Collective Bargaining and Within-firm Wage Dispersion in Spain

This paper analyses the effect of collective bargaining on within‐firm wage dispersion for the case of Spain. What is relevant in the Spanish case is to compare the effect of the two basic levels of bargaining (firm and sector) on wage dispersion. By using the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, this paper concludes that collective agreements at firm level have a negative effect on wage dispersion. At the same time, firms that have signed these types of agreements show greater wage dispersion than those covered by agreements at the sector level, owing to the positive and compensating effect of firms’ and workers’ features.     

Collective Bargaining and the Evolution of Wage Inequality in Italy

Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from the mid‐1980s until the early 2000s, while it has been persistently flat since then. We analyse this trend, focusing on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion. By accounting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown that workers' heterogeneity has been a major determinant of increased wage inequalities, while variability in firm wage policies has declined over time. We also show that the growth in pay dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli di inquadramento, that is, job titles defined by national industry‐wide collective bargaining institutions, for which specific minimum wages apply. We conclude that the underlying market forces determining wage inequality have been largely channelled into the tight tracks set by the centralized system of industrial relations.     

Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining and Individual Effort Determination

We study the impact of tax policy on wage negotiations, workers’ effort, employment, output, and welfare under imperfectly observable effort. A higher degree of tax progression always leads to wage moderation, but the well‐established result from the wage bargaining literature that a revenue‐neutral increase in the degree of tax progression is good for employment does not carry over to the case with wage negotiations and imperfectly observable effort. Introducing tax progression increases employment and output, but we cannot rule out that the negative effort effect of increasing tax progression will lead employment to fall when tax progression is already high.     

The Impact of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strike Activity and Wage Settlements

We examine the effects of collective bargaining legislation, such as (among others) bans on replacement workers and reinstatement rights, on private sector strike activity and wage settlements using Canadian data from 1978 to 2008. Our estimates indicate that this legislation does not have a statistically significant effect on the incidence of strikes. However, we do find that some of the policy variables have a statistically significant effect on strike duration and wage settlements.     

Collective Bargaining and Faculty Job Satisfaction

Estimates of the impact of union membership on job satisfaction suffer from nonrandom self‐selection of employees into unions. In this paper, we circumvent this problem by examining the impact on satisfaction of collective bargaining representation, rather than of union membership. We use a two‐stage technique that controls for nonrandom selection of faculty into institutions, and apply that to a panel of faculty at repeatedly observed four‐year universities. We find that bargaining agreements increase satisfaction with compensation but reduce satisfaction with faculty workload. Bargaining has no statistically measurable impact on overall job satisfaction or on faculty's satisfaction with their authority to make decisions regarding their instructional duties.     

Effectiveness of Mediation Strategies in Collective Bargaining

Effectiveness of mediation strategies is analyzed in two different types of collective labor conflicts: rights conflicts and conflicts of interests. The sample consists of 106 professional labor mediators who completed a questionnaire about the strategies they used and the outcomes they achieved in their most recent mediation intervention. Results from regression analysis indicate that while the use of substantive and contextual strategies is positively related to effectiveness in both types of conflict, the use of reflexive strategies is negatively related to effectiveness, particularly in rights conflicts.     

The Economics of Unions and Collective Bargaining

This paper reviews recent research on the economics of unions and collective bargaining, emphasizing the implications for human resource management. Research findings on the impact of unions, strategic union avoidance behavior by management, strategic use of labor law by unions and employers, and conflict and conflict resolution in labor relations are discussed. The paper highlights unexploited connections between research on unioun impact and research on strategic behavior.     

Firm Investment Behavior and Collective Bargaining Strategy

Using survey data on labor union coverage at the firm level, this paper examines union-nonunion differences in investment activity among 706 U.S. companies during the 1970s. Consistent with a model of union rent seeking, firm-level collective bargaining is associated with significantly lower physical capital and R&D investment, even after controlling for firm and industry characteristics. Deleterious union effects on investment are considerable throughout the 1972–80 period, but they vary across industries. Without significant changes in collective bargaining power or strategies, diminished investment activity by unionized companies is likely to exacerbate the already considerable decline in U.S. union coverage     

Bargaining Structure and Wage Outcomes in the British Coal Industry

The arguments below use case study and time series data to investigate the relationship between bargaining structure and wage settlements in the British coal industry. Consideration of the different bargaining structures in this industry suggests that bargaining power and wage outcomes are very sensitive to market conditions when the negotiating structure is decentralized; when negotiations are centralized in industry-wide bargaining, power and wage outcomes are quite insensitive to market conditions. These conclusions may help in understanding recent events in this industry and perhaps can be generalized to other cases where bargaining structures are undergoing change.     

Variable Pay and Collective Bargaining in British Retail Banking

The growth of variable pay schemes (VPS) appears to threaten collective approaches to pay determination, which are based on standardization and centralization. This article utilizes case study research to analyse the still little‐known relationship between collective bargaining and VPS. It focuses on the retail banking sector, where trade union representation and collective bargaining remain relatively robust. The research identifies an emergent process whereby the growth of bonus schemes has both supplanted collective profit‐share and permitted greater standardization of merit‐pay awards. Unions have therefore achieved some success in terms of limiting variation in base pay, at the same time as the overall purchase of collective bargaining on employee earnings has diminished. The factors contributing to this development are explained.     

The Rise of Experimentalism in German Collective Bargaining

This paper addresses the debate on union strategies by analysing industrial relations change in three of Germany's most internationalized sectors: chemicals, metalworking and construction. It characterizes two logics of change in German industrial relations: a battlefield logic and an experimentalist logic. It demonstrates historical trends towards centralization of wage bargaining in each sector before looking at recent pressures for decentralization and flexibility. In chemi‐cals, the social partners control decentralization. In metalworking increasing flexibility is characterized by a mismatch between the national‐level union and the district‐level employers. Finally, the construction union seeks to replace the centralized bargaining system with a state minimum wage.