PRODUCT QUALITY AND MARKET SIZE*

Do larger markets offer better products? The question has implications for theories of cities and theories of market organization. We document that in the restaurant industry, where quality is produced largely with variable costs, the range of qualities on offer increases in market size. In daily newspapers, where quality is produced with fixed costs, the average quality of products increases with market size, but the market does not offer much additional variety as it grows large. These results are consistent with IO theories of endogenous product quality and with theories that emphasize the consumption advantages of cities.     

PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND AGENCY COSTS*

We model the effects of competition on managerial efficiency and isolate the agency effect of competition, present only in firms subject to agency costs, from the direct pressure effect of competition, which is present in all firms. Using a unique set of Canadian data that surveys both firms and their employees, we then evaluate the empirical significance of these two effects. We find that competition has a significant direct pressure effect as well as a significant agency effect. Both effects increase the importance firms place on quality improvements and cost reductions as well as on contractual incentives and employee effort.     

TYING IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS WITH MULTI‐HOMING*

This paper analyzes the effects of tying on market competition and social welfare in two‐sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi‐homing by participating in multiple platforms to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi‐home and makes platform‐specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare‐enhancing if multi‐homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi‐homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi‐homing is prevalent.     

PRODUCT VARIETY AND COMPETITION IN THE RETAIL MARKET FOR EYEGLASSES*

I use original data on eyewear retailers in a cross‐section of U.S. markets to study how firms' product range choices vary with the degree of local competition. Market level regressions show average per firm variety declining in the number of rivals. In regressions at the firm level, taking account of spatial differentiation within each market, a non‐monotonic relationship between product ranges and competition is apparent. As the number of nearby rivals increases, per firm variety may first rise before eventually declining. Explanations for this pattern are offered, in terms of a tradeoff between business stealing and clustering effects.     

LEARNING‐BY‐DOING AND MARKET STRUCTURE*

Applying the Olley‐Pakes estimation technique to an augmented production function, we estimate rates of learning‐by‐doing in over 250 SIC4 industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector. We then examine the link between learning and producer concentration using Sutton's bounds approach. We find that the lower bound of concentration is higher in high‐learning industries, which suggests that learning‐by‐doing has characteristics of an endogenous sunk cost.     

TYING,COMPATIBILITY AND PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE*

According to the hypothesis of planned obsolescence, a durable goods monopolist without commitment power has an excessive incentive to introduce new products that make old units obsolete, and this reduces its overall profitability. In this paper, I reconsider the above hypothesis by examining the role of competition in a monopolist's upgrade decision. I find that, when a system add‐on is competitively supplied, a monopolist chooses to tie the add‐on to a new system that is only backward compatible, even if a commitment of not introducing the new system is available and socially optimal. Tying facilitates a price squeeze.     

POST‐MERGER PRODUCT REPOSITIONING*

This paper analyzes the effects of mergers between firms competing by simultaneously choosing price and location. Products combined by a merger are repositioned away from each other to reduce cannibalization, and non‐merging substitutes are, in response, repositioned between the merged products. This repositioning greatly reduces the merged firm's incentive to raise prices and thus substantially mitigates the anticompetitive effects of the merger. Computation of, and selection among, equilibria is done with a novel technique known as the stochastic response dynamic, which does not require the computation of first‐order conditions.     

QUANTIFYING MARKET POWER IN THE GERMAN WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET USING A DYNAMIC MULTI‐REGIONAL DISPATCH MODEL*

This paper quantifies the degree of market power in the German wholesale electricity market. A dispatch model simulates competitive marginal costs. In addition to common input factors like plant capacities, fuel prices and load structures, the model also incorporates international power exchange and dynamic effects like start‐up costs and hydro storage plant dispatch. The simulated prices are subsequently used as a benchmark for observed electricity prices. The analysis reveals significant market power in the German electricity market, mainly exhibited during peak periods. Producer surplus is also increased significantly due to strategic behavior.     

PRICES AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURE IN OFFICE SUPPLY SUPERSTORES*

We consider the relationship between prices and market structure for office supply superstores in the U.S. which was central to the Federal Trade Commission's opposition to the merger of Staples and Office Depot. Due to potential biases in a standard regression, we employ a two‐stage approach in which a model of endogenous market structure provides correction terms for a second stage price regression. Using a cross‐section of data on market structures and Staples' prices, we find that excluding the correction term substantially distorts the importance of competitors as the two‐stage model yields stronger negative relationships between prices and market structure variables.     

BESTSELLER LISTS AND PRODUCT VARIETY*

This paper uses detailed weekly data on sales of hardcover fiction books to evaluate the impact of the New York Times bestseller list on sales and product variety. In order to circumvent the obvious problem of simultaneity of sales and bestseller status, the analysis exploits time lags and accidental omissions in the construction of the list. The empirical results indicate that appearing on the list leads to a modest increase in sales for the average book, and that the effect is more dramatic for bestsellers by debut authors. The paper discusses how the additional concentration of demand on top‐selling books could lead to a reduction in the privately optimal number of books to publish. However, the data suggest the opposite is true: the market expansion effect of bestseller lists appears to dominate any business stealing from non‐bestselling titles.     

MARKET COMPETITION,R&D AND FIRM PROFITS IN ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY*

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low‐cost firms compete against less efficient high‐cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high‐cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low‐cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high‐cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low‐cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high‐cost firms. An implication of this result is far‐reaching, as it gives low‐cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high‐cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know‐how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century.     

INEFFICIENCIES AND MARKET POWER IN FINANCIAL ARBITRAGE: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY MARKETS*

For two years prior to the collapse of California's restructured electricity market, power traded in both a forward and a spot market for delivery at the same times and locations. Nonetheless, prices in the two markets often differed in significant and predictable ways. This apparent inefficiency persisted, we argue, because most firms believed that trading on inter‐market price differences would yield regulatory penalties. For the few firms that did make such trades, it was not profit‐maximizing to eliminate the price differences entirely. Skyrocketing prices in 2000 changed the major buyers' (utilities') incentives and exacerbated the price differentials between the markets.     

ASYMMETRIC DYNAMIC PRICING IN A LOCAL GASOLINE RETAIL MARKET*

Asymmetric‐price adjustment is a common phenomenon in many markets around the world, particularly in retail gasoline markets. This paper studies the existence of this phenomenon in the retail gasoline market in the city of Santiago, Chile, using a data set of weekly gas station prices that covers a period of almost four years. We found that prices adjust asymmetrically, and the asymmetry is different for branded gas stations and unbranded stations. In addition, we found that the asymmetry for high‐margin stations is statistically equivalent to that for low‐margin stations. This evidence is suggestive of collusion as a rationale for the asymmetric pricing policy observed.     

A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON INDUSTRY R&D AND MARKET STRUCTURE*

This paper aims to shed some new insights on the long‐debated and both extensively and intensively explored relationship between market concentration and industry R&D intensity. In order to do so, this study develops, from a classic Dorfman‐Steiner [1954] model of firm R&D, a model of industry R&D, where consumer preference over quality and price, R&D technology, and the joint distribution of firm‐specific technological competence and market share jointly determine the level of industry R&D intensity. The joint distribution term, which reflects both the underlying distribution of firms‐specific technological competence and the strength of its link with market share, suggests that the concentration‐R&D relationship differs depending on the strength of the link or simply the appropriability of R&D in terms of market share: A positive relationship is predicted for low‐appropriability industries, where market concentration supplements low R&D appropriability, while a negative or an inverted U‐shaped relationship for high‐appropriability industries. An empirical analysis of data, disaggregated at the five‐digit SIC level, on R&D and market concentration of Korean manufacturing industries provides supportive evidence for the predictions.     

PAYING FOR LOYALTY: PRODUCT BUNDLING IN OLIGOPOLY*

In recent times, pairs of retailers such as supermarket and retail gasoline chains have offered bundled discounts to customers who buy their respective product brands. These discounts are a fixed amount off the headline prices that allied brands continue to set independently. We show that a pair of firms can profit from offering a bundled discount to the detriment of other firms and consumers whose preferences are farther removed from the bundled brands. Indeed, when both pairs of firms negotiate bundling arrangements, there are no beneficiaries and consumers simply find themselves consuming a sub‐optimal brand mix.     

THE ROLE OF DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY IN LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATION ENTRY AND MARKET EVOLUTION: 1999–2002*

We examine the role of differentiation among competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in nearly 1,200 U.S. cities in 1999 and 2002, before and after a valuation crash affecting communications firms. We test and reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous competitors. We also find strong evidence that differentiated CLECs account for both potential market demand and the business strategies of competitors when making their entry decisions. Finally, product heterogeneity in markets in 1999 helps predict how the structure of markets evolved through 2002. We conclude that the policy debate for local telecommunications regulation should account for differentiated behavior.