The Effect of Mortgage Price and Default Risk on Mortgage Spreads

Variations over time in mortgage yield spreads should reflect changes in the underlying prepayment option value; moreover, the relationship between mortgage yield spreads and interest rate dynamics should weaken as the value of the borrowers prepayment option declines. We verify this hypothesis through an empirical analysis of residential mortgage yield spread behavior, and we also present evidence that the strength of the relationship between mortgage spreads and interest rate dynamics weakens (strengthens) as the level of default risk increases (decreases). This result is consistent with the competing risks effect between a borrowers option to prepay or default. Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for mortgage price discount to par as well as default risk when developing time series of mortgage yields.     

Mortgage Default: Classification Trees Analysis

We apply the powerful, flexible, and computationally efficient nonparametric Classification and Regression Trees (CART) algorithm to analyze real estate mortgage data. CART is particularly appropriate for our data set because of its strengths in dealing with large data sets, high dimensionality, mixed data types, missing data, different relationships between variables in different parts of the measurement space, and outliers. Moreover, CART is intuitive and easy to interpret and implement. We discuss the pros and cons of CART in relation to traditional methods such as linear logistic regression, nonparametric additive logistic regression, discriminant analysis, partial least squares classification, and neural networks, with particular emphasis on real estate. We use CART to produce the first academic study of Israeli mortgage default data. We find that borrowers features, rather than mortgage contract features, are the strongest predictors of default if accepting icbadli borrowers is more costly than rejecting good ones. If the costs are equal, mortgage features are used as well. The higher (lower) the ratio of misclassification costs of bad risks versus good ones, the lower (higher) are the resulting misclassification rates of bad risks and the higher (lower) are the misclassification rates of good ones. This is consistent with real-world rejection of good risks in an attempt to avoid bad ones.     

Loan Portfolio Swaps and Optimal Lending

Theories on loan portfolio swap hedging are based on a portfolio-choice approach. This paper presents an alternative: a firm-theoretic model for bank behavior with loan portfolio swaps. Our paper derives the optimal loan rate and rate-taking loan amount of the banks portfolio, and relates them to the market loan rate, counterparty loan rate, swap default risk, capital-to-deposits ratio, and deposit insurance. We find that in the bilateral default risk approach, the comparative static results are generated by four factors: the banks risk magnitude about the equity market value, loan composition in the swap contract, the substitution effect in the loan portfolio, and the income effect from the swap transaction. The results imply that changes in the payoff asymmetry in the event of swap default and the banks regulatory parameters have a direct effect on the banks loan portfolio for lending and swap transactions.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and advice.     

Interest-only and principal-only mortgage strips as interest-rate contingent claims

Interest-only (IO) and principal-only (PO) mortgage strips are valued in a stochastic interest-rate environment. The prepayment rate of the underlying mortgages is affected by two considerations not present in the pure financially rational model: (1) The property owner's holding period is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution, resulting in the possibility of prepayment due to the sale of the property (i.e., prepayment that is too early based on market interest rates); and (2) borrowers are assumed to face heterogeneous transaction costs related to refinancing the existing mortgage, and delay refinancing when market conditions make it optimal to do so (refinancing too late). Properties of IO/PO strips are identified by the finite difference method.     

Commercial Mortgage Default: A Comparison of Logit with Radial Basis Function Networks

This article explores the use of artificial neural networks in the modeling of foreclosure of commercial mortgages. The study employs a large set of individual loan histories previously used in the literature of proportional hazard models on loan default. Radial basis function networks are trained (estimated) using the same input variables as those used in the logistic. The objective is to demonstrate the use of networks in forecasting mortgage default and to compare their performance with that of the logistic benchmark in terms of prediction accuracy. Neural networks are shown to be superior to the logistic in terms of discriminating between good and bad loans. The study performs sensitivity analysis on the average loan and offers suggestions on further improving prediction of defaulting loans.     

Fixed-Rate Endowment Mortgage and Mortgage Indemnity Valuation

We use a contingent claims framework for valuing the the default and prepayment embedded options in certain British fixed-rate endowment mortgages, with a (capped) mortgage indemnity guarantee (MIG). This methodology provides a template for the borrower, lender, and insurer to compare mortgage terms, including the fairness of contract rates, arrangement fees, prepayment penalties, any MIG premiums required, and co-insurance exposure. With empirical inputs, this model may eventually be useful as a mark-to-value proxy for all parties, as expected parameters change (especially interest rate and house price levels, and expected future volatilities), for purposes of determining valued added accounting, appropriate reserves, and indeed for setting premiums and business drivers. Fixed-rate endowment mortgages differ from fixed-rate repayment mortgages primarily because, in the event of early termination, the amount owed by the borrower is a function of the evolution of the term structure of interest rates, whereas for a repayment mortgage it is pre-determined. We compare endownment and repayment mortgages for different levels of loan-to-value ratios, interest rate and house price volatilities.     

Pension Plan Investment Management Mandates: An Empirical Analysis of Manager Selection

We examine the impact of several factors on the selection of portfolio managers for Australian pension plan mandates. Performance measures do not affect the probability of a mandate allocation. Pension sponsors tend to choose managers with top-quartile five-year performance who have recently beaten a market benchmark. Management expenses have a negative impact on a managers chances. A surprising result is sponsors tolerance for high portfolio trading costs. Mandates are spread across manager investment styles. The style and institutional attributes of preferred managers suggest trustees reputation and prudential concerns matter, particularly for the aggregate annual mandate allocations.     

What's in a Name? An Experimental Examination of Investment Behavior

A fundamental unresolved issue is whether information asymmetries underlie investors predisposition to invest close to home (i.e., domestically or locally). We conduct experiments in the United States and Canada to investigate agents portfolio allocation decisions, controlling for the availability of information. Providing participants with information about a firms home base, without disclosing its specific identity, is not sufficient to change investment behavior. Rather, participants need to know a firms name and home base. Additional evidence indicates that participants have a greater perceived familiarity with local and domestic securities and, in turn, invest more in such securities.The authors thank Ann Gillette, Josef Zechner (the editor), and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and acknowledge the financial support of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Georgia Tech, and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.     

Exact Utilities under Alternative Monetary Rules in a Simple Macro Model with Optimizing Agents

We construct an optimizing-agent model of a closed economy which is simple enough that we can use it to make exact utility calculations. There is a stabilization problem because there are one-period nominal contracts for wages, or prices, or both and shocks that are unknown at the time when contracts are signed. We evaluate alternative monetary policy rules using the utility function of the representative agent. Fully optimal policy can attain the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Fully optimal policy is contrasted with both naive and sophisticated simple rules that involve, respectively, complete stabilization and optimal stabilization of one variable or a combination two variables. With wage contracts, outcomes depend crucially on whether there are also price contracts. For example, if labor supply is relatively inelastic, for productivity shocks, nominal income stabilization yields higher welfare when there are no price contracts. However, with price contracts, outcomes are independent of whether there are wage contracts, except, of course, for the nominal wage.     

Small Banks, Small Business, and Relationships: An Empirical Study of Lending to Small Farms

We examine small banks lending to small farms. We find that relationships, as measured by the length of tenure of farm operators, are positively related to bank lending. We also find that de novo banks have a positive tendency to lend to small farms. When existing relationships between borrowers and incumbent lenders are stronger, de novo banks have greater difficulties in lending to small farms. We further find that, even within the category of small banks, lending to small farms (as a percentage of a banks assets) tends to decrease as the bank increases in size.     

Is the ‘Perfect’ Timing Strategy Truly Perfect?

In the presence of transaction cost, the perfect timing strategy which holds stocks in a period with positive excess return and holds cash in a period with negative excess return is not necessarily perfect. Using the optimal growth criterion, this paper derives the truly perfect timing strategy which can achieve the maximum long term growth. It is found that such a perfect timing strategy can achieve a much higher annual return than the perfect timing strategy under reasonable transaction cost. Also, it can achieve a return of over 80% when a review period is as short as a day and when transaction cost is low. Using the truly perfect timing strategy as a benchmark, the likely gains from imperfect timing can be more accurately assessed. For a less frequent review schedule, a market timer needs a very high correct prediction probability in order to be at par with the buy-and-hold strategy. However, the needed correct prediction probability is much less when the review schedule is more frequent. Also, the correct prediction probability needed to be at par with the buy-and-hold strategy increases with the transaction cost.     

Inter-Departmental Cost Allocation and Investment Incentives

This paper endeavors to demonstrate that fixed cost allocation can align investment incentives in a multi-period and multi-division setting. In a decentralized firm, a divisional manager can make an investment that benefits both his own and the operations of a downstream division. The relative budgeted activity (RBA) cost allocation method assigns fixed cost charges according to the ratio of a divisions budgeted activity in proportion to that of the firm, and thereby resolves the hold-up problem created by the decentralized setting. Internal accounting rules can be designed to give managers strong incentives to internalize the firms objective regarding efficient investment levels, and alleviate the tension between ex ante investment efficiency and ex post production efficiency. This paper examines how much the fixed charges should be in order to achieve the optimal level of investment.     

Information Monopoly and Commitment in Intermediary-Firm Relationships

A bank may use the private information that it acquires through monitoring to hold up borrowers. This information monopoly of the bank may inefficiently distort the borrowers investment decisions in environments where moral hazard is prevalent. The paper analyses how this problem is resolved within bank-firm relationships. In the benchmark case when the bank can contractually commit to future actions, the optimal contract turns out to be ambiguous in nature. When commitment contracts cannot be written, firms have an incentive to develop multiple banking relationships in order to decrease the inside banks bargaining power. However, with costly monitoring, this may defeat the initial purpose for contracting with a financial intermediary, namely information production. The paper argues that when contractual commitment is not feasible, bank size may serve as an alternative commitment device that prevents the bank from holding up borrowers in the future.     

Parallel cartoons of fractal models of finance

Summary. Having been crafted to welcome a new scientific journal, this paper looks forward but requires no special prerequisite. The argument builds on a technical wrinkle (used earlier but explained here fully for the first time), namely, the authors grid-bound variant of Brownian motion B(t). While B(t) itself is additive, this variant is a multiplicative recursive process the author calls a cartoon. Reliance on this and related cartoons allows a new perspicuous exposition of the various fractal/multifractal models for the variation of financial prices. These illustrations do not claim to represent reality in its full detail, but suffice to imitate and bring out its principal features, namely, long tailedness, long dependence, and clustering. The goal is to convince the reader that the fractals/multifractals are not an exotic technical nightmare that could be avoided. In fact, the authors models arose successively as proper, natural, and even unavoidable generalization of the Brownian motion model of price variation. Considered within the context of those generalizations, the original Brownian comes out as very special and narrowly constricted, while the fractal/multifractal models come out as nearly as simple and parsimonious as the Brownian. The cartoons are stylized recursive variants of the authors fractal/multifractal models, which are even more versatile and realistic.This revised version was published online in January 2005 with corrections to the Cover date.     

On the Economics of Subprime Lending

US mortgage markets have evolved radically in recent years. An important part of the change has been the rise of the subprime market, characterized by loans with high default rates, dominance by specialized subprime lenders rather than full-service lenders, and little coverage by the secondary mortgage market. In this paper, we examine these and other stylized facts with standard tools used by financial economists to describe market structure in other contexts. We use three models to examine market structure: an option-based approach to mortgage pricing in which we argue that subprime options are different from prime options, causing different contracts and prices; and two models based on asymmetric information–one with asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and one with the asymmetry between lenders and the secondary market. In both of the asymmetric-information models, investors set up incentives for borrowers or loan sellers to reveal information, primarily through costs of rejection.     

The Disciplining Role of Accounting in the Long-Run

One role of accounting is to discipline softer (more manipulable) sources of information. We use a principal-agent model of hidden actions and hidden information to study this role. In our model, there is both a verifiable signal (a publicly observed output) and an unverifiable signal (a productivity parameter privately observed by the agent). In a one-period setting, the optimal contract does not make use of the agents report on the private signal. However, when the output is tracked over two periods, the agents communication can be valuable. This reversal of results suggests uncovering the disciplining role of accounting may require a long-term perspective.JEL Classification: D82, M41     

Nonparametric prediction for the time-dependent volatility of the security price

In this paper we consider a continuous time model for the security price with the time-dependent volatility. It is shown that the non-normality and non-linear dependency of the short-term return, the major characteristics observed on many financial assets, can be incorporated into our model. In order to evaluate the option price formula on the model we propose a nonparametric predictor for the volatility function without reference to a specific functional form. We examine the so-called continuous record asymptotics and show that the proposed predictor is asymptotically minimax for a wide class of the volatility functions. One of the most important results is that the application of the Black-Scholes method can be justified by plugging the proposed predictor in the standard Black-Scholes formula even if the volatility changes over time.     

Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies

We use a unique data set to study how U.K. banks deal with financially distressed small and medium-sized companies under a contractualist bankruptcy system. Unlike in the U.S., these procedures limit the discretion of courts to strict enforcement of debt contracts, without any dilution of creditors claims. We show that lenders and borrowers select a debt structure that avoids some of the market failures often attributed to a contractualist system. Collateral and liquidation rights are highly concentrated in the hands of the main bank, giving it a dominant position in restructuring or liquidating a defaulting firm. There is little litigation, and no evidence of co-ordination failures or creditors runs. However, there is some evidence that the banks dominance makes it lazy in monitoring, relying heavily on the value of its collateral in timing the bankruptcy decision.     

Mortgage Termination: An Empirical Hazard Model with a Stochastic Term Structure

Pricing for mortgage and mortgage-backed securities is complicated due to the stochastic and interdependent nature of prepayment and default risks. This paper presents a unified economic model of the contingent claims and competing risks of mortgage termination by prepayment and default. I adopt a proportional hazard framework to analyze these competing and interdependent risks in a model with time-varying covariates. The paper incorporates a stochastic interest rate model into the hazard function for prepayment. The empirical results reported in the paper provide new evidence about the ruthlessness of default and prepayment behavior and the sensitivity of these decisions to demographic as well as financial phenomena. The results also illustrate that evaluating the interest rate contingent claims with a stochastic term structure has effects on predicting not only the mortgage prepayment behavior but also the mortgage default behavior.     

Environmental Taxes, International Capital Mobility and Inefficient Tax Systems: Tax Burden vs. Tax Shifting

This paper deals with the so-called double dividend of an environmental tax reform. In a model with only labor and a polluting input as factors of production, we find that society faces a trade-off between internalizing environmental externalities and raising revenues in the least distortionary way. However, if capital enters the production structure, an ecological tax reform may render the tax structure more efficient from a non-environmental point of view, thereby raising not only environmental quality but also private incomes.