信托运用于BOT项目的功能及其法律关系

BOT模式在当今中国的公共基础设施建设中被广泛运用,它对于缓解国家财政压力以及改善民生,促进民间资本投资有着多方面的积极意义,在BOT项目中运用信托的方式可以使项目得到更好的开展并确保成功,对于项目各方包括投资人,发起人,与BOT项目有关的其他民间资本等的权益可以更好的保障.     

我国应用BOT进行公路基础设施建设的机遇及发展前景

一、BOT项目的运作模式 BOT是英文"Built、Operate、Transfer"的缩写,即"建设、经营、移交".BOT作为一种项目融资的方式,其基本运作模式是由政府和项目发起人签订特许权授让协议,再由项目发起人组织成立的项目公司承担大型基础设施项目的融资、设计、建设、营运和维护的任务;在规定的特许经营期内,项目公司拥有该项目的所有权并收取费用,用所得收入清偿项目债务,弥补经营开支并获得预期的投资回报;在特许经营期结束后,再将项目无偿移交给政府.BOT项目一般应经过以下几个阶段:项目确定、发包、融资、建设、运营和项目的最终移交.     

国际BOT水电开发项目的风险与规避

建设-经营-移交即BOT是一种项目融资模式和项目管理方式.国际BOT项目通常要求项目发起人依据东道国的法律在东道国注册成立项目公司,由项目公司与东道国政府授权的所属机构签订特许经营协议,通过有限追索的项目融资方式来筹集资金,建设公共设施项目.     

BOT/PPP项目社会效益评价指标的选择

BOT/PPP作为一种重要的融资模式,对基础设施建设过程中解决政府财政压力、引进外资、促进民间资本投入和提高效率等方面有很大优势.然而,BOT/PPP项目同时具有巨大的社会效益.本文在详尽汇总原有指标体系的基础上,结合BOT/PPP项目的特点,试图建立一套适合BOT/PPP项目社会效益评价的指标体系,共有一级指标4个,二级指标20个,以方便评价人员依据项目的特点选择指标体系进行社会效益评价.     

BOT项目套牢问题的博弈分析北大核心CSSCI

由于合同的不完全性和资产的专用性,BOT项目参与方受利益驱动可能采用机会主义行为套牢对方。本文研究了BOT项目中的套牢问题,给出了项目公司和政府套牢问题的博弈收益矩阵;并引入产品购买方,构建了产品购买方和项目公司在政府监督和不监督两种情况下的基于合同价格谈判的套牢问题的博弈收益矩阵。求解得到各方采取套牢行为的临界条件,给出了不同情况下参与方的最优策略。研究表明,政府通过适时的监督、适当的罚款额度和合适的利益激励机制避免被项目公司套牢;项目公司应增大其事前的产权比例和再谈判成本,防止产品购买方通过价格再谈判将其套牢。     

项目融资BOT模式与TOT模式的比较

BOT模式的基本思路是：由一国财团或投资人作为项目的发起人，从一个国家的政府或所属机构获得某些基础设施的建设特许权，然后独立或联合其他方组建项目公司，负责项目的融资、设计、建造和运营。整个特许期内项目公司通过运营来获取利润，并用此利润来偿还债务。在特许期满之时，整个项目由项目公司无偿或以极少的名义价格转交给东道国政府。     

BOT项目公司的法律规制与完善

BOT作为一种投融资方式，具有减轻政府财政负担、提高基础设施建设和运行效率的特点，80年代以来在国际上备受关注并日渐推广。“九五”期间，我国已将BOT作为重要的投融资方式运用于基础设施建设中，但到目前为止，总体上仍是开花多结果少，反映了BOT在发展中面临着诸多障碍。其中，法律障碍是亟需解决的问题。鉴于BOT项目公司是利用BOT投融资方式的中介，在BOT项目中处于重要的地位，也是BOT法律制度调整的主要和重要对象，本文以现行法律对BOT项目公司的规制为线索来探讨在我国推行BOT投融资方式的相关法律问题。BOT与BOT…     

基础设施项目BOT融资分析

BOT作为政府与社会投资者合作运作我国基础设施项目的一种投融资模式,在有效缓解我国政府财政压力的同时,又为国内外社会资金提供了一个具有长期、稳定回报的投资机会,目前正逐渐被推广使用。     

一级密封招标在项目建设BOT方式中的应用分析

在项目建设BOT方式的环境下,分别对以特许期、单位产品收费价格、支付资金及总回收资金为竞标变量的一级密封招标进行了研究。建立了投标人之间的不完全信息静态博弈模型,给出了投标人的最优竞标策略并对各竞标变量选拔投标人的有效性进行了分析。分析显示当竞标人之间对市场的预期不同时,几种竞标变量下的最优竞标策略均存在失效的可能;当单位时间运营和维护成本可以忽略时,以总回收资金为竞标变量是最佳的选择。     

BOT：一个成熟的项目融资方式

一、BOT融资的含义 BOT是英文Build-Operate-Transfer的缩写，即建设-经营-移交方式，是政府将一个基础设施项目的特许权授予承包商卜般为国际财团）。承包商在特许期内负责项目设计、融资、建设和运营，并回收成本、偿还债务、赚取利润，特许期结束后将项目所有权移交政府。实质上，BOT融资方式是政府与承包商合作经营基础设施项目的一种特殊运作模式。     

基于蒙特卡罗的随机投标商人数决策问题

随着我国社会主义市场经济的逐步完善,竞争性招投标方法被引入到各个行业,尤其是在大型建设项目中,普遍实行了招投标方法,因此招投标理论逐渐成为人们日益关注的焦点。笔者探讨了投标商人数为随机时的投标决策问题,认为在招投标为对称情形时,可得到一个形式简单的报价方程,并基于蒙特卡罗模拟法给出了一种新解法。     

BOT projects: Incentives and efficiency

In recent years, governments have been increasingly adopting Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts for large infrastructure projects. However, BOT contracts have received little attention from economists. The apparent agency problem in BOT projects has never been analyzed. In this paper, we develop a model to examine the incentives, efficiency and regulation in BOT contracts. We show that a BOT contract with a price regulation during the concession period and a license extension after the concession period is capable of achieving full efficiency. Both license extension and price control are observed in many real-world BOT projects. We also investigate the efficiency in such contracts by considering other factors, including time consistency, price ceiling, foreign ownership, and the lack of price regulation.     

Labor Market Institutions and the Second-Best Tariff

Labor market distortions provide a second-best case for protection. However, the implications are less obvious when the product market is imperfectly competitive too, as suggested by several partial equilibrium studies. This paper adopts a general equilibrium approach, combining unionization in labor markets with monopolistic competition in product markets. Two labor market settings are considered: fully centralized wage bargaining ("Scandinavia", for short) and negotiation at the firm level ("Latin America"). The competitive labor market case is used as a benchmark. It is shown that in Latin America the second-best tariff is higher, and the welfare level lower, than in the benchmark case. Scandinavia reaches the first best under free trade.     

SPECTRUM LICENSING AND FLEXIBLE BEAUTY CONTEST DESIGNS

McMillan's (1995) ‘flexibility’ proposition suggests a testable hypothesis about beauty contests spectrum assignments. Such flexibility purportedly allows regulators to pursue social welfare (network deployment) goals. A separate argument is that more competitive beauty contests enhance the probability of assignment. The study concludes that regulators do indeed focus on societal (network deployment) welfare goals. Initially, consideration is given in the immediate term where licenses are awarded based on operator aftermarket commitments. Subsequently, spectrum package attributes and financial performance obligations, specified in the tender documents, come into play to support the networks spread more widely through the population in a timely manner. Finally, the econometric results suggest that more competitive beauty contests enhance the probability of assignment.     

Broadening the picture: Negotiating payment schemes for water-related environmental services in the Netherlands

This paper explores how the development of payment schemes for water-related environmental services can be understood and supported. Currently, the development of such payment schemes is perceived mainly through theoretical lenses offered by economists and hydrologists. Notwithstanding the usefulness and appropriateness of these theoretical lenses, they have difficulties to accommodate certain aspects of the development of payment schemes for water-related environmental services. Specifically, the discussion of negotiation aspects remains relatively isolated and superficial, even though it is generally acknowledged that the development of payment schemes is often significantly influenced by political negotiations. This paper addresses this limitation. It shows how the main elements of negotiation analysis can provide a theoretical underpinning for important drivers behind the development of specific payment schemes, which are beyond the scope of hydrological or economic rationality. Four cases of water-related payment schemes in the Netherlands are studied, employing one of the key insights offered by negotiation analysis: the importance of the underlying interests and values of the parties involved. The findings of these four cases show the potential of negotiation analysis as a useful complement for understanding and supporting the development of payment schemes for environmental services.     

THE STRATEGIC PROCESS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME OF A TENDER

ABSTRACT ** :  A competitive tendering process within a public organization does not always render the anticipated results, i.e., the intended strategy is not always realized. This paper shows that the way the strategy process is managed by the parties involved in the tender is of importance to the outcome. Previous research has mainly focused on the situation ex ante the tendering process. This paper contributes to the research on competitive tendering by focusing on the management that takes place ex post the tendering process. For this purpose a theoretical framework consisting of a process-based approach on strategy formation is applied to the analysis of two case studies of competitive tendering in the Swedish water and sewage sector.     

Public Procurement at the Local Level in Austria: The Economic Consequences of Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Public Services

This paper looks at possible problems concerning the economic effects of the introduction of an compulsory competitive tendering for general economic interest services at the local level. It examines the framework in Austria and some fundamental problems of competitive tendering. An obligation binding local authorities to put general economic interest services up for competitive tender, as currently intended by the European Commission (i.e. service concessions), would have considerable medium- and long-term effects on both the process of municipal service provision and the economic position of municipal (public) enterprises. The paper concludes that, from an economic point of view, procurement through competitive tendering does not appear to be effective or tenable for all general economic interest services in (all) different areas. The introduction of compulsory competitive tendering for service concessions in all areas of public services is therefore something best forgotten.     

BOT投资方式分析

BOT是国际上一种新兴的投资方式，它既缓解了东道国政府基础设施急需建设和资金困难的矛盾，同时也带动了资本输入国国民经济、科学技术和管理水平的提高。主要对BOT投资方式的含义、法律特征、法律性质以及我国BOT投资立法的完善问题进行分析，以期引起人们对BOT投资方式及其立法的更多思考。     

利用BOT建设小城镇的思考

采用BOT方式建设小城镇，有利于减轻地方财政负担，加快小城镇基础设施建设速度，提高小城镇基础设施的技术管理水平和营运效率，充分发挥市场机制和政府干预的协同作用，吸引民间资本进入小城镇基础设施建设。为了积极推动利用BOT方式进行小城镇基础设施建设，必须对BOT项目实行优惠政策并形成一系列相应的配套措施。