Does the fourth entrant make any difference?: Entry and competition in the early U.S. broadband market

We study the importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct in an adapted Bresnahan and Reiss (1991, 1994) framework. In our framework, entrants incur sunk costs to enter, while incumbents disregard these costs in deciding on continuation or exit. We apply this framework to study entry and competition in the local U.S. broadband markets from 1999 to 2003. Ignoring sunk costs generates unreasonable variation in firms' competitive conduct over time. This variation disappears when entry costs are allowed. Once the market has one to three incumbent firms, the fourth entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.     

Market size and competition: A “hump-shaped” result

An active empirical literature estimates entry threshold ratios (ETRs), introduced by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), to learn about the impact of firm entry on competition. We show that in the standard homogeneous goods oligopoly model, there is no monotonic relationship with the price-cost margin, one measure for the strength of competition. Regardless of the shape of demand, the ETR is hump-shaped in the number of active firms. It can also increase with entry in the Salop model of product differentiation or in a game of repeated interactions where collusion is possible. Empirical applications should use caution and only interpret changes in the ratio as indicative of a change in competition when the number of firms is sufficiently large.     

Competition in Local Markets: Some Evidence from the Spanish Retail Banking Market

Using the entry threshold concept developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (Brookings Pap Econ Act 3:833–882, 1987), this paper examines how competitive conditions vary in independent local banking markets when the number of depository branches grows. With data on the Spanish retail banking sector in 2003, I estimate a discrete choice model to calculate the entry thresholds. The empirical evidence suggests that the entry of a new branch implies competition on a local level. Local branches seem to have some scope for changing prices fixed on national and regional levels. Moreover, the entry of new branches increases the competition among branches with instruments other than price (e.g., advertising, location, and promotion).      

Regulation,enforcement, and entry: Evidence from the Spanish local TV industry

Although we have many tools to understand the effect of regulation on firm entry, we know little about the importance of actual regulation enforcement. For this purpose, this paper uses data from Spain's local television industry from 1995 through 2001, which provide a unique opportunity for examining how firms' profitability changes with the introduction of regulation and a posterior liberalization. During this period, the local television industry transitioned from a state of alegality (no regulation in place) to being highly regulated and finally to being informally deregulated. Using a firm entry model from Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991a,b), we estimate local TV station entry thresholds by number of entrants across years. We find the entry threshold in 1998 increased relative to the thresholds in 1995 and 2001, suggesting that entry was less attractive during the period when the local TV industry was highly regulated. We decompose the entry thresholds into the fixed costs and variable profits, and find the fixed-cost ratios increase in 1998 and stay constant in 2001. Meanwhile, we find an increase in the variable-profit ratios in 2001. These findings suggest that the informal deregulation did not invalidate the regulation introduced in 1995 on the cost side. However, the deregulation seemed to have an impact on variable profits through how local TV stations competed.     

Determinants of Entry and Profits in Local Banking Markets

This paper estimates a two equation model of market entry and profits, utilizing data on entry into over 2,000 banking markets over the period 1977--88. The entry equations measure whether entry depends on incumbent firms' profits and other market attributes that reflect the long-term attractiveness of markets for entry. Market profits, assumed to follow a partial-adjustment process, are affected by entry directly and indirectly through market structure. The model also corrects for an unavoidable source of error in market-level profits for the banking industry. The estimates suggest that a competitive process is at work in banking markets that limits the ability of supra-normal profits to persist. Entry is more likely in markets that have high profits, consistent with previous empirical results that market structure adjusts more quickly when profits are supra-normal. Population and population growth are also strong determinants of entry. Entry, in turn, reduces profits in rural markets.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2006–2007

In this paper, we evaluate the scope of Chadwick’s claim on the superiority of competition for the market over competition in the market under incomplete information. We firstly characterize the expected outcome achieved under competition in the market at a Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Then we characterize the optimal expected outcome achieved under a competition for the market mechanism designed by a government facing a shadow cost of public funds. We show that a regulated monopoly selected by an auction mechanism results in higher expected welfare than does duopoly competition when the entry cost is low but that the opposite holds when the market size is small and the entry cost is high for some values of the shadow cost of public funds. These results are explained by the influence of adverse selection on the entry decision at the Cournot equilibrium and by the level of expected total fixed costs in both mechanisms.      

VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND SHARED FACILITIES IN UNREGULATED INDUSTRIES

In this paper we analyze the equilibrium market structure, following liberalization, of an industry involving an essential facility. Two alternative modes of market entry are considered, in conjunction with vertical integration, namely: (i) full entry, which means building a new and more efficient facility at a positive fixed cost; and (ii) partial entry, which means purchasing existing capacity from the incumbent, at a fixed price per unit that is freely negotiated between the incumbent and the entrant. We show that vertical integration is a dominant strategy for each firm under either entry mode, and that upstream firms choose to share the incumbent's facility when the entrant's fixed cost exceeds a positive threshold. In addition, welfare analysis shows that in many situations the market can efficiently solve the trade-off between fixed-cost savings and softened downstream competition, thus providing a rationale for the liberalization of such industries. Several competition policy implications are discussed.     

The determinants of entry and exit rates into U.S. manufacturing industries

Entry and exit rates are examined across a fairly large sample of 4-digit U.S. manufacturing industries. Market growth significantly increases (reduces) entry (exit) rates. Profits increase entry rates. Advertising clearly acts as an entry barrier. Sunk capital costs seem to deter exit. While entry and exit rates are related in the sample, whether they are simultaneously determined is unclear.     

Competing buyers,rent extraction and inefficient exclusion

The article illustrates how a seller profitably can prevent entry of a potential competitor, even when entry would increase industry profit. Entry is prevented by offering exclusive contracts to the buyers. The buyers are assumed to be differentiated firms, competing in a downstream market. Exclusion occurs in equilibrium as long as there is some degree of competition among the downstream firms, and even when there are no economies of scale in upstream production.     

How does income inequality affect market outcomes in vertically differentiated markets?

The distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the structure of a vertically differentiated industry when consumer's willingness to pay depends on her income. This paper computes the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model for a lognormal distribution of consumer incomes to investigate the effect of inequality on firms' entry, product quality, and pricing decisions. The main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants. More intense quality competition raises the average quality of products in the market as firms compete for the shrinking share of higher-income consumers. With zero costs of quality improvements and an upper bound on the top quality or when costs of quality are fixed and rise sufficiently fast, greater heterogeneity of consumer incomes also reduces firms' incentives to differentiate their products. Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. However, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market and charges a higher price. The conclusion is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product differentiation, price level, industry concentration, and consumer welfare.     

Industry Structure,Segmentation, and Quality Competition in the U.S. Hotel Industry*

We examine how quality competition affects the relationship between market size and industry structure at the product level using evidence from the U.S. hotel industry. Starting in the early 1980s, quality competition for business travelers became more based on variable and less on fixed costs, and became less scale intensive. Since then, market size increases have been met by more, but smaller, hotels in business travel destinations but continued to be met by larger hotels in personal travel destinations. Our results illustrate how the way consumers benefit from increases in market size depends on how firms compete.     

Defining Market Dominance: A Study of Antitrust Decisions on Business Acquisitions in New Zealand

Information from the 207 decisions of the New ZealandCommerce Commission on business acquisitions for1991–96 are used to test how the Commission assessedmarket dominance. Dominance is found to emerge whereboth the market share of the merged entity and theentry barriers were high. A probit regression modelsuggests that there was a 50% probability thatdominance would be found when market share was 75%,in a market where the entry barrier was high. Theapplication of the US merger guidelines to a sub-setof markets finds that the dominance threshold ofanti-competitiveness applied to New Zealand mergerswas very much more lenient than the substantiallessening of competition threshold used in the U.S.     

Competitive Pressure and Innovation at the Firm Level

This paper provides empirical evidence on the relationship between market competitive pressure and firms' innovation using panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms for 1990–2006. We depart from standard measures of competition, and construct variables capturing the fundamentals of competitive pressure (product substitutability, market size and entry costs) to test the theoretical predictions of Vives [2008, The Journal of Industrial Economics] for free entry. Our results line up favourably with these predictions. We obtain that greater product substitutability and higher costs of entry lead to more process innovation but less product innovation, whereas market enlargement spurs both product and process innovation.     

Product Diversity in Asymmetric Oligopoly: Is the Quality of Consumer Goods too Low?

We analyse an oligopoly model incorporating horizontal differentiation and quality differences. High quality goods are overpriced and underproduced. When the market is fairly well covered, low quality products may be profitable when their net social contribution is negative, implying excessive entry. In a relatively uncovered market, even low quality goods are underproduced and there may be underentry. When fixed costs are independent of quality, the market tends to select the right firms. Otherwise, the market may produce low quality products when it should produce high quality ones. The model is calibrated using market data for yoghurt.     

Generic Entry into the Regulated Spanish Pharmaceutical Market

This paper empirically analyses entry by generic firms into the strictly regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. We estimate a fixed effects negative binomial entry model using a panel of 77 active ingredient markets during the period 1999–2005. The results show that generic entry depends positively on revenues, the age of the market, and the number of previous brand-name competitors, and negatively on the number of generic incumbents. We also find that regulation may drive out competition since, contrary to what policy makers might expect, the system of reference pricing restrains generic entry.     

Real Estate Brokers, Nonprice Competition and the Housing Market

Given a fixed commission rate and easy entry, economic profits must be competed away on some nonprice margin in the real estate brokerage market. This paper focuses on nonprice competition in the level or quality of services offered buyers and sellers in the market, examining the equilibrium adjustment process, comparative static predictions and efficiency implications. In contrast with earlier studies focusing on wasteful advertising, this paper demonstrates that higher commission rates can either increase or decrease deadweight loss, depending upon how broker services affect buyer and seller transaction costs.     

DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET*

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex‐ante the firms that compete ex‐post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case.     

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities

We analyze the potential entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” The model assumes quality-dependent marginal production costs and considers sequential quality choices by an incumbent and an entrant. Entry-quality decisions and the entry-deterrence strategies are related to the fixed cost necessary for entry and to the degree of consumers’ taste for quality. We detail the conditions under which the incumbent increases its quality level to deter entry. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well. Welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.     

Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty

We look at a Bertrand model in which each firm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active firms is uncertain. The model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which industry profits are positive and decline with the number of firms, the same features which make the Cournot model attractive. Unlike those in a Cournot model with similar uncertainty, Bertrand profits always increase in the probability that firms are inactive. Profits decline more sharply than in the Cournot model, the pattern found empirically in Bresnahan and Reiss [1991].