers require objective evidence to base decisions on which public policies or investments to pursue. In this paper we develop an economy‐wide approach to assessing public investments in tourism. The approach is powerful in that it considers all inter‐sectoral linkages that are critical for tourism‐sector analysis. This framework is linked to a microsimulation module that enables estimation of household‐level and destination‐specific impacts and the distribution of benefits. To illustrate the framework and the insights it can generate, we apply it to a public investment in Belize's Cayo District. Our findings show that the overall level of economic activity increases while an appreciation of the real regional exchange rate results in slower growth in traditional nontourism exports. Greater availability of capital and labor to meet increased demand would reduce this effect. The investment results in a reduction in the poverty headcount on the order of 0.7 percentage points, though there is a small increase in inequality that is a function of the skill requirements of the new positions created as a result of the investment.     

Determinants of adaptation costs in procurement: an empirical estimation on Italian public works contracts

It is widely agreed that rules governing public procurement should be designed to achieve value for money. However, in the public works sector, ‘…?the good being procured is usually complex and hard to be exactly specified ex ante, …?[and] alterations to the original project might be needed after the contract is awarded. This may result in considerable discrepancies between the lowest winning bid and the actual costs that are incurred by the buyer’ (Bajari et al., 2006). There is now a wide body of literature focusing on cost escalation during the execution of contracts and their estimates reveal that it can be often quite large. This article is aimed at offering an empirical test of the determinants of adaptation costs in the public works procurement. Using a detailed data set on Italian public works contracts, we run an empirical analysis, grounded on the main conclusions reached in the literature, to test for the main drivers of adaptation costs.     

Democracy vs. dictatorship

A democratic society is often regarded as a prerequisite for economic growth and development. Yet, most empirical studies are not capable of identifying a positive link between GDP growth and democracy indexes. In addition, it is a stylized empirical fact that: (i) most developing countries are dictatorships; and (ii) many poor dictatorships have experienced high growth performances and emerged from poverty such as South Korea, China and Egypt. Against this background, it is of interest to analyse in which ways the growth performance between autocratic and democratic economies may differ, in particular among low-income countries. To answer this question, we compare the endogenous growth paths of two economies that differ only in their political regimes in the context of an overlapping generations model. The key features of the model are: (i) a positive bequest motive in the form of investments in education or productive public capital (infrastructure); (ii) a higher marginal (inter-temporal) utility of consumption today versus consumption tomorrow in low-income countries (for example, subsistence level of consumption); and (iii) a dictator that cares about her income or the income of her dynasty tomorrow. In this framework, we demonstrate that poor but large and stable dictatorships exhibit a higher equilibrium growth rate than comparable (equally poor) democracies. Moreover, there exists a particular threshold value in income such that the growth-reducing impact of dictatorial consumption (corruption) outweighs the higher (initial) public investments. Above this, the growth rate under democracy dominates the one in dictatorship.     

The impact of public investment in medical imaging technology: an interagency collaboration in evaluation

The Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI) and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) allied to analyze the impact of their investments in medical imaging research. The CFI funds capital and operating programs for research infrastructure, and CIHR's mandate concentrates its funding on research activity. It happens that CIHR-funded research consumes CFI-funded infrastructure as an input in the innovation process. Apart from a few partnered programs, by design there is no coordination between CFI and CIHR funding decisions. Together, these agencies invested $916 million over a 14-year-period. In this paper, we evaluate the economic and health benefits from advancements in one funded area, namely computed tomography perfusion (CTP). CTP is an imaging technique that uses computed tomography to measure blood flow in organs and tissues. It is mostly used to assess acute ischemic stroke. The net social benefits attributable to these investments are substantially positive: the benefit-to-cost ratio is estimated to be between 6.66-to-1 and 9.99-to-1. We review how public investments from multiple funders comingle in the innovation process to deliver social value and improved health outcomes.     

Public overspending in higher education

We study the trade-off between governmental investments in pretertiary and tertiary education from an efficiency point of view. We develop a model comprising agents with different incomes and abilities, public and private schools, and public universities that select applicants based on an admission exam. Reallocating governmental resources from tertiary to pretertiary education may positively affect aggregate production and human capital if some conditions are satisfied. For instance, in an economy with a high proportion of credit-constrained students, a reallocation of expenditure toward public schools benefits many students, compensating for the negative effect of a decrease in public university investments. We also quantitatively investigate the optimal allocation of public investment between pretertiary and tertiary education, and we find that a 10% increase in productivity of public investments in pretertiary education could increase the optimal GDP between 2.1% and 3%.     

University‐firm competition in basic research and university funding policy

We characterize equilibrium investments in basic research by the commercial and university sectors contingent on public funding of the university. We find that firms invest in basic research despite the opportunities for free riding and we present conditions under which firms even have incentives to augment the public funding to the university. We characterize the socially optimal volume of public funding for the university sector. Finally, we compare total investments in a mixed duopoly with those of duopolies composed of two universities as well as two profit‐maximizing firms.     

Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs

This paper examines endogenous merger formations in a mixed oligopoly. Applying the core as a solution concept, we analyze which market structure(s) remain(s) stable when three firms—two symmetric private firms and one inefficient public firm—are allowed to merge with each other in a mixed Cournot industry. We show that according to the value of the marginal cost of the public firm, there always exists a pair of share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-merged) public firm and the (pre-merged) private firm such that the market structure with the merger between the public firm and one private firm belongs to the core. When the initial market structure is a mixed triopoly, it can only be blocked when one public firm and one private firm merge. Furthermore, we conduct a similar analysis in a general mixed oligopoly with one public firm and n private firms.      

The Tyranny of Concepts: CUDIE (Cumulated, Depreciated, Investment Effort) Is Not Capital

The cost of public investment is not the increment to the value ofpublic capital. Unlike with private investors, there is no plausiblebehavioral model in which every dollar that the public sectorspends as ``investment' creates economically valuable ``capital.'While this simple analytic point is obvious, it has so far beenuniformly ignored in the empirical literature on economic growth,which uses—at best—cumulated, depreciated, investmenteffort (CUDIE) as a proxy for capital stocks. However, particularlyfor developing countries the difference between investment costand capital value is of first-order empirical importance: governmentinvestment is half of more of total investment, and calculationspresented here suggest that in many countries government investmentspending has created little useful capital. This has implicationsin three broad areas. First, none of the existing empirical estimatesof the impact of public spending has identified the productivityof public capital. Even where public capital has a potentiallylarge contribution to production, public-investment spendingmay have had a low impact. Second, it implies that all estimatesof total factor productivity in developing countries are deeplysuspect as there is no way to empirically distinguish betweenlow growth because of investments that create no factors andlow growth due to slow productivity growth. Third, multivariateregressions to date have not adequately controlled for capitalstock growth, which leads to erroneous interpretations of regressioncoefficients.     

The Layoff Rat Race*

We investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs. After investments are made, firms may have to lay off workers, and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates. Greater skill investments, especially in specific human capital, contribute more to a firm's bottom line, so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last. We show that as long as workers' bargaining positions are not too weak, workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities. Indeed, workers over‐invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough, even though they only receive a share of any investment. More generally, we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms, the probability that a firm will downsize, and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy.     

A dynamic‐efficiency rationale for public investment in the health of the young

In this paper we assume away standard distributional and static‐efficiency arguments for public health and instead seek a dynamic efficiency rationale. We study a lifecycle model wherein young agents make health investments to reduce mortality risk. We identify a welfare rationale for public health under dynamic efficiency and exogenous mortality even when private and public investments are perfect substitutes. If health investment reduces mortality risk but individuals do not internalize its effect on the life‐annuity interest rate, the “Philipson‐Becker effect” emerges; when the young are net borrowers, this works together with dynamic efficiency to support a role for public health.     

Investments and uncertainty revisited: the case of the US economy

This article examines the relationship between investments and uncertainty for the US economy, as the latter is approximated by consumer sentiment, purchasing managers’ prospects and economic policy uncertainty. Contrary to the existing literature, we provide evidence that this relationship is time varying. The time variation is attributed to the observed temporal replacement effect between private and public investments. Furthermore, we show that there are two distinct correlation regimes in this relationship and unless we concentrate on them, we cannot fully unravel the real link between uncertainty and investments. Finally, we examine whether the use of the two correlation regimes provides better forecasts for investments compared to the use of the uncertainty indices alone. The forecasting exercise reveals that the use of correlation regimes provides statistically superior out-of-sample forecasts.     

Does the Energy-Efficiency Paradox Exist? Technological Progress and Uncertainty

We explain why firms may choose not to undertake investments inenergy-saving technologies that appear profitable from a net presentvalue perspective. As future technological advances are inherentlyuncertain and investments in new technology are, at least partly,irreversible, it may ``pay' to postpone investments in energy savingand wait for the arrival of improved varieties. This insight casts doubton the existence of so-called ``low hanging fruits in energy saving'(although we do not wish to deny that organisational failures may alsobe important). Failure to appreciate the underlying stochasticity oftechnological progress may obscure the insight that there is value inwaiting, and costs involved in terminating the option to invest. Theappetite for low-hanging fruits will be less when these costs areincorporated in the analysis. We demonstrate that the effect of thearrival rate of new technologies on the adoption lag for a rational firmis ambiguous. The same holds for the effect of the expected ``jump' inefficiency of new technologies. Government policies aimed at enhancingthe adoption of new technologies through stimulation of R&D maytherefore be counterproductive.