Timeliness of Reporting and Earnings Information Transfers

This study examines earnings timeliness and its effect on earnings information transfers. Empirical analyses focus on a sample of approximately fifteen hundred earnings reports and nearly four thousand information transfers. The principal findings are: (1) earlier earnings releases yield negative information transfers, (2) earnings releases yield negative (nominal) information transfers to firms that previously (subsequently) release their earnings reports, and (3) earlier earnings releases yield negative information transfers to firms that have not yet disclosed earnings. These findings show that the timing of earnings reports has significant and far-reaching economic consequences.     

Reporting Frequency, Information Precision and Private Information Acquisition

Abstract:  This study examines whether the choice between quarterly and semiannual reporting affects the precision of investors' information and their private information acquisition activities. In the first part of this study, we show that a firm's reporting frequency has no effect on the average precision of investors' information. However, our analysis of announcement-period price variance and share turnover shows that an increase in reporting frequency does make interim and annual financial reports a more important component of investors' information set, relative to other sources of information. In particular, the results of this analysis suggest that investors of semiannual reporters hold more precise pre-announcement information than investors of quarterly reporters. In the second part of our study, we test one explanation for this finding. We argue that an increase in a firm's reporting frequency reduces investors' incentives to acquire private information between consecutive announcement dates and, consequently, should reduce information asymmetry among investors, increase share liquidity, and stimulate trading. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that quarterly reporters have lower average bid-ask spreads and higher abnormal share turnover than semiannual reporters.     

Private Equity Involvement and Earnings Quality

Abstract:  This paper examines the relation between private equity (PE) investors' involvement and their portfolio firms' earnings quality. We operationalize earnings quality through comparative analyses of conditional loss recognition timeliness. For a sample of unlisted Belgian firms, we find that PE involvement increases a firm's willingness to recognize losses more timely as compared to industry, size and life-cycle matched non-PE backed firms. Further, we document more powerful earnings quality effects for firms backed by independent and captive PE-investors as compared to firms backed by government-related PE-investors. Finally, we find no systematic variation in earnings quality across different levels of PE ownership. Our results are robust to the inclusion of various controls and remain unaffected when we consider the endogeneity of PE investments and compare pre- and post PE investment years. The current results provide novel evidence towards the understanding of PE investors' governance implications for portfolio firms' earnings quality.     

Which Institutional Investors Trade Based on Private Information About Earnings and Returns?

Recent work suggests that institutional investors execute profitable trades based on private information about earnings and returns. We provide new evidence on the prevalence and sources of such informed trading by (1) testing for the creation and liquidation of positions based on private information, (2) introducing private information proxies that reflect the size and nature of an institution's position in each portfolio firm, and (3) using a methodology that examines multiple investor characteristics simultaneously at the institution‐firm level. We find that changes in ownership by institutions with large positions in a firm are consistent with informed trading. However, other previously documented proxies for private information produce results more consistent with risk‐based trading (e.g., investment style) or insignificant in the presence of other proxies (e.g., fiduciary type). We also find that informed trading is more prevalent in small firms and when the large positions are taken by investment advisers and large institutions.     

Reforms in the Korean Financial Reporting Systems and Earnings Quality

This study examines the effect of reforms in the Korean financial reporting systems on earnings quality through an investigation of two sample periods: (1) prior to, and (2) after the 1997 financial crisis in Korea. The results indicate that financial sector reforms have reduced the opacity of Korean firms’ earnings reports.     

The Variability of Earnings and Non-Earnings Information and Earnings Prediction

This paper examines the performance of a 'composite' model of earnings prediction that integrates current earnings and current price as predictors of next year's earnings. The results show that current earnings (current price) play a key role in predicting future earnings when the ratio of earnings variance to price variance is low (high). The composite model is superior to univariate time-series models in out-of-sample predictive accuracy for the overall sample, and is substantially so for the group of firms with a high ratio of earnings variance to price variance.     

Information Asymmetry Around Earnings Announcements

This study examines bid-ask spreads to determine how the anticipation and release of earnings announcements affect information asymmetry in the stock market. I use regression analysis and find that bid-ask spreads are negatively related to public information availability and positively related to earnings variability and the market reaction to prior unexpected earnings. The results suggest that firms for which earnings is expected to yield a relatively larger stock market reaction have greater information asymmetry than firms for which earnings are expected to yield a smaller market reaction.I also find that bid-ask spreads gradually increase in the four days prior to earnings announcements, and increase sharply the day prior to, the day of and the day after the earnings announcements. Bid-ask spreads seven to ten days after earnings announcements are not significantly different from bid-ask spreads seven to ten days prior to earnings announcements.     

Fundamental Information and Monetary Policy: The Implications for Earnings and Earnings Forecasts

Building on the work of Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997 and 1998) this paper tests whether market-based information including dividend yield (Fama and French, 1998), firm size (Reinganum, 1981), and the ratio of book value to market value (Fama and French, 1992) add explanatory power to accounting data for predicting future earnings. The paper also tests whether earnings changes and the predictability of those changes are conditioned on monetary policy. It is found that the ratio of book value to market value is significantly related to earnings changes. Analyst forecast accuracy differs depending on monetary policy regime, but this difference is not due to differing interpretation of fundamental signals on financial statements appearing under differing monetary policy regimes. It is also found that there is a significant relation between monetary policy, earnings changes, and the level of signals concerning earnings changes.     

Accounting Earnings Announcements and Differential Predisclosure Information

Recent studies have detected an inverse association between a firm's size and the stock price reaction to the firm's accounting earnings announcements, which has been interpreted as evidence that larger firms have relatively richer information sets. This study expands on this work, using two firm-specific factors to capture both the time and flow-per-period elements of information production (period of listing and firm size respectively) and examines whether these variables are a better information proxy than is size alone. After controlling for firm size, a statistically significant inverse relationship between a firm's period of listing and the information content of its annual earnings announcement is detected. The findings have implications for standard-setters as well as for auditors'assessment of the risk associated with audits of newly listed firms.     

Information Content and Timing of Earnings Announcements

Abstract:   The China Securities Regulatory Commission requires all listed firms to make earnings announcements by the end of April each year. This requirement creates a unique opportunity for us to evaluate the timing of earnings announcements in a four‐month cluster. Firms, which are willing to make early announcements, tend to surprise the market, as indicated by the higher volume and price reactions. Later announcements are more predictable, as indicated by the lower volume and price reactions. These results indicate that an information asymmetry exists between early and late earnings announcements in Mainland China.     

Earnings Management through Transaction Structuring: Contingent Convertible Debt and Diluted Earnings per Share

In this article we examine whether firms structure their convertible bond transactions to manage diluted earnings per share (EPS). We find that the likelihood of firms issuing contingent convertible bonds (COCOs), which are often excluded from diluted EPS calculations under Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 128, is significantly associated with the reduction that would occur in diluted EPS if the bonds were traditionally structured. We also document that firms' use of EPS‐based compensation contracts significantly affects the likelihood of COCO issuance and find weak evidence that reputation costs, measured using earnings restatement data, play a role in the structuring decision. These results are robust to controlling for alternative motivations for issuing COCOs, including tax and dilution arguments. In addition, an examination of announcement returns reveals that investors view the net benefits and costs of COCOs as offsetting one another. Our results contribute to the literature on earnings management, diluted EPS, financial reporting costs, and financial innovation.     

Reporting Discretion and the Choice of Fresh Start Values in Companies Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

Using a sample of seventy-two firms that adopted fresh start reporting upon their emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, I test whether management estimates of fresh start equity values are misstated and whether such misstatements are related to characteristics of individual firms' bankruptcy process. I predict that the reported fresh start value reflects a tension between managerial incentives to promote the acceptance of the plan of reorganization, and incentives to enhance future reported performance. I test whether the tendency to overstate the fresh start equity value is increasing in factors affecting the acceptance of the reorganization plan (i.e., bankruptcy claimants' relative bargaining power) and decreasing in factors affecting postbankruptcy reported performance (i.e., the probability of future losses). I find that, relative to the market value of equity immediately after emergence from Chapter 11, the fresh start equity value is, on average, understated by about 4%. The difference between the fresh start equity value and market value also exhibits significant cross-sectional variation (an average absolute error of 11%). Consistent with my first prediction, the misstatement is increasing in the relative bargaining power of junior claimants. In contrast to my second prediction, the misstatement is also increasing in the likelihood of future reported losses. This result suggests that firms that are more likely to experience postbankruptcy financial distress are more concerned with obtaining acceptance for their plan than with the effects of the fresh start equity value on postbankruptcy performance. Finally, I document that the misstatement in the fresh start equity value is negatively related to whether firms have undergone prepackaged bankruptcies, and positively related to replacement of a prebankruptcy CEO.     

The Effects of Taxes,Agency Costs and Information Asymmetry on Earnings Management: A Comparison of Public and Private Firms

The realization of securities gains and losses to manage earnings in publicly-traded bank holding companies has been documented in a large number of studies, but very little is known about why managers engage in this behavior. Two possible explanations for earnings management put forth by Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) are that managers engage in this behavior either to circumvent accounting-based contracts designed to mitigate agency problems, or to reduce information asymmetry.We compare public and private banks' realizations of securities gains and losses to determine how their earnings management differs. We find that public banks consistently engage in more earnings management than private banks, and that the portion of their current period securities gains and losses attributable to earnings management is more positively associated with next period's earnings before securities gains and losses. These findings are consistent with earnings management occurring due to greater information asymmetry in public firms, and suggest that earnings management may not necessarily lead to the erosion in the quality of earnings suggested by Levitt (1998).     

信息可靠性、企业成长性与会计盈余持续性

本文以我国2001至2006年期间上市公司为研究对象,延续FWY和RSST的方法,考察信息可靠性和企业成长性对应计利润持续性较差现象的解释力。我们采用经营资产利润率与经营资产现金获取率的均方差计量信息可靠性。研究发现,企业成长性越好,信息失真值越高;会计扭曲越严重,应计利润的持续性越差;信息可靠性越高(低),会计盈余持续性越高(低);应计利润和现金收益整体对下一期的会计盈余预测能力越强(弱),会计盈余持续性检验模型的解释力越高(低);应计利润较现金收益的持续性差,且这种现象不因信息可靠性高或低而改变。     

盈余管理、信息风险与审计意见

盈余管理和信息风险是影响审计意见的两个重要因素。已有研究主要关注当期盈余管理与审计意见的关系,少有关注信息风险对审计意见的影响。本文运用我国上市公司的数据,同时研究盈余管理和信息风险对审计意见的影响。检验结果表明,公司的信息风险与审计师出具非标意见概率显著正相关,而当期盈余管理与审计师出具非标意见的概率无显著相关性。这表明,审计师出具审计意见时主要考虑信息风险,而没有证据表明审计师出具审计意见时考虑了盈余管理。本文的研究结论深化了已有审计意见和审计质量决定因素方面的研究。     

Information Asymmetry and Earnings Management: Some Evidence

This paper conducts an empirical investigation of the relationship between information asymmetry and earnings management predicted by Dye (1988) and Trueman and Titman (1988). When information asymmetry is high, stakeholders do not have sufficient resources, incentives, or access to relevant information to monitor manager's actions, which gives rise to the practice of earnings management (Schipper, 1989; Warfield et al., 1995). Empirical results suggest a systematic relationship between the magnitude of information asymmetry and the level of earnings management in two different settings.