Regional versus Multilateral Trade Liberalization,Environmental Taxation,and Welfare

The paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets, and compares the impacts of regional and multilateral tariff reduction on strategic environmental taxation and welfare. While both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in tariff‐reducing countries, regionalism also reduces production in a non‐participating country and may decrease its consumption. Consequently, regionalism and multilateralism change pollution tax and welfare in the tariff‐reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local, but in dissimilar ways for global pollution. When pollution is global, regionalism is likely to be preferred to multilateralism for the establishment of free trade among countries.     

A note on the trade potential of Central and Eastern Europe

This paper discusses the results of recent studies which use the so-called ‘gravity’ approach to predict the potential volume and direction of the trade of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It also examines how the trade of the former socialist economies have evolved following external liberalization. It then compares the predictions made using the PPP based estimates of GDP for 1989 with actual 1992 trade data and the corrected predictions based on actual 1992 GDP figures. The results indicate that the CEE trade responded very quickly to the new regime and being redirected away from CMEA and towards EU markets. CEE's actual trade patterns do not now considerably differ from that of similar Western European countries. Moreover, the projection based on the data of 1992 do not indicate any remaining unused CEE trade potential.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

A general equilibrium evaluation of the fiscal costs of trade liberalization in Ukraine

The establishment of an Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (AA/DCFTA) with the European Union (EU) would be the next significant step towards Ukraine’s deeper integration into the world economy. Despite widely expected additional welfare gains, the signing of the AA/DCFTA at the Third Eastern Partnership summit in November 2013 in Vilnius was suspended by the Ukrainian government due to geopolitical concerns and a severe economic and financial crisis in Ukraine coming along with high external debt and a substantial public budget deficit. This puts the fiscal consequences of Ukraine’s continued liberalization into focus, as transition and developing countries face higher fiscal costs associated with trade integration. Accordingly, this paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the part of the potential EU-Ukraine DCFTA which leads to a loss of tariff revenues, namely the tariff elimination. In particular, we apply a static Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for the single small open economy of Ukraine and focus on the effects of Ukraine’s unilateral tariff elimination by simulating three scenarios reflecting different means to compensate for the loss of tariff revenues. It turns out to be important to take these costs into consideration while modeling trade liberalization, as the results vary significantly across the scenarios.     

Dimensions of quality upgrading

The impact of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies’ trade integration with European markets on CEE trade structures has been studied extensively. These studies frequently observe a quality upgrading of CEE exports. In this paper we consider three dimensions of quality upgrading: upgrading across industries, upgrading across different quality segments within industries and, finally, product upgrading within quality segments inside industries. For the analysis we partition industries into quality segments based on EU‐15 import unit values. The results for ten CEE countries (comprising the CEE‐5, the Baltics and South East Europe) and thirteen industries suggest fundamental differences, both across country groups and across the three different notions of quality upgrading. The CEE‐5 show no evidence of entering a ‘low‐quality trap’ in all three dimensions. By contrast, while there is a general catching‐up process across industries and inside quality segments, the second notion of low‐quality specialization may be applicable within the high‐tech industries to the performance for the Baltics and South East Europe as a group.     

ARDL panel estimation of stock market indices and macroeconomic environment of CEE and SEE countries in the last decade of transition

We tested the hypothesis of the procyclicality of stock exchanges regarding the economic activity of CEE and SEE countries, to measure the level of financial integration during the last decade of the transition period, and to compare these two groups of emerging countries. Our ARDL panel estimates support the hypothesis of procyclicality in the transition period in the CEE and SEE regions, and further financial integration, due to the opening up of the market economy and repricing of systematic risk, followed by large capital inflows, trade liberalization and industrial production, along with the implementation of institutional reforms regarding EU integration. In addition, the significant positive coefficient of capital inflows and negative coefficient of unemployment rate in the CEE and SEE panel ARDL results confirm the volatility of the transition process, as is obvious in higher industrial production, followed by the significant impact of import on CEE countries and the much higher significant impact of export on SEE countries.     

Similarity in trade structures,integration and catching‐up1

In this paper, we look at the role of export composition in the growth process, considering how increased similarity in trade structure among countries can induce catching‐up in income levels in a group of countries in transition. We analyze the sectoral export patterns of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) by comparing them to those of the current members of the European Union (EU), focusing on countries’ specialization as suppliers for the EU market, and we assess whether similar export patterns foster the catching‐up process of the CEECs. Our main result is that similarity in export composition has a positive, significant and non‐linear impact on catching‐up, and seems to be driven by the growth of the main export market and delocalization of production more than by other factors.     

Race‐to‐the‐bottom Tariff Cutting

Unilateral tariff liberalization accounts for the lion's share of trade liberalization since the 1980s and has accompanied the most successful trade‐led development model of the past 50 years, “Factory Asia”. Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our grasp of the process of economic development. This paper provides empirical evidence for seven Asian emerging economies from 1988 to 2006 consistent with a tariff race to the bottom driven by a competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). The identification is two‐pronged. First, it is shown that tariffs on parts and components, intermediates and capital goods, crucial locational determinants for assembly firms, are correlated in competitive space, i.e. across countries at a similar level of development, but not across all countries. Second, it is shown that the tariff correlation in competitive space is significantly higher for inputs than consumer goods.     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Mergers: a Global Analysis*

We analyze the effects of bilateral tariff reductions on the profitability of cost‐reducing horizontal mergers. Given Cournot competition in a two‐country world, for any positive tariff below a certain threshold, marginal trade liberalization is shown to encourage only those domestic mergers with sufficiently large cost‐savings and to discourage the rest. For tariffs close to, but smaller than, the prohibitive tariff, however, marginal trade liberalization necessarily encourages all domestic mergers. Moreover, we show that for a given level of cost‐savings, the impact of marginal trade liberalization may not reliably predict that of nonmarginal liberalization. Although at high tariffs, domestic mergers are shown to be unambiguously more profitable than cross‐border mergers, near free trade, mergers which yield the most cost‐savings become the most profitable. Thus, when comparing domestic and cross‐border mergers, trade liberalization encourages the type which yields the most cost‐savings.     

Kosovo – EU trade relations: a dynamic panel poisson approach

To inform policymaking following trade liberalization between Kosovo and the EU within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), we specify a gravity model to investigate Kosovo’s trade in goods with 28 EU countries over the period 2005–2013. We reconcile competing methodological requirements by using a dynamic Poisson approach to estimation. Together, persistent trade patterns and an unfavourable combination of demand and supply elasticities suggest that trade liberalization in isolation is not sufficient to promote exports but may need to be incorporated within a wider policy and institutional framework. In addition, our findings suggest that trade costs should be a particular focus for policy: distance has a big negative influence on Kosovo’s exports to EU countries; while diaspora communities promote Kosovo’s exports to EU markets, most likely because they offset trade costs.     

A Welfare Ranking of Multilateral Reductions in Real and Tariff Trade Barriers when Firms are Heterogenous

Trade liberalization comes about through reductions in various types of trade barriers. This paper introduces, apart from the customary real trade costs (i.e. iceberg and fixed export costs), two revenue generating trade barriers (i.e. an ad valorem tariff and a trade license) into a standard heterogeneous‐firms‐trade model with Pareto distributed productivities. We derive analytical welfare rankings of all four liberalization channels for an equal effect on two openness measures, for any trade cost level and while all four barriers are simultaneously present, i.e. for any initial equilibrium. We show that when openness is measured at retail prices, not border prices, the welfare rankings are sensitive to the degree of efficiency in revenue redistribution, e.g. the share of tariff revenues wasted on rent‐seeking activities. As a result, multilateral tariff reductions can switch from the least to the most preferred mode of liberalization. Among the other three barriers we establish a universal welfare ranking for any strictly positive level of revenue redistribution and for either measure of openness.     

Trade liberalization and markups: Micro evidence from China

This paper presents evidence from highly disaggregated Chinese firm-product data that, given productivity, input tariff reductions induce an incumbent importer/exporter to increase product markups. We further investigate empirically the mechanisms underlying this trade liberalization effect, and find that input tariff reductions decrease marginal costs, and their effects on markup adjustments are more profound among firms with higher import dependence. Moreover, we exploit unique features of Chinese data by comparing results for two trade regimes: ordinary trade (wherein firms pay import tariffs to import) and processing trade (wherein firms are not subject to import tariffs). While the aforementioned trade liberalization effects and mechanisms only apply to ordinary trade, processing trade samples are used in a placebo test. The paper also shows that more productive firms charge higher markups for products. All these findings are robust to alternative markup measures including one estimate using physical-quantity output data, different production function specifications, a subsample consisting only of pure exporters, and estimations based on our theoretical derivations.     

Analyzing the System of Preferential Tariffs for Least Developed Countries

This paper analyzes the rents available from non‐reciprocal preferential tariffs for least developed countries (LDCs) on all exports to the quad countries at the tariff line level. Most of the rents come from the European Union (EU) in clothing and textiles, while the USA and Canada offer few rents and charge significant tariffs to LDCs. We develop a dual economy labor market model that generates an income distribution and simulates the distributional effects of preferences. We find that the benefits of the preferences outweigh any adverse distributional effects. Relative inequality may increase with preferences in some cases, but absolute incomes increase in every case. We conclude that in the absence of multilateral liberalization, preferences are beneficial to some LDCs and expansion of preferences is desirable. In the event of multilateral liberalization, an import subsidy scheme that maintains the rents is the most desirable outcome.     

A Ricardian Model with Endogenous Comparative Advantage and Endogenous Trade Policy Regimes

This paper develops a Ricardian model with transaction costs and endogenous and exogenous comparative advantages. It shows that the level of division of labour and trade increases as transaction conditions improve. It identifies the conditions for trade negotiations that result in zero tariff rates and the conditions for the coexistence of unilateral tariff protection and unilateral laissez faire policies. The model may explain the policy transformation of some European governments from Mercantilism to laissez faire in the 18th and 19th century and policy changes in developing countries from protection tariff to trade liberalization and tariff negotiation.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

The Division and Size of Gains from Liberalization in Service Networks*

If two disjoint country service networks involving a small and large country are connected as part of international liberalization in the presence of network externalities, the per capita gain for the small country from access to a large network will be large, and the per capita gain for the large country will be small. In contrast to goods, the benefits of liberalization in network‐related services are more likely to be approximately equally divided between large and small countries than is true of trade in goods, where benefits accrue disproportionately to the small country. We also argue that non‐cooperation in network‐related services trade may involve more extreme retaliation than suggested for trade in goods by the optimal tariff literature, so that relative to a non‐cooperative outcome, gains from liberalization in network‐related services become larger than from liberalization in goods. We develop simple models which we use for numerical examples showing these points, along with an empirical implementation for global telecoms liberalization for the US, Europe, Canada, and the rest of the world using the framework developed in the paper. This shows similar proportional gains to regions, consistent with the theme of the paper that goods and services liberalization differ.     

Prospective NATO or EU membership and institutional change in transition countries1

This article quantifies the impact of incentives related to potential membership on institutional change as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators. Based on a panel of 25 transition countries for the period from 1996 to 2008, we show that pre‐accession incentives provided by EU and NATO clearly matter for institutional development. In addition, path‐dependency determined by cultural norms may be overcome by economic liberalization, while foreign aid hampers institutional development.     

Converging in divergent ways

This paper focuses on intra‐industry trade (IIT) between Central, Eastern and South‐Eastern European (CESEE) countries and the EU‐15. It assesses the determinants of intra‐industry trade by combining a detailed product‐level (HS‐6) trade‐flow database with country‐level structural, monetary and institutional variables. Estimates are obtained with System‐GMM and dynamic fractional response models. Our results suggest that structural factors driving IIT differ in the region, notably perceptions of corruption and the distance in the stock of physical capital from the EU‐15. On the other hand, nominal variables such as the competitiveness of corporate taxation and the flexibility of exchange rate regimes contribute to the increase in intra‐industry trade in the whole region.     

Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality: Evidence from India

We evaluate empirically the impact of the dramatic 1991 trade liberalization in India on the industry wage structure. The empirical strategy uses variation in industry wage premiums and trade policy across industries and over time. In contrast to most earlier studies on developing countries, we find a strong, negative, and robust relationship between changes in trade policy and changes in industry wage premiums over time. The results are consistent with liberalization‐induced productivity increases at the firm level, which get passed on to industry wages. We also find that trade liberalization has led to decreased wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in India. This is consistent with the magnitude of tariff reductions being relatively larger in sectors with a higher proportion of unskilled workers.     

On the emergence of an MFN club: equal treatment in an unequal world

Abstract .  Motivated by GATT, we endogenize the formation of a club whose members have to abide by the MFN principle of non-discrimination. The underlying model is that of oligopolistic intraindustry trade. While an MFN club does not alter average tariff levels across countries, it increases aggregate world welfare; makes non-members worse off; and can immiserize its high cost members. These results imply that (i) core WTO rules such as MFN are valuable even if multilateral negotiations deliver limited trade liberalization and (ii) the distributional effects of MFN maybe one reason why developing countries have been granted Special and Differential treatment at the WTO.