Environmental Regulation: An Incentive for Foreign Direct Investment

Empirical evidence has so far failed to confirm that lenient environmental regulation attracts investment from polluting firms. In a Cournot duopoly with a foreign firm and a domestic firm, we show that the foreign firm may want to relocate to the domestic country with stricter environmental regulation, when the move raises its rival domestic firm's cost by sufficiently more than its own. The domestic (foreign) country's welfare is (usually) lower with foreign direct investment.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

异质性FDI绿色技术溢出环境规制门槛效应研究

在测度2003-2018年中国工业36个细分行业绿色全要素生产率的基础上,采用线性模型和门槛模型实证比较诱导劳动型FDI和资本型FDI发挥绿色技术溢出效应的环境规制强度。结果表明：FDI并不会自动发挥绿色技术溢出效应,需借助环境规制的调节作用,但环境规制强度应保持在合理区间。静态门槛模型结果表明,当环境规制强度超过第二门槛值后,两类FDI均能发挥绿色技术溢出效应,但仅资本型FDI显著。动态面板模型结果表明,当环境规制强度提高到第三门槛值后,两类FDI均能够发挥显著的绿色技术溢出效应。此外,异质性检验结果表明,为诱导FDI发挥正向绿色技术溢出效应,应在资本密集型行业、劳动密集型行业和污染密集型行业设置较高的环境规制强度,而在清洁生产型行业设置较低的环境规制强度。     

Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze strategic environmental standards in the presence of foreign direct investment. A number of foreign firms located in a host country compete with a domestic firm in another country to export a homogeneous good to a third country. When the number of foreign firms is exogenous, the host country applies a stricter environmental regulation than the other producing country. However, under free entry and exit of foreign firms, the host country may apply a less severe standard under both non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium. We also find that the nature market structure does not affect the equilibrium values of total pollution if export subsidies are also used.JEL Classification: F2, H2     

FDI、环境规制与黄河流域城市绿色全要素生产率

文章利用黄河流域65个重点城市2001—2017年的面板数据,基于非径向、非角度SBM方向性距离函数的ML指数,测度城市绿色全要素生产率的动态变化情况,并在此基础上考虑区位、时期差异特征,实证研究外商直接投资(FDI)、环境规制对城市绿色全要素生产率的影响。结果显示:①2001—2010年,上游城市增长动力源于绿色技术效率,中下游城市源于绿色技术进步,2011年以来绿色全要素生产率普遍呈现增长趋势。②从全样本回归结果看,FDI全时段、第二阶段对绿色全要素生产率的影响为负,第一阶段正向影响源于绿色技术进步。环境规制具有显著的正向影响,第二阶段的影响系数略小,且对绿色技术效率的影响为负。③上游城市FDI在全时段、第一阶段影响为正,中下游城市在全时段、第二阶段影响为负,环境规制有正向影响,绿色技术效率提升仍是短板。相应提出以下政策建议:优化要素配置,注重规模效应,着力提升绿色技术效率;以"一带一路"倡议为引领,制定差异化引资战略,提高FDI质量和水平;健全生态环境与经济发展协同监控机制,保障经济绿色、健康、高质量发展;加强绿色科技研发、提高投资成效和金融服务水平。     

外商直接投资的生态环境效应研究展望

目前,外商直接投资的环境效应问题,随着投资动机与引资目标的变迁而日益突出。所以,需要转变研究视角,分析外商直接投资的环境效应,作为今后选择性利用外资的前提;同时,引导FDI运用统一的环境标准,减少对东道国的环境污染,使外资真正在构建环境友好型社会,实现生态现代化中发挥作用。     

Foreign Direct Investment, Human Capital and Environmental Pollution in China

By using provincial socioeconomic and environmental data, this paper examines the relationship between human capital, FDI and pollution emissions in China. The result shows the impact of FDI on pollution emission is highly dependent on the level of human capital. FDI is negatively associated with pollution emissions in provinces with the higher levels of human capital, whereas FDI is positively related to pollution emissions in provinces with the lower levels of human capital. This suggests that pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) holds only in those provinces with low human capital. This study also finds that the sign of FDI’s effect on each pollutant’ emission requires the different threshold level of human capital, which may help to reconcile the current conflicting PHH empirical evidences partially.     

Direct Foreign Investment Versus Licensing

This paper examines the choice among alternative modes of direct foreign investment, namely, the wholly owned subsidiary (the S option) and joint venture (the J option), vis-à-vis licensing (the L option). The focus is on the role of moral hazard, difference in risk attitude and the prospect of the host country's policy toward the venture. An apparently surprising result is that riskiness of the project is a factor against the J option. Moreover, in the absence of policy intervention, L is dominated by either S or J, whereas if there is an anticipation of policy intervention (i.e., there is a policy moral hazard) L may emerge as the best option.     

Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment

Despite the growing interest in capital and technology issues, certain issues still remain to be explored regarding the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation and the corporation's consequent choice of investment location. This paper addresses some of these concerns by analyzing the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation, both theoretically and empirically. For this purpose, the paper integrates a number of traditional and nontraditional variables into the standard theory of investment based on the maximization of the expected value of the firm. The theoretical model implies that both traditional as well as nontraditional factors matter in determining the flows of foreign direct investment in a country. The generalized investment theory on US foreign direct investment then is tested empirically utilizing panel data for 44 countries from 1983 to 1990. The estimation results provide considerable support for the importance of both traditional and nontraditional factors in determining flows of foreign direct investment in a country. Furthermore, the country-specific dummies show high level of significance, reflecting the importance of the country-specific characteristics in explaining flows of foreign direct investment.     

Competing for Foreign Direct Investment

The paper analyzes 'subsidy games' between countries in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. The winner of this game results from the interaction of two factors, relative country size and employment gains from FDI: a large (or 'central') country is more likely to attract FDI, and so is a country with high unemployment. The subsidy equilibrium is compared with two alternative solutions: zero subsidies and first-best subsidies. It is shown that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero subsidies: the gains from efficient location implied by subsidy competition may more than outweigh the losses from higher subsidies. Moreover, departing from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best subsidies (without side payments) implies a gain to one country and a loss to the other. This suggests that it may be difficult to reach a consensus to move away from the status quo of subsidy competition.     

Foreign Debt,Foreign Direct Investment and Volatility

We investigate how foreign debt and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the growth and welfare of a stochastically growing small open economy. First, we find that foreign debt influences the growth of domestic wealth by lowering the cost of capital, while FDI affects the country's welfare by providing an additional source of permanent income. Second, a decline in domestic investment may improve domestic welfare as FDI replaces the gap. Even when the welfare deteriorates, its magnitude is mitigated, leaving more room for discretionary fiscal policy. Third, a fiscal policy aimed to stabilize domestic output fluctuations needs to be conducted not to crowd out the welfare benefit of FDI too much. Fourth, an economy with both types of foreign capital experiences wider welfare swings by external volatility shocks than the one with foreign debt alone, while the welfare effects from domestic volatility shocks are mitigated. The welfare effects of fiscal shocks are much smaller with both types of foreign capital. Lastly, the first-best labor income tax covers the government absorption by the labor's share of total output, and the capital income tax covers the rest. Investment is penalized or subsidized depending on the social marginal cost-gain differential.     

外资企业环境绩效的探讨——以上海市为例

本文采用上海市企业的排污和经营数据,分析了内外资企业的环境绩效。我们的研究表明外资企业有更高的环境绩效;然而,外资企业并没有在排污口末端去除更多的污染物,相反甚至更少。这反映了外资企业低的排放主要是因为更清洁的生产过程,而不是因为更多的污染物去除。因此,我们认为外资企业更高的环境绩效主要原因是他们具有内在先进的、清洁的生产技术。     

外商直接投资与金融创新

改革开放20多年以为，中国与世界经济一体化迅速加快，而外商直接投资已经成为中国经济快速增长的关键因素之一。外商直接投资促进了所有制结构多元化的变迁，对中国经济制度的市场化变革提供了持续的推动力。虽然我国金融市场化改革取得了很大成就，但是金融结构和金融制度安排并没有发生实质性的变化。随着中国加入WTO，外商直接投资的深度与广度将得到很大发展，这将推动我国金融结构的金融制度安排和创新。     

Regional Blocs and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper examines the impact of the emergence of regional blocs on the patterns of interbloc and intrabloc trade when firms have the option to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). For exogenously given external tariffs, when firms have the option to engage in FDI, all interbloc trade may cease—complete trade diversion that is replaced by interbloc FDI investment creation. In such an event the volume of world trade declines but this is more than offset by the increase in world output due to direct investment. The paper also investigates the optimal tariff that a trading bloc levies on imports from nonmember countries. The tariffs are restricted by the option to engage in two‐way direct investment; hence, the regional blocs are hampered from mutually harming one another through an escalation in the tariff war. Finally, the formation of two regional blocs enhances the welfare of all countries.     

Market Structure and Foreign Direct Investment

During the last decade the extent of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US has increased dramatically. An important aspect of industries where most FDI takes place is their high level of concentration. This paper investigates how strategic interactions among domestic and foreign producers influence the structure of the industry. Especially, it focuses on the foreign firms' choice between exporting versus servicing these markets by investing in a plant located in the host country when facing competition from a domestic oligopoly. The empirical investigation reveals that the relationship between FDI and tariffs is not as simple as previously thought. In highly concentrated industries, where strategic behavior may play an important role, high tariffs rather than low tariffs may lead to less FDI and more imports.     

外商直接投资与国家自主创新

本文将FDI(外商直接投资)和LICENSIING(技术许可)作为其潜在的渠道,建立了技术引进的模型.此模型的一个重要特征是模型中的主要假设,模型的结论以及模型的政策意义都与实际经验的观察相一致.对于包括中国在内的发展中国家(LDC)而言,技术许可比外商直接投资所带来的技术外溢更有效,在考虑制定何种政策以达到社会福利的最优化时,人力资本的水平起到了决定性的作用.     

Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper investigates why a developing country may adopt a partial reform. A country is considered where the ruling elite (referred to as state capital) prevents the entry of foreign capital, and taxes the private sector before reform. A higher productivity of foreign capital always increases the attractiveness of a partial reform under which state capital can control the inflow of foreign capital, but can reduce the attractiveness of a full reform under which the entry of foreign capital is unregulated. Hence, state capital's control over foreign capital may be a necessary condition for the reform to take place at all.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Contract Enforcement

A long-standing deterrent to foreign direct investment in developing countries is weak enforcement of binding contracts. A local firm may learn business skills from a cooperating multinational firm and subsequently do business on its own based on the acquired skills. In a two-period, double-moral-hazard model, non-binding contracts are shown to be preferred by all parties, implying that contract enforcement is unnecessary. Our results shed light on the puzzling phenomenon that substantial FDI has been carried out under contractual arrangements in developing countries in which contract enforcement is problematic. They can also explain some interesting stylized facts on contractual joint ventures between multinationals and local firms in the early stage of an economic transition.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 761–782. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.     

外商直接投资再创新高

<正> 中国“入世”的第一年,我国利用外商直接投资更加保持了较高的增长势头,据外经贸部统计,今年1至6月全国新批设立外商投资企业15155家,比去年同期增长26.39％;合同外资金额439.9亿美元,同比增长31.47％;实际使用外资金额245.79亿美元,同比增长18.69％。截至今年6月底,全国累计批准外商投资企业405180家,合同利用外资金额7892.81亿美元,实际使用外资金额4198.02亿美元。主要指标分析 1.增长幅度较大。在2001年我国利用外资进入恢复性增长及中国加入世贸组织后的半年时间里,外商直接投资以前所未有的速度和规模涌入中国。2002年1～6月我国利用     

Labor Training and Foreign Direct Investment

Evidence shows that most foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from developed to developed countries (North–North) in skilled labor‐intensive industries. This paper builds a model that incorporates labor training into the proximity–concentration tradeoffs to analyze the entry mode of multinationals to a foreign country. Production requires both skilled labor and unskilled labor.. A multinational pursuing FDI needs to provide training to some workers in the host country to equip them with skills that are specific to the production of the firm. Labor training and skill specificity lead to contract friction. It is shown that in skilled labor‐intensive industries, FDI increases along with the economic development level of the host country, whereas in unskilled labor‐intensive industries, the reverse is true. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical findings on the prevalence of North–North FDI in skilled labor‐industries and North–South FDI in unskilled labor‐intensive industries.