Dividend changes and catering incentives

We extend Baker and Wurgler's [2004a. Journal of Finance 59 1125–1165] catering theory to include decreases and increases in existing dividends. Consistent with our extended model, we find that the decision to change the dividend and the magnitude of the change depend on the premium that the capital market places on dividends. We also find that the stock market reaction to dividend changes depends on the dividend premium. Thus, the capital market rewards managers for considering investor demand for dividends when making decisions about the level of dividends.     

The ex-date impact of special dividend announcements: A note

This study examines the impact of special dividend announcements for a sample of Australian companies on the ex date of the special dividend. This study documents that the drop-off ratio is significantly greater for special dividends that participate in DRPs than non-DRPs. Further, it reveals that the drop-off ratio is greater for resources firms than for financial and industrial firms. Finally, a cross-sectional regression model reveals that the drop in price on the ex-date is significantly related to the announcement period price reaction, DRPs versus non-DRPs, size of the company, and special dividend per share.     

Ex-dividend day trading: Who,how, and why? : Evidence from the Finnish market

This study examines the ex-dividend day trading behavior of all investors in the Finnish stock market. Consistent with dynamic dividend clientele theories, investors with a preference for dividend income buy shares cum-dividend and sell ex-dividend; the reverse is true for investors with the opposite preference. Investors also engage in overnight arbitrage, earning on average a 2% overnight return on their invested capital. Trades at the investor-level reveal that idiosyncratic risk is an important determinant in the choice of stock for short-term ex-day trading. Furthermore, transaction costs and dividend yield jointly determine whether the volume of short-term trading activity is nonzero.     

A MICROSTRUCTURE ANALYSIS OF THE LIQUIDITY IMPACT OF OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES

We examine the liquidity impact of Canadian open market repurchases and find that spreads are smaller and depths greater during repurchase programs (as compared to the prerepurchase period) and on repurchase days (as compared to nonrepurchase days). We examine the types of orders used by repurchasing companies and find that all repurchase orders are limit orders and more than 70% of these unambiguously add liquidity to the limit order book. The improved liquidity is consistent with U.S. research but different from results from other markets. We attribute the difference to an uptick restriction that limits the aggressiveness of North American repurchases.     

The evolving relation between earnings,dividends, and stock repurchases

This paper examines how the relation between earnings and payout policy has evolved over the last three decades. Three principal groups of payers have emerged: firms that pay dividends and make regular repurchases, firms that make regular repurchases, and firms that make occasional repurchases. Firms that only pay dividends are largely extinct. Repurchases are increasingly used in place of dividends, even for firms that continue to pay dividends. While other factors help explain the timing of repurchases, the overall level of repurchases is fundamentally determined by earnings. The results suggest that repurchases are now the dominant form of payout.     

Dividend Omissions and Intraindustry Information Transfers

We examine potential information transfers from companies that announce dividend omissions to their industry rivals. Specifically, we examine the abnormal stock returns and abnormal earnings forecast revisions of rivals after a company makes a dividend‐omission announcement. Our results show negative and significant abnormal stock returns and negative and significant abnormal forecast revisions for rival companies in response to the announcement, and a significant and positive relation between the two. We conclude that a dividend‐omission announcement transmits unfavorable information across the announcing company's industry that affects cash flow expectations and ultimately stock prices.     

Accelerated share repurchases

Accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) are credible commitments by firms to repurchase shares immediately. Including an ASR in a repurchase program reduces the flexibility that firms have to alter an announced program in response to subsequent changes in the price and liquidity of its shares, unexpected shocks to cash flow and/or investment, etc. Thus, we investigate whether firms' decisions to include ASRs in their repurchase programs are associated with factors expected to influence the costs of lost flexibility and the benefits of enhanced credibility and immediacy. We find robust evidence consistent with the costs of lost flexibility and the benefits of credibility and immediacy being important determinants of ASR adoption. Additionally, we find that ASR announcements are associated with positive average abnormal stock returns.     

Dividend policy: Reconciling DD with MM

Miller and Modigliani [1961. Dividend policy, growth and the valuation of shares. Journal of Business 34, 411–433] establish the irrelevance of dividend policy in a perfect capital market. DeAngelo and DeAngelo [2006. The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance theorem. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 293–315.] suggest the Miller-Modigliani analysis is flawed and consequently their central conclusion is incorrect. The purpose of this paper is to show the vital role played by stock repurchases and agency costs in reconciling the two opposing views.     

Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy

This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.     

Do Emerging Market Firms Follow Different Dividend Policies From U.S. Firms?

We find that emerging market firms exhibit dividend behavior similar to U.S. firms, in the sense that dividends are explained by profitability, debt, and the market‐to‐book ratio. However, empirical dividend policy equations are structurally different, indicating different sensitivities to these variables. Additionally, emerging market firms seem to be more affected by asset mix, which seems to be due to their greater reliance on bank debt. Overall, country factors are as important in dividend policies as previous studies find them to be in capital structure decisions.     

Share reacquisitions,surplus cash,and agency problems

Share repurchases help alleviate agency costs of surplus cash by restricting management’s scope to waste corporate resources. But why do self-interested managers agree to disgorge surplus cash in the first place? This study examines the intervening effect of managerial monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms on the decision to distribute excess cash through a share repurchase. Findings indicate that repurchases substitute for cash retention decisions that would otherwise prove costly for shareholders, and that better managerial incentive alignment and closer monitoring by external shareholders are important factors stimulating such payouts.     

CULTURE,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,AND DIVIDEND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We find that Hofstede's cultural dimensions—uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long‐term orientation—remain significant in the determination of firms’ dividend policies, even after controlling for corporate governance. We also show that this association varies with the strength of corporate governance, measured by the degree of investor protection. Hence, national culture and investor protection independently affect firms’ dividend payouts but also interact with each other, such that strong investor protection induces higher dividend payouts in high uncertainty avoiding and/or highly masculine cultures. Our results provide strong evidence that cultural differences matter and offer additional power in explaining variations in dividend policies.     

Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the determinants of dividend policy

In the US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, and Japan, the propensity to pay dividends is higher among larger, more profitable firms, and those for which retained earnings comprise a large fraction of total equity. Although there are hints of reductions in the propensity to pay dividends in most of the sample countries over the 1994–2002 period, they are driven by a failure of newly listed firms to initiate dividends when expected to do so. Dividend abandonment and the failure to initiate by existing nonpayers are economically unimportant except in Japan. Moreover, in each country, aggregate dividends have not declined and are concentrated among the largest, most profitable firms. Finally, outside of the US there is little evidence of a systematic positive relation between relative prices of dividend paying and non-paying firms and the propensity to pay dividends. Overall, these findings cast doubt on signaling, clientele, and catering explanations for dividends, but support agency cost-based lifecycle theories.     

Buyback behavior of initial public offering firms

We examine the motives behind the share repurchase decisions of initial public offering (IPO) firms by studying the stock and operating performance after the IPO date. We find that IPO firms that announce repurchases within 3 years of IPO dates exhibit poorer long-run abnormal operating performance than other IPO firms. These IPO firms also experience poorer stock return performance and downward analyst forecast revisions. Moreover, these firms show intensive insider selling transactions after the IPO date. These results for IPO announcing repurchase firms are consistent with the misleading hypothesis, which suggests that these IPO firms mislead investors by announcing repurchases as false signals.     

Information content of repurchase signals: Tangible or intangible information?

The outperformance of repurchasing firms with a high book-to-market (B/M) ratio is usually explained by investors’ undervaluation of the firm’s past performance. However, several studies suggest that the underestimation of future intangible value may explain the high return associated with the share repurchase. To better understand the actual information content of repurchases, I decompose the B/M ratio into past tangible information and future intangible information and find that repurchase signals an undervaluation of the intangible return. In addition, I investigate several potential proxies for intangible information—R&D expenses, intangible assets, and future operating performance. My results show that intangible information signals the undervaluation of future operating performance.     

Does political economy reduce agency costs? Some evidence from dividend policies around the world

This study shows that firms in proportional-electoral countries pay out lower dividends and that the correlation between a firm's growth potential and dividend payout ratio is weaker in proportional-electoral countries. However, firms in proportional-electoral countries that cross-list in majoritarian system countries, tend to pay out higher dividends and the negative relation between growth potential and dividend payout tend to be stronger than their peers that do not cross-list. For a few countries that changed their electoral system towards a more proportional system, we observe a decrease in dividend payout ratio and a weaker relation between growth and dividends after the change. Overall these results indicate that a country's political system affects the severity of agency problems. Further, the effect of legal origin on dividend policy reverses once we include the political economy variables in the regressions. We also document that the electoral system not only affects the amount of dividends paid by a firm but also the form of payment.     

Institutional ownership,volatility and dividends

We find that the sign of the correlation between institutional ownership and volatility depends on the firm’s dividend policy: institutional ownership is negatively (positively) related to volatility among non-dividend (dividend) paying stocks. The empirical results are consistent with an interaction between institutional preference for low volatility and the tendency of higher levels of institutional ownership to increase volatility through their trading behavior. This result is robust to many control variables and possible endogeneity concerns. Supporting our conjecture that institutions herd on dividend signals we find that the correlation between turnover and institutional ownership is higher for dividend paying stocks, and that the positive correlation between turnover and institutional ownership is higher on dividend declaration days. Finally, we also find that the level of institutional ownership drops following an increase in volatility for both dividend payers and non-payers, and that volatility rises following increased institutional ownership for dividend paying stocks.     

Comparing different explanations of the volatility trend

We analyze the puzzling behavior of the volatility of individual stock returns over the past few decades. The literature has provided many different explanations to the trend in volatility and this paper tests the viability of the different explanations. Virtually all current theoretical arguments that are provided for the trend in the average level of volatility over time lend themselves to explanations about the difference in volatility levels between firms in the cross-section. We therefore focus separately on the cross-sectional and time-series explanatory power of the different proxies. We fail to find a proxy that is able to explain both dimensions well. In particular, we find that Cao et al. [Cao, C., Simin, T.T., Zhao, J., 2008. Can growth options explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk? Review of Financial Studies 21, 2599-2633] market-to-book ratio tracks average volatility levels well, but has no cross-sectional explanatory power. On the other hand, the low-price proxy suggested by Brandt et al. [Brandt, M.W., Brav, A., Graham, J.R., Kumar, A., 2010. The idiosyncratic volatility puzzle: time trend or speculative episodes. Review of Financial Studies 23, 863-899] has much cross-sectional explanatory power, but has virtually no time-series explanatory power. We also find that the different proxies do not explain the trend in volatility in the period prior to 1995 (R-squared of virtually zero), but explain rather well the trend in volatility at the turn of the Millennium (1995-2005).     

The impact of technical defaults on dividend policy

This paper examines how loan covenant violations impact firm dividend policy. Using contract-level loan data for nonfinancial firms in the US, this study provides evidence that the occurrence of a covenant violation significantly increases the likelihood of a dividend reduction in the subsequent quarter. Moreover, we show that the degree of creditor–shareholder conflict and firm financial constraints are important determinants of dividend cuts upon technical default. Additionally, this paper finds the tendency of dividend cuts upon technical default weakened after the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act. These findings suggest that loan covenants serve a critical role in mitigating creditor–shareholder conflicts.