共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Jaylson Jair da Silveira 《Review of Political Economy》2017,29(4):613-635
This article sets out a classical model of economic growth in which the distribution of income features the possibility of profit-sharing with workers, as firms choose periodically between two labor-extraction compensation strategies. Workers are homogeneous with regard to labor power, and firms choose to compensate them with either only a conventional wage or a share of profits on top of this conventional wage. Empirical evidence shows that labor productivity (i.e. labor extraction) in profit-sharing firms is higher than labor productivity in non-sharing firms. The frequency distribution of labor-extraction employee compensation strategies and labor productivity across firms is time-variant, being driven by satisficing imitation dynamics from which we derive two significant results. First, heterogeneity in labor-extraction compensation strategies across firms, and hence earnings inequality across workers can be a stable long-run equilibrium outcome. Second, although convergence to a long-run equilibrium may occur with either a falling or increasing proportion of profit-sharing firms, the share of net profits in income and the rates of net profit, capital accumulation and economic growth nevertheless all converge to the highest possible long-run equilibrium values. 相似文献
2.
We construct an equilibrium job search model with on‐the‐job search in which firms implement optimal‐wage strategies under full information in the sense that they leave no rent to their employees and counter the offers received by their employees from competing firms. Productivity dispersion across firms results in wage mobility both within and across firms. Workers may accept wage cuts to move to firms offering higher future wage prospects. Equilibrium productivity dispersion across ex ante homogeneous firms can be endogenously generated. Productivity dispersion then generates a nontrivial wage distribution which is generically thin‐tailed, as typically observed in the data. 相似文献
3.
We analyze an equilibrium search model with three sources for wage and unemployment differentials among workers with the same (observed) human capital but different appearance (race): unobserved productivity, search intensities, and discrimination due to an appearance‐based employer disutility factor. We show that the structural parameters are identified using labor market survey data. Estimation results for a black and white high school graduate sample imply: black productivity is 3.3% lower than white productivity; the employer's disutility factor is 31% of the white's productivity level; and 56% of firms have a disutility factor toward blacks. 相似文献
4.
We develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs. Our main theoretical contribution is to integrate the portfolio choice problem faced by workers into an equilibrium framework. All equilibria of our model exhibit wage dispersion. Consistent with stylized facts, the density of wages is decreasing and higher wage firms receive more applications per vacancy. Unlike most models of directed search, the equilibria are not constrained efficient. 相似文献
5.
Shouyong Shi 《European Economic Review》2006,50(4):849-875
I analyze a large labor market where homogeneous firms post wages to direct the search of workers who differ in productivity. I show that the model has a unique equilibrium. The wage differential depends positively on the workers’ productivity differential only when the latter is large. When the productivity differential is small, high-productivity workers get a lower wage than low-productivity workers. This reverse wage differential remains even when the productivity differential shrinks to zero. However, the equilibrium is socially efficient. High-productivity workers always get the employment priority and higher expected wages than low-productivity workers. Although discrimination in terms of expected wages does not exist, conventional measures are likely to incorrectly find discrimination in the model. 相似文献
6.
Shimer (2005) argues that a search and matching model of the labor market in which wage is determined by Nash bargaining cannot generate the observed volatility in unemployment and vacancy in response to reasonable labor productivity shocks. This paper examines how incorporating monopolistically competitive firms with a working capital requirement (in which firms borrow funds to pay their wage bills) improves the ability of the search models to match the empirical fluctuations in unemployment and vacancy without resorting to an alternative wage setting mechanism. The monetary authority follows an interest rate rule in the model. A positive labor productivity shock lowers the real marginal cost of production and lowers inflation. In response to the fall in price level, the monetary authority reduces the nominal interest rate. A lower interest rate reduces the cost of financing and partially offsets the increase in labor cost from a higher productivity. A reduced labor cost implies the firms retain a greater portion of the gain from a productivity shock, which gives them a greater incentive to create vacancies. Simulations show that a working capital requirement does indeed improve the ability of the search models to generate fluctuations in key labor market variables to better match the U.S. data. 相似文献
7.
How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high‐ or low‐productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can conduct on‐the‐job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump‐shaped, skewed significantly to the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates residual dispersion statistics 75–90% of those found empirically. However, the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment. 相似文献
8.
We build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and policy implications of firms’ market power in a frictional labor market. The main characteristics of our environment are that wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and the number of agents is finite. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and the firms’ market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms. A minimum wage exacerbates the inefficiencies by forcing the low‐productivity firms to increase their wage. Moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare by improving the workers’ outside option. 相似文献
9.
Robert Shimer 《European Economic Review》2006,50(4):811-830
This paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex. I instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an environment. I show that if workers and firms are homogeneous, there are market equilibria with a continuous wage distribution in which identical firms bargain to different wages, each of which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game. If firms are heterogeneous, I characterize market equilibria in which more productive firms pay higher wages. I compare the quantitative predictions of this model with Burdett and Mortensen's [1998. Wage differentials, employer size and unemployment. International Economic Review 39, 257-273.] wage posting model and argue that the bargaining model is theoretically more appealing along important dimensions. 相似文献
10.
Jeffrey Brinkman Daniele Coen‐Pirani Holger Sieg 《International Economic Review》2015,56(4):1135-1164
We develop a new dynamic general equilibrium model to explain firm entry, exit, and relocation decisions in an urban economy with multiple locations and agglomeration externalities. We characterize the stationary distribution of firms that arises in equilibrium. We estimate the parameters of the model using a method of moments estimator. Using unique panel data collected by Dun and Bradstreet, we find that agglomeration externalities increase the productivity of firms by up to 8%. Economic policies that subsidize firm relocations to the central business district increase agglomeration externalities in that area. They also increase economic welfare in the economy. 相似文献
11.
《Review of Economic Dynamics》2001,4(1):159-187
This paper analyzes a model of equilibrium wage dynamics and wage dispersion across firms. It considers a labor market where firms set wages and workers use on-the-job search to look for better paid work. It analyzes a perfect equilibrium where each firm can change its wage paid at any time, and workers use optimal quit strategies. Firms trade off higher wages against a lower quit rate, and large firms (those with more employees) always pay higher wages than small firms. Non-steady-state dispersed price equilibria are also analyzed, which describe how wages vary as each firm and the industry as a whole grow over time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, J41. 相似文献
12.
Elena Quercioli 《International Economic Review》2005,46(1):133-143
This article explores a model of firm‐specific training in a job search environment with labor turnover. The main substantive finding is a positive association between training and wages (when dispersed). The article then precisely characterizes how both wage dispersion and firm profitability depend on the flow value b≥ 0 of workers' unmatched time. It is shown that: (i) for all high values b, no equilibrium exists; (ii) for intermediate values b, multiple equilibria arise, where firms earn zero profits, and choose from a general wage distribution; (iii) for all lower values b, there is a unique equilibrium, with firms earning positive profits, and choosing from an atomless set of wages. 相似文献
13.
The empirical content of the job search model: Labor mobility and wage distributions in Europe and the US 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Job search models of the labor market hypothesize a very tight correspondence between the determinants of labor turnover and individual wage dynamics on one hand, and the determinants of wage dispersion on the other. This paper offers a systematic examination of whether this correspondence is present in the data by estimating a rudimentary partial equilibrium job search model on a 3-year panel of individual worker data covering 10 European countries and the U.S. We find that our basic job search model fits the data surprisingly well. This also allows us to point at a number of interesting empirical regularities about wage distributions. Our results suggest that cross-sectional data on individual wages contain the basic information needed to obtain a reliable measure of the “magnitude of labor market frictions”, as measured by a parameter of the canonical job search model. Finally, we use our results in a cross-country comparison of the intensity and nature of job-to-job turnover. We arrange countries into two different groups according to their turnover intensity. We further show that the nature of job-to-job turnover is very different between those two groups: Turnover is predominantly voluntary in low-turnover countries, whereas it is to a large extent involuntary in high-turnover countries. 相似文献
14.
Suphanit Piyapromdee 《International Economic Review》2018,59(3):1315-1343
This article extends a classic on‐the‐job search model of homogeneous workers and firms by introducing a shirking problem. Workers choose their effort levels and search on the job. Firms elicit effort through wages and monitoring; an inverse relationship between wages and monitoring rates is derived. Wages play a dual role by allocating labor supply and motivating employee effort. This gives rise to an equilibrium wage distribution that contrasts with existing literature. In particular, I show that a hump‐shaped and positively skewed wage distribution, as observed empirically, can be derived even when firms and workers are, respectively, identical. 相似文献
15.
Vassilis T. Rapanos 《International economic journal》2013,27(4):477-494
Abstract The purpose of the present paper is to examine the effects of taxation on income distribution in a model with efficiency wages and involuntary unemployment. Central to our efficiency-wage model is the hypothesis that firms set wages above market-clearing levels, whenever the productivity of labor depends on the real wage paid by the firm, and unemployment. Within a two sector general equilibrium model we study the incidence of factor and commodity taxes on income distribution, and unemployment. Our findings differ substantially from those derived by the traditional neoclassical analysis, originally developed by Harberger, and as it has been extended by several authors. 相似文献
16.
《Review of Economic Dynamics》1999,2(2):456-471
This paper demonstrates that in a free entry search and bargaining economy with concave production firms over-employ. Bargaining allows the worker's wage to depend upon marginal productivity. As such, with strictly concave production, the wage declines as firms employ more labor. Firms react to this declining wage function by choosing an inefficiently large number of workers. However, in equilibrium, fewer firms are likely to enter causing aggregate employment and vacancies to fall.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: J30, J41, J50. 相似文献
17.
Lene Kromann 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2015,117(1):248-289
In this paper, we study the possible segregation of overweight individuals already established in the labor market when firms make decisions on hiring, firing, and promoting. Most existing studies use wage equations to document wage differences, but little is known about the reason for the differences and the sorting of workers. Using an equilibrium search model, search frictions are taken into account. Additionally, sorting is examined using a logit model. We find that wage differences between workers who have a normal weight and workers who are overweight or obese can be explained by differential firm behavior, with respect to both the job‐offer arrival rate and the probability of being promoted. 相似文献
18.
JAVIER FERNÁNDEZ‐BLANCO 《International Economic Review》2013,54(3):885-914
Consistent with the empirical evidence, this article analyzes a labor market in which separations are not permanent and reactivated firms prefer to rehire former employees instead of seek new ones. Workers engage in job search due to the uncertain prospects of rehiring. If firms can commit to wages contingent on rehiring, they backload wages to provide incentives for workers to reduce their unobservable search effort. Under risk aversion and incomplete markets, if productivity at reactivation is sufficiently high, the tension between wage backloading and consumption smoothing leads to excessive search in equilibrium. 相似文献
19.
We consider the role of unobservables, such as differences in search frictions, reservation wages, and productivities for the explanation of wage differentials between migrants and natives. We disentangle these by estimating an empirical general equilibrium search model with on-the-job search due to Bontemps et al. (1999) on segments of the labour market defined by occupation, age, and nationality using a large scale German administrative dataset.The native-migrant wage differential is then decomposed into several parts, and we focus especially on the component that we label “migrant effect”, being the difference in wage offers between natives and migrants in the same occupation-age segment in firms of the same productivity. Counterfactual decompositions of wage differentials allow us to identify and quantify their drivers, thus explaining within a common framework what is often labelled the unexplained wage gap. 相似文献
20.
This paper investigates equilibria where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk averse workers search for new job opportunities whether employed or unemployed. We generalize previous work by assuming firms have different productivities. Equilibrium implies more productive firms always offer more desirable contracts. Thus workers never quit from more productive firms for less productive firms. Nevertheless turnover is inefficient as employees with long tenures at low productivity firms may reject outside job offers from more productive firms. A worker who quits to a more productive firm may accept a wage cut. Such wage cuts are compensated by faster “promotion” rates to higher wage levels in the future. We also generalize previous arguments by showing equilibria exist where the distribution of offers contains interior mass points and find equilibrium wage/tenure contracts need not be smooth. 相似文献