Foreign Ownership,Equity Arbitrage and Strategic Trade Policy *

This paper investigates whether the cost of environmental regulation influences the international location of polluting industries. Industries that operate production facilities in developing countries are identified through their use of the offshore assembly provisions in the U.S. tariff Code. Pollutions Intensity of industry output is found to significantly reduce the probability of conducting offshore assembly in developing countries. This finding contradicts the arguments that developing countries are becoming pollution havens as a result of offshore assembly independent of their general disregard for the environment. Integrating production across national boundaries might actually enhance worldwide environmental quality. Relatively clean stages of the production process are being transferred to developing countries with lax environmental regulations, while polluting segments remain in the U.S. where strict environmental controls are enforced. [F1, Q2]     

Can Rich Countries Become Pollution Havens?*

This paper bridges the gap between two‐country Ricardian trade models where differences in environmental policies create pollution havens in a poorer region with weaker pollution regulations, and 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin models that predict under certain conditions that pollution havens may occur in a richer region with tighter regulations. By relaxing the Heckscher–Ohlin assumptions of factor price equalization and no specialization, we show how creation of pollution havens in either region is possible, due to the interplay of policy and factor‐endowment motives. We also analyze the conditions for creating pollution havens in the cases of exogenous and endogenous environmental policy.     

Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis

This paper presents evidence on whether multinationals are flocking to developing country “pollution havens”. Although we find some evidence that foreign investors locate in sectors with high levels of air pollution, the evidence is weak at best. We then examine whether foreign firms pollute less than their peers. We find that foreign plants are significantly more energy efficient and use cleaner types of energy. We conclude with an analysis of U.S. outbound investment. Although the pattern of U.S. foreign investment is skewed towards industries with high costs of pollution abatement, the results are not robust across specifications.     

Environmental regulations and innovation activity in UK manufacturing industries

We examine the relationship between environmental regulations and innovation, using data from UK manufacturing industry during 2000-2006. We estimate a dynamic model of innovation behaviour, and explicitly account for the likely endogeneity of our measure of the stringency of environmental regulations (pollution abatement costs). Our results indicate that while on the one hand environmental R&D and investment in environmental capital are stimulated by greater pollution abatement pressures, on the other hand there is not a positive impact of environmental regulation on total R&D or total capital accumulation. We find some evidence that this is because more stringent environmental regulations directly lower the optimal expenditure on non-environmental innovations. In addition, we find that environmental R&D may crowd out non-environmental R&D, although there is no evidence that environmental capital crowds out non-environmental capital.     

Do stock markets penalize environment-unfriendly behaviour? Evidence from India

A growing body of research points to the fact that capital markets react to environmental news and thus create incentives for pollution control in both developed and emerging market economies. In this paper, we conduct an event study to examine the impact of environmental rating of large pulp and paper, auto, and chlor alkali firms on their stock prices. We find that the market generally penalizes environmentally unfriendly behaviour in that announcement of weak environmental performance by firms leads to negative abnormal returns of up to 30%. A positive correlation is found between abnormal returns to a firm's stock and the level of its environmental performance. These findings should be viewed as further evidence of the important role that capital markets could play in environmental management, particularly in developing countries where environmental monitoring and enforcement are weak.     

Agglomeration Effects in Foreign Direct Investment and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis

Does environmental regulation impair international competitiveness of pollution-intensive industries to the extent that they relocate to countries with less stringent regulation, turning those countries into “pollution havens”? We test this hypothesis using panel data on outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows of various industries in the German manufacturing sector and account for several econometric issues that have been ignored in previous studies. Most importantly, we demonstrate that externalities associated with FDI agglomeration can bias estimates away from finding a pollution haven effect if omitted from the analysis. We include the stock of inward FDI as a proxy for agglomeration and employ a GMM estimator to control for endogenous time-varying determinants of FDI flows. Furthermore, we propose a difference estimator based on the least polluting industry to break the possible correlation between environmental regulatory stringency and unobservable attributes of FDI recipients in the cross-section. When accounting for these issues we find robust evidence of a pollution haven effect for the chemical industry.     

Pollution Control and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: An Industry-Level Analysis

Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into developing countries have been increasing dramatically over the past decade. At the same time, there has been widespread concern that lax environmental standards are in part responsible for this surge. This paper revisits the question of the existence of a pollution haven effect by examining the extent to which the pollution intensity of production helps explain FDI in Mexico. We focus on pollution intensities, which are directly related to emission regulations, rather than unobservable pollution taxes and allow for substitution between capital and pollution. Examining several different pollutants, we find a positive correlation between FDI and pollution that is statistically and economically significant in the case of the highly regulated sulfur dioxide emissions. Industries for which the estimated relationship between FDI and pollution is positive receive up to 30% of total FDI and 30% of manufacturing output. Although we confirm the importance of Mexico’s comparative advantage in labor-intensive production processes, consistent with the previous literature, our results suggest that environmental considerations may matter as well for firms’ investment decisions.      

Tax competition with parasitic tax havens

We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens. We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become tax havens, and we show that the abolition of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. We argue that these results extend to the case where there are also taxes on wage income that involve administrative and compliance costs.     

Environmental Regulation Induced Foreign Direct Investment

The last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the relationship between environmental regulations and international capital flows. However, empirical studies have so far failed to find conclusive evidence for this so-called pollution haven or race to the bottom effect where foreign direct investment (FDI) is assumed to be attracted to low regulation countries, regions or states. In this paper we present a simple theoretical framework to demonstrate that greater stringency in environmental standards can lead to a strategic increase in capital inflows which we refer to as environmental regulation induced FDI. Our result reveals a possible explanation for the mixed results in the empirical literature and provides an illustration of the conditions under which environmental regulations in the host country can affect the location decision of foreign firms.     

Tax Enforcement Policy and the Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Tax Havens

A tax competition model is presented to investigate the effects of tax havens on the public good provision. We show that when countries facing a rise in tax havens change their tax enforcement strategies in response, the existence of tax havens may result in a higher level of equilibrium public good provision as compared to the case with no tax havens. Accordingly, tax havens could be welfare enhancing for non‐haven countries. This result offers a possible explanation for the recent empirical evidence that the corporate tax revenues in high‐tax countries have actually increased with the growth in the flow of foreign direct investment to tax havens.     

Which countries become tax havens?

This paper analyzes the factors influencing whether countries become tax havens. Roughly 15% of countries are tax havens; as has been widely observed, these countries tend to be small and affluent. This paper documents another robust empirical regularity: better-governed countries are much more likely than others to become tax havens. Controlling for other relevant factors, governance quality has a statistically significant and quantitatively large association with the probability of being a tax haven. For a typical country with a population under one million, the likelihood of a becoming a tax haven rises from 26% to 61% as governance quality improves from the level of Brazil to that of Portugal. Evidence from US firms suggests that low tax rates offer much more powerful inducements to foreign investment in well-governed countries than do low tax rates elsewhere. This may explain why poorly-governed countries do not generally attempt to become tax havens, and suggests that the range of sensible tax policy options is constrained by the quality of governance.     

Financial markets and firm size: The role of employment protection laws and barriers to entrepreneurship

This article provides evidence on the institutional determinants of firm size for the period 1980–1998. Using a comprehensive longitudinal database across 29 industrial sectors in 15 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, we study how labour regulations and barriers to entrepreneurship (BE) affect industrial organization in the presence of capital market frictions. We show that strict employment protection laws (EPL) and high BE negatively affect firm size in sectors that are more dependent on external funds. Our findings demonstrate that the interaction between market regulations and financial market imperfections help to explain some of the differences in firm structure across countries.     

Environmental regulation and trade pattern：a case of China

As a growing number of countries, including both developed and developing countries, have in recent yearstaken environmental regulation at different levels, a question of great concern has been raised： can the regulation alterthe existing trade volume and trade pattern, and ultimately drive pollution-intensive industries to countries with low-levelregulations or even those without regulations at all？ Starting from the three different propositions concerning therelationship between environmental regulation and trade pattern, this paper applies cointegration analysis and errorcorrection model to empirically testing the relationship between environmental regulation and trade in China during theperiod of 1985-2005. Our empirical results indicate that in the short run the collection of pollution discharge fees bearsa positive impact on the export share of clean products of total exports. Thus, higher pollution discharge fees raise theratio of clean products exports to total exports. This further indicates that more stringent environmental regulationpromotes the exports of clean products. In the long run pollution discharge fees are positively correlated with the exportshare of clean products but negatively associated with their import share. Such correlations imply that environmentalregulation tends to facilitate the international specialization in line with comparative advantages.     

Are foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations? Evaluating the evidence from China

At the center of the pollution haven debate is the claim that foreign investors from industrial countries are attracted to weak environment regulations in developing countries. Some recent location choice studies have found evidence of this attraction, but only for inward FDI in industrial countries. The few studies of inward FDI in developing countries have been hampered by weak measures of environmental stringency and by insufficient data to estimate variation in firm response by pollution intensity. This paper tests for pollution haven behavior by estimating the determinants of location choice for equity joint ventures (EJVs) in China. Beginning with a theoretical framework of firm production and abatement decisions, we derive and estimate a location choice model using data on a sample of EJV projects, Chinese effective levies on water pollution, and Chinese industrial pollution intensity. Results show EJVs in highly-polluting industries funded through Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan are attracted by weak environmental standards. In contrast, EJVs funded from non-ethnically Chinese sources are not significantly attracted by weak standards, regardless of the pollution intensity of the industry. These findings are consistent with pollution haven behavior, but not by investors from high income countries and only in industries that are highly polluting. Further investigation into differences in technology between industrial and developing country investors might shed new light on this debate.     

A new approach to capital flows: Theory and evidence

This paper examines how an open economy determines its financial openness and deals with volatile capital flows when deciding to utilize them for output growth. We find that higher economic instability is an inevitable price paid for faster growth if a country permits wider openness without reversing its financial vulnerability. We prove that the country can leave its capital market wider open to achieve higher growth and lower instability if its financial system has been strengthened substantially. We show why some financially advanced countries request reluctant developing countries to liberalize their immature markets and how the conflict of interest between the two parties is formulated. The paper also presents a large sample of cross-country experiences with tradeoffs between growth and instability, with the observed evidence supporting our theoretical predictions.     

Pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics

Effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used. A new explanation for this discrepancy is offered. Pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing, and via spillovers, also in non-pricing sectors. Pricing may therefore increase pollution, providing a reason why decision-makers tend to reject environmental pricing. Five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced. They are consistent with available empirical evidence. Regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing, because pollution is condoned. Damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment.     

Profit-shifting from Czech multinational companies to European tax havens

Although tax havens have been affecting other countries for decades, only in recent years have the associated challenges been subject to intensive scrutiny in both research and policy areas. We contribute to the growing evidence of corporate tax base erosion and profit-shifting by testing multinational companies’ ownership links to individual tax havens rather than to groups of them, as is the case with most previous research. Our company-level analysis suggests that profit shifts through debt financing from the Czech Republic to Luxembourg, Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands. We have ascertained that tax havens are not limited to tiny islands and may actually be found among European countries. We also provide rough estimates of the impact of this profit-shifting on tax revenues as well as a policy recommendation.     

环境规制对比较优势的影响

在古典和新古典贸易理论中，一国的贸易模式取决于该国的比较优势。本文的研究结果表明，发达国家环境规制的严格化使得发展中国家重度污染密集型产业的比较优势得到相对的强化，而对中、轻度污染产业的影响则依据产业的不同而不同。文章还以我国纺织服装业为例作了进一步分析。最后，作者从环境规制的完善、产业结构调整及环境成本内在化几个方面提出了政策建议。     

Are environmentally responsible firms less vulnerable when investing abroad? The role of reputation

Globalization allows multinational firms to locate strategically the polluting activities in lax countries. This paper revisits the empirical evidence by exploiting heterogeneity in firms’ environmental image. While locating in countries with weak environmental standards is likely to be detrimental for a firm’s image and reputation, investing in corporate environmental responsibility can help firms to convince consumers that they have good environmental practices, even when investing in the “dirty” countries. Exploiting an original database that records an index of environmental responsibility for large European firms, we find that the firms viewed as environment-friendly are more often than others located in countries with weak environmental regulations. We show that our findings are not likely to be driven by omitted variables bias, specific sectors nor particular countries. Interestingly, this relationship is observed only among the firms with a well-established reputation for environmental responsibility.     

Cross-country evidence on the relationship between regulations and the development of the life insurance sector

Using a global sample, this study sketches the impact of insurance regulations on the life insurance sector, revealing a significant negative association between supervisory control on policy conditions of life annuities as well as pension products and the development of the industry. A similar inverse relation is observed between the index of capital requirements and insurance development. These results hold when we control for demographic factors, economic factors, religious inclination, culture, as well as for other relevant regulations. We also find some evidence that while the overall supervisory power does not matter, the ability to intervene at an early stage could have a positive effect on insurance development. Additionally, the impact of some regulations appears to differ between advanced and developing countries.