Using Financial Accounting Data to Examine the Effect of Foreign Operations Located in Tax Havens and Other Countries on U.S. Multinational Firms' Tax Rates

This paper investigates the effect tax havens and other foreign jurisdictions have on the income tax rates of multinational firms based in the United States. We develop a new regression methodology using financial accounting data to estimate the average worldwide, federal, and foreign tax rates on worldwide, federal, and foreign pretax book income for a large sample of U.S. firms with and without tax haven operations. We find that on average U.S. firms that disclosed material operations in at least one tax haven country have a worldwide tax burden on worldwide income that is approximately 1.5 percentage points lower than firms without operations in at least one tax haven country. Our results also show that U.S. firms face a 4.4% current federal tax rate on foreign income whether or not they have tax haven operations. Finally, we find that U.S. firms with operations in some tax haven countries have higher federal tax rates on foreign income than other firms. This result suggests that in some cases, tax haven operations may increase U.S. tax collections at the expense of foreign country tax collections.     

Corporate tax reforms and tax-motivated profit shifting: evidence from the EU

This paper examines whether the profit-shifting trend in Europe during 2003–2013 can be explained by tax policy changes. Consistent with prior literature, we find that affiliates’ profits are sensitive to tax rate changes. However, we document that tax base–broadening reforms have mitigated the incentives for both inward and outward profit shifting. In particular, we find that anti-avoidance rules prevent multinational companies from shifting profits out of their foreign affiliates, whereas other tax base–broadening rules, such as restrictions on the deductibility of tax losses or on group tax relief, reduce the incentives for multinational companies to shift profits into foreign affiliates. Furthermore, we find evidence of a downward trend in profit shifting across European countries, especially when the tax enforcement is stricter. Overall, these results suggest that broader tax bases and stricter tax enforcement have successfully curbed this particular tax strategy.     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

Are U.S. Multinational Corporations Becoming More Aggressive Income Shifters?

This paper examines income shifting of U.S. multinational companies over the past two decades. Domestic and foreign policy makers are increasingly concerned with the effect of income shifting on dwindling tax revenues, however, extant research on income shifting by U.S. multinational enterprises is mixed. We address the disconnect between the academic literature and the policy maker's perceptions by examining the extent of multijurisdictional income shifting by U.S. multinational companies. We directly address conflicting results in extant literature and show that using either multiperiod proxies or instrumental variables overcomes weaknesses of annual proxies in this setting. Our tests show that U.S. companies have become more active at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have changed. Holding tax rate differences between U.S. and foreign jurisdictions constant, our empirical estimates suggest that our sample of 380 corporations with low average foreign tax rates collectively shifts approximately $10 billion of additional income out of the United States annually during 2005–2009 relative to 1998–2002 due to varying regulatory costs of shifting.     

Capital structure and international debt shifting

This paper presents a model of a multinational firm's optimal debt policy that incorporates international taxation factors. The model yields the prediction that a multinational firm's indebtedness in a country depends on a weighted average of national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested using a novel firm-level dataset for European multinationals and their subsidiaries, combined with newly collected data on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Our empirical results show that a foreign subsidiary's capital structure reflects local corporate tax rates as well as tax rate differences vis-à-vis the parent firm and other foreign subsidiaries, although the overall economic effect of taxes on leverage appears to be small. Ignoring the international debt shifting arising from differences in national tax rates would understate the impact of national taxes on debt policies by about 25%.     

The incentive to locate a multinational firm: The effect of tax reforms in the United Kingdom

The advent of the single European market has focused attention on the structure of international tax incentives for the location of multinational business. Multinationals that channel foreign income through the United Kingdom have been likely to suffer double taxation in the form of surplus advance corporation tax when they subsequently distribute the income to a foreign parent. This paper shows that the 1993 U.K. tax reforms create a significant reduction in the tax cost of locating in the United Kingdom, relative to traditionally favorable tax regimes such as the Netherlands.     

Where do firms manage earnings?

Despite decades of research on how, why, and when companies manage earnings, there is a paucity of evidence about the geographic location of earnings management within multinational firms. In this study, we examine where companies manage earnings using a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms from 1994 to 2009. We predict and find that firms with extensive foreign operations in weak rule of law countries have more foreign earnings management than companies with subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong. We also find some evidence that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries manage earnings more than other firms and that the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Apart from these results, we find that most earnings management takes place in domestic income, not foreign income.     

Shareholders’ tax incentives and changes in the organizational form of foreign operations

This study examines whether the tax incentives of home-country shareholders influence the organizational form changes of foreign operations. While a corporation and a limited company (LC) in South Korea are treated the same for Korean tax purposes, an LC can be treated as a pass-through entity for U.S. tax purposes. This tax treatment of LCs can create incentives for U.S. owners to convert their Korean corporations to LCs. We find that private corporations owned by U.S. shareholders are more likely to convert to LCs than those owned by non-U.S. shareholders. We also find that the tax costs and benefits of conversion affect the likelihood of LC conversion for U.S.-owned firms. Overall, our results suggest that multinational corporations use organizational form changes as a tool for international tax strategies.     

Currency Denomination of Intercompany Debt and Multinational Taxes

For multinational companies (MNCs) with foreign subsidiaries, the currency denomination of intercompany debt can have important effects on both taxes and financial statements. This paper analyzes the choice between an intercompany loan denominated in the home currency and one denominated in the subsidiary's functional currency. Using U.S. rules for financial accounting and taxes, the author demonstrates the expected impact of the loan's currency denomination on the expected level and variability of an MNCs overall taxes in the case where it has excess foreign tax credits.
The author's analysis shows that the foreign currency loan denomination leads to lower expected tax if the foreign withholding tax rate on interest is higher than the parent's home income tax rate. At the same time, the parent currency denomination leads to lower expected taxes if the parent's home income tax rate is higher than the foreign withholding tax rate on interest. Moreover, if an MNCs excess foreign tax credits are attributable to the subsidiary, the foreign currency loan denomination leads to lower variability in overall taxes. But in cases where the excess foreign tax credits arise from other foreign operations, the parent currency denomination leads to lower variability of overall tax.     

ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES OF MULTINATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING: A U.K. PERSPECTIVE

This paper reports the findings from an empirical study of multinational transfer pricing based on the information provided by 47 British multinational companies. The results indicate that company profit after tax was the key consideration for those companies in formulating their international transfer pricing policies. In addition, they also considered other important variables including the competitive position of their foreign subsidiaries, divisional performance evaluation, and foreign restrictions on repatriation of profits. Six dimensions of environment variables of multinational transfer pricing were also extracted using factor analysis technique.     

Restricted interest deductibility and multinationals’ use of internal debt finance

This paper reconsiders the role of interest deductibility for internal debt financing of multinational corporations (MNCs). We provide quasi-experimental evidence using restrictions on interest deductibility through thin-capitalization rules. Explicitly distinguishing between firms subject to a binding restriction and unrestricted firms, a panel data sample selection model is used to explore the tax sensitivity of the capital structure of foreign subsidiaries of MNCs. Our results confirm that the tax incentive for using internal loans is effectively removed for restricted subsidiaries. While internal debt financing of unrestricted subsidiaries positively responds to taxes, the effects are relatively small.     

中国与东盟四国吸引跨国公司地区总部的税收政策比较研究

东盟的新加坡、马来西亚、泰国和菲律宾四国(以下简称"东盟四国")在运用税收手段吸引跨国公司地区总部方面有很多有价值的经验。本文对比了我国和东盟四国在吸引跨国公司地区总部方面的税收政策,提出我国应该借鉴东盟四国的经验,把吸引跨国公司地区总部纳入国家引进外资的战略框架。     

Structuring a tax efficient international operation

International taxation is rapidly increasing in importance in the U.S. business environment. As a student preparing for a career in public accounting or industry, it is vital that you have familiarity with key international tax issues. In this case, you will participate in a detailed tax-planning exercise involving a multinational corporation that is restructuring its tax operations. In the process, you will be exposed to a wide-ranging array of real-world tax issues: tax theory, source of income, transfer pricing, foreign tax credits, the foreign earned income exclusion and Subpart F income. The case also incorporates questions designed to help you explore the financial accounting implications of tax planning. The case consists of three tax modules and each module emphasizes two to three specific tax issues. Two of the modules also contain a subset of tax-related financial accounting questions. To complete the case successfully, you will be required to understand basic international tax theory, to engage in the tax research process and to apply your theoretical knowledge in analyzing complex business scenarios.     

Auditing internal transfer prices in multinationals under monopolistic competition

This paper derives an appropriate standard price that can be used by the tax authorities of a country for auditing transfer prices in multinational firms (MNFs) for the purpose of social welfare maximization of the country. We assume that the corporate tax rate in the host country, where MNFs undertake foreign direct investment to locate their manufacturing divisions, is lower than that in the home country. Our conclusion is that the tax authorities of the home country should not always force MNFs to hold down the transfer price through a too strict audit standard if it aims to maximize social welfare of the country in the long-run equilibrium. This result implies that tax authorities face a trade-off between consumer welfare and tax revenue when determining the standard price used for auditing. One notable implication is that the tax authorities should raise the upper-limit price allowed for internal transfers as the elasticity of substitution between brands for consumers decreases.     

An Empirical Study of the Consequences of U.S. Tax Rules for International Acquisitions by U.S. Firms

This article examines the effect of tax factors on the equity values of U.S. multinational corporations making foreign acquisitions. Abnormal stock returns are found to be related to a tax variable that captures differences in the international tax status of acquiring firms but not related to a naive tax variable that captures differences between tax rates in target countries and the United States. Our evidence suggests that aggregate intercountry differentials in after-tax returns are competed away, while firm-specific, tax-related advantages (or disadvantages) are reflected in abnormal returns around the announcement date of the acquisition.     

Anti-tax-avoidance provisions and the size of foreign direct investment

The paper sets up a model of a multinational firm in which the home country uses a credit with deferral or an exemption system and the host country is a low-tax jurisdiction. In this model the impact of anti-tax-avoidance provisions on the size and the growth of the foreign subsidiary is analyzed. Two main results emerge. First, anti-tax-avoidance provisions may lower the cost of capital of foreign firms quite significantly. Second, in contrast to previous models with limited financial possibilities the paper shows that a tax induced growth dynamics is absent if there are some important tax constellations.     

Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign direct investment

This paper explores the effects of unilateral tax provisions aimed at restricting multinationals’ tax planning on foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a unique dataset which allows us to observe the worldwide activities of a large panel of multinational firms, we test how limitations of interest tax deductibility, so-called thin-capitalization rules, and regulations of transfer pricing by the host country affect investment and employment of foreign subsidiaries. The results indicate that introducing a typical thin-capitalization rule or making it more tight exerts significant adverse effects on FDI and employment in high-tax countries. Moreover, in countries that impose thin-capitalization rules, the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI is increased. Regulations of transfer pricing, however, are not found to exert significant effects on FDI or employment.     

Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation

US corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets. This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that the magnitude of US multinational cash holdings are, in part, a consequence of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms facing higher repatriation taxes hold higher levels of cash, hold this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings. In addition, less financially constrained firms and those that are more technology intensive exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens.     

Tax‐Aided Financial Services Companies and the Cost of Capital

Over the past two decades, the governments of several European countries have implemented special tax devices to attract the finance centres of multinational companies. This paper determines how the cost of capital for investments made by multinationals is affected by the tax regimes, bringing into play the Irish financial services company, the Belgian co‐ordination centre, the Dutch finance company and the Luxemburg company coupled with a Swiss finance branch. It gives evidence that intermediation of a tax‐aided services company in the financing scheme of a foreign subsidiary provides an important tax saving. However, the home and source countries' tax regimes influence the hierarchy of the less heavily taxed treasury and finance centres. The methodology relies on the marginal effective tax rates theory and consists of an extension of Alworth's (1988) model to include treasury centres.     

Corporate tax payments under formulary apportionment: Evidence from the financial reports of 50 major U.S. multinational firms

Under a formulary apportionment system of taxing multinational corporate income, U.S. tax liabilities would be based on the product of a multinational firm's worldwide income and the fraction of their real activities that occur in the United States – typically, an average of asset, payroll, and sales shares. This analysis utilizes financial reporting data for 50 large U.S. multinational firms to analyze how tax payments would change under a possible formulary system, updating Shackelford and Slemrod (1998). Our time period is 2005–2007 instead of 1989–1993. We find that tax payments under formulary apportionment would increase modestly overall but by a lower magnitude than found by Shackelford and Slemrod. Given the changes in the international tax environment since the earlier time period, this is a puzzling finding; we speculate regarding possible explanations.