政府采购腐败的机理分析及其防范措施

本文认为,腐败是公共权力在民众与国家或官员之间委托代理运行的必然产物。在政府采购活动中,存在着"纳税人—政府—财政部门—政府采购机构—政府采购官员"这样一条长长的委托代理链,作为初始委托人的纳税人实际上没有行为能力,既不能在政府采购市场决策中签约,也不能从中直接受益,而其他委托代理人则由于利益关联会产生一系列政府采购腐败。政府采购腐败产生的根源主要是制度的缺失,也受非制度因素的影响。政府采购腐败的防范既需要政府采购制度的创新,也需要非制度措施的配合。对政府采购腐败的制度防范,一要完善采购制度,加大寻租成本,降低寻租收益,抑制寻租行为;二要建立政府采购公开制度,增加采购透明度,使政府采购行为各环节在相关法定程序及政府部门和社会的监督下进行;三要加强政府监管制度,健全政府采购招投标竞争机制。对政府采购腐败的非制度防范,一要完善政府采购相关法律体系,对政府采购的使用范围、管理权限、履约责任等政策性和技术性问题进行明确界定;二要加强政府采购人员教育工作,建立政府采购人员资格认证制度;三要努力提高各利益主体的相互监督意识,建立全方位监督体系。     

我国排污权初始分配问题探析

排污权的初始分配是一项复杂、细致和严谨的工作.目前我国在排污权交易的初始分配理论研究方面已有较大的进展,但排污权交易实践方面产生的效果并不理想.这主要是因为我国相应的法律法规不够健全、污染物测算的技术不够成熟以及监管体系的不够完善等原因所造成的.针对此,本文提出应及时加强对排污权的立法工作、建立健全总量控制体系及排污收费制度、制定排污权分配有偿化标准等措施,以此来平衡经济发展与环境保护之间的关系.     

从冲突走向和谐——论企业排污权与公民环境权

公民环境权与企业排污权是一对矛盾.企业生产的过程难免会对环境造成污染,威胁到公民的环境权,企业的性质决定了企业排污行为的正当性以及公民对这一行为的容忍,既然是容忍就应该有度,那么如何使公民的环境权与企业的排污权和谐相处便是一个迫切需要解决的法律问题.     

企业信用缺失的成因及治理

市场经济条件下,企业信用的缺失会成为企业发展的一大障碍,其产生的原因主要在于国家法律制度不完善,政府行为不规范,企业产权制度不明晰等方面。要从根本上解决这一问题,需要政府、企业和全社会共同协调配合,我国应加强相关制度建设,建立完善的的法律法规体系,加大执法监督的力度,建立奖惩分明的机制,加强企业对信用的管理,改善信用坏境,做到有法必依,从而让失信者没有生存的空间,促进企业健康发展。     

从诚信建设的角度看遏制商业欺诈

诚实守信是社会的基本规范,诚信经商是开展营销活动的基本要求,但在目前的经营活动中,商业欺诈行为却屡有发生,产生这些商业欺诈的原因,有利益的驱动,诚信的缺失,立法的滞后,道德水平的下滑等。要打击商业欺诈活动,必须加强诚信建设,树立诚信经商的观念,建立社会信用共享机制,加强政府的监管力度,完善法律保障体系,以规范企业的经营行为,促进市场经济的健康发展。     

上市公司造假的经济学分析

目前我国证券市场造假泛滥,虚假上市、虚假财务、虚假重组、虚假信息比比皆是。从经济学的角度对此进行剖析,可以看出这是一种寻租行为,其产生的主要原因是信息不对称和监督不力。因此要根治这一弊病,必须建立强制性信息披露制度、加强监管力度及完善公司内部制衡机制。     

论排污权交易制度在中国的实施

排污权交易的存在有其理论基础。我国环境问题的解决需要排污权交易制度。在我国推行排污权交易制度,必须分步进行。必须不断推进排污收费制度的改革,在注重其他配套制度完善的同时,建立健全排污权交易法律制度。     

上市公司报表性资产重组的博弈分析

报表性资产重组的最终目的是希望利用这种财务报表的改善来"摘帽"、保配、哄抬股价或者保住上市资格,而不是为了优化公司的资产结构,增强企业竞争力.报表性资产重组的频繁发生,严重影响了我国证券市场的正常运行与发展.本文建立了上市公司控股股东和监管机构之间的博弈模型,发现上市公司控股股东的行为与监管部门的行为存在相互依赖性,指出在存在寻租空间的情况下,应加强对监管人员的再监管.     

证券市场寻租行为分析及治理对策

我国证券市场由于体制、结构、功能定位及监管等方面的原因,存在着大量的寻租行为.寻租行为的存在极大的危害了市场的健康发展,导致社会资源的浪费和社会福利的损失.本文深入分析了我国证券市场的寻租行为存在的原因,并在完善制度,加强监管体系建设方面提出了相关建议.     

论我国排污权交易存在的问题及破解思路

排污权交易是在政府部门的监督下,发挥市场机制对生态环境容量资源的优化配置作用,以更好地保护生态环境。本文对我国排污权交易存在的缺乏法律依据、排污总量确定难、排污初始分配难以做到公正公平以及排污监测难等主要问题进行分析。由此可见,我国并没有形成有效地以市场为机制的排污权交易二级市场。借鉴美国排污权交易制度的先进经验,提出建立我国完善的排污权交易制度的对策建议。     

上市公司会计寻租动因分析

"寻租是运用稀缺资源去追求人为地创造财富转移的费用",会计作为一种工具通过资本市场对资源配置的作用,使得会计寻租具有了经济后果。由于会计管制的存在、会计领域产权不清晰、会计信息不对称以及上市公司在我国经济生活中的特殊地位和作用,导致了上市公司会通过会计寻租来达到其自身利益目的不良行为。根据组织行为学和经济学的相关理论对上市公司会计寻租的动因进行分析,不仅能在深层次了解会计寻租产生的根源,而是对治理和消除寻租行为具有一定的理论和现实意义。     

塔洛克寻租理论对我国房地产业资源优化配置的启示

根据塔洛克对寻租活动社会成本的分析,寻租活动的发生是通过政府的政治行程进行的,它影响社会经济运行的交易成本。在我国,利益集团的寻租活动对房地产行业资源配置产生的负面效应是:寻租活动增加政府的廉政成本,误导社会的资源流向。要使我国的房地产行业资源得到一个较为合理有效的配置,政府应改革土地使用权出让制度;完善政府的信息披露制度;实行激励机制与制约机制相结合的制度。同时,政府要明确自身的权利、权力和责任,贯彻好国家的各项经济政策,提高行政效率;社会各方面也要对其进行监督,使政府自律与他律相结合。     

Government Intervention,Perceived Benefit,and Bribery of Firms in Transitional China

This article examines whether (1) government intervention causes bribery (or corruption) as rent-seeking theory suggested; (2) a firm’s perceived benefit partially mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior, as rational choice/behavior theory suggested; and (3) other firms’ bribing behavior moderates the relationship between government intervention and a firm’s perceived benefit. Our study shows that government intervention causes bribery/corruption indeed, but it exerts its effect on bribery/corruption through the firm’s perceived benefit. In other words, a firm’s perceived benefit fully mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior. We also find that other firms’ bribery positively moderates the relationship between government intervention and a given firm’s bribery. This study partly proves that firms are rational actors. Potential benefit encourages them to practice bribery. Besides, this research also supports the rent-seeking view of bribery/corruption, which argues that government intervention is a source of bribery/corruption. However, we have also identified that only those government interventions that will create “rent” can cause bribery/corruption.     

Mass incarceration and consumer financial harm: Critique of rent-seeking by the carceral state

Mass incarceration is an approach to managing public safety that emphasizes detention over other means. It is also neoliberalism's quintessential political and economic project because it mobilizes a prison industrial complex to generate revenue. We highlight rent-seeking, the pursuit of extra-budgetary revenues by carceral agencies, because it inflicts financial harm on incarcerated consumers and their supporters. Carceral agencies leverage government's authority to set the conditions of detention. However, when they also leverage government's market-making authority to seek rents from incarcerated persons we characterize that as a government failure. To understand it, we depart from a focus on corruption by specific actors to highlight features of institutions that enable unethical behavior. We join activists and elected officials who call for an end to mass incarceration, but we also highlight more immediate reforms that can help restrain rent-seeking and enable greater public scrutiny of the carceral state.     

城市户外广告媒体资源市场化配置研究

城市,外广告媒体资源市场化配置是市场经济发展的必然要求,本文基于公共资源的视角,分析城市户外广告媒体资源市场化配置的寻租风险、商业风险和道德风险,通过完善户外广告管理系统,建立有救的产权交易机制,以及系统性的政府立法等,来提高城市户外广告资源的经济效益和社会效益。     

借鉴寻租理论加强国防人力资源管理

寻租作为一种非生产性活动产生于"经济人"的趋利避害行为,如果在军队中存在寻租行为,其结果会导致军事人力资源"生产"效率和配置效率的损失,损害军队战斗力的提高和优化。治理寻租行为必须引入竞争机制,实现军事人力资源的必要流动,建立事前监督和事后惩罚机制,加大寻租成本,弱化军人的寻租动机,消除诱发寻租的存在机率。     

政府管制对企业信誉策略的影响分析

首先阐述企业信誉的传染性、脆弱性和自我增值性,及其在较完善的市场经济中的自发形成和作用机制;然后从政府管制强化企业的短期行为、增加发现和追究失信企业成本、提供寻租机会等角度,详细探讨了管制对企业信誉的负面影响,并通过一个简单的博弈模型,得出管制过度时企业不讲信誉的结论。     

Future rent-seeking and current public savings

The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits. This is because myopic politicians face political risk and prefer to extract political rents as early as possible. In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic political economy model. We show that this conventional wisdom relies on economic volatility being low relative to political uncertainty. If economic volatility is high relative to political uncertainty, then a rent-seeking government actually over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government. This result emerges because of the option value of rent-seeking: a rent-seeking government over-values future funds because of the possibility of using them for future rents instead of cutting taxes in the event of a future boom (when marginal utility of private consumption is low). This over-saving bias is temporary since, in the long run, the rent-seeking government over-borrows relative to the benevolent government as it eventually squanders the funds it has accumulated. We find that both the under-saving and over-saving bias of the government can be solved by a rule of capping deficits.     

Future rent-seeking and current public savings

The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits. This is because myopic politicians face political risk and prefer to extract political rents as early as possible. In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic political economy model. We show that this conventional wisdom relies on economic volatility being low relative to political uncertainty. If economic volatility is high relative to political uncertainty, then a rent-seeking government actually over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government. This result emerges because of the option value of rent-seeking: a rent-seeking government over-values future funds because of the possibility of using them for future rents instead of cutting taxes in the event of a future boom (when marginal utility of private consumption is low). This over-saving bias is temporary since, in the long run, the rent-seeking government over-borrows relative to the benevolent government as it eventually squanders the funds it has accumulated. We find that both the under-saving and over-saving bias of the government can be solved by a rule of capping deficits.     

The good,the bad,and the ugly: Technology transfer competence,rent-seeking,and bargaining power

In this paper, we explore the relationships between subsidiary technology transfer competence, bargaining power and rent-seeking. In the multinational corporation, technology transfer competence is generally perceived as something desirable. We connect this bright side of subsidiary-level processes to a potentially uglier and darker side of the organization, namely that subsidiaries gain bargaining power that is exercised for bad ends, i.e., rent-seeking. Using an empirical analysis that comprises intrafirm technology transfers, this paper finds that technology transfer competence leads to greater subsidiary bargaining power that in turn increases rent-seeking behavior; but this competence does not directly affect rent-seeking. We suggest that bargaining power offers a key explanation for rent-seeking. This paper advances the understanding of subsidiary sources of power within the multinational corporation and the organizational determinants of rent-seeking, which is relevant to theory development as well as to managers.