VERTICAL MERGERS,FORECLOSURE AND RAISING RIVALS' COSTS – EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE*

The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that, absent commitment, such foreclosure cannot occur in Nash equilibrium. The laboratory data reported in this paper provide experimental evidence in favor of the hypothesis. Markets with a vertically integrated firm are significantly less competitive than those where firms are separate. While the experimental results violate the standard equilibrium notion, they are consistent with the quantal‐response generalization of Nash equilibrium.     

Tying in Two‐Sided Markets with Multi‐Homing: Corrigendum and Comment

We identify two issues in Choi's [2010] paper on tying in two‐sided markets published in this Journal, and provide solutions to both of them. First, we point out that the equilibrium in the absence of tying requires more restrictive conditions and does not satisfy a natural equilibrium refinement criterion. We offer an alternative timing structure that validates the equilibrium derived in Choi [2010] under the conditions provided there. Second, we show that his equilibrium analysis with tying ignores a profitable deviation. We rectify this analysis under our alternative timing structure and derive the (mixed‐strategy) equilibrium with tying. We also show by means of simulations that tying is welfare‐enhancing whenever it is profitable, which is consistent with the main finding in Choi [2010].     

Tying in evolving industries,when future entry cannot be deterred

We show that the incentive to engage in exclusionary tying (of two complementary products) may arise even when tying cannot be used as a defensive strategy to protect the incumbent’s dominant position in the primary market. By engaging in tying, an incumbent firm sacrifices current profits but can exclude a more efficient rival from a complementary market by depriving it of the critical scale it needs to be successful. In turn, exclusion in the complementary market allows the incumbent to be in a favorable position when a more efficient rival will enter the primary market, and to appropriate some of the rival’s efficiency rents. The paper also shows that tying is a more profitable exclusionary strategy than pure bundling, and that exclusion is the less likely the higher the proportion of consumers who multi-home.     

TYING IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS WITH MULTI‐HOMING*

This paper analyzes the effects of tying on market competition and social welfare in two‐sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi‐homing by participating in multiple platforms to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi‐home and makes platform‐specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare‐enhancing if multi‐homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi‐homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi‐homing is prevalent.     

On Stability in Competition: Tying and Horizontal Product Differentiation

We combine Hotelling’s model of product differentiation with tie-in sales. A monopolist in one market competes with another firm in a second market. In equilibrium firms choose zero product differentiation. Due to the tying structure no firm can gain the whole market by a small price reduction. A differentiation effect due to tie-in sales leads to this equilibrium stability.      

Bundling,tying, and collusion

Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in a collusive oligopolistic market.     

The Role of Value‐Informed Pricing in Market‐Oriented Product Innovation Management*

Although the positive effect of a market orientation on new product success is widely accepted and the market orientation literature has increased its understanding of how a market orientation leads to performance, the extant literature has overlooked the role of value‐informed pricing in the relationship. Value‐informed pricing is a pricing practice in which the decision makers base the price of the new product on the customers' perceptions of the benefits that the product offers and how these benefits are traded by customers against the price (that has yet to be determined). Considering that pricing mistakes may hit hard on the profitability of product innovations, it is important to firms to have a good understanding of its role. This study develops a framework in which value‐informed pricing is integrated in the relationship between market orientation and new product performance. A distinction is made between customer and competitor orientations, and relative product advantage is also included in the conceptual model. The model is tested on data obtained from managers based on a cross sectional sample of 144 firms. The respondents were involved in a decision‐making process of the pricing of a new product. The model is tested using structural equations modeling. The results show that value‐informed pricing has a strong effect on new product performance. It also reveals that each component of a market orientation fulfills a specific role in a market‐oriented organization. Value‐informed pricing is found to have important mediating effects in the market orientation–new product performance relationship. Results show that firms with a strong customer orientation engage in value‐informed pricing and develop superior benefits to customers in an advantageous product. In turn, both value‐informed pricing and relative product advantage positively affect new product market performance. However, no significant effect of competitor orientation on value‐informed pricing is found. Combined with the finding that competitor orientation negatively affects relative product advantage, this suggests that competitor orientation may hurt new product performance when this orientation is not balanced with a strong customer orientation. The results also portray that value‐informed pricing leads to higher product advantage. Interestingly, this relation is contingent on the degree of interfunctional coordination within the firm. This suggests that the relationship between market orientation and new product performance is strongest if firms integrate value‐informed pricing in the new product development process. In this sense, a market‐oriented firm mirrors the customer value perception that makes a trade‐off between benefits and price.     

Firm‐Size Wage Gaps along the Formal‐Informal Divide: Theory and Evidence

Observationally equivalent workers are paid higher wages in larger firms. This fact is often called the “firm‐size wage gap” and is regarded as a key empirical puzzle. Using microlevel data from Turkey, we document a new stylized fact: The firm‐size wage gap is more pronounced for informal (unregistered) jobs than for formal (registered) jobs. To explain this fact, we develop a two‐stage wage‐posting game with market imperfections and segmented markets, the solution to which produces wages as a function of firm size in a well‐defined subgame‐perfect equilibrium. The model proposes two explanations. First, taxes on formal employment generate a wedge between formal and informal size wage gaps. Thus, government policy can potentially affect the magnitude of the firm‐size wage gaps. The second explanation features a market‐based framework with strategic interactions. Relative to small firms, large firms typically post higher wages for both formal and informal jobs. A high‐wage formal job attracts a larger pool of applicants than a high‐wage informal job. The larger pool of applicants for the formal job, in turn, allows the firm to somewhat lower the initial wage offer, while this second‐round effect is negligible for informal jobs. As a result, size differentials are lower in formal jobs than informal jobs. We argue that the observed patterns in the use of social connections in job search and heterogeneity in job preferences can be used to justify the validity of this second mechanism.     

Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms

We propose a model of two‐tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient. We discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market.     

JOINT VENTURE BUY‐OUTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

This paper provides a theory of joint venture buy‐outs in the presence of demand uncertainty. In an infinite horizon framework with demand uncertainty, we consider a foreign firm's decision on whether to form a joint venture or to open a fully owned subsidiary. Without the possibility of future share adjustment, the foreign firm enters the market through a joint venture if the host‐country firm helps to reduce the uncertainty significantly. Consequently, the firm enters at an earlier point in time compared to the situation in which opening a fully owned subsidiary is the only option to the firm. The possibility of future share adjustment in the joint venture further increases the incentive to speed up foreign investment. Although the possibility of share adjustment results in a joint venture buy‐out and can reduce the future profits of the host‐country firm, it may increase host‐country welfare by attracting foreign investment at an earlier point in time. We show the implications of learning in the joint venture.     

Multimarket Contact and Rivalry over Knowledge‐based Resources

Research summary: Research shows that multimarket contact (MMC ) reduces rivalry involving downstream activities. Yet, studies showing that MMC can increase the threat of imitation suggest a need to better understand how MMC affects upstream rivalry over knowledge‐based resources. In this study, we argue that MMC increases rivalry over knowledge‐based resources since the deterrent threat of retaliation that typically leads to mutual forbearance in downstream activities will not be sufficient to restrain firms from protecting their knowledge from imitation in upstream activities. In support of these arguments we find that MMC increases the likelihood that a firm initiates patent litigation against a rival. This study suggests the relationship between MMC and rivalry may depend on the competitive domain and the type of resources over which firms are competing . Managerial Summary: How does market overlap or MMC affect rivalry between two competitors? Prior studies have largely found that an increase in market overlap decreases rivalry in less knowledge‐intensive context because of the deterrent threat of retaliation. However, in this paper, we argue that an increase in market overlap may not reduce rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive context because of heterogeneity in capabilities to protect knowledge. We find that a firm is more likely to initiate patent litigation against a rival as market overlap increases. Our findings suggest that the incentive to protect value across multiple product markets may surpass the motivation to cooperate with rivals and that managers should have a more nuanced view of how market overlap with competitors affects rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive contexts . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

企业并购的信号博弈分析

井购是市场经济体制下的一种产权交易活动，是并购双方在追求各自利益最大化前提下所进行的信号博弈过程。由于企业井购双方信息不对称性所导致的逆向选择，企业并购市场会出现分离均衡、混同均衡和准分离均衡三种状态，其中只有分离均衡是最理想和最有效率的均衡。文章建立了目标企业与并购企业之间的信号传递博弈模型，提出克服并购双方信息的不对称性和对目标企业进行合理估价是实现分离均衡的最有效方法。     

Survey measures of first‐ and second‐order competences

Research summary : This study tests and validates survey measures of first‐ and second‐order competences in order to foster cumulative empirical research and theoretical refinement in the area of dynamic capabilities. Data from two informants and two time periods for a sample of publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms are used to examine the convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity, and the reliability of scales to measure various levels and types of competences. Findings suggest that customer competence, technological competence, marketing competence, and R&D competence are related but distinct dimensions, evidencing strong validity and reliability. Qualifying this empirical support, it was found that items regarding manufacturing operations and facilities seemed to measure aspects unrelated to the focal competences, and that marketing competence had no relation to future market‐resource accumulation. Managerial summary : This study enhances understanding and measurement of dynamic capabilities, in particular, marketing and R&D second‐order competences. Marketing and R&D second‐order competences are a firm's ability to build new competences to serve new markets or use new technologies, respectively. The ability of a firm to add new market‐related resources (such as brands and distribution channels) and technological resources (such as patents and engineering skills) helps it cope with environmental change and grow in new directions. For firms in stable environments, being able to serve new markets and use new technologies provide opportunities for growth. For firms in turbulent environments, these skills are a matter of survival. Using data collected from publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms, this study tests and validates questions that can be asked in questionnaires presented to management. It finds that even if a firm has strong skills in serving current customers and great technology, it may not be able to go after new markets or technologies. The survey questions tested here could be used not only by other researchers, but also by practitioners. Managers, management consultants, and industry association advisors could use the scales as diagnostic instruments or to perform benchmarking. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CREDIBLE RETALIATORY ENTRY AND STRATEGIC TOE‐HOLDS*

The anticipated profits from entry by an established firm into a new market will depend on how incumbents in that market are expected to respond. One possibility, suggested by cases and the literature, is that an incumbent may respond with ‘retaliatory entry’ into the first entrant's ‘home’ market. The model presented here describes conditions under which this can be a credible threat that deters the first entry. When the conditions are such that it is not credible, the paper shows how firms can provide credibility through the establishment of toe‐hold investments in other markets.     

Comparing the resource‐based and market‐based views of the firm: empirical evidence from Czech privatization

The recent privatization of state‐owned enterprises in the Czech Republic forms a natural experiment to test and compare the predictive ability of the resource‐based view (RBV) against the market‐based view (MBV) under conditions of great change. It has been recognized in the literature that, under normal stable circumstances, a firm's internal resources and its external market power are fundamentally intertwined. Consequently, it is difficult to identify the relative roles of these two theories in explaining expected firm performance and firm value. However, when market conditions are in a state of flux, as in the case of the Czech Republic in 1992, we expect the firm's resources to be the primary determinants of firm value. In order to test this notion, an RBV model was developed, based on a set of firm features reflecting the rare and valuable ability to compete in the emerging capitalistic economy (as opposed to the currently prevailing bureaucratically planned economy). A contrasting MBV model was also developed, highlighting the role of market power in this regard. These models were assessed in a cross‐sectional sample of 988 Czech firms undergoing privatization. The empirical findings show that the RBV‐driven variables are remarkably better at explaining share values of Czech firms in the period of privatization than MBV‐driven variables. These results underscore the role of firm resources as a primary determinant of firm value in rapidly changing environments. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific human capital investments as a signal of general value: Revisiting assumptions about human capital and how it is managed

Research summary : Prior scholarship has assumed that firm‐specific and general human capital can be analyzed separately. This article argues that, in some settings, this is not the case because prior firm‐specific human capital investments can be a market signal of an individual's willingness and ability to make such investments in the future. As such, the willingness and ability to make firm‐specific investments is a type of general human capital that links firm‐specific and general human capital in important ways. The article develops theory about these investments, market signals, and value appropriation. Then, the article examines implications for human resource management and several important questions in the field of strategic management, including theories of the firm and microfoundations of competitive advantage. Managerial summary : While managers don't often use the terms firm‐specific and general skills, they certainly recognize that investments employees make in their skill sets are more or less relevant to a specific firm. For instance, investing in specific relationships within a firm or learning a firm's proprietary software would be considered firm‐specific investments. While such skills may seem relevant only to the particular firm in which they were invested, these investments may also send valuable signals to competing firms that such employees are willing and able to make similar investments elsewhere. Hence, managers should be interested in determining if a potential hire has made prior firm‐specific investments to help them know whether that person might be likely to make such investments in his or her future place of employment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Experimenting to Learn about Demand in Duopoly with Forward‐Looking Consumers

Using a two‐period model, I show that competition between two symmetric duopolists trying to learn about unknown features of demand results in an informationally suboptimal process. Because a firm’s marginal return to price experimentation equals zero if the rival’s price is matched in the first period, myopic symmetric pricing arises in equilibrium even though a firm’s expected second‐period profit attains a local minimum. Furthermore, forward‐looking consumers suffer from ratcheting because their first‐period purchase decisions partly reveal their preferences, which exacerbates the informational suboptimality of the firms’ experimentation process without affecting their pricing. The role of firm asymmetries is also analyzed.     

Cross‐Border Mergers and Market Segmentation

This paper shows that cross‐border mergers are more likely to occur in industries which serve multiple segmented markets rather than a single integrated market, given that cost functions are strictly convex. The product price rises in the market where an acquisition is made but falls in the other, decreasing the acquisition price of other firms (in contrast to the results in the existing merger literature on integrated markets). Although the sum of consumer surplus across the countries may rise in response to a given acquisition, one of the countries gains at the expense of the other.     

Efficient versus Responsive Supply Chain Choice: An Empirical Examination of Influential Factors

Contemporary strategies in operations management suggest that successful firms align supply chain assets with product demand characteristics in order to exploit the profit potential of product lines fully. However, observation suggests that supply chain assets often are longer lived than product line decisions. This suggests that alignment between supply chain assets and demand characteristics is most likely to occur at the time of initial market entry. This article examines the association between product demand characteristics and the initial investment in a supply chain at the time of market entry. We characterize supply chains as responsive or efficient. A responsive supply chain is distinguished by short production lead‐times, low set‐up costs, and small batch sizes that allow the responsive firm to adapt quickly to market demand, but often at a higher unit cost. An efficient supply chain is distinguished by longer production lead‐times, high set‐up costs, and larger batch sizes that allow the efficient firm to produce at a low unit cost, but often at the expense of market responsiveness. We hypothesize that a firm's choice of responsive supply chain will be associated with lower industry growth rates, higher contribution margins, higher product variety, and higher demand or technological uncertainty. We further hypothesize that interactions among these variables either can reinforce or can temper the main effects. We report that lower industry growth rates are associated with responsive market entry, but this effect is offset if growth occurs during periods of high variety and high demand uncertainty. We report that higher contribution margins are associated with responsive market entry and that this effect is more pronounced when occurring with periods of high variety. Finally, we report that responsive market entry also is correlated positively with higher technological demand uncertainty. These results are found using data from the North American mountain bike industry.     

VERTICAL MERGERS AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION*

This paper presents an equilibrium theory of vertical mergers that incorporates strategic behaviors in the Hotelling‐type location model. This enables one to consider the relationship between downstream firms' strategies for product differentiation and vertical integration. I show that vertical integration enhances the degree of product differentiation of the integrated firm. Under some conditions, partial integration arises in equilibrium, which may increase the profit of the nonintegrated downstream firm. The paper also discusses the welfare implications of vertical integration.