Capital Constraints,Asymmetric Information,and Internal Capital Markets in Banking: New Evidence

A growing literature investigates the role of internal capital markets in mitigating financial constraints faced by the subsidiaries of a conglomerate. Most studies have relied on indirect tests based on correlations between the cash flows and the investment of the subsidiaries. In contrast, we avoid the widespread criticisms of such specifications by providing direct tests that focus on the mechanisms through which internal reallocations of funds occur. We find that internal capital markets are used by multibank holding companies to mitigate capital constraints faced by individual bank subsidiaries. In addition, we show that internal capital management within a multibank holding company involves not only the movement of capital to those subsidiaries with a relatively greater need for capital but also the movement of assets (loans) from less well capitalized to better capitalized subsidiaries by means of loan sales and purchases among the subsidiaries. Furthermore, net loan sales are used to allow efficiency‐enhancing specialization among bank subsidiaries, insofar as those subsidiaries with the best loan origination opportunities are able to focus on loan originations even if they do not have sufficient capital to hold the loans. Our evidence is consistent with banks affiliated with holding companies more actively participating in loan sales and purchases because, by using their internal secondary loan market, they are able to avoid the “lemons” problem faced by stand‐alone banks.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.     

Liquidity Provision,Bank Capital,and the Macroeconomy

New bank equity must come from somewhere. In general equilibrium, raising bank capital requirements means either that banks produce less short‐term debt (as debt holders must become shareholders), or short‐term debt is not reduced and the banking system acquires nonbank equity (as the shareholders in nonbanks become shareholders in banks). The welfare effects involve a trade‐off because bank debt is special as it is used for transactions purposes, but more bank capital can reduce the chance of bank failure (producing welfare losses).     

Efficiency and Risk in Latin American Banking: Explaining Resilience

Using an unbalanced panel of 272 commercial banks, we estimate cost and revenue efficiency scores for fifteen Latin American and Caribbean countries over the period 2001-8. Using Granger causality techniques, we find evidence that in the face of increased risk and lowered capital, banks have tended to improve cost efficiency. The results also indicate that cost efficiency is negatively related with revenue efficiency, both dynamically and across countries. Market concentration is related to greater revenue efficiency. In the absence of developed capital markets, competitive forces and strengthened regulation seem to be forcing cost-efficiency improvements. Banks with market power, however, seem to be able to pass on to customers the cost of raising capital buffers and provisioning for risk.     

Credit Availability and the Collapse of the Banking Sector in the 1930s

This paper examines the mechanism through which banking sector distress affects the availability of credit using the experience of the United States during the Great Depression. We utilize previously neglected data from a 1934 survey conducted by the Federal Reserve System of both banks and Chambers of Commerce regarding the availability of credit, and examine which aspects of the banking system collapse affected credit availability as indicated by the survey. We find that bank failures had the most dominant impact, but there is also some evidence for the importance of funding constraints from deposit outflows and of protracted bank liquidation.     

On the Contagion Effect in the US Banking Sector

By using the spatial econometrics methodology, this paper investigates the contagion of the risk taking by banks in the US banking sector during 2001 to 2012. In addition, the contagion signals up to the Subprime crisis in 2008 are analyzed and different channels of contagion are studied in order to identify fragile groups of banks. Our analysis reveals that there is no significant contagion transmitted to the whole banking system. However, we observe that the bank contagion is significantly spread locally and for the group of banks that share similar characteristics related to size and bank regulations.     

Competition and Concentration in the New European Banking Landscape

This paper measures the degree of concentration and competition in the enlarged European Union (EU) banking environment over the period 1998–2002. In the empirical part we opt for a methodology as proposed by Panzar and Rosse based on a non‐structural estimation of market competition. Our results suggest that European banks were operating under conditions of monopolistic competition and that bank interest revenues in the 10 new EU member states was earned under conditions of higher competition than those that existed in the old EU banking countries. The opposite result was observed for total operating revenues. Smaller banks earn interest income in a less competitive environment than larger banks, while the opposite is observed for total revenues.     

Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area

This paper studies the role of credit supply factors in business cycle fluctuations using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial frictions enriched with an imperfectly competitive banking sector. Banks issue collateralized loans to both households and firms, obtain funding via deposits, and accumulate capital out of retained earnings. Loan margins depend on the banks' capital‐to‐assets ratio and on the degree of interest rate stickiness. Balance‐sheet constraints establish a link between the business cycle, which affects bank profits and thus capital, and the supply and cost of loans. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using data for the euro area. The analysis delivers the following results. First, the banking sector and, in particular, sticky rates attenuate the effects of monetary policy shocks, while financial intermediation increases the propagation of supply shocks. Second, shocks originating in the banking sector explain the largest share of the contraction of economic activity in 2008, while macroeconomic shocks played a limited role. Third, an unexpected destruction of bank capital may have substantial effects on the economy.     

Efficiency and Stock Performance in European Banking

Abstract:   Recent competitive pressures have progressively driven banks to strategically focus on generating returns to shareholders. Therefore, the investigation of the determinants of bank performance and their relationship with share prices has become increasingly important. This paper extends the literature on market‐based accounting to examine the relationship between stock prices and efficiency. Specifically, it investigates if changes in stock performance can be explained by changes in operating efficiency, derived by parametric and non‐parametric methods. Results seem to suggest that changes in efficiency are reflected in changes in stock prices and that stocks of cost efficient banks tend to outperform their inefficient counterparts.     

Liquidity Risk,Bank Networks,and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Reducing systemic liquidity risk related to seasonal loan demand was one reason for founding the Federal Reserve System. Nevertheless, less than 8% of state‐chartered banks joined the Fed in its first decade. Banks facing high liquidity risk from seasonal loan demand were more likely to join the Fed in its first decade. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that banks could obtain some indirect access to the discount window through interbank transfers. Some banks apparently joined the Fed to pass through discount window liquidity to other banks via the interbank network.  Joining the Fed increased member banks’ lending.     

Bank Risk Taking at the Onset of the Current Banking Crisis

We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period leading to the current banking crisis. Using a sample of large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we find that BHCs with greater managerial control, achieved through various corporate governance mechanisms, take less risk. BHCs that pay CEOs high base salaries also take less risk, while BHCs that grant CEOs more in stock options or that pay CEOs higher bonuses take more risk. The evidence is generally consistent with BHC managers exhibiting greater risk aversion than outside shareholders, but with several factors affecting managers’ risk‐taking incentives.     

Effect of Foreign Shareholdings and Originating Countries on Banking Sector Efficiency

We analyze how foreign shareholdings affect the ASEAN-5’s banking sector efficiency using stochastic frontier analysis. Unlike most extant studies, which compare the performance of local and foreign banks, we assess how foreign shareholdings affect bank efficiencies. We also apply resource-based theory to analyze whether the foreign shareholdings’ countries of origin matter. We find that foreign shareholders from more developed countries enhance the bank’s resource base. Those from Asia have the greatest effect, perhaps because of their proximity and familiarity. Moreover, excessive regulation stifles the host countries’ profit efficiency potential. Finally, foreign shareholding concentration potentially enhances efficiencies by reducing agency costs.     

信贷资本配置效率与产权结构——基于中国商业银行的实证分析

商业银行所有权安排是影响信贷资本配置质量的基本变量.由于理论背景不同,对银行产权与信贷配置效率的关系出现了截然相反的两种观点.在理论分析信贷配置的所有权效应基础上,本文选取中国16家资产规模最大的商业银行的数据,对中国1990年代以来国有产权的信贷配置效率进行实证分析,结果表明,在国有银行制度下,中国的信贷资本具有正的但较低的配置效率,银行国有产权比重过高使信贷配置效率未能达到最佳状态.     

Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements

We characterize welfare maximizing capital requirement policies in a quantitative macrobanking model with household, firm, and bank defaults calibrated to Euro Area data. We optimize on the level of the capital requirements applied to each loan class and their sensitivity to changes in default risk. We find that getting the level right (so that bank failure risk remains contained) is of foremost importance, while the optimal sensitivity to default risk is positive but typically smaller than under Basel internal ratings based (IRB) formulas. Starting from low levels, savers and borrowers benefit from higher capital requirements. At higher levels, only savers prefer tighter requirements.     

Monetary Policy,Bank Lending,and the Risk‐Pricing Channel

This paper identifies a monetary policy channel through the risk pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit (jumbo CDs). Adverse policy shocks increase debt holder perceptions of bank default, increasing the risk premia for some banks, thereby decreasing their external funding of loans. The results show that contractionary policy increases the sensitivity of jumbo‐CD spreads to leverage and asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks. The results also show a distributional and aggregate effect on banking system jumbo CDs and total loans, producing a risk‐pricing (or market discipline) channel. This channel has implications for monetary and regulatory policies, and financial stability.     

Capital Regulation with Two Banking Sectors: Cyclicality and Implementation

We present a capital regulation policy in a model in which banks can choose to be unregulated, by operating in the shadow banking sector, when the cost of being regulated (restriction on portfolio risk) exceeds the benefit (cheaper funding/insurance). We show that the welfare maximizing capital requirement policy can be procyclical: lower requirement during booms and higher requirement during recessions. Our policy specifies the level of capital requirement as a function of the observed relative size of the unregulated and regulated banking sectors. This specification achieves the optimal aggregate risk exposure by obtaining the right mix of the two sectors.     

资本约束、风险管理与商业银行成长

基于资本必须覆盖风险命题的要求,银行的风险管理能力决定了银行的资本规模和资本的配置,银行资本管理实质上等价于风险管理,资本约束实质上就是风险约束。资本软约束是制约中国商业银行成长的主要障碍之一,但仅仅致力于资本充足率问题的解决并不能保证我国商业银行的可持续成长,风险约束是制约我国商业银行成长的瓶颈。只有从制度、技术和经营战略等方面入手,不断提高风险管理能力,建立以资本约束为核心的业务增长模式和资源配置方式,尽快实现成长模式由资金约束到资本约束的转变,中国商业银行才能在效益、质量和规模协调发展的基础上实现持续成长。     

资本约束、风险管理与商业银行成长

基于资本必须覆盖风险命题的要求，银行的风险管理能力决定了银行的资本规模和资本的配置，银行资本管理实质上等价于风险管理，资本约束实质上就是风险约束。资本软约束是制约中国商业银行成长的主要障碍之一，但仅仅致力于资本充足率问题的解决并不能保证我国商业银行的可持续成长，风险约束是制约我国商业银行成长的瓶颈。只有从制度、技术和经营战略等方面入手，不断提高风险管理能力，建立以资本约束为核心的业务增长模式和资源配置方式，尽快实现成长模式由资金约束到资本约束的转变，中国商业银行才能在效益、质量和规模协调发展的基础上实现持续成长。     

Monetary Policy and Banking Structure

In this paper, I examine the differences in optimal monetary policy in various banking systems. In particular, I compare two monetary economies: one with a competitive banking system and the other with a monopolistic one. In addition, the optimality of the discount window policy is considered. It is shown that the Friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy in a monopolistic banking economy, and the zero‐inflation policy is optimal in a competitive banking economy under appropriate parameters. In addition, the combination of the Friedman rule and the discount window policy can achieve efficient allocation in both banking systems.     

Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.