Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.     

Optimal taxation and redistribution in an OLG model with unemployment

This paper concerns redistribution via nonlinear income taxation in an overlapping generations model with two ability-types. We assume that the wage rates are determined by bargaining between unions and firms, meaning that the equilibrium is characterized by involuntary unemployment. We show that the policy instruments that are used to calculate the marginal labor income tax rate for each ability-type give rise to intertemporal tax base effects. In addition, since the relationship between the employment and the capital stock implies intertemporal production inefficiency at the second best optimum, imperfect competition in the labor market may itself justify capital income taxation.      

Education policies and optimal taxation

This paper studies the design of education policies in a setting in which optimal redistributive labor taxation is available. It is usually argued that the crucial parameter to guide education policy is the complementarity of education and ability. This is true only when labor supply is fixed or when income taxes are not allowed. I show that, if labor supply is endogenous and if the government can tax income in a nonlinear way, the crucial parameter is how the education elasticity of wage changes with ability. Taking the elasticity criterion into account, education subsidies are optimal in cases in which, under the complementarity criterion, education taxes would be optimal. To do this, I use an asymmetric information setting that motivates nonlinear taxation of income and education. JEL Classification H21 · H23 · H52 · I28     

Taxation and skills investment in frictional labor markets

This paper examines the effects of wage taxation and corporate income taxation on training investment in frictional labor markets. Because of labor market frictions, the wage structure is compressed and workers do not capture the entire return from their skills. As a result, both firms and workers have incentives to support part of the costs of training investments. The analysis shows that when decisions to invest in training are made by firms and workers acting cooperatively, a wage tax increases the level of investment in skills whereas a corporate income tax decreases it. In this case, the introduction of a small wage tax unambiguously increases efficiency. The effects of both types of taxes on training are reversed when investment decisions are taken by firms alone. In any case, a corporate income tax is not neutral with respect to decisions to invest in skills even if the full cost of investment is deducted from taxable income in the period when it is incurred and the tax system provides full loss offset.     

Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections

Taxing internationally mobile factors of production has been dismissed as an inefficient means of raising tax revenue. This paper addresses the question of whether it is efficient to tax capital at source when labor markets and the taxation of lumpsum income suffer from imperfections. Four reasons for taxing capital are identified: (i) institutional constraints rendering any taxation of profit income infeasible; (ii) market power in the demand for labor; (iii) market power in the supply of labor if it increases with the employment of capital; (iv) unemployment benefits that are not tied to net real wages. It is argued that the case for taxing capital is not particularly strong. By reinterpreting capital as energy the results are applicable to the discussion about ecological tax reforms.     

From the global income tax to the dual income tax: Recent tax reforms in the Nordic countries

The paper discusses the recent drive toward a system of dual income taxation (DIT) in the Nordic countries. The pure version of this system combines progressive taxation of labor and transfer incomes with a proportional tax on income from capital at a level equal to the corporate income tax rate. The paper considers the motives for the introduction of this new income tax system, ranging from abstract theoretical arguments to very pragmatic considerations. While the Nordic DIT system violates the principles of the conventional personal income tax, it is argued that it may in fact be more in line with the philosophy of a true Haig-Simons comprehensive income tax. It is also suggested that the DIT system may cause fewer distortions to resource allocation than the conventional income tax. On the debit side, the paper points out several practical problems of taxing income from small enterprises under the differentiated income tax.     

Optimal income taxation and social norms in the labor market

This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-type model extended to allow for social interaction and social norms in the labor market. One norm refers to “normal behavior” with respect to work hours (the hours of work norm), whereas another means that “one should earn one’s living by working” (the participation norm). The results show how the hours of work norm gives rise to a corrective motive for using income taxation. We also show how the interaction between the hours of work norm and the private incentive to participate in the labor market (which reflects the participation norm) gives rise to an employment motive for using the income tax.     

Targeted savings and labor supply

Substantial evidence suggests that savings behavior may depart from neoclassical optimization. This article examines the implications of raising the savings rate—whether through social security, retirement plans, or otherwise—for labor supply, where labor supply is determined by behavioral utility functions that reflect the non-neoclassical character of savings behavior. Under one formulation, raising the targeted savings rate increases labor supply regardless of the slope of the labor supply curve; under a second, raising the targeted savings rate has the same effect on labor supply as that of raising the labor income tax rate; and under a third, raising the targeted savings rate has no effect on labor supply. Effects on labor supply are particularly consequential because of the significant preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation.     

Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation

This paper addresses vertical fiscal externalities in a model where the state governments provide health care and the federal government provides a sickness benefit. Both levels of government tax labor income and policy decisions affect labor income as well as participation in the labor market. The results show that the vertical externality affecting the state governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved that the vertical fiscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to the states.      

Private retirement savings and mandatory annuitization

The present paper studies the growth, welfare, and efficiency consequences of tax-favored retirement accounts in a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic lifespan and labor income uncertainty. We focus on the implicit differential taxation of savings motives and the mandatory annuitization of withdrawals after retirement. The simulations performed for the German economy indicate that the differential taxation of savings motives has only modest efficiency effects but especially low-income households benefit. On the other hand, mandatory annuitization improves overall economic efficiency significantly by about 0.4% of aggregate resources, but future generations are hurt due to intergenerational income effects from reduced accidental bequest.     

Intertemporally Dependent Preferences and the Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation

The welfare cost of capital income taxation is analyzed utilizing intertemporally dependent preference operationalized using a variable rate of time preference. It is shown that if households exhibit increasing marginal impatience, then the welfare cost of capital income taxation is inversely related to the elasticity of the rate of time preference with respect to consumption. Therefore, the welfare cost of capital income taxation reported using time additive preferences may not be robust. Numerical examples show that the use of time additive preferences could result in the welfare cost of capital income taxation to be overestimated by as much as 25%.     

Taxes and stabilization in contemporary macroeconomic models

The role of proportional and procyclic labor income taxes for automatic stabilization with stochastic productivity is analyzed in a contemporary macroeconomic model based on imperfect competition. The importance of short-run nominal wage rigidity for the effectiveness of progressive taxes on labor income for stabilizing output and raising household welfare is examined in a model that yields complete analytical solutions with stochastic output shocks. Increasing the procyclicity of labor income tax rates raises welfare with and without rigid nominal wages in the model economy. With fully flexible prices and wages, a positive covariance between the distortionary tax rate and productivity reduces the volatility of production and employment. This effect disappears under nominal wage rigidity, although progressive taxation can still raise welfare by reducing the distortion caused by a proportional labor tax. With rigid nominal wages and flexible consumer goods prices, payroll taxes levied at rates that rise with output can serve as automatic stabilizers. JEL Code E62 · H20     

Inflation Taxation and Welfare with Externalities and Leisure

This paper examines how inflation taxation affects resource allocation and welfare in a neoclassical growth model with leisure, a production externality and money in the utility function. Switching from consumption taxation to inflation taxation to finance government spending reduces real money balances relative to income, but increases consumption, labor, capital, and output. The net welfare effect of this switch depends crucially on the strength of the externality and on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. While it is always negative without the externality, it is likely to be positive with a strong externality and elastic intertemporal substitution.     

传统逃税理论模型的进一步修正:以中国现行税制为框架

在现行税制基础上对逃税影响因素的分析更有针对性。在同时考虑选流转税和所得税的情况下，所得额多少及流转税税率高低对申报收入的影响方向都是不明确的；所得税税率对申报收入的影响在“负所得税“制度情形下，才会有利于鼓励诚实纳税，在其他情形下是不确定的；罚款率和查获概率的提高有助于减少逃税。     

Migration,wages and income taxes

We analyze labor migration flows between two countries (regions) with different-sized populations and different levels of productive efficiencies to determine the effects of such flows on income taxation. The residents are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs, although they are otherwise identical. Each resident compares her post-tax revenue at home with that obtained abroad, including migration costs, and each country’s government maximizes tax receipts. We study the existence of an equilibrium for any configuration of wages and for any difference in the relative sizes of the countries (regions). Then, we compute and characterize the equilibrium, whenever it exists, for any set of parameters, sizes and wage differentials. Finally, we show that equilibrium migration flows affect the level of income taxation in both the origin and destination countries.     

Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection

We characterize the set of second‐best “menus” of student‐loan contracts in an economy with risky labor‐market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard, and risk aversion. We combine student loans with optimal income taxation. Second‐best optima provide incomplete insurance because of moral hazard. Optimal repayments must be income contingent, or the income tax must comprise a graduate tax. Individuals are ex ante unequal because of differing probabilities of success, and ex post unequal, because taxation trades off incentives and redistribution. In addition, second‐best optima exhibit an interim equalization property: the poststudy but prework expected utilities of newly graduated student types must be equal.     

Effective labor taxation and the international location of headquarters

Profit taxes are widely acknowledged to influence the location of firms’ headquarters. This paper sheds light on the role of aspects of labor taxation for the international location of headquarters. While profit taxes can be avoided in various ways, it is much harder for firms to manipulate the firm-specific labor tax base so that labor taxes may be relatively important for firm location. We construct a unique data set of effective labor taxes in 120 countries and use data on the location of 35,206 firms to analyze the impact of labor income tax rates, the progressivity of the income tax schedule, and social security contributions on firms’ decisions where to locate their headquarters. The findings suggest that both a higher progressivity of the tax system and higher (employee- and employer-borne) social security contributions negatively influence a country’s attractiveness for headquarters location. Hence, a one percentage point increase in these payroll taxes, reduces the probability of a country to attract headquarters by 6.1 %. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications and subsets of the data.     

基于一体化的视角看欧盟税收体系的结构问题与改革取向

欧盟的一体化进程在向各国提出新的税收课题的同时,也使得各国原有的税收问题进一步凸显.在税收结构中,劳动税有一个高税收楔子,对消费税的依赖度很高,而公司所得税和不动产税在总税收中却占一个很小的份额.这种税收结构带来了较低的劳动积极性、较大的税收非中性、较弱的税收再分配能力等问题,并有悖于市场统一化和货币单一化的新形势.这一切决定了欧盟税收体系的改革取向.