Voluntary disclosure of corporate venture capital investments

In this paper, we investigate drivers of corporate venture capital investment announcements. Consistent with voluntary information disclosure theories, we find that a public announcement is less likely to be made when the start-up firm is in the seed stage but more likely when the parent company is large, active in concentrated markets and in non-high-tech industries; spends heavily on internal R&D and capital expenditures; has low leverage ratio; and faces more information asymmetry problems. In addition, corporate venture capital programs managed externally disclose more often than internal programs. We find that parent companies facing more severe asymmetric information problems enjoy the highest abnormal returns in response to announcements. This study contributes to the literature on voluntary information disclosure in that it evidences that larger corporations use disclosure of some of their investments in innovative startups strategically as a way to convey valuable information to the market.     

Financial contracting with strategic investors: Evidence from corporate venture capital backed IPOs

We analyze financial contracting in start-ups backed by corporate venture capitalists (CVCs). CVCs' strategic goals can economically hurt or benefit the start-ups, depending on product market relationships between start-ups and CVC parents. Empirically, start-ups receive funding from both complementary and competitive CVC parents. However, start-up insiders commonly limit the influence of competitive CVCs, awarding them lower board power, while retaining higher board representation for themselves. Second, lead CVCs receive lower board representation, indicating heightened concerns about their greater influence in start-ups' early stages. Finally, start-ups extract higher valuations from competitive CVCs, reflecting greater moral hazard problems. Overall, CVC strategic objectives affect their early inclusion in VC syndicates, their control rights and share pricing.     

The impact of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of Australian initial public offerings

This study explores the role of venture capitalists on investee boards at the time of listing for 552 initial public offerings. Australian board structures and mechanisms are more similar to those in the US and the United Kingdom, but market activity characteristics are more similar to Japanese and German systems. Further, the Australian private equity market is relatively young compared to US and European markets. IPOs backed by venture capital have more independent boards, similar to US IPOs. Venture capitalists improve governance by using their networks to recruit specialist independent directors with industry experience.     

How venture capital works

The popular mythology surrounding the U.S. venture-capital industry derives from a previous era. Venture capitalists who nurtured the computer industry in its infancy were legendary both for their risk taking and for their hands-on operating experience. But today things are different, and separating the myths from the realities is crucial to understanding this important piece of the U.S. economy. Today's venture capitalists are more like conservative bankers than the risk takers of days past. They have carved out a specialized niche in the capital markets, filling a void that other institutions cannot serve. They are the linch-pins in an efficient system for meeting the needs of institutional investors looking for high returns, of entrepreneurs seeking funding, and of investment bankers looking for companies to sell. Venture capitalists must earn a consistently superior return on investments in inherently risky businesses. The myth is that they do so by investing in good ideas and good plans. In reality, they invest in good industries--that is, industries that are more competitively forgiving than the market as a whole. And they structure their deals in a way that minimizes their risk and maximizes their returns. Although many entrepreneurs expect venture capitalists to provide them with sage guidance as well as capital, that expectation is unrealistic. Given a typical portfolio of ten companies and a 2,000-hour work year, a venture capital partner spends on average less than two hours per week on any given company. In addition to analyzing the current venture-capital system, the author offers practical advice to entrepreneurs thinking about venture funding.     

做风险投资,IBM的理念

IBM这样描绘公司的风险投资战略:公司风险战略大多集中在金融投资领域,而IBM却采取了一种与众不同的互惠战略,即将关系置于直接投资之上的战略.目前,该战略正结出丰硕的成果:大的风险投资公司正逐渐了解IBM的愿景和战略并看到由其投资公司变为其组合公司从而创造利润的大好机遇;创业者们正获取IBM的技术技能、市场渠道,从而为其自身解决方案获得更高的信誉度和有效性.     

风险投资的策略有哪些变化?

风险投资在2007年第二季度表现如何?清科集团总裁兼首席执行官倪正东有一个评价,他说:"在刚刚走过的2007年第二季度,中国创业投资活动激增,无论是投资基金的募集还是投资的额度都达到了振奋人心的新峰值,成为中国创业投资产业史上一个新的里程碑.     

Strategic decertification in venture capital

An early-round investment delivers information about the quality of a project before more funds are needed. To obtain the best early-round financing offer, the entrepreneur should then approach a venture capitalist with highest screening ability. Going for the most accurate venture capitalist can however backfire in a follow-on round of financing. He could extract advantageous terms by threatening not to reinvest: the more accurate the incumbent, the more the signal sent by his non-participation to alternative financiers would be negative. Then, the most attractive early-round venture capitalist has only intermediate screening ability. The threat of strategic decertification enhances credit rationing.     

Legality and venture capital exits

This paper introduces an analysis of the impact of Legality on the exiting of venture capital investments. We consider a sample of 468 venture-backed companies from 12 Asia-Pacific countries, and these countries' venture capitalists' investments in US-based entrepreneurial firms. The data indicate IPOs are more likely in countries with a higher Legality index. This core result is robust to controls for country-specific stock market capitalization, MSCI market conditions, venture capitalist fund manager skill and fund characteristics, and entrepreneurial firm and transaction characteristics. Although Black and Gilson (1998) [Black, B.S., Gilson, R.J., 1998. Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 243–77] speculate on a central connection between active stock markets and active venture capital markets, our data in fact indicate the quality of a country's legal system is much more directly connected to facilitating VC-backed IPO exits than the size of a country's stock market. The data indicate Legality is a central mechanism which mitigates agency problems between outside shareholders and entrepreneurs, thereby fostering the mutual development of IPO markets and venture capital markets.     

The reputation effect of venture capital

The main purpose of this paper to examine how the reputation effect of venture capital (VC) is associated with the initial return and ex-post performance of its invested IPO firms. In this paper, we use 267 Taiwanese IPO firms in 1994–2007 periods and find that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of ex-post equity market-to-book ratio, ROA and R&D expenditure ratio. For those VC-backed IPOs, reputable VC-backed firms outperform mediocre VC-backed ones. Moreover, among the four proxies of VC reputation, the market share with respect to total IPO proceeds is most promising in explaining IPO firms’ ex-post performance. The overall result confirms the reputation effect associated with VC.     

Local bias in venture capital investments

This paper examines local bias in the context of venture capital (VC) investments. Based on a sample of U.S. VC investments between 1980 and June 2009, we find more reputable VCs (older, larger, more experienced, and with stronger IPO track record) and VCs with broader networks exhibit less local bias. Staging and specialization in technology industries increase VCs' local bias. We also find that the VC exhibits stronger local bias when it acts as the lead VC and when it is investing alone. Finally, we show that distance matters for the eventual performance of VC investments.     

风险投资是什么?

风险投资是什么?一个本是很明确的问题,怎么就有了疑问. 前不久,本刊记者应邀参加了牛仔投资承办的2007首届武汉国际风险投资大会,两天议程走下来,忽然觉得风险投资是一个需要经常说起的话题,特别是在中小企业融资难的今天.     

Asset liquidity and venture capital investment

We examine the relationship between asset market liquidity and venture capital (VC) investment and find that it is inverted U-shaped. Asset liquidity and VC investment are positively related for low levels of asset liquidity but negatively related for higher levels of asset liquidity. We also document evidence that VC firms with more industry experience invest more in a liquid asset market than those without industry experience or with significant experience in other industries. Portfolio companies obtained their first investment in a liquid asset market are less likely to exit successfully; however, given a successful exit, they prefer to exit through mergers and acquisitions rather than going public.     

Government venture capital and cross-border investment

We use data on venture capital investments from 26 countries from 1998–2013. We investigate the following questions: Do domestic government sponsored venture capital funds augment or curtail domestic private venture capital funds from cross-border investment? Do government sponsored venture capital funds attract or repel foreign private venture capital investment? The results show that a preponderance of mixed-structured over pure-structured government venture capital investment has a crowding-in effect overall: it attracts domestic and international private venture capital to the domestic venture capital market while simultaneously increasing total private venture capital investment. In contrast, a preponderance of pure-government over mixed-government venture capital fund investment repels foreign private venture capital investment (has a crowding out effect). We find that both these effects are more pronounced for domestic rather than foreign private venture capital and that the attraction effect is stronger than the repulsion effect.     

Squaring venture capital valuations with reality

We develop a valuation model for venture capital–backed companies and apply it to 135 US unicorns, that is, private companies with reported valuations above $1 billion. We value unicorns using financial terms from legal filings and find that reported unicorn post-money valuations average 48% above fair value, with 14 being more than 100% above. Reported valuations assume that all shares are as valuable as the most recently issued preferred shares. We calculate values for each share class, which yields lower valuations because most unicorns gave recent investors major protections such as initial public offering (IPO) return guarantees (15%), vetoes over down-IPOs (24%), or seniority to all other investors (30%). Common shares lack all such protections and are 56% overvalued. After adjusting for these valuation-inflating terms, almost one-half (65 out of 135) of unicorns lose their unicorn status.     

Human capital investment,new firm creation and venture capital

This paper studies the relation between firm investment in general human capital, new firm creation and financial development for new firm financing, such as the existence of a venture capital industry. On one hand, firm investment in general human capital leads employees to generate new innovative ideas for starting their own firm. Since employees need a venture capitalist to start their new firm, firm investment in general human capital encourages the creation of venture capitalists by increasing the need for their services, such as providing advice and monitoring. On the other hand, as new firm financing becomes available, firms’ willingness to invest in general human capital increases, and as a by-product, the creation of employee-founded and venture capital-backed new firms increases in the economy. Hence, our model provides a rational explanation for the emergence of new firms created by employees of established firms, which represents one of the most common type of new firms in many industries.     

风险投资的十个真相

优秀的VC并不是永远都不会错过好项目、不投资坏项目,也不可能做到,但是．即便是成功的VC都会看走眼、放过好项目。这只是关于风险投资真相之一,还是其他种种真相．对此,创业者要有所了解     

Relational venture capital financing of serial founders

I study how often and why a serial founder receives financing for his new company from a venture capital (VC) firm that also invested in his previous company. One in 10 VC investments leads to a repeated relationship and one in three serial founders enters into a repeated relationship with any previous VC firm. A repeated relationship is more likely when the relational VC firm has acquired more private information about the founder, but less likely if the founder’s new venture has a bad fit with the VC firm’s geographic or industry focus. My findings add to the literature on relational financing by showing that the preservation of information is an important motivation for relational financing when screening and monitoring costs are high. Yet, repeated relationships are discontinued because investors also respond to information problems by specializing in certain types of firms. Finally, I find evidence of non-relational investments being passed onto trusted VC syndication partners.     

Start-up investment with scarce venture capital support

Venture capitalists, representing informed capital, screen, monitor and advise start-up entrepreneurs. The paper reports three new results on venture capital (VC) finance and the evolution of the VC industry. First, there is an optimal VC portfolio size with a trade-off between the number of companies and the value of managerial advice. Second, advice tends to be diluted when the industry expands and VC skills remain scarce in the short-run. The delayed entry of experienced VCs eventually restores the quality of advice and leads to more focused company portfolios. Third, as a welfare result, VCs tend to provide too little advisory effort and to invest in too few companies. Testable implications are also discussed.     

Entrepreneurial finance: Banks versus venture capital

We analyze how entrepreneurial firms choose between two funding institution: banks, which monitor less intensively and face liquidity demands from their own investors, and venture capitalists, who can monitor more intensively but face a higher cost of capital because of the liquidity constraints that they impose on their own investors. Because the firm's manager prefers continuing the firm over liquidating it and aggressive (risky) continuation strategies over conservative (safe) continuation strategies, the institution must monitor the firm and exercise some control over its decisions. Bank finance takes the form of debt, whereas venture capital finance often resembles convertible debt. Venture capital finance is optimal only when the aggressive continuation strategy is not too profitable, ex ante; the uncertainty associated with the risky continuation strategy (strategic uncertainty) is high; and the firm's cash flow distribution is highly risky and positively skewed, with low probability of success, low liquidation value, and high returns if successful. A decrease in venture capitalists’ cost of capital encourages firms to switch from safe strategies and bank finance to riskier strategies and venture capital finance, increasing the average risk of firms in the economy.