国家专营条件下的盐业物流系统模式探讨

阐述了我国食盐流通体系的现状,分析了我国国家专营条件下的盐业物流系统应具备的功能,其内部作业流程,以及系统的网络结构。     

北京市汽车工业战略联盟博弈

本文分析了北京汽车工业内外战略联盟关系，给出了有中心企业的多方、多阶段组织博弈的数学描述，以及多方、多阶段战略联盟博弈模型。依据战略联盟博弈模型分析的结果对北汽控股公司内外战略联盟的建立提出若干建议。     

中国垄断行业监管体制建设面临的问题和改革设想

对垄断行业实施监管,首先应明确“垄断”与“监管”概念的具体内涵,区分自然垄断与行政性垄断的特征。石油天然气行业是我国目前为数不多的以国有和行政性垄断为主的行业,对这一行业的行政性垄断与自然垄断进行分析有一定的典型意义。通过分析发现当前垄断行业改革及监管体制建设尚存在的几个重要问题,对此提出加快推进垄断行业改革及建立现代监管框架的设想。     

新自然垄断理论在铁路运输业的研究与应用

传统理论一般都认为铁路具有典型的自然垄断性、公益性，多数国家对铁路进行严格管制，垄断经营，结果许多国家铁路陷入重重困境。1982年，鲍莫尔等提出的新自然垄断认为对于弱自然垄断，可以用竞争来替代经济管制。实际上，铁路只是具有“局部自然垄断性”。“网运分离”模式可以打破铁路一体化垄断、引入竞争，但这需要一个长期过程，当前最关键的打破垄断、引入竞争的对策是分类建设、分类经营、建立多元化投融资主体，并可以采取PPP模式引入国内外社会资本、引入竞争。     

垄断、竞争与经济增长

一个国家经济增长的实质就是垄断的不断形成与竞争逐渐产生的过程。没有垄断,经济增长就缺乏后劲;没有竞争,经济增长就失去了动力。垄断并非十恶不赦,它有其存在的基础,也有它消失的理由;新的垄断需不断问世,旧的垄断要及时退出历史舞台,只有这样,经济的持续增长才能实现。     

垄断与行业收入差距影响因素的实证研究

本文选取2007～2011年中国多个行业的相关数据,通过分析企业管理费用,对工资外收入的统计来源进行研究,以航空运输业和医药制造业为例,对影响行业间收入差距的因素做了实证研究.实证分析表明,垄断因素是造成行业间收入差距的最主要原因,其对行业间收入差距的贡献程度达到75％以上;人力资本对行业间收入差距的贡献很低;外商投资比例和成本费用利润率对行业间收入差距有一定贡献,并且对缩小行业间的收入差距有重要意义.     

Unions,organisation change and alcohol policy

There is little doubt that company policies which successfully attempt to change employee behaviour patterns require a high level of trade union involvement. Workplace alcoholism policies are an example of this kind of initiative. This article presents some preliminary, survey evidence on the extent to which alcohol policies have been introduced in Scotland.     

我国电力行业的自然垄断效率分析

本文通过建立计量模型,从行业利润率和全要素效率两方面实证分析了我国电力行业的自然垄断效率变化。     

行业垄断对收入差距影响的实证分析

文章对行业间收入差距和行业内部收入差距进行了描述性统计分析,然后利用2010~2011年样本工业行业的数据估算出行业明瑟(Mincer)工资收入方程,进而用费景汉-拉尼斯分解方法分析了选定的行业特征对行业收入差距的贡献度。在此基础上,利用奥希卡-布林德(Oaxaca-Blinder)分解方法对垄断性行业与竞争性行业之间的收入差距进行了分析。最后,还利用菲尔兹(G·Fields)分解方法对垄断性行业与竞争性行业各自内部的收入差距进行了分析。研究结果表明:行业垄断程度对行业间收入差距的影响最大;行业职工受教育程度对垄断性行业与竞争性行业之间的收入差距解释力不够,垄断性行业的高收入在很大程度上是不合理的;行业职工受教育程度对垄断性行业内部的收入差距几乎没有影响,而对竞争性行业内部的收入差距产生了一定的影响。     

Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency

Durable-goods producers frequently choose to monopolize the maintenance markets for their own products. This paper shows that, similar to leasing, one reason a firm may employ this practice is that it reduces or even eliminates problems due to time inconsistency. We first demonstrate this result in a setting closely related to Bulow's (1982) classic analysis of durable-goods monopoly. We then show the result in a setting similar to those considered in Waldman (1996, 1997) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) , in which new and used units are imperfect substitutes. The paper also discusses alternative explanations for the phenomenon.     

The Changing Role of the State in the Electricity Industry in Brazil, China, and India

ABSTRACT . Technological breakthroughs, macroeconomic pressures, and advances in economic thought have led to a redefinition of the role of the state from producer to arbiter among private interests. Still, the details of such a redefinition vary among countries. We aim to understand the reasons for such differences and draw their policy implications through a case study of the electricity industry in Brazil, China, and India. Over the past decade, these countries have sought to restructure their state‐owned electric utilities. The restructuring effort has led to different outcomes in the three countries. We argue that ideology, institutional arrangements, and the behavior of interest groups lie at the heart of such differences.     

Modern Pirates: How Arbitration Lawyers Help Corporations Seize National Assets and Limit State Autonomy

Large‐scale companies have worked for centuries with the governments of powerful nations to extract wealth from the rest of the world. Since the 1990s, one important method of continuing that legacy has been the use of secretive legal proceedings known as investor‐state dispute settlements (ISDS). Through this innocuous‐sounding practice, transnational corporations (TNCs) are able to blame foreign governments for their failure to extract as large a profit as they anticipated from their operations abroad. Asserting that changes in fiscal, environmental, or social policies have harmed them, TNCs have claimed that foreign governments should compensate them for the loss of potential revenues. ISDS tribunals have awarded billions of dollars as a result of such claims, mostly made under the auspices of bilateral investment treaties. Not only must governments spend millions of dollars defending themselves against assaults and tens or hundreds of millions if they lose their cases, but the ISDS system also has a chilling effect on the adoption of legislation designed to protect the health and safety of citizens. As a result of all the lawsuits in which corporations collect damages from governments under investment treaties, an array of groups in the legal industry have profited substantially: law firms representing corporate interests, arbitrators and other specialists in corporate arbitration, and litigation funders. The arbitration industry is, as a practical matter, the glue that holds the system together. The law firms involved in this industry do not wait passively for cases to arise. Instead, they actively pursue corporations to seek arbitration with governments, proselytize for the legitimacy of the current international investment regime, and block reforms that would limit arbitration opportunities. By creating methods of insulating TNCs from normal business risks and forcing host governments to bear the burden of liabilities, the arbitration system has effectively reinstituted a neo‐colonial regime through the judicial system.     

Trade Unions in a Free Society

What is the function of trade unions in a free society? G.R.Steele, of Lancaster University, analyses the paradox that trade unions, which are only possible in a free society, are ultimately in conflict with it.