铸币税：基于不同视角的理解

本文讨论了不同货币体系下铸币税对政府和中央银行的含义。同时也讨论了铸币税对收入再分配和政府宏观经济政策的意义。本文着重指出。铸币税收入与通货膨胀税是存在差异的。在对我国中央银行资产负债表进行分析的基础上，本文还估算了2003年我国政府从货币发行中获得的铸币税收入的规模。     

关于铸币税问题的思考

铸币税不是一种税,而是指铸造货币所获得的收入;发行货币是铸币税的源泉,铸币税是中央银行发行货币的结果;现代经济制度下,铸币税是指中央银行的货币发行所获得的利润。     

浅析电子货币的发展对央行铸币税收入的影响

电子货币作为小额交易的支付工具的广泛使用,有可能会取代央行发行的通货,使央行由发行无息负债所换取的利息性资产收益,即一般所称的铸币税收入(seigniorage revenues)大幅减少,从而影响央行运作的独立性。巴塞尔委员会曾对十国集团成员国电子货币发展对中央银行铸币税收入有可能产生的影响进行过研究,笔者认为:由于货币构成的差异和货币面额构成的差异,电子货币的发展对我国中央银行铸币税收入的影响更大。     

财政赤字货币化、央行铸币税与经济增长

铸币税是政府发行货币所取得的收入。现阶段我国政府可以通过增加铸币税来弥补财政赤字 ,摆脱通货紧宿 ,减少税收扭曲 ,促进经济发展     

对外贸易中的铸币税及其经济效应

铸币税是指发行货币所得到的收益,既包括中央银行发行的基础货币,也包括商业银行发行的存款.中央银行征收铸币税的能力随着货币乘数增加而减弱,而商业银行的征收能力则随货币乘数的增加而增加.铸币税可以分解为通货膨胀税和扣除净出口部分的经济增长税两部分,外汇储备本质上是货币当局向本国人们征收的铸币税.     

竞争性货币与铸币税

铸币税是指货币发行者从发行货币而得到的收入,本文从使用共同货币的成本出发,从货币使用的成本和收益的角度分析了铸币税的存在和度量,在此基础上,将货币视为适用格雷欣法则,最后引入了哈耶克的竞争性货币,从铸币税的角度分析了通货膨胀的治理.     

中国铸币税的规模与因素分析

铸币税是指一国货币当局在货币创造过程中获取的净收入。处于经济转轨中的中国,经济增长、通货膨胀、货币化①进程以及货币流通速度的变化都是影响货币供给的重要因素。文章在理论上简单论述了影响我国铸币税的结构因素后,根据我国的相关数据,对我国铸币税的规模和结构进行了实证分析。     

电子货币对央行铸币税收入和独立性的影响

电子货币是近年来发展很快的一项金融创新,通常分为储值卡类和网络类两种.由于电子货币可能替代通货在小额交易中充当支付工具,其发展将使中央银行的铸币税收入发生变化,并进而影响到央行的独立性.本文就该问题进行了深入研究,采用三种方法估计了电子货币对央行铸币税收入的影响,并在此基础上进一步讨论了央行的独立性是否会发生变化的问题.     

中国的铸币税与通货膨胀:1952-2004

本文基于现金先行模型重新构建了我国的实际现金余额需求函数,并在实际现金余额需求函数的约束下,假定我国政府的目标是追求铸币税最大化,推导出了铸币税最大化的通货膨胀率和货币余额增长率的公式。在此基础上,探讨了铸币税征收与通货膨胀的关系,并利用我国1952—2004年的数据进行实证研究,结果表明,为了避免恶性的通货膨胀和最优化铸币税的征收,我国的货币余额增长率应当控制在22%—24%以下,通货膨胀率应当控制在11%—14%以内。     

财政赤字货币化过程中铸币税收益问题

一般说来,一国的经济主权主要有两个:货币主权和课税主权,其中货币主权在经济上的实现形式便是政府的铸币税收入,也即政府发行货币所取得的收入。 铸币税问题的讨论一般是同财政赤字货币化问题相联系的。当前我国宏观经济政策的主导一直是以增发国债为核心的积极财政政策,财政赤字经常     

SEIGNIORAGE, DOMESTIC DEBT, AND FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA

This paper describes the institutional features of China's hybrid economy that have allowed the government to earn high levels of seigniorage. It quantifies both the financial benefits and implicit costs to the government of extracting seigniorage from the economy. The analysis, which is based on the inside/outside money model of Gurley and Shaw (1960), indicates that seigniorage earnings in the period 1987—1994 were large, but were earned at the cost of a rising implicit government debt and potential future inflation. The paper also outlines how the Chinese government's ability to earn seigniorage in the future may decline as the economy becomes fully monetized and as reform alters the economy's unique institutional structure.     

Policy Rules and Monetarist Arithmetic

This note demonstrates the existence of an important equilibrium path overlooked in the literature on monetarist arithmetic. Pleasant monetarist arithmetic is possible when the interest‐elasticity of money demand exceeds unity. In this case, tight money may lead to a transitory increase in seigniorage, the retirement of government debt, and lower inflation in both the short run and the long run. The set of equilibrium paths is sensitive, however, to the form of the policy rule. Pleasant monetarist arithmetic is not an equilibrium if the policy rule fixes the share of the fiscal deficit financed by seigniorage. Both pleasant monetarist arithmetic and the tight‐money paradox are equilibrium paths when the government's commitment to low money growth is conditional on inflation remaining below its previous level.     

Fiscal Consequences of Monetary Integration within a Common Economic Area: The Case of Belarus,Kazakhstan and Russia

This article analyses the possible impact of planned monetary integration on public sector revenue from seigniorage in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Using the concept of total gross seigniorage, we investigate the main sources and uses of the central bank revenue in these countries. Special attention is given to the role of seigniorage revenue in financing public sector expenditure. Amounts of yearly transfers from central banks to the state budget in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are evaluated, and the size of potential gains and losses in seigniorage revenue under different scenarios of monetary integration are estimated.     

Seigniorage Wealth and Redistribution in Central and Eastern European Countries

The analysis presented in this article focuses on seigniorage revenues in five Central and Eastern European Countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. A comprehensive discrete period accounting framework for measuring the sources and uses of seigniorage in the 1990s is presented. The framework is based upon the gross concept of seigniorage that defines seigniorage in the broadest possible sense as the sum of revenues resulting from the monopoly power to issue money. Legal, institutional and operational details which are relevant for the creation of base money in a country are taken into account. The article reveals similarities and differences in seigniorage wealth between the countries under scrutiny, evaluates the magnitude of seigniorage and shows that accession to the European Monetary Union will create significant once-and-for-all gains of seigniorage wealth for the countries resulting from redistributing seigniorage wealth.     

Government Bond Seigniorage

Recent studies have indicated that government bonds are an imperfect substitute for money in providing transaction services. Based on these studies, this article develops a theoretical framework showing that, as with money seigniorage, the government can gain an interest benefit from issuing government bonds. The article terms this interest benefit as ‘government bond seigniorage’. Further, the article estimates government bond seigniorage in comparison with money seigniorage for five countries (Australia, Canada, France, Italy and the United States) during the period 1959–2001. It is found that government bond seigniorage accounts for a larger percentage of Gross Domestic Product than money seigniorage, but also experiences greater fluctuations for all sample countries.     

Seigniorage and EMU : The fiscal implications of price stability and financial market integration

Disinflation, especially if coupled with financial market liberalisation, has implications for public finances because it lowers the revenue from the inflation tax. There might thus be a trade-off between the criteria on inflation convergence and public finances that were set at Maastricht. This paper measures the effects of lower inflation and financial market integration on the revenue from seigniorage for the EC member countries that have in the past relied most heavily on this source of revenues. The main result is that disinflation alone will reduce the revenue from seigniorage by over 2% of GDP in Greece, but much less than 1% of GDP in the other countries considered here. The overall impact of EMU (i.e. disinflation plus financial market integration) is a loss of seigniorage revenues of 2.9% of GDP in Greece and a little over 1% of GDP in Portugal and Spain. Two different measures of seigniorage yield similar results regarding the overall change, but differ regarding the transitional period and the level.     

Riding the wave: Monetary responses to aid surges in low-income countries

We focus on the management of highly persistent shocks to aid flows in the presence of currency substitution by the domestic private sector. Such shocks have beneficent long-run effects, but when currency substitution is high they can produce dramatic macroeconomic management problems in the short run. What is the appropriate mix of money and exchange rate targeting in such cases, and the role of temporary sterilization? We analyze these and related issues in an intertemporal optimizing model that allows a portion of aid to be devoted to reducing the government's seigniorage requirement. Our results show that a managed float, with little or no sterilization of increases in the monetary base, supports the smooth absorption of the increased aid without incurring higher inflation, higher real interest rates or overshooting of the real exchange rate.     

Seigniorage and public good in an OLG model with cash-in-advance constraints

This paper is a contribution to the theory of the optimal monetary policy in overlapping generations models with a cash-in-advance constraint applying on old age consumption purchases. We are particularly interested in the study of seigniorage when the latter is used to finance public goods valued by consumers. Assuming that a public good enters the utility function and the existence of cash-in-advance constraints, we find a Laffer curve of seigniorage at steady-state. We also analyze the dynamic optimal monetary policy when the government maximizes an intertemporal social welfare function and can only resort to seigniorage to finance the purchases of the public good. We show that the optimal rate of money growth may be strictly higher than the one which maximizes steady-state seigniorage: the optimal amount of seigniorage may lie on the decreasing part of the Laffer curve of seigniorage. We finally suppose that the government can use lump-sum taxes in addition to seigniorage. Then, the Friedman rule prevails and public expenditures are only financed through lump-sum taxes.     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001