WHY FOREIGN OWNERSHIP MAY BE GOOD FOR YOU*

We develop a two‐country model with heterogeneous producers and rent‐sharing at the firm level. We identify two sources of a multinational wage premium: A composition effect because multinational firms are more productive, make higher profits, and pay higher wages, and a firm‐level wage effect, because a firm makes higher global profits and thus pays higher wages in its home market when becoming multinational. With two identical countries, the wage premium is fully explained by firm characteristics. Allowing for technology differences between countries, a residual wage premium exists in the technologically backward country but not in the advanced country.     

The Impact of Unionization Structures with Heterogeneous Firms and Rent‐Sharing Motives

How are unemployment and output affected if wages are set on the sector level rather than firm level? We take a new look at this question, allowing for heterogeneous firms and rent‐sharing motives. Without these motives, employment and output are lower under sector‐level wage‐setting due to higher wage markups. With rent‐sharing motives, however, firm selection is higher under sector‐level wage‐setting, which tends to increase employment and output, thus counteracting the markup effect. Simulations show that the firm‐selection effect decreases the difference between the two unionization structures substantially but it does not change the signs of the effects on output and employment.     

Union coverage and sectoral wages: Evidence from the Netherlands

This paper investigates the impact of union coverage on sectoral wages in the Netherlands. The semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to union coverage appears to be around 0.05; it is higher in the industrial than in the other sectors. The impact of union coverage on wages appears to be lower in the Netherlands than in the US and the UK. Union coverage increases the weight of internal (sector-specific) factors in wage determination and decreases the weight of external (labour market) factors. Apparently, unions increase the role of rent sharing in wage formation and stabilize employment.     

效率工资、租金分享与企业工资收入差距——基于第一次全国经济普查工业企业数据的实证研究

企业利润对工资差距的影响究竟来自效率工资还是来自租金分享,这是理论界和政策制定者共同关心的问题。文章利用2004年第一次全国经济普查数据实证分析发现:(1)企业利润是解释我国企业工资差距的重要因素,这主要由效率工资导致。(2)国有企业存在租金共享,但它不是通过企业利润实现的,而是利用行业垄断地位直接将职工高工资转化为企业成本实现的。(3)集体企业存在着租金共享。(4)外资企业也存在租金共享,但存在租金共享的外资企业同时具有更高的效率。(5)私营企业存在效率工资。与其他所有制企业不同的是,对私营企业而言,行业垄断不但不能提高反而会降低职工工资水平,或反过来说,产品市场竞争有利于提高职工工资水平。最后,文章针对性地给出了一些缩小企业工资差距的政策建议。     

The Distributional and Allocative Impacts of Virtual Labor Mobility across Time Zones through Communication Networks

Using a specific‐factors' model, with two goods (a shift‐working good and a non‐shift‐working good), three factors (capital specific to shift‐working, land specific to non‐shift‐working and labor) and two countries (Home and Foreign), which are located in different time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labor services via communication networks on factor prices and production patterns. If two countries are identical in size, then under free trade in labor services, all workers work only in their local daytime, and night shift in each country is performed by imported labor services supplied by residents of the other country in their local daytime. Night‐time wage becomes the same as daytime wage (a wage equalization result). Other factor prices are also equalized. In both countries, capital rental rate increases, while land rent decreases. However, if two countries are different in size, trade in labor services does not equalize wages: in the large country, wages for night‐shift workers are higher than daytime wages and some residents work at night; in the small country, daytime wages become higher than night‐time wages and no one works at night, and night‐shift work is done by imported labor services from the large country. Land rent in the small country decreases. Land rent in the large country may or may not decrease, but it is always higher than in the small country. Capital rental rates in both countries are equalized and increase.     

International Trade and Collective Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from German Employer–Employee Data

In theoretical trade models with variable mark‐ups and collective wage bargaining, exposure to international markets might reduce the exporter wage premium. We test this prediction using linked German employer–employee data covering the years 1996–2007. To separate the rent‐sharing mechanism from assortative matching, we exploit individual worker information to construct profitability measures that are free of skill composition. Our results show that rent‐sharing is less pronounced in more export‐intensive firms or in more open industries. The exporter wage premium is highest for low‐productivity firms. In line with theory, these findings are unique to the subsample of plants covered by collective bargaining.     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

Unfair incentives: A behavioural note on sharecropping

We conducted a laboratory‐in‐the‐field experiment with real‐life tenants in Ethiopia to test the incentive effects of fixed wage, sharecropping, fixed rent, and ownership contracts. The experimental task resembles a common process in agricultural production. The sharecropping contract is a piece rate scheme framed as a profit‐sharing agreement. Sharecropping output was about 12 percent smaller than the fixed rent output. Surprisingly, it is statistically indistinguishable from the fixed wage output, despite substantial piece rates. This effect is driven by real‐life sharecroppers. Their sharecropping output was smaller than that of non‐sharecroppers, especially in a region where a controversial land reform took place. We argue that our subjects dislike sharecropping contracts because of the unfair profit sharing and the disputed allocation of land. Fairness concerns, therefore, may be another impediment to efficiency under the sharecropping contract.     

A Village Economy: Land and People of Huecorio

This paper utilizes an original establishment survey in a select few low-wage industries in Los Angeles to draw conclusions about the existence of and explanations for intra-industry wage differentials. We explore differences in average establishment wages but also in the starting wage of the largest low-wage occupations in establishments. Well over 50 percent of the variation in average establishment wages occurs across establishments within industries and 60 percent or more of the starting occupational wages of establishments occurs both within industries and occupations. Differences in the skills of workers account for a portion of the variation in intra-industry average and intra-occupational starting wages, but so too do institutional factors such as unions, rent sharing, monitoring difficulty, and recruitment difficulty.     

Evolution of the Interindustry Wage Structure in China Since the 1980s

Industry mean wages in China have exhibited sharply increased dispersion since the early1990s. Researchers have attributed this rising inequality within the industrial wage structure to: (i) increasingly competitive labour markets leading to better matches between worker pay, worker skills and employer demands; or (ii) residual government control in some industrial sectors that has generated high wages through monopoly rent sharing. We argue that the rise in China's industrial wage dispersion is primarily attributable to increasingly competitive labour markets, which have led to greater returns to schooling and to efficient redistribution of workers across major industry groups. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the level or changes in government monopoly power has had negligible impact on China's rising industrial wage dispersion.     

Technological Change and Wages in China: Evidence from Matched Employer–Employee Data

The relationship between research and development (R&D) intensity and wages is examined using a unique matched employer–employee dataset. The ordinary least squares estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in R&D intensity is associated with an increase in the hourly wage rate between 3.4% and 6.9% for the full sample, depending on the exact specification. The instrumental variable estimates are that a one standard deviation increase in R&D intensity is associated with an increase in the hourly wage rate between 5.5% and 11.4%. The wage elasticity with respect to R&D intensity is found to be higher in larger firms as well as for better educated workers and workers with technical skills. Consistent with the rent‐sharing hypothesis it is also found that the wage elasticity with respect to R&D intensity is higher for workers who belong to the Communist Party or union.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

Inter industry and occupational wage differentials in Italy

The vast literture on wage determination in the post-war era extensively documents the existence of large and persistent wage differentials among industries and workers of comparable skills. This paper addresses the issue of wage dispersion in the context of the Italian economy. The stability over time of industry relative wages confirme previous results obtained for the other countries. A wide class of earings equations is estimated using microdata for the Italian manufacturing industry. The results provide little evidence in support of the view that wage dispersion can be explained by either unmeasured workers' charcteristics or by compensating wage differentials. Conversely, the estimated pattern of industry-occupation wage differentials is consistent with the existence of rent sharing mechanisms and fairness considerations.     

Prices,Productivity and Wage Bargaining in Open Economies*

According to the standard union bargaining model, unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages, but product‐market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain. We formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model, where labour and product‐market conditions together determine wages. A wage equation is derived and estimated on aggregate data for four Nordic countries. Wages are found to depend not only on unemployment and the replacement ratio, but also on productivity, international prices and exchange rates. There is evidence of considerable nominal wage rigidity. Exchange rate changes have large and persistent effects on competitiveness.     

Shirking, Unemployment and Aggregate Fluctuations

Empirically, real wages exhibit relatively little cyclical variation and a weak cyclical pattern. Early real business cycle (RBC) models predict, to the contrary, large, procyclical real wage movements. Incorporating efficiency wages into a RBC environment would seem promising since one prediction from the efficiency wage literature is real wage rigidity. This paper evaluates a common microfoundation for efficiency wages, the shirking model, with respect to its predictions for real wages within a RBC-style model. Simulations of the model reveal that it can generate dampened but still strongly procyclical real wage behavior.     

Fair wages in a New Keynesian model of the business cycle

We build a New Keynesian model of the business cycle with sticky prices and real wage rigidities motivated by efficiency wages of the gift exchange variety. Compared to a standard sticky price model, our Fair Wage model provides an explanation for structural unemployment and generates more plausible labor market dynamics—notably accounting for the low correlation between wages and employment. The fair wage induced real wage rigidity also significantly reduces the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. The smoother dynamics of real marginal cost increase both amplification and persistence of output responses to monetary shocks, thus remedying the well-known lack of internal propagation of standard sticky price models. We take these improvements as a strong endorsement of the addition of real wage rigidities to nominal price rigidities and conclude that the fair wage extension of this paper constitutes a promising platform for an enriched New Keynesian synthesis.     

Public or Private Sector Wage Leadership? An International Perspective*

Whether a government acts as a wage leader, placing pressure on private‐sector wages (more open to competition), or whether it plays a passive role and merely follows wage negotiations in the private sector, there are important implications for macroeconomic development, particularly in small open economies and/or countries that are members of a monetary union, such as those of the European Monetary Union. With the notable exception of the case of Sweden, opinion on this issue is still divided. In this paper, we look at public‐ and private‐sector wage interactions from an international perspective (18 OECD countries). We focus on the causal two‐way relationship between public and private wage setting, confirming that the private sector, on the whole, appears to have a stronger influence on the public sector, rather than vice versa. However, we also find evidence of feedback effects from public wage setting, which affect private‐sector wages in a number of countries. When the private sector takes the lead on wages, there are few feedback effects from the public sector, while public wage leadership is typically accompanied by private‐sector feedback effects.     

NOMINAL WAGE INDEXATION,QUASI‐EQUILIBRIA AND REAL WAGE DYNAMICS

In contrast to the traditional static approach to indexation, this paper analyses the dynamic consequences for real wages of the mechanism that links nominal wages to inflation. Revisiting a contribution by Dehez and Fitoussi on macroeconomic fluctuations , I analyse a monetary overlapping generations small open economy in which full indexation is interpreted as the occurrence of a dynamic ‘quasi‐equilibrium’. In the suggested framework, the nominal wage is linked to the inflation rate by a specific indexation formula whose shape relies on unions' bargaining positions. Assuming a constant peg for the real interest rate and the superneutrality of money, I show that the economy has a unique long‐run quasi‐equilibrium allocation whose stability depends only on the behaviour of the monetary authority. Moreover, I show how the operating of a ‘wage‐aspiration effect’ might lead to the persistence of involuntary unemployment.     

A note on internal and external reference in efficiency wage models

According to Bewley, a workers’ morale depends on being treated fairly within firms. This implies that the internal comparison of the own wage with wages paid to other workers within the firm affects individual effort determination. By contrast, the standard efficiency wage models only consider a comparison of the own wage with external income opportunities as the only determinant for individual effort. We provide a simple efficiency wage framework in which both the internal and external perspectives can affect individual effort determination. Our framework suggests that the internal reference is essential for the existence of real wage rigidity while the external reference ensures an upward-sloping wage-setting curve.