From “tax state” to “debt state”

The paper is motivated by Joseph A. Schumpeter's The Crisis of the Tax State. It inquires whether the buildup of government debt in peacetimeprosperity is a threat to the stability, existence or creation of viable tax states. The paper begins by setting out Schumpeter's conception of the tax state and the nature of recent political-economic events which have reinvigorated the concept. Next the paper sets out some simple debt dynamics and sketches a debt-induced business cycle arising from heavy reliance on debt finance in peacetimeprosperity. Finally, the paper assesses threats to the tax state in light of recent work on path dependence and positive feedback. An attempt is made to throw some light on whether the plethora of new, and often small, states spawned by the demise of communism can be viable tax states.Essay on Government, the Tax State and Economic Dynamics submitted to the Third Schumpeter Prize Competition.     

Ein ‚Wirtschaftswissenschafter‘ von heute über Wirtschaftswissenschaft von heute

Ohne ZusammenfassungIch bin den Herausgebern, der Schriftleitung und dem Verlag der Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie zu besonderem Dank verpflichtet für die Veröffentlichung dieses Artikels, der im wesentlichen meine Stellungnahme zu dem im Weltwirtschaftlichen Archiv von 1954 erschienenen und in Anm. 2 genau zitierten Aufsatz A. Zottmanns Wirtschaftswissenschaft von heute? enthält.Daß ich nicht am nämlichen Ort antworten wollte, werden die Leser verstehen.     

Disability insurance in an optimal pension scheme

Disability or poor health is traditionally associated with a complete loss of earnings capacity and/or prohibitive increases in the disutility of labor. Thus, it invokes a necessity to withdraw from the labor market. A number of empirical and theoretical studies have questioned this conventional view and suggested instead that the use of disability-contingent allowances for early retirement mainly reflects the leniency of the eligibility rules. This raises the issue of designing incentive-compatible health-contingent retirement rules and questions concerning the resulting characterization of optimal pension systems. The study shows that the presence of moral hazard induces an overinsurance of normal retirees, raises the optimal contribution-rate, and lowers the optimal normal benefit level and the normal retirement age. Moreover, even if the realization of an ex-ante uncertain health shock increases the disutility of labor only slightly, the disability-contingent retirement age and the date when this health shock occurs will coincide — given that the system entails normal retirement provisions as well. Thus, minimum eligibility ages and other arrangements to induce prolonged work of actually disabled persons can very generally be demonstrated to be suboptimal.     

Wilhelm Weber—50 Jahre

Ohne ZusammenfassungFerner zahlreicheBuchbesprechungen, insbesondere in der Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, und Zeitungsartikel.     

Sector-specific capital, “Bang-bang” investment,and the Filippov solution

Bang-bang investment in a two-sector growth model with immobile capital is rational and leads to a unique and globally stable long-run equilibrium along a sliding trajectory. This steady state coincides with the stationary equilibrium in the traditional model with non-sector-specific capital.This article was written while the authors were visiting scholars at Cornell University. We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from the Erasmus University Trust Fund and the Netherlands Scientific Organization. We would like to thank, without implicating, two anonymous referees, Martijn Herrmann, Jean-Marie Viaene, Claus Weddepohl, and the participants of seminars at the University of Maryland, the University of Montreal, and Erasmus University Rotterdam for perceptive remarks and useful comments. Jeroen Hinloopen and Rien Wagenvoort provided able graphical assistance. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the World Bank.     

Exchange rates and bertrand oligopoly

The impact of exchange-rate changes on industrial prices seems ambiguous. Incomplete and even perverse pass-through has been observed: the import prices in the depreciating country decrease while those in the appreciating country increase. To explain these counterintuitive price reactions we consider a situation of international Bertrand competition: two firms, based in different countries, are selling in both countries simultaneously. The profit-maximizing duopolists set the prices for their products in each of the two markets which are segmented on the demand side. We then study the qualitative effect of an exogenous exchange-rate change on the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Under the strong assumption of linear demand and cost functions we have normal exchange-rate pass-through. However, allowing for more general cost structures in this simple static model enables us to show that the import prices in both countries might move in counterintuitive directions.     

Zur Kritik der Dyopoltheorie von Krelle

Zusammenfassung Heertje hat schwerwiegende Einwände gegen die Dyopollösung von Krelle und damit unausgesprochen und im Fall Ott auch explizit gegen die Weiterentwicklungen erhoben. Bei der Analyse der Kritik von Heertje haben wir uns ausschließlich auf die Fragenkreise beschränkt, die aus der Modell-Struktur der Krelle-Lösung herleitbar und beantwortbar sind; die Kritik Heertjes erfährt so eine systemendogene Behandlung. Dabei zeigt sich, daß die Einwände Heertjes weitgehend widerlegbar sind. Indessen hat der Krelle-Ansatz in der bisherigen umfänglichen Diskussion jedoch auch Kritik erfahren, wiewohl Krelle selbst und andere⁷² in Teilbereichen den Einwänden begegnen konnten. Existent bleiben nach wie vor asymmetrische Züge im Preisbildungsprozeß, da auch kleine Schritte irgendwann ihr Ende und ihre Inzidenz finden: einer ist dann doch der Sklave⁷³. Nicht überzeugen können auch die Versuche, die Initiativen zum ersten Preiszug zu begründen. Korrekturbedürftig scheint auch die Hypothese der preispolitischen Abstinenz im Gleichgewichtsbereich: hier bieten die aus einem Lernprozeß geborenen Strategien der festen Preisrelation und der differenzierten Preiserhöhung einen realitätsnahen und analytisch faßbaren Erklärungsansatz. Insofern scheinen die Oligopoltheorien von Ott⁷⁴ und Heuß⁷⁵ in ihrer Prämissenwahl und Aussage überzeugender. Dies ist jedoch ein modell-exogener Einwand; die Konsistenz der Krelle-Lösung bleibt davon unberührt.     

Klassische Nationalökonomie gestern und heute

Ohne ZusammenfassungDieser Artikel ist dieungekürzte Fassung des Beitrages Klassische Nationalökonomie des Verfassers zum Staatslexikon (Band IV).     

Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets

Summary This paper defines a choice process over social outcomes in which agents choose the institutional rules ormechanisms themselves without outside interference. Truly endogenizing the mechanism selection process in this way, however, involves facing an infinite regress problem in which outcomes are chosen by games which are themselves chosen by games, ad infinitum. This paper allows the possibility of such an infinite regress which we callfully endogenous mechanism selection.We introduce the notion ofFree Choice which restricts the class of mechanisms in the regress to those which prevent agents from being locked in to an equilibrium outcome by the actions of others. Under this condition, the infinite regress is shown to get truncated with the number of selection iterations endogenously determined. It turns out that the outcomes resulting from a Free Choice-constrained regress are (Weakly) Pareto optimal; in particular, these outcomes solve a weighted Rawlsian Maxmin criterion. We also show that these outcomes are invariant to the equilibrium concept used to evaluate games in the regress.This paper is based on the author's dissertation from the University of Minnesota (November, 1989).I am very grateful for the guidance, advice, and encouragement from my advisor, Marcel K. Richter, and for the many helpful suggestions from David Levine. I have also benefited from conversations with Nabil Al-Najjar, Gerhard Glomm, Leonid Hurwicz, James Jordan, Ramon Marimon, Andrew McClennan, Ariel Rubinstein, and William Thomson.     

Austrian economic policy

Zusammenfassung Die österreichische Wirtschaftspolitik wird in Österreich vielfach als austro-keynesianisch etikettiert. Der vorliegende aufsatz versucht zu zeigen, daß das Keynesianische dieser Politik nicht in einer Stop-and-go-Politik besteht, was üblicherweise als Keynesianismus bezeichnet wird. Vielmehr zielt die österreichische Wirtschaftspolitk darauf ab, intrinsische Instabilitäten des Marktprozesses als Folge von Unsicherheiten oder wechselnden Erwartungen durch gesamtwirtschaftliche Arrangements zu reduzieren: Sozialpartnerschaft, stabiler Finanzsektor, Unabhängigkeit der Investitionsentscheidungen von monetären Faktoren sowie Dominanz automatischer Stabilisatoren. Diese Reduktion von Marktinstabilitäten kann als fundamentale Politikempfehlung Keynes' angesehen werden.Der Terminus Austro in der Bezeichnung der österreichischen Wirtschaftspolitik weist darauf hin, daß es ein hausgemachtes Konzept ist, welches neben keynesianischen Elementen auch klassische Relikte, neoklassische Erweiterungen, monetaristische Vermutungen oder einfach Wirtschaftspolitik à la Hausverstand beinhaltet. Dies gilt insbesondere für eine Vielzahl von selektiven Eingriffen wie Investitions-, Spar- oder Exportförderung. Gemeinsam ist diesen selektiven Eingriffen, daß sie üblicherweise als Erklärungen für die Erfolge der österreichischen Wirtschaftspolitik herangezogen werden; der konkrete Beweis hiefür steht jedoch aus.Der Aufsatz unternimmt den Versuch, das austro-keynesianische Konzept theoretisch wie auch empirisch kritisch zu prüfen.

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Revised joint version of two papers presented at the Premier colloque du Club européen des associations d'économistes: Les politiques économiques des années 1980, Paris, March 1983. The conference volume will be published under the editorship of P. Maillet, Association Française de Science Economique.     

Agency in a market setting

This paper examines a market in which a continuum of principals and agents interact in a game. Principals offer contracts while agents decide on sets of acceptable contracts. A mechanism from a class satisfying efficiency, unbiasedness, and continuity properties then matches principals and agents. With risk neutral agents, when the contribution of principals and agents to the total gains from trade in a pairing are additively separable, the equilibria of the game coincide with the competitive equilibria for the market. In particular, all contracts used in Nash equilibrium induce first-best effort levels. Both principals and agents have exogenous opportunities outside this market. In equilibrium, agents have endogenously determined outside opportunities available from employment by another principal, and this may be the binding participation constraint in a principal-agent pairing. The results are extended to special non-separable cases and to the case of identical risk averse agents.We are grateful to seminar participants at Indiana University, the University of Kentucky, and Vanderbilt University for comments on earlier versions of this work. Referees' comments led us to generalize the model and to more clearly specify the point of the paper.     

Multilateral trade liberalization: Some general equilibrium simulation results for Austria

This paper uses the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade for a quantitative evaluation of the general equilibrium effects of various multilateral trade liberalization scenarios on the Austrian economy. The analysis is motivated by the recent incorporation into the model of an original input-output table for Austria, and by a severe shortage of knowledge on the effects of liberalization on the Austrian economy. In addition to the actual Tokyo-round tariff cuts, the paper concentrates on an almost complete multilateral elimination of post-Tokyo-round protection, including the most important non-tariff trade barriers. The paper also reports on some aggregate price and exchange rate effects, but the primary focus of the analysis will be sectoral adjustment, characterized by changes in employment, per-unit value added, and returns to sector-specific capital.

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Zusammenfassung In Österreich besteht ein gewisses Defizit an systematischen quantitativen Analysen der bestehenden Handelsprotektion bzw. der Effekte, die eine Beseitigung dieser Protektion — etwa im Rahmen der laufenden GATT-Verhandlungsrunde — haben kann. In dieser Arbeit wird das an der University of Michigan (USA) entwickelte Welthandelsmodell für eine solche Analyse verwendet. Mit Hilfe dieses viele Länder umfassenden und empirisch implementierten allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodells werden die Auswirkungen verschiedener Szenarien der multilateralen Liberalisierung des internationalen Handels, einschließlich der Beseitigung nichttarifärer Handelshemmnisse, auf die österreichische Volkswirtschaft untersucht. Diese Untersuchung wurde möglich durch die mittlerweile erfolgte Aufnahme der österreichischen Input-Output-Daten in das Michigan-Modell. Sowohl aggregierte als auch sektorale Effekte werden berechnet, wobei die letzteren Aufschluß geben können über allenfalls zu erwartende Anpassungsschwierigkeiten.

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All simulations reported on in this paper were carried out while I was visiting scholar at the University of Michigan in 1987–88. I am deeply indebted to Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern for having me participate in their ongoing research project on General Equilibrium Trade Policy Modeling, for offering me unlimited use of their computational model, and for their continuous support and encouragement. I am also grateful to John Alfaro and Jon Haveman for computational assistance. Thanks are due to Josef Richter and Gottfried Tappeiner for their cooperation in providing the Austrian input-output table in machine readable form.     

Coase-Paradigma versus Pigou-Paradigma: Über Information und Motivation als Grundfragen dezentralisierter Umweltkontrolle

Ohne ZusammenfassungDiese Studie wird im Rahmen des Projekts Zur politischen Ökonomie des öffentlichen Wirtschaftssektors der Kommission für Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, erstellt. Zu danken habe ich für kritische Anregungen den Mitgliedern des Workshops der Nationalökonomischen Gesellschaft Wien, insbesondere Herrn Univ.-Ass. Dr. G. Winckler (Wien) und Herrn Univ. Prof. DDr. D. Bös (Wien) für wichtige Vorschläge hinsichtlich der Gesamtkonzeption der vorliegenden Abhandlung.     

Farm income,market wages,and off-farm labour supply

In most developed countries we observe an increasing share of part-time farming at the expense of full-time farmers. In the present paper, we develop a theoretical labour supply model which accounts for the specific decision problem of a farmer. The empirical analysis uses the ordered probit and a Tobit model to explain labour supply behaviour for a sample of farm households in Upper Austria. Farm size, household characteristics, as well as education significantly influences off-farm labour supply behaviour. The obtained wage elasticities for male farmers are comparable in magnitude to those obtained in labour supply studies for adult females or elderly people.

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Zusammenfassung Nebenerwerbslandwirtschaft entwickelt sich immer mehr zur vorherrschenden Form der Erwerbstätigkeit von Landwirten. Die Erwerbsentscheidung zwischen Voll-, Zu- und Nebenerwerb wird im Rahmen eines statischen Arbeitsangebotsmodells untersucht und mit Hilfe eines Ordered-probit-bzw. eines Tobit-Ansatzes für 1.842 landwirtschaftliche Haushalte in Oberösterreich getestet. Das Arbeitsmarktverhalten von Landwirten ist gekennzeichnet durch eine hohe Lohnelastizität vergleichbar den Ergebnissen für das Erwerbsverhalten von Personen auf dem sekundären Arbeitsmarkt. Darüber hinaus läßt sich ein signifikanter Einfluß der Betriebsgröße, der Struktur des landwirtschaftlichen Haushaltes sowie der Art und des Umfangs der Ausbildung des Betriebsleiterehepaares erkennen.

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We are grateful to the Agrar- und Forstrechtsabteilung der oberösterreichischen Landesregierung for giving us access to the data set, and E. Fürst for helpful assistance in data preparation. We are indebted to the participants of the first annual conference of the Austrian Association of Agricultural Economists (ÖGA) held in Vienna in October 1991 and especially to R. Winter-Ebmer, M. Hofreither, and three anonymous referees for valuable comments.     

The “Dorfman Steiner” rule

Conclusion When this research was started, it was guessed that the Dorfman-Steiner rule would lose its relevance in an intertemporal setting. This belief has turned out to be false: along the optimal paths ofp (t) ands (t), and must be equal. The only difference with the Dorfman-Steiner result is that they will be different from unity.The author is chargé de cours at the Faculté Universitaire Catholique de Mons (Belgium). He has greatyl benefited from comments by M. Beuthe and J. J. Lambin.     

Sparen und Einkommensverteilung

Summary The wage and salary bill in Austrian manufacturing industry is divided into a fixed and a variable part on the assumption that wages of skilled labour and salaries can be regarded as fixed, wages of unskilled and semi-skilled workers as variable cost. The excess of value added (factor incomes) over the variable wage cost (gross profit) is shown to be more stable in the trade cycle than the excess of value added over the total wage cost (net profit); this accords with the idea of a relatively stable mark-up on variable cost.As a proportion of value added, gross profit and even more net profit in the above sense decline gradually over the period 1956 to 1972. This would indicate a declining degree of monopoly or increasing degree of competition which presumably applies mainly to the export markets. The hypothesis is advanced that more active competition has taken place in foreign markets which enabled Austrian manufacturing to increase its share in those markets. The reduction in profit margins was made possible by tax allowances i.e. by the quick write-off a considerable part of new investment. This tax allowances amounts to an interest free government loan to the investor, which in fact will not be repaid of the depreciation funds are reinvested immediately after the equipment is fully written off. The proportion of the industry's capital which is in this sense financed by the government increases over time as investment expands; a profit rate has to be earned only on the remaining capital stock, so that without reduction of the return on private capital the profit margins may be reduced. (The tax allowances thus amount to a virtual reduction of the capital coefficient which proceeds gradually over a long time.)The paper finally shows the relation between the share of savings and the share of corporate incomes in the total private income during the cycle. The share of saving moves with the cycle and this is made possible by a shift to corporate income.     

Der Weg zur Konvertibilität

Ohne ZusammenfassungVortrag, gehalten am 26. Mai 1955 in der Nationalökonomischen Gesellschaft in Wien.     

Ein Entscheidungsmodell für Konsumieren und Sparen

Summary The present study analyses the simultaneous problem of consumption and saving by means of a consistent demand system; for this purpose the linear—expenditure—system (LES), developed by R. Stone, has been modified and used as a methodological base. Saving takes, for the sake of operationality, the character of a consumer—good and becomes an argument of the utility function. The usual neoclassical assumption of utility maximization allows the derivation of a linear expenditure system of consumption and saving (LESSC) when prices and income are given. The simultaneous LESSC-model has remarkable weaknesses, however: the assumption of certainty, the static character of the model, the disregard for major savings—motives and private expenditure on homebuiding led to bad elasticity—estimates. The assumpion of directly—additive utility functions causes furthermore collinearity between income—and price—elasticities such that the meaning of the derived elasticities is greatly reduced.The income—elasticities derived from the LESSC are positive throughout but show a remarkable variance. The calculation of the Friedman—bias demonstrates a rather strong bias due to the assumption of certainty. A modification resulted in income—elasticities of private consumption and savings of around 0,93 (unmodified: 0,88) and 1,41 (unmodified: 1,76). The demand for consumption goods of great necessity was income—inelastic whereas the demand for goods of less importance to survival was income—elastic. An analysis of income—elasticities of the disaggregated system and the relation between transitory components of consumption and income existing in Austria gave the impression that unexpected changes in income are not only reflected in saving but also in changes of the consumption—structure.The respective price—elasticites are all negative and smaller than 1. For less important consumption—goods lower price—elasticities have been measured and for easily substitutable goods higher ones. Marked crossprice—elasticities could only by discovered with clothing and food products. Generally it can be said that an increase in prices of goods of the daily needs hits both the expenditure on easily substitutable consumption goods and causes dissaving.A comparison with the elasticities calculated through OLS shows a greater reliance of LESSC—elasticities as far as data of differing aggregation levels are concerned.

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Mécanique Sociale may one day take her place along with Mécanique Celeste throned each upon the double—sided height of one maximum principle, the supreme pinnacle of moral as of physical science.     

Vertical and Horizontal Trust Networks in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Third Reich

In a seminal contribution to the literature on bureaucracy, Breton and Wintrobe (The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organization. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1982) develop a model wherein subordinates and superiors in a bureaucratic structure trade with each other to advance the objectives of the superiors. The success of such an organizational arrangement (for superiors) is based upon the development of vertical trust networks in a way that facilitates the promise of informal payments by superiors in return for informal services provided by their subordinates. Breton and Wintrobe [Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986) 905] also provide a theoretical application of their model by describing the Nazi bureaucracy as a conglomeration of competing agencies that zealously carried out the Final Solution to the Jewish question. As an extension, this note develops two compelling empirical examples of vertical and horizontal trust networks within the Nazi regime: Einsatzgruppen As (Special Action Detachments) attempt to liquidate all Lithuanian Jews after the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in 1941 and the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler.JEL Classification: D23, D73.     

Zur Frage der Wirtschaftsmacht

Ohne ZusammenfassungNach einem in der Nationalökonomischen Gesellschaft in Wien am 27. April 1954 gehaltenen Vortrag.