保险市场信息不对称问题研究

保险市场是一个典型的信息不对称市场,主要表现为逆选择和道德风险问题,其实另外一类信息不对称也越来越引起监管者及社会公众的注意,那就是保险公司利用信息不对称对投保人或保险潜在消费者甚至对社会公众投资者而产生的不利影响。这种对信息占有的不对称状况,很容易被保险市场参与者所利用,并导致保险市场运行的低效率。目前,中国保险市场上保险公司和投保人之间的信息不对称问题表现得比较突出,已经成为制约保险业可持续发展的一个重要因素。本文从理论角度研究信息不对称问题产生的机制,梳理信息不对称问题在理论上的解决方法,并从中得到保险市场应对信息不对称问题的建议,以期对中国保险市场的健康发展起到借鉴意义。     

信息不对称对保险业的影响及治理措施

保险市场是一个典型的信息不对称市场,保险市场的不对称信息主要包括逆向选择和道德风险。保险市场信息不对称将导致保险市场资源配置的低效率,因此要加强保险市场信息披露,完善和发展保险技术,整顿市场秩序,以促进保险市场的健康发展。     

浅析农业保险市场中信息不对称的双重性及其应对策略

通过分析农业保险市场中信息不对称的双重性及其影响,具体表现为：投保人（农业生产者）拥有的有关保险标的的个体信息优势及其引发的逆向选择和道德风险问题;保险人拥有的有关保险产品、保险市场、保险公司经营情况等整体信息优势及其引发的逆向选择和道德风险问题,在此基础上提出一些应对农业保险市场中信息不对称双重性的策略建议,从而促进中国农业保险市场的健康发展。     

浅析规避逆选择和道德风险的制度建设

随着社会经济的发展,中国保险业也在飞速发展.但是在发展的背后也存在很多问题.保险市场是典型的信息不对称市场,由信息不对称引起的逆选择和道德风险是广泛存在的.这些问题在很大程度上影响了保险风险分散机制的发挥,进而阻碍了保险市场的发展.本文主要结合我国保险市场的实际情况从制度建设的角度提出了规避保险市场逆选择和道德风险的对策.     

道德风险视角下的保险业信用问题

“最大诚信原则”是保险业经营的基本原则，但是保险市场各方道德风险的存在使“最大诚信”难以很好的发挥。各种道德风险对保险市场产生了很大的危害，如果不有效的控制，就会进一步引发保险业的诚信危机。由于保险机制的固有特性，无论是保险的买方还是卖方都不可能如愿获得足够的信息，这种对信息占有的不对称状况，很容易被保险市场参与者所利用，并导致保险市场道德风险的产生。那么，控制道德风险的对策就是建一个“人人诚实守信”的保险业的信用体系，这个体系应该从监管、制度等层面上控制道德风险的产生。     

保险市场信息不对称问题探讨

由于保险市场信息不对称,投保人无法了解保险产品质量,保险人对保险标的或被保险人的实际情况又不如投保人了解透彻,导致保险市场资源配置无效率,高质量保险无人买,而投保人的需求得不到满足,同时存在"逆向选择"和"道德风险"问题。本文通过分析保险市场信息不对称的表现形式及其原因,提出几点对策。     

对信息不对称市场上信贷配给现象的思考

在一个信息不对称的信贷市场上,银行和企业之间的信息是不对称的。由于信息不对称,将导致逆向选择和道德风险问题,进而出现信贷配给现象。与一般性均衡下的供求相等不同,信贷配给性均衡状态下的需求大于供给。本文分析了信息不对称-逆向选择和道德风险-信贷配给的传导机制,并证明了信贷市场上配给性均衡的长期存在性。     

对信息不对称市场上信贷配给现象的思考

在一个信息不对称的信贷市场上,银行和企业之间的信息是不对称的.由于信息不对称,将导致逆向选择和道德风险问题,进而出现信贷配给现象.与一般性均衡下的供求相等不同,信贷配给性均衡状态下的需求大于供给.本文分析了信息不对称-逆向选择和道德风险-信贷配给的传导机制,并证明了信贷市场上配给性均衡的长期存在性.     

科技保险中利益相关方的和谐路径研究

该文针对我国未来科技保险市场中可能出现的由信息不对称引起的道德风险、逆向选择等问题,提出建立由科技保险中两个重要的利益相关方——保险公司和高新技术企业组成创新战略联盟,并尽力解决联盟中可能出现的问题,达到双方和谐发展,进而促进我国科技保险事业可持续发展的目的。     

关于保险信息不对称问题的探讨

保险市场的信息不对称是客观存在的,其对保险契约的达成、市场的运转产生不容低估的影响。拟就保险信息不对称的表现、影响及矫正问题进行探讨。     

Does asymmetric information matter in the early insurance market? Evidence from the auto insurance market

In the late 1960s, the performance of automobile insurance declined dramatically in Japan in spite of rapid growth in the diffusion rate, and the premiums were sharply raised several times in order to improve the situation. This observation indicates the possible presence of adverse selection (death spiral), and provides an ideal situation for assessing informational asymmetry. Using bodily injury liability (BIL) insurance data from 46 Japanese prefectures over the period 1966 to 1975, this article tests two hypotheses of adverse selection: (i) high-risk drivers were more likely to join the BIL insurance market and (ii) sharp premium increases drove low-risk policyholders away. Various empirical analyses show that there is little evidence for either type of adverse selection. We also test whether a risk-misperception hypothesis can explain our results, and find some evidence that the population density have a significantly positive impact on the demand for BIL insurance.     

基于委托代理视角的寿险转保行为分析

寿险转保已成为保险市场上一种普遍的现象,由于信息和专业知识的缺乏,保单持有人进行寿险转保交易必须通过保险代理人,而保险代理人和保单持有人的行为目的不一致,导致诱导转保时有发生。本文通过建立委托代理模型分析后发现目前的代理人佣金支付制度鼓励代理人诱导转保,而引入奖惩机制则能对代理人形成激励,本文运用比较静态分析方法,考察不同制度设计对代理人行为的影响,提出了初步的制度设计构想,从而为监管机构出台相应的政策法规提供思路。     

Information Asymmetries and Risk Management in Healthcare Markets: The U.S. Affordable Care Act in Retrospect

This article critically examines the pertinent issues in ex ante and ex post moral hazard in healthcare markets, with the U.S. Affordable Care Act (ACA) as its focal point of inquiry. First, it compares the various types of information asymmetries resulting from the production, allocation, and utilization of health insurance. Second, it reviews the literature on adverse selection, moral hazard, and risk mitigation against which salient ACA reforms are analyzed. In contrasting conventional moral hazard from an alternative theory of welfare maximization, it suggests that healthcare (over)utilization cannot necessarily be considered wasteful, even if it ends up costing insurers more on a short-term basis. Costs and savings attributable to healthcare spending under the ACA will vary between the consumer, insurer, and regulator-subsidizer. Despite the ambiguities surrounding definitions of “health,” the challenge of containing inefficient moral hazard, and encouraging its desirable counterpart, lies in the tradeoffs that arise between consumer access to affordable and quality healthcare and the market competitiveness of health insurers. The new Trump administration will have to address these tradeoffs in repealing and replacing the ACA, particularly in light of escalating insurance premiums and deductibles, narrower provider networks, and technical implementation issues.     

The welfare effect of income tax deductions for losses as insurance: Insured- versus insurer-sided adverse selection

Kaplow (1992) shows in a complete-information environment that allowing income tax deductions for losses as partial insurance is undesirable in the presence of private insurance markets. This paper elaborates on Kaplow's finding by studying two extreme types of asymmetric information structures in private insurance markets: Either the insured or insurers possess superior information. It is shown that our derived result is consistent with Kaplow's if the insured have superior information; however, Kaplow's negative conclusion with respect to the income tax deduction will be overturned if insurers have superior information instead. A policy implication from our finding is that whether or not to allow an income tax deduction for losses needs to be more refined and, specifically, it should be tailored to the “adverse selection” information structures of private insurance.     

中国居民医疗保险购买行为研究-基于商业健康保险的角度

本文通过健康保险市场供需双方行为分析,构建居民医疗保险购买行为模型,利用中国健康与营养调查数据(2000—2006),运用部分观测的二元Probit估计方法(Bivariate Probit with partial observability),从实证的角度分析商业健康保险市场中供需双方各自的风险选择行为,以及城乡地区居民对商业健康保险的潜在需求行为及其宏微观影响因素。本文发现:(1)城乡居民都存在显著的逆向选择行为;(2)城乡社会医疗保障对居民商业健康保险需求行为有显著的促进作用;(3)影响居民商业健康保险行为的其他因素还包括,个人的风险偏好和经济购买力。     

A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt

We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-risk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance terms. We explore two different mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Our theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer credit and auto insurance markets.     

我国农业保险信息不对称问题研究

农业保险是现代农业发展的有力保障,也是强农惠农的重要政策之一,但信息不对称问题严重阻碍了我国农业保险的发展。研究发现,投保农户与保险公司的逆选择、心里风险和道德风险是农业保险信息不对称的主要表现形式,而农业生产的特殊性、农业风险的多样化,以及农业保险的利益外溢性和我国农民保险知识匮乏、诚信意识较差等等是导致我国农业保险信息不对称问题产生的主要原因。因此,本文提出建立适合我国国情的农业保险经营模式,积极发展由政府支持、商业保险公司参与的农业保险合作社模式经营农业保险;并根据农业保险信息不对称的不同表现形式,建立相应的博弈模型从而优化保单设计、制定合理价格策略;最后,加大科技投入建立信息甄别机制和险情评估系统、宣传农业保险以及建立农业保险监管体系等也是防范信息不对称的重要举措。     

Private Information in Life Insurance,Annuity, and Health Insurance Markets

Economic theory predicts that private information on risks in insurance markets leads to adverse selection. To counterbalance private information, insurers collect and use information on applicants to assess their risk and to calculate premiums in an underwriting process. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), this paper documents that differences in the information used in underwriting across life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets attenuate private information to different extents. The results are in line with – and might help to reconcile – the mixed empirical evidence on adverse selection across these markets.     

Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets

This paper analyzes the equilibrium of an insurance market where applicants for insurance have a duty of good faith when they reveal private information about their risk type. Insurers can, at some cost, verify the type of insureds who file a claim and they are allowed to retroactively void the insurance contract if it is established that the policyholder has misrepresented his risk when the contract was taken out. However, insurers cannot precommit to their risk verification strategy. The paper analyzes the relationship between second-best Pareto-optimality and the insurance market equilibrium in a game theoretic framework. It characterizes the contracts offered at equilibrium, the individuals' contract choice as well as the conditions under which an equilibrium exists.