Synchronised Business Cycles in East Asia and Fluctuations in the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate

Because many authors have proposed stimulating the ailing Japanese economy by monetary expansion and yen depreciation, we explore the repercussions of depreciating the yen against the dollar on the other East Asian economies – which largely peg to the dollar. Since 1980, economic integration among Japan's neighbours – China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – has intensified and (except for China and Singapore) their business cycles have been highly synchronised. These cycles have been closely linked to fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate – through changes in the export competitiveness, inflows of foreign direct investment and intra‐Asian income effects. We show that a major yen devaluation would have a negative impact on incomes in other East Asian economies and that it is not a sensible policy option for Japan.     

东亚区域汇率合作与协调：基于一般均衡模型的分析

研究东亚货币合作和汇率协调的理论模型在20世纪80年代初期以后获得较快的发展．其中早期的理论模型多是局部均衡分析,或者是应用博弈论建立的理论模型。通过建立三个国家的一般均衡理论模型,我们可以看到东亚各经济体对美元或者日元的单一钉住不如钉住一篮子货币。在东亚汇率合作中,钉住以贸易为权重的货币篮子是一种纳什均衡,它可以缓冲美元与日元汇率变动对各经济体的宏观经济所带来的冲击。     

Exchange Rate Volatility and Exports: New Empirical Evidence from the Emerging East Asian Economies

This paper examines the impact of bilateral real exchange rate volatility on real exports of five emerging East Asian countries among themselves as well as to 13 industrialised countries. We recognise the specificity of the exports between the emerging East Asian and industrialised countries and employ a generalised gravity model. In the empirical analysis we use a panel comprising 25 years of quarterly data and perform unit‐root and cointegration tests to verify the long‐run relationship among the variables. The results provide strong evidence that exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on the exports of emerging East Asian countries. In addition, the results suggest that the pattern of bilateral exports is influenced by third‐country variables. An increase in the price competitiveness of other emerging East Asian countries has a negative impact on a country’s exports to a destination market, but the magnitude of the impact is relatively small. These results are robust across different estimation techniques and do not depend on the variable chosen to proxy exchange rate uncertainty. The results of the GMM‐IV estimation also confirm the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on exports and suggest that this negative relationship is not driven by simultaneous causality bias.     

Is the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate Really Responsible for East Asia's Export and Business Cycles? A Commentary on McKinnon and Schnabl (2003)

In a paper published in The World Economy, Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl claim that fluctuations in the nominal yen/dollar exchange rate are the principal causal factor behind the export and business cycles in East Asian countries ( McKinnon and Schnabl, 2003 ). Their econometric work, however, suffers from at least two important difficulties. First, while McKinnon and Schnabl preclude industry shocks as an explanation for the East Asian countries’ macroeconomic fluctuations, cyclical fluctuations in the global electronics industry have a significant impact on their short‐run export and output dynamics. Second, although McKinnon and Schnabl assume that the relative industrial competitiveness of Japan and other East Asian countries moves in tandem with fluctuations in the nominal yen/dollar exchange rate, the empirical validity of this assumption is not indisputable. Once these two issues are taken into account properly, it becomes very difficult to make a convincing case for the yen/dollar exchange rate being the main driver of East Asia's macroeconomic instability. A brief critique will also be made of another paper that has appeared recently in The World Economy ( Doraisami, 2004 ), which models Malaysia's pre‐crisis export dynamics using the nominal yen/dollar exchange rate as a proxy for the country's export competitiveness.     

不对称国际经济体系下的人民币汇率问题--一个劳动力平价视角

本文试从经济和金融全球化的视角,以劳动力平价为分析基础,分析在不对称国际经济体系中的人民币汇率水平问题。通过对中美劳动力平价以及中国与印度尼西亚、马来西亚和韩国三国的劳动力平价的比较研究,发现对美元而言,人民币1998年之前存在着较严重低估,1998年之后低估程度缩小;对印度尼西亚、马来西亚和韩国三国而言,10年来一直处于竞争性均衡中,在劳动力平价上不存在比较优势。因而,只有在人民币汇率形成机制中考虑东南亚国家货币的影响,才能保证我国商品的国际竞争力。     

Is the US Dollar a Suitable Anchor for the Newly Proposed GCC Currency?

Responses of inflation and non‐oil output growth from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to monetary policy shocks from the United States (US) were estimated to determine whether there is evidence to support the US dollar as the anchor for the proposed unified currency. A structural vector autoregression identified with short‐run restrictions was employed for each country with Fed funds rate as the US monetary policy instrument, non‐oil output growth and inflation. The main results suggest that for inflation, the GCC countries show synchronised responses to monetary policy shocks from the US which are similar to inflation in the US, and for non‐oil output growth, there is no clear indication that US monetary policy can be as effective for the GCC countries as it is domestically. Consequently, importing US monetary policy via a dollar peg may guarantee only stable inflation for the GCC countries – not necessarily stable non‐oil output growth. If the non‐oil output response is made conscientiously – and there are concerns over the dollar’s ability to perform its role as a store of value – a basket peg with both the US dollar and the euro may be a sound alternative as confirmed by the variance decomposition analysis of our augmented SVAR with a proxy for the European short‐term interest rate.     

Exchange rate jumps and exports: Evidence from China

We apply the autoregressive conditional jump intensity (ARJI ) model to monthly exchange rate returns of China against 81 countries and investigate the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports over the period of 1995–2004. We decompose bilateral exchange rate volatility into continuous and discrete components and find that only the discrete part of exchange rate volatility, that is, the exchange rate jumps, has a significantly negative effect on exports, which to some extent reconciles the old yet unsettled debate in previous literature on the role of exchange rate volatility in international trade. There is also some evidence suggesting that the development of domestic financial market will boost international trade, but it does not help attenuate the negative effect of bilateral exchange rate jump risk on exports.     

Exchange Rate Volatility and Intra‐Asia Trade: Evidence by Type of Goods

This paper examines the impact of intra‐Asia exchange rate volatility on intra‐Asia trade in primary goods, intermediate goods, equipment goods and consumption goods from 1980 to 2009. For Asia, the evidence shows that as intraregional exchange rate volatility increases, intraregional exports in these goods fall. This adverse impact is even more pronounced in the subregion of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)+5 comprising ASEAN member countries plus the People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Japan; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei, China; and especially among intermediate and equipment exports. Again, the impact magnifies in an even smaller subgroup excluding the smaller ASEAN economies. These results underline the significant impact of exchange rate volatility on the region's production networks. For South Asia, however, exchange rate volatility appears to have a positive impact on exports. Still, caution is warranted given that South Asian economies trade relatively little with each other.     

Exchange Rate Volatility and International Trade Flows in sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical Evidence

In this article, the authors examine the relationship between the volatility in exchange rates and the volume of international trade in sub-Saharan African countries. Using the gravity equation and annual data for the period 1998–2007, they find a statistically significant and negative correlation between the volatility in exchange rates and the volume of trade. The estimated elasticities show that the responsiveness of the flow of international trade to changes in exchange rate volatility is very small. This suggests that eliminating the volatility in the exchange rates will result in only small increments in the volume of trade. Accordingly, pursuing a policy of exchange rate stability would not be sufficient to significantly increase the volume of bilateral trade in the sub-Saharan African region.     

Impact of Exchange Rate Uncertainty on Trade Flows: Evidence from Commodity Trade between the United States and the United Kingdom

Previous studies that investigated the impact of exchange rate volatility on the trade flows employed aggregate trade data and standard estimation techniques. They provided mixed results. In this paper we use disaggregated import and export data for 177 commodities traded between the United States and the United Kingdom to investigate whether volatility of the real bilateral dollar–pound exchange rate has any detrimental effect on trade flows at the commodity level. Additionally, we employ the bounds testing approach to cointegration and error‐correction modelling that is suitable for the models used mostly because it does not require pre‐unit‐root testing and variables in the model could be stationary, non‐stationary or a combination of the two. In most trade flow models estimated, we found a negative effect of exchange rate volatility on commodity trade.     

Evaluating China's Exchange Rate Regime

The U.S.in the last couple of years has been up in arms about China's exchange rate regime. In 1994 China established a de facto currency peg.The dollar-RMB ex- change rate was fixed at 8.28.The People's Bank of China(PBC)al- lowed the rate a narrow band of around .01 to.02 percent in which it could shift daily.The exchange rate program did not become newsworthy until U.S.Treasury Secretary John Snow's visit in 2003.In fact as a study by Frankel and Wei(2007) showed,the RMB's forward was actually selling at a discount against the dollar prior to Secretary Snow's visit to China     

人民币实际有效汇率调整及其波动率与中美贸易收支

基于1995年1月至2007年9月的月度数据,分析了人民币实际有效汇率与中美贸易收支的关系。结果显示,人民币汇率波动率增加有助于缩小中美贸易收支顺差,人民币汇率升值无论长期或是短期,都不能解决中美双边贸易收支失衡问题。美国经济增长引致的进口需求是中美贸易顺差和我国收入增长的重要原因,在当前经济形势下,要警惕美国经济下滑导致我国的出口下降,进而使我国经济出现"硬着陆"的风险。     

Exchange rate volatility and Japan–U.S. commodity trade: An asymmetry analysis

Exchange rate volatility is said to affect trade flows in either direction. When increased volatility is separated from decreased volatility, asymmetric analysis reveals even more support for the fact that both increased volatility and decreased volatility affect trade flows in either direction. We add to this new literature by considering 57 industries that trade between Japan and the US. In addition to providing evidence of asymmetric response of their trade flows to a measure of exchange rate volatility, our approach identifies industries that could benefit from increased exchange rate volatility and those that could be hurt. Similarly, we identify industries that could benefit from decreased volatility and those that could be hurt. The overall conclusion is the adverse effects of dollar–yen volatility on the trade between the two countries.     

Does Euro or Dollar Pegging Impact the Real Exchange Rate? The Case of Oil and Commodity Currencies

The aim of this paper is to investigate the equilibrium exchange rates for commodity and oil currencies as well as the discrepancies of their observed exchange rates to these equilibriums. To this end, first, we estimate a long‐term relationship between the real effective exchange rate and economic fundamentals, including the commodity terms of trade. The estimation relies on panel cointegration techniques and covers annual data from 1980 to 2007. Our results show that real exchange rates co‐move with commodity prices in the long run and respond to oil price somewhat less than to commodity prices. Second, we assess the degree of misalignment of these currencies, as the gap between their observed exchange rate and the estimated equilibrium exchange rate. We show that these misalignments are not significantly related to the exchange rate regimes adopted by the countries, either pegged or floating. However, for pegged currencies, the size of misalignments significantly depends on the anchor currency, either the euro or the dollar. A comparison of misalignments of pegged commodity and oil currencies across different periods confirms these results: during periods of dollar (euro) overvaluation, currencies pegged to the dollar (euro) tend to be overvalued; the reverse being true when the dollar (euro) is undervalued. Consequently, pegged currencies are often driven away from their equilibria by wild fluctuations in the key currencies, on which they are anchored.     

Exchange rate policies in Asia in an era of financial globalisation: An empirical assessment

Ebbs and flows of capital have complicated macroeconomic policy management for all emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) regardless of whether they have adopted flexible or managed exchange rate regimes. In the light of the renewed interest in the trilemma versus dilemma debate, we contribute to the related literature by presenting an empirical analysis of exchange rate flexibility and intervention for selected Asian EMDEs over the time period 2001–2016. In addition to estimating augmented Frankel–Wei regressions, we employ a generalised auto‐regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model to assess the extent of foreign exchange (FX) intervention and whether there exist any asymmetries in the way countries intervene. Our results show that although there is greater flexibility in exchange rates, there is evidence of some countries potentially using FX intervention to manage currency movements. We also find evidence of asymmetry in intervention where exchange rate volatility responds more emphatically to FX sales than purchases.     

Designing EU–US Atlantic Monetary Relations: Exchange Rate Variability and Labour Markets

The variability of the euro seems to have a statistically significant and economically small, but non‐negligible, impact on labour markets in Euroland. Unemployment tends to increase and employment growth tends to fall whenever the effective exchange rate of the euro or the bilateral euro/dollar exchange rate becomes more variable. In the US a similar effect seems to be operating, but it is statistically less strong, especially concerning employment growth, which seems largely insulated from exchange rate variability. These results fit the general observation that US labour markets are more flexible and that the euro area is considerably more open than the US (exports of goods and services amount to close to 18 per cent of Euroland GDP versus only about 11 per cent for the US).     

AMU Deviation Indicators for Coordinated Exchange Rate Policies in East Asia and their Relationships with Effective Exchange Rates

After the Asian currency crisis in 1997, the monetary authorities of East Asian countries have been strengthening their regional monetary cooperation. In this paper, we propose a deviation measurement for coordinated exchange rate policies in East Asia to enhance the monetary authorities’ surveillance process for their regional monetary cooperation. We calculate an Asian Monetary Unit (AMU) as a weighted average of East Asian currencies following the method used to calculate the European Currency Unit (ECU). Also, we calculate AMU Deviation Indicators which show how much each of the East Asian currencies deviates from a hypothetical benchmark rate in terms of the AMU. Furthermore, we investigate relationships between the AMU Deviation Indicators and the effective exchange rates, which mean international price competitiveness in terms of international trade. We found strong relationships between the AMU Deviation Indicators and the effective exchange rates except for some currencies. The results suggest that monitoring the AMU Deviation Indicator will be useful for the monetary authorities’ surveillance in East Asia in order to stabilise their effective exchange rate or price competitiveness among the East Asian countries.     

Understanding bilateral exchange rate volatility

This paper develops an empirical model of bilateral exchange rate volatility. We conjecture that for developing economies, external financial liabilities have an important effect on desired bilateral exchange rate volatility, above and beyond the standard optimal currency area (OCA) factors. By contrast, industrial countries do not face the same set of constraints in international financial markets. In our theoretical model, external debt tightens financial constraints and reduces the efficiency of the exchange rate in responding to external shocks. We go on to explore the determinants of bilateral exchange rate volatility in a broad cross section of countries. For developing economies, bilateral exchange rate volatility (relative to creditor countries) is strongly negatively affected by the stock of external debt. For industrial countries however, OCA variables appear more important and external debt is generally not significant in explaining bilateral exchange rate volatility.     

The dynamics of exchange rate regimes: Fixes, floats, and flips

The impermanence of fixed exchange rates has become a stylized fact in international finance. The combination of the “mirage” view that pegs do not really peg with the “fear of floating” view that floats do not really float generates the conclusion that exchange rate regimes are, in practice, unimportant for the behavior of the exchange rate. This is consistent with evidence on the irrelevance of exchange rate regimes for general macroeconomic performance. Recent studies, however, show that the exchange rate regime matters. This can be understood by considering the dynamics of exchange rate regimes. We demonstrate that the “mirage” view is somewhat misleading and incomplete. Pegs frequently break, but many do last. Also, there is a high degree of flipping, that is, the re-formation of pegs that have broken. Thus, a fixed exchange rate today is a good predictor that one will exist in the future. We also investigate the quantitative effect of fixed exchange rates. While the “fear of floating” view suggests little actual difference in fixed and floating rates with respect to exchange rate volatility, we show that fixed exchange rates exhibit considerably greater bilateral exchange rate stability than flexible rates, both today and in the future.     

Argentina's Currency Board Collapse: Weak Policy or Bad Luck?

Two basic views can be discerned in post‐mortems of Argentina's currency board: (1) that weak fiscal policy was fundamentally to blame, and (2) that the peso had become too severely overvalued for the peg to survive. This paper evaluates the evidence for these rival interpretations. The real effective exchange rate index did not indicate massive overvaluation, but this index does not capture the effects on the equilibrium rate of the ‘sudden stop’ in capital flows to emerging markets after 1998. It also understates the amount of adjustment required for Argentina to reach the equilibrium rate, because neighbour countries’ dollar exchange rates were held up by Argentina's overvaluation, as is indicated by their depreciation in 2002. Argentina was particularly vulnerable to the sudden stop because of the extreme volatility of its portfolio inflows. Fiscal policy simulations suggest that, even with a substantially improved primary balance from 1994 onwards, loss of investor confidence would still have triggered unsustainable debt dynamics once the recession began to bite after 1998. The stagnation of output and prices in Argentina created a yawning gap between the interest rate on debt and the rate of growth of nominal GDP. Had the currency been floated in, say, 1995, the real devaluation of the peso would still have pushed up the debt/GDP ratio, but higher output would have left greater scope for addressing this by running a sizeable primary surplus. Moreover, the more gradual depreciation under floating might have allowed the economy to adjust to higher debt service payments without resort to default. The IMF has criticised itself for not pressing for tighter fiscal policy in the 1990s. A more fundamental criticism would be that it was seduced by the bipolar model into complacency about adjustment to real shocks and forgetting the teachings of optimum currency area theory.