Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average

People are overconfident. Overconfidence affects financial markets. How depends on who in the market is overconfident and on how information is distributed. This paper examines markets in which price-taking traders, a strategic-trading insider, and risk-averse marketmakers are overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume, increases market depth, and decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. Its effect on volatility and price quality depend on who is overconfident. Overconfident traders can cause markets to underreact to the information of rational traders. Markets also underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information, and they overreact to salient, anecdotal, and less relevant information.     

Information, Trading Demand, and Futures Price Volatility

We examine the relation between futures price volatility and trading demand by type of trader in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500-stock index futures market. We find that volatility covaries negatively with signed speculative demand shocks but is positively related to signed hedging demand shocks. No significant relation between volatility and demand shocks for small traders is found. Our results suggest that changes in positions of large hedgers destabilize the market, whereas changes in positions of large speculators stabilize volatility. Consistent with models with asymmetrically informed traders, we find that large speculators are likely to possess superior forecasting ability, large hedgers behave like positive feedback traders, and small traders are liquidity traders.     

The Value of Central Clearing

I study a contracting innovation that suddenly insulated traders of hedging contracts against counterparty risk: central clearing counterparties (CCPs) for derivatives. The first CCP was created in Le Havre (France) in 1882, in the coffee futures market. Using triple difference-in-differences estimation, I show that central clearing changed the geography of trade flows Europe-wide, to the benefit of Le Havre. Inspecting the mechanism using trader-level data, I find that the CCP solved both a “missing market” problem and adverse selection issues. Central clearing also facilitated entry of new traders in the market. The successful contracting innovation quickly spread to other exchanges.     

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND OPTIONS TRADING

This paper demonstrates that options trading does not have a uniform impact on the volatility of underlying stocks. Although uninformed traders are able to hedge the risk of underlying stocks by maintaining opposite positions in the options market, informed traders hold outright options positions to capitalize on their information. This hedging behavior tends to reduce noise in the stock market, whereas the speculating behavior tends to generate noise in the stock market. As a result, stocks that were originally volatile, i.e., traded primarily by uninformed traders, will be stabilized by the introduction of options. Conversely, stocks that were more stable become destabilized by options trading.     

Optimal hedging of uncertain and long-term foreign exchange exposure

This paper employs stochastic dynamic programming to analyze two hedging problems which arise frequently, especially in international finance. One is the hedging of an uncertain exposure when the arrival of new information is anticipated. It is shown that a risk-averse agent will hedge a fraction of his maximum potential exposure to reduce risk. The second problem concerns hedging an exposure which extends beyond the delivery date of the available forward contract. The solution yields a rule by which successive contracts can be linked to form an optimal hedging strategy. A short empirical study illustrates this rule.     

Selective hedging strategies for crude oil futures based on market state expectations

This paper studies the ex-ante selective hedging strategies of crude oil futures contracts based on market state expectations and compares the hedging performances to the traditional minimum variance routine hedging strategies. The main advantage of the proposed method is that it achieves a trade-off between return and risk, rather than hedges risk at all costs. Specifically, we first use a multi-input Hidden Markov Model(HMM) to identify the market state, assess the market’s herding impact, and then integrate the findings of identification and measurement to forecast the price trend. We offer an adjustment criterion for the hedge ratios driven by GARCH²-type models based on the anticipated market state. We conducted an empirical analysis to examine the hedging effect of WTI and Brent crude oil futures, the results indicate that the proposed state-dependent hedging strategies are superior to the traditional model-driven hedging strategies concerning the hedged portfolio based on four criteria. The robustness check reveals that the proposed hedging strategies still outperform in different market situation. The findings can help traders in the crude oil markets, and the methodology can be applied to other energy markets.     

The Impact of Large Portfolio Insurers on Asset Prices

We develop a simple model in which the presence of portfolio insurers in a market of risk-averse traders leads to multiple equilibria for the pricing of financial assets and can cause an increase in volatility, including insurance-induced price drops. We demonstrate, however, that centralized portfolio insurance firms may actually reduce, not increase, volatility, even if the existence of these firms increases the total amount of funds under insurance.     

Sovereign Debt Portfolios,Bond Risks,and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

We document that governments whose local currency debt provides them with greater hedging benefits actually borrow more in foreign currency. We introduce two features into a government's debt portfolio choice problem to explain this finding: risk-averse lenders and lack of monetary policy commitment. A government without commitment chooses excessively countercyclical inflation ex post, which leads risk-averse lenders to require a risk premium ex ante. This makes local currency debt too expensive from the government's perspective and thereby discourages the government from borrowing in its own currency.     

Option trading and individual investor performance

This paper examines the impact of option trading on individual investor performance. The results show that most investors incur substantial losses on their option investments, which are much larger than the losses from equity trading. We attribute the detrimental impact of option trading on investor performance to poor market timing that results from overreaction to past stock market returns. High trading costs further contribute to the poor returns on option investments. Gambling and entertainment appear to be the most important motivations for trading options while hedging motives only play a minor role. We also provide strong evidence of performance persistence among option traders.     

Human vs. high-frequency traders,penny jumping,and tick size

This paper examines changes in market quality resulting from the smaller tick size of the interbank foreign exchange market. Coupled with the lower tick size, the special composition of traders and their order placement strategies created a suitable environment for high-frequency traders (HFT’s) to implement sub-penny jumping strategy to front-run human traders. We show that the spread declined following the introduction of decimal pip pricing. However, benefits of spread reduction were mostly absorbed by the HFT’s. Market depths were also significantly reduced with the occupation of the top of the order book by HFT’s. This new environment changed the market maker-market taker composition between different traders and altered price impacts of the order flows.     

Spot versus forward speculation and hedging: A diagrammatic exposition

It has recently been recognized that the controversial implication of the Modern Theory of Forward Exchange, that the forward rate can differ from the rate required for interest parity, no longer holds when speculators are allowed to choose between spot and forward speculation. This paper shows this result within the diagrammatic apparatus usually used to describe the Modern Theory. The paper also shows the effect of importers and exporters choosing between spot and forward hedging. It is observed that when either speculators or traders can choose between money market and forward speculation/hedging, forward rates equal interest parity rates. The diagram can be adapted to consider borrowing-lending spreads etc.     

The self-financing equation in limit order book markets

The goal of this paper is to present a mathematical framework for trading on a limit order book, including its associated transaction costs, and to propose continuous-time equations which generalise the self-financing relationships of frictionless markets. These equations naturally differentiate between trading via limit and via market orders, as they include a price impact or adverse selection constraint. We briefly mention several possible applications, including hedging European options with limit orders, to illustrate their impact and how they can be used to the benefit of low-frequency traders. Two appendices include empirical evidence for facts which are not universally recognised in the current literature on the subject.

     

Market or limit orders?

In this paper we investigate the problem of optimal order placement of an asset listed on an exchange using both market and limit orders in a simple model of market dynamics. We seek to understand under which settings it is optimal to place limit or market orders. Limit orders typically lower transaction costs but increase the risk of incomplete order execution, whereas market orders typically have higher transaction costs but are guaranteed to be executed. Rather than considering order book dynamics to determine if a limit order is executed we rely on price dynamics for this. We look at implementation shortfall in this setup with market impact of trading and propose a dynamic program to find the optimal placement of both market and limit orders for risk-neutral and risk-averse traders. With this we find a bound on the expected cost of trading and show that a trader who behaves optimally should always expect to pay less to trade less. We then solve the dynamic program numerically and examine optimal order placement strategies. We find that the decision between market and limit orders is sensitive to price volatility, risk aversion, and trading costs.     

WHEN‐ISSUED SHARES,SMALL TRADES,AND THE VARIANCE OF RETURNS AROUND STOCK SPLITS

The increases in volatility after stock splits have long puzzled researchers. The usual suspects of discreteness and bid‐ask spread do not provide a complete explanation. We provide new clues to solve this mystery by examining the trading of when‐issued shares that are available before the split. When‐issued trading permits noise traders to compete with a more homogenous set of traders, decreasing the volatility of the stock before the split. Following the split, these noise traders reunite in one market and volatility increases. Thus, the higher volatility after the ex date of a stock split is a function of the introduction of when‐issued trading, the new lower price level after the split date, and the increased activity of small‐volume traders around a stock split.     

Official FX interventions through derivatives

We use high-frequency data to study the effects of currency swap auctions carried out by the Brazilian Central Bank on the USDBRL exchange rate. We find that official currency swap auctions impact the exchange rate in a significant way, even though they do not directly alter the supply of foreign currency in the market. We show that during our sample period auctions of contracts in which the Central Bank took a short position in USD had larger effects than those in which the Central Bank took a long position. The supply of currency swaps to the market provides an alternative for traders that demand foreign currency for financial (speculative or hedging) rather than transactional reasons, and thus affects the demand for foreign currency and its price. This mechanism is likely to be particularly relevant when forecasters extrapolate exchange rate trends at short-term horizons.     

Production and hedging implications of executive compensation schemes

This paper connects executive compensation with hedging and analyzes a crucial shareholders and managers agency source that evolves from the pricing of the hedging device. The shareholders are risk-neutral, while the risk-averse manager hedges the price risk of the manufactured quantity, and his compensation package includes equity-linked compensation-stock grants. Only when the hedging instrument's pricing includes a risk premium, hedging is costly to the shareholders, while it is costless to the manager. Then from the owners' point of view, we observe managerial over-hedging, increasing in the equity-linked compensation level. This result leads to a violation of the classical production and hedging separation theorem. We conclude that, in the case where the hedging device's pricing bears a risk premium, shareholders can regulate the corporate value diversion to managers through diminishing the managerial equity-linked compensation scheme or by putting restrictions on the extent of hedging activities of executives.     

A revised option pricing formula with the underlying being banned from short selling

An important issue in derivative pricing that hasn't been explored much until very recently is the impact of short selling to the price of an option. This paper extends a recent publication in this area to the case in which a ban of short selling of the underlying alone is somewhat less ‘effective’ than the extreme case discussed by Guo and Zhu [Equal risk pricing under convex trading constraints. J. Econ. Dyn. Control, 2017, 76, 136–151]. The case presented here is closer to reality, in which the effect of a ban on the underlying of an option alone may quite often be ‘diluted’ due to market interactions of the underlying asset with other correlated assets. Under a new assumption that there exists at least a correlated asset in the market, which is allowed to be short sold and thus can be used by traders for hedging purposes even though short selling of the underlying itself is banned, a new closed-form equal-risk pricing formula for European options is successfully derived. The new formula contains two distinguishable advantages; (a) it does not induce any significantly extra burden in terms of numerically computing option values, compared with the effort involved in using the Black–Scholes formula, which is still popularly used in finance industry today; (b) it remains simple and elegant as only one additional parameter beyond the Black–Scholes formula is introduced, to reflect the dilution effect to the ban as a result of market interactions.     

Learning from others,reacting, and market quality

Traders pay attention to one another but are unable to perfectly deduce each others’ beliefs from transactions alone. This explains why markets are hard to beat and also why trading occurs at all. Even when traders react rationally to the actions of others, they cannot arrive easily at a common posterior assessment of value. We model a realistic market composed of traders who combine their own private information with rational learning about the information possessed by others. We compare phenomena in this market with an otherwise identical market populated by traders who receive the same private information but ignore other traders. Using simulation to engender greater realism, we find that learning usually reduces volatility, increases the accuracy of the market price as a forecast of value, reduces trading volume, and decreases the prevalence of bubbles. However, for some combinations of market conditions, learning can have the opposite effect. The marginal influences of eight different market conditions, ranging from information heterogeneity through resource diversity, are estimated. Prices, volatility, volume, and bubbles exhibit subtle and complex responses to market conditions.     

Trade Disclosure,Information Learning and Securities Market Performance

In this paper we examine the effect of information disclosure on securities market performance when liquidity traders are able to acquire information about inside trading. We show that the bid-ask spread increases with the liquidity trader's learning efficiency, which is greater when trade information is disclosed. The bid-ask spread is always higher when trade information is not disclosed. However, the discrepancy between the bid-ask spreads with and without information disclosure narrows when the learning efficiency increases. We also show that the gains of the informed traders in a market without trade information disclosure are reduced in the presence of the liquidity trader's learning. Nevertheless, liquidity traders do not necessarily benefit from increased transparency. In particular, liquidity traders may face higher trading costs.