Stock Prices and the Supply of Information

We develop a model in which the dependence of the brokerage commission rate on share price provides an incentive for brokers to produce research reports on firms with low share prices. Stock splits therefore affect the attention paid to a firm by investment analysts. Managers with favorable private information about their firms have an incentive to split their firm's shares in order to reveal the information to investors. We find empirical evidence that is consistent with the major new prediction of the model, that the number of analysts following a firm is inversely related to its share price.     

Initiation of brokers’ recommendations,market predictors and stock returns

We study more than 5000 broker recommendations on companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, focusing in particular on ‘initiating recommendations’. We find that returns on initiating recommendations are significantly different from zero in the 6 months following the release of the recommendation. We also find that ‘strong buy’ and ‘buy’ recommendations provide better predictions than those formed from market-based variables cited in the literature. In contrast to the short event window studies in the US, there is no significant difference between returns on initiating and continuing recommendations. Mean returns on all categories of recommendations on technology-related companies are negative, reflecting the technology bubble in the period of our study. Finally, variables, such as broker prestige and membership of the Australian All Ordinaries Index have no explanatory power.     

How broker ability affects institutional trading costs

The present paper shows that broker research and trade execution ability has a significant impact on the cost of institutional trading. The results reveal that there is significant variation in the ability of brokers to control execution costs. Trades executed by brokers with stronger research ability exhibit a higher permanent price impact, whereas those executed by brokers with better execution ability exhibit a lower temporary price impact. Brokers are also found to specialize on an industry level that gives rise to variation in ability within a brokerage house.     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

The Relationship Among Market-Making Revenue, Payment for Order Flow, and Trading Costs for Market Orders

We study the division of market-making revenue among dealer, broker, and trader. When Knight Securities, a major Nasdaq dealer, interacts with market orders in actively traded stocks during the fourth quarter of 1996, we estimate that its revenue is $0.057 per share. Knight pays brokers at least $0.025 per share (44% of revenue) for orders. To examine whether brokers appear to share these payments with traders, we compare net trading costs (trade price net of commissions) for traders using brokers routing Knight orders with estimated net trading costs for traders using the only discount broker we can determine did not directly receive market-making revenue. We find that the net trading cost of the broker refusing order-flow payments does not dominate the net trading cost of all brokers selling order flow to Knight. This finding suggests that order-flow payments do not unambiguously harm traders and challenges the conclusions of extant studies using only trade prices to assess market quality.     

Principal–Agent Conflict and Broker Effort Near Listing Contract Expiration: The Case of Residential Properties

In the real estate market the seller/agent relationship changes over the course of the listing contract. As the contract expiration nears, brokers may increase efforts generating more potential buyers and, perhaps, a higher offered price. Brokers may also persuade the seller to reduce the reservation price. These two aspects have different implications for the selling price of the property. Employing a sample of 24,100 properties sold in Clark County, Nevada, we investigate the relationship between the selling price and the time-to-expiration of the listing contract. We find that prices are lower if the property is sold near the expiration of the listing contract, indicating that the price-reduction effect dominates the broker-effort effect.

RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES OF NON-LIFE REINSURANCE MARKETING METHODS

Abstract: This paper extends the study of the relative cost efficiency of insurance delivery systems from the primary market to the market for non-life reinsurance services. As in the primary market for insurance services there are two predominant methods of marketing reinsurance services: reinsurers who rely on employees, termed direct writers, and those who rely on brokers.
An extensive literature relating to the primary market for non-life insurance consistently indicates that independent agency insurers have a cost disadvantage relative to exclusive agency insurers. This literature also suggests that independent agency insurers may supply superior service but a continuing erosion of the market share of independent agency insurers suggests that the perceived service differential is not valued sufficiently to offset the perceived cost differential.
The authors find evidence that, cet. par., broker supplied reinsurers operate with lower costs than direct reinsurers but we find less convincing evidence of a service differential favoring direct reinsurers. More significantly, we observe that the largest component of the traditional measure of the reinsurer's cost is the commission paid back to the primary insurer: the seemingly lower cost brokers provide a higher net cost product. Yet brokers thrive in the marketplace suggesting the existence of a product differentiated by service or quality. With the important caveat that measures of service are imperfect and data is limited, we find no evidence of a service differential.     

The effect of affiliated analysts on stock recommendations: Evidence from share pledges in China

We use the share pledge context in China to examine how affiliated analysts whose securities companies are pledgees of share pledge firms issue stock recommendations on these listed firms. We find that their recommendations are more optimistic than those of non-affiliated analysts, and they are more likely to issue Buy and Add recommendations, suggesting that they issue optimistic rating reports for share pledge firms due to their conflicts of interest. We also find a dynamic adjustment in the stock recommendation behavior of these analysts, and their probability after issuing optimistic stock recommendations is significantly reduced before and after the years that the affiliation relationship between them and share pledge firms both began and ended. These affiliated analysts continue to issue optimistic stock recommendations after visiting the share pledge firms if they work in the same location as the firms, or if they are star analysts among New Fortune’s “top five analysts,” and when the information transparency of the share pledge firms is higher. In addition, the optimistic stock recommendation behavior of affiliated analysts is more significant in our sample of firms with high share pledge ratios and downward stock price pressure. The earnings forecast quality of affiliated analysts is also found to be lower, and they are less inclined to downgrade stock recommendations for these share pledge firms. Buy recommendations issued by both non-affiliated and affiliated analysts can bring cumulative excess returns in the short event window, but those issued by affiliated analysts are significantly negative in the long-term event window, and significantly lower than those issued by non-affiliated analysts. Overall, our study shows that affiliated analysts issue optimistic rating reports on share pledge firms due to conflicts of interest, which leads to decision-making bias in investors and thus decreases the stock price crash risk of the firms. Our findings further reveal the economic consequences of share pledging and extend our understanding of the behavior of analysts in a conflict of interest situation from the share pledge perspective.     

Do brokerage houses add value? The market impact of UK sell-side analyst recommendation changes

This paper reports on the first full study investigating the economic role of sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations in the UK market. We also explore whether UK analysts are, in practice, influenced by the same biases as that reported for their US counterparts.We find that share prices are significantly influenced by analysts’ recommendation changes, not only at the time of the recommendation change but also in subsequent months. The price reaction to new sell recommendations is greater than the price reaction to new buy recommendations and exhibits post-recommendation drift which is consistent with initial underreaction to bad news. Returns generated are influenced, cross-sectionally, by factors associated with a firm's information environment and analyst incentives such as size, same-sign earnings forecast revisions and recommendation changes that skip a rank.We find that UK analysts’ investment recommendations in practice appear less susceptible to potential conflicts of interest than their US counterparts. The ratio of new sell to buy recommendations is higher in the UK and a greater proportion of such recommendations are accompanied by same-sign earnings forecast revisions than their equivalents in the US. We find brokerage house investment banking relationships do not appear to impact (adversely) on abnormal returns.     

Unchecked intermediaries: Price manipulation in an emerging stock market

How costly is the poor governance of market intermediaries? Using unique trade level data from the stock market in Pakistan, we find that when brokers trade on their own behalf, they earn annual rates of return that are 50-90 percentage points higher than those earned by outside investors. Neither market timing nor liquidity provision by brokers can explain this profitability differential. Instead we find compelling evidence for a specific trade-based “pump and dump” price manipulation scheme: When prices are low, colluding brokers trade amongst themselves to artificially raise prices and attract positive-feedback traders. Once prices have risen, the former exit leaving the latter to suffer the ensuing price fall. Conservative estimates suggest these manipulation rents can account for almost a half of total broker earnings. These large rents may explain why market reforms are hard to implement and emerging equity markets often remain marginal with few outsiders investing and little capital raised.     

Applying hedging strategies to estimate model risk and provision calculation

We present an empirical study of the intertwined behaviour of members in a financial market. Exploiting a database where the broker that initiates an order book event can be identified, we decompose the correlation and response functions into contributions coming from different market participants and study how their behaviour is interconnected. We find evidence for the following. (1) Brokers are very heterogeneous in liquidity provision—some appear to be primarily liquidity providers while others are primarily liquidity takers. (2) The behaviour of brokers is strongly conditioned on the actions of other brokers. In contrast, brokers are only weakly influenced by the impact of their own previous orders. (3) The total impact of market orders is the result of a subtle compensation between the same broker pushing the price in one direction and the liquidity provision of other brokers pushing it in the opposite direction. These results enforce the picture of market dynamics being the result of the competition between heterogeneous participants, interacting to form a complex market ecology.     

Broker recommendations and Australian small‐cap equity fund management

This study examines whether the abnormal performance of active Australian small‐cap equity fund managers is associated with broker recommendations. Our evidence supports the investment value of broker recommendations, showing significant abnormal returns (ARs) both pre‐ and post‐broker recommendations. We find that when a factor‐mimicking portfolio based on broker recommendations is added to a Carhart (1997) model, annual alphas are reduced by 48 basis points. Using transaction‐level data, buy trades following broker recommendations earn significant cumulative ARs of 1.56 per cent after 60 days. Overall, we find that broker recommendations account for an economically significant component of alphas.     

The effects of regulation on industry structure and trade generation in the US securities industry

This study investigates the effects of Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement on market share within the US securities industry as well as the determinants of market share during 1996–2004. We find that these regulations did not cause top brokers to lose market share in spite of their reduction of information asymmetries existing within the brokerage industry. They did, however, significantly reduce the quarterly variability in market share changes. We find that Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement reduce the importance of an all-star analyst, issuer affiliation, and analyst optimism for gaining brokerage market share. We further discover that the Global Research Analyst Settlement increases the importance of coverage as a market share determinant while reducing the value of analyst experience for non-top brokers. We find that our results remain robust even when we limit our analysis to a set of pure brokerage firms.     

Brokers and Order Flow Leakage: Evidence from Fire Sales

Using trade‐level data, we study whether brokers play a role in spreading order flow information in the stock market. We focus on large portfolio liquidations that result in temporary price drops, and identify the brokers who intermediate these trades. These brokers’ clients are more likely to predate on the liquidating funds than to provide liquidity. Predation leads to profits of about 25 basis points over 10 days and increases the liquidation costs of the distressed fund by 40%. This evidence suggests a role of information leakage in exacerbating fire sales.     

Dividend Policy and Corporate Performance

Substantial research has been conducted to determine the signal that results from dividend initiations and omissions. Our study extends from previous research by measuring the long-term valuation effects following dividend initiations and omissions. We find that firms initiating dividends experience favorable long-term share price performance. Conversely, firms omitting dividends experience unfavorable long-term share price performance. The long-term valuation effects resulting from dividend initiations are more favorable for firms that are smaller, that overinvest, and that had relatively poor performance prior to the initiations. The long-term effects resulting from dividend omissions are more unfavorable for large firms and for firms experiencing relatively large dividend omissions.     

Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations

Brokerage analysts frequently comment on and sometimes recommendcompanies that their firms have recently taken public. We showthat stocks that underwriter analysts recommend perform morepoorly than 'buy' recommendations by unaffiliated brokers priorto, at the time of, and subsequent to the recommendation date.We conclude that the recommendations by underwriter analystsshow significant evidence of bias. We show also that the marketdoes not recognize the full extent of this bias. The resultssuggest a potential conflict of interest inherent in the differentfunctions that investment bankers perform.     

The Information Content of Dividend Surprises: Evidence from Germany

This paper reconsiders the issue of share price reactions to dividend announcements. We use the difference between the actual dividend and the analyst consensus forecast as obtained from I/B/E/S as a proxy for the surprise in the dividend announcement. Using data from Germany, we find significant share price reactions after dividend announcements. We use panel methods to analyze the determinants of the share price reactions and find evidence in favour of the cash flow signaling hypothesis and dividend clientele effects. We further find that the price reaction to dividend surprises is related to the ownership structure of the firm. The results do not support the free cash flow hypothesis. An additional result of our analysis is that dividend changes are not an appropriate measure to capture the information content of dividend announcements.     

Buys,holds, and sells: The distribution of investment banks’ stock ratings and the implications for the profitability of analysts’ recommendations

This paper analyzes the distribution of stock ratings at investment banks and brokerage firms and examines whether these distributions can predict the profitability of analysts’ recommendations. We document that the percentage of buys decreased steadily starting in mid-2000, likely due, at least partly, to the implementation of NASD Rule 2711, requiring the public dissemination of ratings distributions. Additionally, we find that a broker's ratings distribution can predict recommendation profitability. Upgrades to buy (downgrades to hold or sell) issued by brokers with the smallest percentage of buy recommendations significantly outperformed (underperformed) those of brokers with the greatest percentage of buys.     

Capital gains tax,supply‐driven trading and ownership structure: direct evidence of the lock‐in effect

This study investigates the effect of differential capital gains tax rates on investor trading and share prices in a unique market setting that facilitates the resolution of conflicting prior evidence of holding period tax incentives. In particular, we examine whether the concessionary tax treatment of long‐term capital gains increases the supply of shares that qualify for long‐term status, thereby causing downward price pressure. We find evidence of abnormal seller‐initiated trading following the 12‐month anniversary of listing for IPO firms that appreciate in price (‘winners’) and report no such evidence for firms that decline in price (‘losers’). Consistent with the tax concessions being greater for individual than institutional investors, we report that abnormal seller‐initiated trading is mitigated by higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. We also report limited evidence, for winners, of declining share prices upon qualifying for long‐term tax status.     

The interaction between opening call auctions and ongoing trade: Evidence from the NYSE

We investigate the impact that the opening batch has on trading for the remainder of the day and what impact the prior day's trading has on the subsequent day's open. Traders have an interest in these trading impacts as their trades may cluster around opening and closing time periods. We find that the larger the volume in the opening batches, the greater the volume across the day. We also find the prior day's volume being positively related to the subsequent day's opening volume. Combined, these results suggest a continuing pattern of trade volume rolling from one day to the next. Additionally, we find that the spread in the continuous market can be partially attributed to the price change in the opening batch. We also find evidence of opening trade price reversals. Combined with the absence of price reversals following the opening trade, we conclude that the opening process may be more efficient at handling information than the continuous market.