Wealth Distribution and Optimal Inheritance Taxation in Life-cycle Economies with Intergenerational Transfers

Intergenerational transfers are introduced into a general equilibrium life-cycle model in order to explain observed levels of wealth heterogeneity. In our overlapping generations model, heterogenous agents face uncertain lifetime and leave both accidental and voluntary bequests to their children. Furthermore, agents face stochastic employment opportunities. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the US economy. Our results indicate that bequests only account for a small proportion of observed wealth heterogeneity. The introduction of an inheritance tax increases both welfare, as measured by the average lifetime utility of a newborn, and equality of the wealth distribution.
JEL classification : D 31; D 91; H 21; C 68; E 21     

Bequests,taxation and the distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model

This paper examines the role of bequests and of taxation on bequests for the distribution of wealth. We investigate a model with overlapping generations and heterogenous households where parents derive utility directly from their bequests. We obtain all results analytically. Using the coefficient of variation as the measure of inequality, bequests per se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise private savings and hence average wealth holdings more than the variance of wealth. From a policy perspective, taxing bequests and redistributing government revenue lump-sum among the young generation further decreases wealth inequality.     

The effect of changes in Social Security on bequests

The net effect on intergenerational transfers of an increase in Social Security benefits will depend on how much of the increase is consumed and how much bequeathed. I show analytically that the marginal propensity to consume an increase in Social Security benefits is indeterminate: it could range from zero to 1.0 or even larger. At one extreme bequests would fully offset the increase in benefits; at the other bequests would fall. According to simulations based on an estimated model of life-cycle behavior, consumption increases by slightly more than the increase in Social Security benefits, causing bequests to fall. That is, bequests do no offset at all an increase in transfers from the younger generation to the older.     

Envy and Inequality*

We present an overlapping generations economy, populated by heterogeneous agents who care about both consumption relative to others and the bequest they leave to their offspring. We show that saving and bequest rates vary across the income distribution, and we obtain several interesting results. First, envy reduces the steady‐state capital stock and increases the degree of inequality in consumption, capital ownership, and bequests. Second, if the bequest motive is sufficiently strong the equalizing effect of bequests disappears. Third, income inequality for a given cohort increases with age. Fourth, the distribution of inherited wealth becomes more unequal than that of wealth in general. Fifth, economic position becomes more persistent across generations.     

Intergenerational Wealth Elasticity in Japan

This study estimates the intergenerational wealth elasticity using original Japanese survey data and assesses factors explaining the intergenerational wealth elasticity, such as income, educational level, bequests and preferences. The age‐adjusted elasticity of child wealth with respect to parental wealth ranges from 0.266 to 0.367, and transition matrices indicate that the intergenerational transmission of wealth persists more strongly in the tails of the distributions. The correlation between parent and child wealth mainly stems from income, education and bequests, which jointly constitute 63.9% of the wealth elasticity.     

Accidental Bequests: A Curse for the Rich and a Boon for the Poor*

When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics, such as productivity and longevity, the population should be partitioned into two groups: those who do not receive an inheritance and those who do. The first tagged group receives a Mirrlees second‐best tax schedule; the second group, when its type is fully revealed, faces a first‐best tax schedule. Receiving an inheritance makes high‐ability types worse off and low‐ability types better off. High‐ability individuals face a bequest tax of more than 100 percent, while low‐ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller, as well as larger, than 100 percent, and it might even be negative.     

Effects of Aspirations and Habits on the Distribution of Wealth

We analyze how the introduction of habits and aspirations affects the distribution of wealth when the labor productivity of individuals is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and when bequests arise from a joy‐of‐giving motive. In the presence of either bequests or aspirations, labor income shocks are transmitted intergenerationally, and this transmission, together with contemporaneous shocks, determines the distribution of wealth. We show that the introduction of aspirations (habits) decreases (increases) the average wealth, and increases (decreases) both its intragenerational variability and the degree of intergenerational mobility. Therefore, a distinction between aspirations and habits is relevant because they involve different implications for the distribution of wealth.     

ON THE WEALTH DYNAMICS OF SWEDISH FAMILIES, 1984–98

This paper focuses on three issues. First, it analyzes the increasing inequality of wealth in Sweden in terms of percentile age and birth cohort differences, and finds very weak evidence of life-cycle savings. There are rather strong birth cohort differences in wealth accumulation. Second, it is shown that bequests and inter vivo gifts contribute to the age and cohort differences in wealth, but do not increase the inequality of wealth. The third theme is mobility of wealth as a function of bequests, age, period, length of the transition period, and the magnitude of quantile differences.     

自愿审计、公允价值对盈余管理的影响——基于2006-2007年上市公司中期报告的经验证据

文章以2006年和2007年"中报"153个自愿审计和1910个未审计的观测值组成非配对样本,采用Heckman二阶段回归纠正自选择偏差方法,研究自愿审计与上市公司盈余管理的关系,以及新会计准则中采用公允价值后是否影响了二者的关系.研究发现:自选择问题确实对上市公司的盈余管理有显著影响;在考虑了自选择因素之后,自愿审计本身并没有降低上市公司的盈余管理程度;公允价值对选择自愿审计、未选择审计公司的盈余管理均未产生影响.     

HOUSEHOLD SAVING IN THE '90s: EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-SECTION WEALTH SURVEYS

This paper uses a series of cross-section surveys to measure how wealth accumulation and active saving rates varied across cohort-groups during the early and mid 1990s. Our estimated rates of saving and wealth change across cohorts show a somewhat more dramatic life-cycle pattern than found in previous studies, in part because we use a new technique, and in part because the cross-section wealth surveys we use oversample the wealthiest families whose behavior dominates aggregate changes. Adjusting the wealth-change rates for bequests and subtracting out the capital gains component of wealth change move the estimates in the direction of results from previous studies, but the biggest changes in that direction result from excluding the top of the wealth distribution in each year.     

THE RISK‐FREE RATE IN A FINITE HORIZON MODEL WITH BEQUESTS

This paper studies the risk‐free rate in an overlapping generations economy with bequests. It is shown that the risk‐free rate depends on risk aversion, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the share of wealth invested in human wealth, life expectancy, and the preference for bequests. In a standard life‐cycle context, mortality increases the subjective time rate of discount, and thus increases the compensation required to postpone consumption. This latter effect is offset in a bequest‐driven model of the type considered here, leading to much more powerful income effects. In this sense, the model provides a bequest‐motive explanation for the risk‐free rate puzzle put forward by Weil in 1989.     

RETIREMENT WEALTH AND LIFETIME EARNINGS*

This article argues that a satisfactory theory of wealth inequality should account not only for the marginal distribution of wealth, but also for the joint distribution of wealth and earnings. The article describes the joint distribution of retirement wealth and lifetime earnings in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. It then evaluates the ability of a stochastic life‐cycle model to account for key features of this distribution. The life‐cycle model fails to account for three key features of the data. (1) The correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth is too high. (2) The wealth gaps between earnings rich and earnings poor households are too large. (3) Wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings is too small. Models in which households differ in rates of return or time preferences account much better for the joint distribution of retirement wealth and lifetime earnings.     

JOB SEARCH AND ASSET ACCUMULATION UNDER BORROWING CONSTRAINTS*

This article examines the relationship between wealth accumulation and job search dynamics. It proposes a model in which risk‐averse individuals search for jobs, save, and borrow to smooth their consumption. One motivation for accumulating wealth is to finance voluntary quits in order to search for better jobs. Using data on men from the National Longitudinal Survey (1979 cohort), I estimate the individual's dynamic decision problem. The results show that borrowing constraints are tight and reinforce the influence of wealth on job acceptance decisions, namely that more initial wealth and access to larger amounts of credit increase wages and unemployment duration.     

Bequests as signals: Implications for fiscal policy

This paper explores how bequests affect redistributive fiscal policies. The main premise underlying our approach is that bequests act as a signal of parental affection. It is shown that private transfers in the form of bequests may not offset public transfers to a significant extent, even though such private transfers are altruistically motivated and are strictly positive for all but a negligible set of households. This is notable since these conditions are normally believed to yield a fully offsetting response (Ricardian equivalence). We explicitly identify circumstances under which the departure from Ricardian equivalence is large. Notably, the departure may be quite large even when our model is observationally very close to one in which Ricardian equivalence is known to hold (in the sense that children care very little about parental affection).     

Do voluntary commitment mechanisms improve welfare? The effect of mandatory and voluntary oaths in a social dilemma

We investigate whether oaths can enforce property rights in a social dilemma and increase welfare. We examine the impact of mandatory and voluntary oaths in a laboratory experiment where individuals can produce wealth, protect accumulated wealth, and take wealth from others. Individuals are more productive when oaths are mandatory compared to a no-oath environment. Subjects’ voluntary signing oaths behave similarly to those who sign a mandatory oath. When the oath is voluntary, nonoath-taking individuals engage in nonproductive behavior, negating the positive impact from the voluntary oath. Our results show that altering commitment mechanisms can result in varying welfare levels.     

The trajectory of wealth in retirement

In this paper, we develop a measure of household resources that converts total financial and non-financial assets, plus annuity-like assets (mainly, Social Security and defined-benefit pensions) into an expected annual amount of wealth per person in retirement. We use this measure, which we call “annualized comprehensive wealth,” to investigate spend-down behavior among a panel of older households in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1998 to 2006. Our analysis indicates that for most retired households, comprehensive wealth balances decline much more slowly than their remaining life expectancies, so that the predominate trend is for real annualized wealth to rise significantly with age over the course of retirement. Comparing the estimated age profiles for annualized wealth with profiles simulated from several different life-cycle models, we find that a model that takes into account uncertain longevity, random medical expenses, and intended bequests lines up best with the broad patterns of rising annualized wealth in the HRS.     

Sex Preference, Marriage of Heirs and Bequest Behaviour

This paper discusses some economic implications of sex preferences and the bequest behaviour of parents. A simple two-period model with general assumptions is developed. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not exist unless constraints are imposed. However, such an equilibrium exists if bequests are non-negative, if bequests to sons and daughters are equal or if preferences are heterogeneous. The model thus explains why such institutional constraints on bequests are observed in the real world, and why in some (developing) countries male children inherit the major wealth from parents. It also has useful implications for the debt neutrality proposition.
JEL Classification Numbers: D1, J12, J13, J16.     

Effects of uncertain lifetime and annuity insurance on capital accumulation and growth

Summary.  This paper studies the effects of uncertain lifetime on capital accumulation and growth and also the sensitivity of those effects to the existence of a perfect annuities market. The model is an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes. The technology is convex and such that the marginal product of capital is bounded away from zero. A contribution of this paper is to show that the existence of accidental bequests may lead the economy to an equilibrium that exhibits asymptotic growth, which is impossible in an economy with a perfect annuities market or with certain lifetimes. This paper also shows that if individuals face a positive probability of surviving in every period, they may be willing to save at any age. This effect of uncertain lifetime on savings may also lead the economy to an equilibrium exhibiting asymptotic growth even if there exists a perfect annuities market. Received: April 17, 1996; revised version: December 9, 1997     

DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS, AND THE ACCUMULATION OF RETIREMENT WEALTH

The private pension structure in the United States, once dominated by defined benefit (DB) plans, is currently divided between defined contribution (DC) and DB plans. Wealth accumulation in DC plans depends on a participant's contribution behavior and on financial market returns, while accumulation in DB plans is sensitive to a participant's labor market experience and to plan parameters. This paper simulates the distribution of retirement wealth under representative DB and DC plans. It uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to explore how asset returns, earnings histories, and retirement plan characteristics contribute to the variation in retirement wealth outcomes. We simulate DC plan accumulation by randomly assigning individuals a share of wages that they and their employer contribute to the plan. We consider several possible asset allocation strategies, with asset returns drawn from the historical return distribution. Our DB plan simulations draw earnings histories from the HRS, and randomly assign each individual a pension plan drawn from a sample of large private and public defined benefit plans. The simulations yield distributions of both DC and DB wealth at retirement. Average retirement wealth accruals under current DC plans exceed average accruals under private sector DB plans, although DC plans are also more likely to generate very low retirement wealth outcomes. The comparison of current DC plans with more generous public sector DB plans is less definitive, because public sector DB plans are more generous on average than their private sector DB counterparts.     

WEALTH,ASSET PORTFOLIO,MONEY DEMAND AND POLICY RULE

I look at the linkages between monetary policy and asset wealth using quarterly data for the USA. I show that a positive interest rate shock leads to a fall in aggregate wealth and an important change in portfolio composition: housing wealth gradually decreases, but the effects are very persistent; and financial wealth quickly shrinks, but the impact is short‐lived. I also find that the money market can be characterized as follows: (i) the money demand has a large interest elasticity and a small output elasticity; and (ii) the estimated monetary policy reaction function highlights the special focus given by the central bank to developments in monetary aggregates. These features call for an approach whereby monetary authorities put more emphasis on tracking wealth developments, in particular, given the asset portfolio rebalancing between money holdings and financial and/or housing assets.