An Experimental Study of Electronic Bulletin Board Trading for Emission Permits

This paper reports a laboratory experiment that studies several features of a tradable emission permit program recently implemented in the Los Angeles area. The experiment focuses on the new Electronic Bulletin Board trading institution, in which firms publicly post proposed terms of trade. Potential trading partners can review this information online, and transactions are executed following bilateral negotiation. The experiment includes trading restrictions implemented in the regulations due to the geography of Los Angeles. We find that the bulletin board market performs well and that prices reflect market conditions as accurately as in the continuous double auction trading institution.     

Pooling of Uncertainty: Enforcing Tradable Permits Regulation when Emissions are Stochastic

An under-appreciated advantage of tradable permits regulation is its ability to create better decision-making when emissions are stochastic. In general, the distribution of stochastic actual emissions around intended emissions results in over- or under-compliance. Permit tradability reduces the extent to which actual aggregate emissions deviate from regulatory targets, by giving firms an additional mechanism for responding to uncertainty. We construct a two period model of permit regulation with ex post enforcement to demonstrate how the permit market distributes uncertainty, and to illustrate the importance of expectations toward permit market outcomes.     

Trade of Permits for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Bilateral Trade Need not be the Answer

The Kyoto Protocol sets national quotas on GHG emissions and allows international trade of these quotas. Taking terms-of-trade effects into account, we argue that this trade is characterized by asymmetric, identity-dependent externalities, and show that bilateral trade of permits may not be sufficient for an efficient allocation of emissions. We derive conditions under which bilateral trade does improve the allocation of permits. The conditions are strong. In this sense, we argue that, for emissions permits, market design matters.     

The Analysis and Modification of Opportunity Cost of Investment

We think we should use basic return rate of industry to measure the opportunity cost of capital and use the rule of Maximum NPV （Net Present Value） to modify the wrong solution in the book.     

Opportunity Cost Estimation of Ecosystem Services

Land-use changes rank among the most significant drivers of change in ecosystem services worldwide. The enhancement of important services such as biodiversity and carbon sequestration requires modifications in land-use that can lead to the decline in other ecosystems services. Targeting the most suitable areas for particular land-uses based on comparative advantages requires opportunity cost information across large regions. This is a demanding task because the input–output relations are ill-defined and determined by spatially heterogeneous operational and environmental conditions. To address this methodological challenge, this paper presents a two-stage semiparametric technique that enables multi-dimensional production possibility frontiers to be estimated from data provided by biophysical models. Specific advantages of the proposed frontier approach are its flexibility with regard to assumptions on the convexity of the production possibility set and its freedom from any separability assumptions for the input–output space and the space of the heterogeneous background variables. The method is illustrated for a case study of 18 Central and Eastern European countries. Results show that opportunity costs of changes in ecosystem services provision differ substantially between regions. Those areas having already relatively high levels of carbon sequestration have a comparative advantage in sequestering carbon. Opportunity costs of biodiversity are generally positively related with the level of biodiversity up to a turning point after which they are negatively related. To illustrate the policy consequences of the observed economies and diseconomies of scope we compare two management regimes to illustrate the potential gains from smart land management.     

Opportunity Cost Model of Infrastructure Access Charges for Chinese Railways

For the suppliers of concerned services, theories about infrastructure pricing： SAT （Stand Alone economists such as Laffont, Tirole, etc. developed Test）, ECPR （Efficient Component Pricing Rule）. Especially, Sidak, Spulber, put forward M-ECPR （Market Efficient Component Pricing Rule） method for bottleneck infrastructures. In this article, we bring the M-ECPR principles into the study of Chinese railways pricing of its network infrastructures. Combined with our Engineer Model and Opportunity Cost Model, we analyzed the special conditions faced by Chinese railways, and developed a model for sharing infrastructure fees among freight and passenger transportations. Engineer Model split Variable Cost （VC） and Fixed Cost （FC） into freight and passenger activities, and Opportunity Cost Model take the insufficient supply of infrastructure capacity into consideration. Of course, the subsidy from the government greatly affected the price standard for bottleneck facilities, or so-called network infrastructures.     

发现成本与创业机会

节约成本是创造财富的根本原因,斯密的分工创造财富的原理仅是节约成本的方式。通过对发现成本、内化成本及创业之间的关系进行分析,提出:创业是发现成本、节约成本最重要的形式;创业企业有不断发现成本、节约成本的机会;在发现成本、节约成本的过程中能挖掘更多的创业机会。     

The Permits Game: Conveying the Logic of Marketable Pollution Permits

A classroom game, the Permits Game is an interactive technique to help students understand how the market can be used to arrive at a cost-effective method for pollution control.     

Allocating Tradable Permits on the Basis of Market Price to Achieve Cost Effectiveness

It is a well known result that distributional constraints can lead to an imperfectly competitive permit market where the emission target is no longer met at least cost. In this paper, we suggest an allocation rule for tradable permits which can handle this problem. If the permit allocation is dependent on the market price for permits, this allocation rule can achieve both cost effectiveness and meet specific requirements for cost distribution across agents.     

组织协调费用的一个分析框架

鉴于企业内部不同程度地存在市场的事实,作者认为应该把管理费用区分为组织协调费用和内部交易费用两部分.员工认同感、程序化程度、规模是决定组织费用三个主要因素.它们之间是相互影响的,单独只强调这三个因素中任何一个,而忽略其他二者的影响,都将导致组织畸形、缺乏效率、组织协调费用增加.     

An Experimental Investigation of Hard and Soft Price Ceilings in Emissions Permit Markets

Tradable emissions permits have been implemented to control pollution levels in various markets and represent a major component of legislative efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions. Because permits are supplied for a fixed level of pollution, allowing the market for permits to determine the price, price control mechanisms may be needed to protect firms from price spikes caused by fluctuations in the demand for permits. We test permit markets in an experimental laboratory setting to determine the effectiveness of several price control mechanisms, with special attention on the soft price ceiling. We focus on a static setting similar to some of the earliest experimental work focused on price ceilings. Results indicate that both permit supply adjustments and price ceilings (hard ceilings) effectively limit elevated prices in this setting. By contrast, reserve auctions to implement soft ceilings do not consistently control prices, especially when a minimum reserve permit price is applied. Furthermore, the grandfathering of permits allows permit sellers to realize significant welfare gains at the expense of buyers under a soft ceiling policy. Our results thus highlight several advantages of hard ceilings for controlling short term price increases.     

A Bottleneck Input Supplier's Opportunity Cost of Competing Downstream

Journal of Regulatory Economics - Should the supplier of a bottleneck input be prevented from vertically integrating downstream unless the (perhaps regulated) price of the input is set equal to...     

国际资本自由流动背景下的发展中国家:机遇与挑战

信息处理和传播技术的迅速改善,以及国内金融市场的开放、资本项目交易的自由化、用于退休的私人储蓄的增长,都刺激了金融创新的发展,并创造出数万亿美元的、在国际范围内流动的资本.同时,全球银行业的合并、来自非银行金融机构(包括对冲基金和共同基金)的竞……     

矿建施工企业项目成本管理

矿建施工企业必须克服项目成本管理中存在的与决策不相配比,成本控制不全面、不连续,工期成本、不可预见成本 被忽视等不足,以中标价为依据,建立和完善目标成本管理体系,对项目成本进行有效控制,才能在竞争日趋激烈的矿建市场 中谋求生存与发展。     

Payments for Ecosystem Services Programs: Predicting Landowner Enrollment and Opportunity Cost Using a Beta-Binomial Model

This paper concerns predicting enrollment in payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs to promote habitat preservation on private lands. We develop a beta-binomial model to address both program participation and the amount of land enrolled by each potential enrollee. We apply the estimation approach to stated preference data from non-industrial private forest owners in Finland. As an alternative econometric model, we also develop a multivariate censored regression model of enrollments. Using cross-validation, we find that the beta-binomial model predicts at least as well as the multivariate censored model yet has fewer parameters. Using our estimation results, we demonstrate policy predictions regarding program enrollment and landowner opportunity cost.     

Global Security Policies against Terrorism and the Free Riding Problem: An Experimental Approach

The World Trade Center attack has shed light on the urgent need to implement preventing measures against terrorism and to enhance cooperation in the global security system for all countries. However, international coordination cannot be taken for granted. It is often ineffective and likely to fail for several reasons. Perhaps the more prominent reason to explain failure in coordination is that collective actions against terrorism may suffer from the well‐known free riding problem. In this paper we experimentally investigate cooperation dilemma in counterterrorism policies by measuring to what extent international deterrence policy may suffer from free riding. In our game, contributions to the group account do not aim to increase the production of the public good but instead seek to decrease the probability that a stochastic event destroys the good. A country could choose to free ride by investing nothing in the international deterrence policy and instead invest all its resources in its own national protection or even choose to ignore totally terrorism by investing on alternative projects. We also look at the effects of institutions that allow sanctioning and rewarding of other countries to facilitate coordination on deterrence policy. We find that, in absence of institutional incentives and after controlling for risk aversion, most of countries defect by investing very weakly in collective actions against terrorism while largely investing to protect themselves. In contrast, the introduction of punishment/reward incentive systems improves significantly the contribution level to the collective security account.     

降低行政成本的制度分析

我国目前是世界上行政管理成本最昂贵的国家之一.许多学者已从不同角度分析其原因.笔者认为可用帕金森定律和黄宗羲定律来解释其根本原因.本文不打算在原因分析上多费笔墨,只想从制度的角度谈谈如何降低行政成本,具体途径为:缩小规模、创新流程、优化结构;建立低行政成本的政府框架,完善制度约束;建立绩效评估制度,推动行政成本正向激励;强化行政成本监管,在制度设计上为"公共领域"创造条件.     

电子版公布策略的经济学分析

有一类产品,既有实物载体,也可以有电子载体,且不同形式的载体给消费者带来的效用有所不同。对于这类产品,其电子版在网络上的传播往往被视为盗版;但也有相反的情况:厂商主动将免费的电子版公布到网上,可是实物产品的销售不但没有减少,反而增加。文章研究发现,当高端客户比例和产品符合其需求的顾客比例较高时,免费的电子版不但不应该视为盗版,而且还可以作为一种营销工具,利用口碑传播来扩大潜在的顾客群,从而促进实物产品的销售,最大化企业利润。文章对这一问题建立了规范模型,讨论在各种不同情况下厂商的电子版公布策略与相应的价格策略。     

Free Riding and Consistent Conjectures in the Provision of Public Goods: An Experimental Study

The aim of this paper is to examine free riding and consistent conjectures in the provision of public goods. In this research, a Lindahl optimum is never reached. The prediction that public goods will inevitably be under-supplied is proven. With repetition, the subjects' contributions move toward the free riding level instead of the Lindahl optimum. However, a surprising observation is that the public goods provided sometimes increase with time. Economists and males behave more selfishly than other people. Most people expect matching behaviour, and most of them do behave accordingly. The extent to which people will match is overestimated, therefore expectations about the amount of public goods and the amount of actually provided public goods will be revised accordingly and tend to decline over time.