Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

How Do Diversity of Opinion and Information Asymmetry Affect Acquirer Returns?

We examine the theoretical predictions that link acquirer returnsto diversity of opinion and information asymmetry. Theory suggeststhat acquirer abnormal returns should be negatively relatedto information asymmetry and diversity-of-opinion proxies forequity offers but not cash offers. We find that this is thecase and that, more strikingly, there is no difference in abnormalreturns between cash offers for public firms, equity offersfor public firms, and equity offers for private firms aftercontrolling for one of these proxies, idiosyncratic volatility.     

Can financial statement analysis beat consensus analysts’ recommendations?

We examine whether investors can exploit financial statement information to identify companies with a greater likelihood of future earnings increases and whether stocks of those companies generate 1-year abnormal returns that exceed the abnormal returns from following analysts’ consensus recommendations. Our approach summarizes financial statement information into a “predicted earnings increase score,” which captures the likelihood of 1-year-ahead earnings increases. We find that, within our sample of consensus recommendations, stocks with high scores are much more likely to experience future earnings increases than stocks with low scores. A hedge portfolio strategy that utilizes our approach within each consensus recommendation level generates average annual abnormal returns of 10.9 percent over our 12-year sample period, after controlling for previously identified risk factors. These abnormal returns exceed those available from following analysts’ consensus recommendations. Our results show that share prices and consensus recommendations fail to impound financial statement information that helps predict future earnings changes.     

The impact on stock prices of deferral and elimination of internal control audit requirement for small firms

This paper examines the cumulative market reaction to the events related to deferral of internal control audit requirement under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and its elimination under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 for nonaccelerated filers (small firms). We document that small firms experienced negative cumulative abnormal returns around these events; and the differences between the cumulative abnormal returns for small firms and the two control groups (accelerated and large accelerated filers) were negative and significant at the 1% level. These results support the notion that market participants value the reliability of financial information irrespective of the firm size. Within the small firms, we find no firm characteristic significantly explains the market reaction to the events considered. That is, all small firms lost market value in reaction to the events that delayed and eliminated their internal control audit requirement.     

Internal control reporting and market liquidity

We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on information asymmetry by analyzing the relation between SOX Sections 302 and 404 control reports and market liquidity using bid-ask spreads. Lower market liquidity indicates higher levels of information asymmetry implying that market participants perceive financial statement misstatement risk is higher. If SOX disclosures contain relevant information, then one would expect firms reporting internal control material weaknesses to have lower market liquidity. Accordingly, we find that market liquidity is lower (i.e., bid-ask spreads are higher) for firms reporting ineffective control compared to firms reporting effective control using either annual SOX 404 internal control reports or quarterly SOX 302 disclosure control reports, which suggests that SOX 302 and 404 reports provide useful information for identifying firms with a higher risk of financial statement misstatement. However, we do not find consistent results using two alternative liquidity measures: trading volume and market quality indices. We then examine whether changes in control reports are associated with changes in market liquidity. We generally do not find that firms with improved (deteriorated) control reports experience a larger decrease (increase) in bid-ask spreads or larger increases (decreases) in trading volume and market quality indices compared to other firms, suggesting that market participants do not discern a change in information asymmetry when the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting changes.     

Information and Long‐Term Stock Performance Following Open‐Market Share Repurchases

We find that firm managers have private information when they decide on open‐market share repurchases, and that this information is significantly correlated with announcement period and post‐announcement abnormal returns. We further find that long‐term post‐announcement abnormal returns are related to private information differently for firms that actually repurchase shares when compared to firms that announce a repurchase program but do not acquire shares. Our results indicate that managers’ private information is only ambiguously revealed by the repurchase announcement, and that the market waits for the firm's subsequent actions, such as actual repurchase, to further interpret the private information.     

Value Relevance of Comprehensive Income for the Canadian Market*

The value relevance of comprehensive income (CI) compared to net income (NI) remains unresolved. We look at this issue in the Canadian market, using association methods to determine the value relevance of reporting CI and other comprehensive income (OCI) components for stock prices and returns. The sample consists of all the firms in the S&P/TSX Composite Index that prepared their financial statements according to Canadian standards or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) over the 2008–2016 period. Although we find no evidence that CI is more value relevant than NI for stock prices and returns, we note that some OCI components are incrementally value relevant beyond NI for both amounts. In addition, financial services firms differ from other companies in terms of the relationships between some of their OCI components and prices or returns, with such firms even driving some relationships. Relationships between OCI components and prices or returns are also affected when data from the financial crisis period are excluded, with some relationships even changing after IFRS adoption. These results inform Canadian standard setters and financial statement users that OCI components are decision useful for the Canadian market.     

VALUATION EFFECTS OF OPEN MARKET STOCK REPURCHASES FOR FINANCIALLY WEAK FIRMS

We test the proposition that announcements of open market stock repurchases improve the flow of positive information regarding the firm's prospects, particularly for financially weak firms. For financially strong firms with already good prospects for cash flows, the role of stock repurchases is less important. We provide evidence for an inverse relationship between financial risk, measured by bond rating, and the magnitude of stock repurchase-induced abnormal returns. Results also suggest that the value of information implied by announcements of open market repurchases about increases in cash flows and leverage, is more important for financially weak firms than for financially strong firms.     

The Equity Share in New Issues and Aggregate Stock Returns

The share of equity issues in total new equity and debt issues is a strong predictor of U.S. stock market returns between 1928 and 1997. In particular, firms issue relatively more equity than debt just before periods of low market returns. The equity share in new issues has stable predictive power in both halves of the sample period and after controlling for other known predictors. We do not find support for efficient market explanations of the results. Instead, the fact that the equity share sometimes predicts significantly negative market returns suggests inefficiency and that firms time the market component of their returns when issuing securities.     

Foreign Exchange Exposure Elasticity and Financial Distress

Financially distressed firms have limited ability to manage exchange rate exposure over time which could cause their fundamental value to be sensitive to the cash flow volatility related to currency movements. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the likelihood and costs of financial distress help explain cross‐sectional variations in return sensitivity to currency movements. We find that the level of exchange rate exposure elasticity is related to proxies for the likelihood of financial distress, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness. Further, firms with a greater likelihood and higher costs of financial distress exhibit greater abnormal returns in response to large exchange rate shocks.     

Scale and the Scale Effect in Market‐based Accounting Research

The nature of the data we usually encounter in market‐based accounting research is such that the results of the regressions of market capitalization on financial statement variables (referred to 'price‐levels' regressions) are driven by a relatively small subset of the very largest firms in the sample. We refer to this overwhelming influence of the largest firms as the 'scale effect'. This effect is more than heteroscedasticity. It arises due to the non‐linearity in the relation between market capitalization and the financial statement variables. We present the case that scale is market capitalization rather than a correlated omitted variable. Since scale is market capitalization, we advocate its use as a deflator in a regression estimated using weighted least squares. This regression overcomes the scale effect and the resultant regression residuals are more economically meaningful. Christie's (1987) depiction of scale is the same as ours but he advocates the use of the returns regression specification in order to avoid scale effects. We agree that returns regressions should be used unless the research question calls for a price‐levels regression.     

Predicting Stock Returns Using Financial Statement Information

We examine the profitability of the Ou and Penman (1989a) Pr trading strategy and the Holthausen and Larcker (1992) Prob trading strategy over the period 1980–1992 in the UK. This is a test of whether an investor can earn abnormal returns by exploiting fundamental accounting data. We employ alternative abnormal return metrics and research designs to control for risk. Using a UK dataset offers an independent test because the UK differs from the US in its formal and informal financial reporting environment, its structure of share ownership, and the behaviour of its economy over the study period. We find consistent evidence that an investor could have used a summary measure of financial statement information to predict future abnormal returns by indirectly predicting one-year-ahead earnings changes, but only weak and inconsistent evidence that an investor could have used a summary measure of financial statement information to predict one-year-ahead stock returns directly. We offer some thoughts on the reasons for these different results.     

线上销售与未来股票收益

本文通过分析相关上市公司在电商平台的线上销售数据,发现线上销售增长可以预测未来股票收益。根据线上销售增长率构建投资组合可以获得月均1.27%的超额收益,经三因子、五因子模型调整后收益率分别为1.40%和1.35%,并且该超额收益在较长时间内不会逆转。横截面回归结果显示,线上销售增长与未来股票收益显著正相关,并在控制其他市场异象因子后仍然显著。此外,本文还发现线上销售数据的预测能力主要集中在投资者关注有限、线上销售占比高以及套利成本高的公司,其投资价值来源于对公司未来基本面信息的预测能力。进一步研究表明,同时利用线上销售指标和营业收入指标进行投资可以获得更高的超额收益。在考虑业绩预告和业绩快报对线上销售指标预测能力的潜在影响后,结果依然稳健。     

Equity issues when in distress

We investigate the role of financial distress in the seasoned equity market. We find that distressed firms comprise about 40% of SEOs and these distressed issuers have worse abnormal announcement returns than non‐distressed issuers. Stock return volatility is an important determinant for announcement returns for non‐distressed SEO issuers but not for distressed SEO issuers. Signals of firm quality are associated with better announcement returns, larger issues, increased investment, improved operating performance, and lower likelihood of delisting for distressed SEO firms as compared to non‐distressed firms. Our findings suggest equity finance is valuable for financially distressed firms with strong growth prospects.     

Abnormal returns to investment strategies based on the timing of earnings reports

This paper adds to recent evidence on market inefficiency in processing information in earnings reports. It documents that short positions taken in sample stocks which did not report earnings by the date expected during the sample period, 1971–1976, would have been abnormally profitable, before transaction costs. This is because late reports, on average, revealed bad news which was not anticipated in market prices prior to the report date. The magnitude of the average abnormal returns is in the order of 1.0% over 20 days but is larger for smaller firms in the sample and positively related to the length of the reporting delay. The paper also documents that long positions taken in stocks reporting early with good news would have generated abnormal returns of approximately 1.0% on average over a 20-day holding period.     

Loss persistence and returns in the UK

In this study, we examine whether estimated loss reversal probabilities are fully reflected in UK stock market prices. Overall, we provide evidence of varying degrees and types of loss firm mispricing with respect to estimated loss reversal probabilities. In particular, a significant and positive relationship between loss reversal probability and annual returns is found only for firms with higher trading costs. When looking at monthly returns, however, especially for the financial statement release month subsequent to the loss year, a significant and positive relationship is found for all firms. Thus, the evidence is consistent with UK market participants not fully incorporating relevant information into the pricing of loss firms and, as a consequence, being surprised by the content of the earnings for many or all UK loss firms.     

Factors Associated with Differences in the Magnitude of Abnormal Returns Around NYSE Versus Nasdaq Firms' Earnings Announcements

This study provides an explanation for the 'exchange effect' puzzle documented in prior accounting research. Grant (1980) finds that the magnitude of earnings announcement week abnormal returns is higher, on average, for firms traded over-the-counter than for NYSE firms. Atiase (1987) shows that this incremental 'exchange effect' persists even after controlling for firm size. We investigate potential explanations for this incremental exchange effect. We first show that even after controlling for differences in firm size, Nasdaq firms have less rich information environments and enjoy greater growth opportunities than NYSE firms. We then investigate whether differential predisclosure information environments and/or growth opportunities can explain the incremental exchange effect. The results indicate that although the absolute magnitude of the earnings announcement-related abnormal returns is inversely related to proxies for the amount of predisclosure information, the incremental exchange effect cannot be explained by differences in the predisclosure information environment. In contrast, after controlling for differences in growth opportunities across NYSE versus Nasdaq firms, and investors' heightened sensitivity to Nasdaq firms' growth opportunities in particular, there is no significant incremental exchange effect (whether or not we control for predisclosure information). These results suggest that the incremental exchange effect puzzle documented in prior research is more likely to reflect growth-related phenomena than differences in the predisclosure information environment.     

Corporate Governance,Valuation, and Performance: Evidence from a Voluntary Market Reform in Brazil

In December 2000, the São Paulo Stock Exchange launched a new premium market segment for companies that voluntarily commit to “good practices of corporate governance.” We construct a composite index (NM6) that combines six proxies for the main governance practices targeted by Bovespa's reform. We find that higher scores for our index are related to greater market value but not to better operating performance. An investment strategy that purchased stocks of firms with high NM6 and sold stocks of firms with low NM6 would have earned abnormal returns of 10.68% per year from 2001 to 2005.     

Market uncertainty and disclosure of internal control deficiencies under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

This study examines cross-sectional differences in stock market reactions to the disclosure of internal control deficiencies under Section 302 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We hypothesize that the market punishment for internal control problems will be less severe for internal control disclosure that helps reduce market uncertainty around the disclosure. We also predict that such a relation is dependent on the types of disclosure and the market’s prior knowledge of the credibility of firms’ financial reporting. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that when firms disclose their internal control deficiencies, their abnormal stock returns are negatively associated with changes in market uncertainty (e.g., changes in the standard deviations of daily stock returns) around the disclosure. We also find that the impact of the uncertainty reduction is greater for voluntary disclosures of non-material weakness, especially those made in the context of previous suspicious events. The negative impact of changes in market uncertainty on the abnormal stock returns remains intact even after controlling for possible simultaneity. An analysis using financial analysts’ earnings forecasts dispersion as an alternative proxy for uncertainty confirms the results.     

Unfunded pension liabilities and stock returns

This paper investigates whether the market rationally anticipates the value implications of unrecognized pension obligations, using a large sample of Japanese firms where pension obligations are substantially underfunded. If a firm's unrecognized pension obligation is not incorporated into its share price, its stock returns will be lower than those of other firms, because its deficit will affect the firm's income statement in the coming years. We find that firms with large unrecognized obligations earn lower risk-adjusted returns. This evidence suggests that the market does not efficiently incorporate information in the pension items.