Dollarization and financial integration

How does a country's exchange rate regime impact its ability to borrow from abroad? We build a small open economy model in which the government responds to shocks by adjusting monetary policy and foreign borrowing. Sovereign borrowing is subject to endogenous limits, which ensure repayment when the default punishment corresponds to financial autarky. Dollarizing implies renouncing monetary policy, but can make access to international debt markets more valuable, thereby loosening borrowing constraints. This mechanism linking dollarization to financial integration is consistent with observed declines in spreads on foreign-currency debt in countries adopting the dollar or the euro.     

NEW ESTIMATION OF CHINA'S EXCHANGE RATE REGIME

Abstract. The present paper updates the question: what precisely is the exchange rate regime that China has put into place since 2005, when it announced a move away from the US dollar peg? Is it a basket anchor with the possibility of cumulatable daily appreciations, as was announced at the time? We apply to this question a new approach of estimating countries’ de facto exchange rate regimes, a synthesis of two techniques. One is a technique that has been used in the past to estimate implicit de facto currency weights when the hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility. The second is a technique used to estimate the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility when the hypothesis is an anchor to the US dollar or some other single major currency. Because the RMB and many other currencies today purportedly follow variants of band‐basket‐crawl, it is important to have available a technique that can cover both dimensions, inferring weights and inferring flexibility. The synthesis adds a variable representing ‘exchange market pressure’ to the currency basket equation, whereby the degree of flexibility is estimated at the same time as the currency weights. This approach reveals that by mid‐2007, the RMB basket had switched a substantial part of the US dollar's weight onto the euro. The implication is that the appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar during this period was due to the appreciation of the euro against the dollar, not to any upward trend in the RMB relative to its basket.     

Sovereign default risk and volatility

In a model of sovereign debt with endogenous default, we find a non-monotonic relationship between default risk and volatility, reflecting a trade-off between prudence and the insurance value of default. We show that this feature also holds in the data.     

Commodity Price Instability and Debt-linking by Developing Countries

Most developing countries borrow in world capital markets. Typically this borrowing is denominated in one of the major currencies and requires periodic servicing. The foreign exchange required to meet the service obligation is often dependent on the export of one or a small number of commodities. This demand usually competes with a number of other claims on export earnings, including both consumption and capital goods imports. This paper investigates the use of commodity-linked borrowing by developing countries. If the interest and/or principal payments on external debt are linked to the price of a country's principal exports, the risk of default can be shifted to better-diversified lenders. The social cost of linking is much smaller than that of other compensating arrangements. In addition, commodity-linked debt may reduce the borrower's direct lending costs. This will depend on the quantity of linked debt supplied and the dispersion of expectations about the future price of the commodity. If the supply is small relative to the demand among investors who expect the commodity price to increase, the resulting reduction in the cost of borrowing may be sufficient to offset the premium for bearing the risk associated with the commodity's future price.     

Sovereign bond markets with political risk and moral hazard

A model of interest rates on sovereign bonds with default risk is presented. The model accounts for interaction between interest rates and default risk. Multiple equilibria and stability issues are examined. The model explores the level of debt that markets will tolerate in a context where there is uncertainty about output growth, fiscal discipline, real exchange rates, and IMF intervention. The effect of likely IMF assistance on the debt ceiling is shown to be large.     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

The structure of public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime

Abstract This paper explores the relationship between the denomination of public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime. Three types of debt (nominal, indexed, and foreign) and two regimes (fixed and flexible) are considered. Indexed debt is insulated against unexpected inflation. The real (domestic‐currency) value of foreign debt is subject to valuation effects from real exchange rate shocks. The ‘fear‐of‐floating’ result, that foreign debt makes pegging more attractive, is shown to hold unambiguously only if the peg is fully credible. If the peg lacks credibility, a critical factor is the perceived likelihood of using the ‘escape clause’ of a switch to a float, which raises the costs of pegging. Foreign debt increases the temptation to resort to the escape clause, so when a peg is not fully credible (as is almost always the case in reality), pegging tends to be less attractive than floating in the presence of foreign debt.     

Household’s optimal mortgage and unsecured loan default decision

How do households make optimal borrowing and default decisions when they have the option to borrow in multiple ways? In this paper, I analyze households’ optimal mortgage and unsecured loan borrowing and default decisions in the context of the recent recession. I model households as able to default on mortgage debt to walk away from capital losses, at the price of foreclosure. However, a household can also default on unsecured debt to maintain its home, in exchange for a longer exclusion from credit markets following default. Depending on the costs of each alternative, financially constrained households exhibit heterogeneity in optimal default decisions.Next, I analyze how mortgage loan modification policies, after a sudden drop in house prices, affect household choices in the mortgage and unsecured loan markets. The quantitative exercise shows that the government-driven mortgage modification program, initiated in 2009, reduces the mortgage default rate by 0.27% points. However, this increases the unsecured loan charge-off rate by 0.66% points.     

Sovereign debt spread and default in a model with self-fulfilling prophecies and asymmetric information

The euro area sovereign debt crisis has renewed interest in government credibility and the risk of default. Recent empirical evidence has shown that the sharp increase in government bond yields cannot be attributed entirely to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. Contagion effects can occur, and self-fulfilling speculation may arise. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model in the spirit of the second-generation currency crisis models developed by Obstfled (1996). The model describes a strategic game between governments and private investors. Euro area countries face a trade-off as governments may either commit to and implement restrictive fiscal policies or default on debt. The commitment strategy may not be optimal if the fundamentals deteriorate. The policy maker lose part of their credibility, and governments are forced to default. In addition, we introduce uncertainty about the cost of default in the model, which is then able to account for a greater variety of equilibrium. Thus, when the evaluation of the cost of default is asymmetric, prophecies are not always realized and default does not occur. Simulations of the model then show that it offers insights, and can help to account for the situations of Greece and Italy during the sovereign debt crisis.     

Non‐linearities,Business Cycles and Exchange Rates

This paper conjoins the disparate empirical literatures on exchange rate models and monetary policy models, with special reference to the importance of output, inflation gaps and exchange rate targets. It focuses in on the dollar/euro exchange rate, and the differential results arising from using alternative measures of the output gap for the US and for the Euro area. A comparison of ‘in‐sample’ prediction against alternative models of exchange rates is also conducted. In addition to predictive power, I also assess the various models' plausibility as economic explanations for exchange rate movements, based on the conformity of coefficient estimates with priors. Taylor rule fundamentals appear to do as well, or better, than other models at the 1‐year horizon.     

Exchange Rate Policy in China after the Financial Crisis: Evidence from Time‐varying Exchange Rate Basket

We analyze the period of a managed floating exchange rate policy in China between June 2010 and November 2014. We estimate a time‐varying structure of a hypothetical currency basket using the Kalman filter. We show that the exchange rate policy continues to focus on the US dollar. However, its weight has been gradually declining, while this decline has moderated in 2014. The euro played some role before summer 2011, but became negligible after the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis. Finally, the Thai baht has positive implicit weights.     

The perils of debt deflation in the Euro area: a multi regime model

Academic research and policy makers in the Euro area are currently concerned with the threat of debt deflation and secular stagnation in Europe. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that secular stagnation and debt deflation in the Euro area may be rather slowly developing. Yet what appears as major peril is that debt deflation with a lack of economic growth, rising real interest rates and further rising debt may trigger household defaults, defaults of firms and banks, rise of risk premia, and default risk of certain sectors of the economy or sovereign defaults. It is this rising default and financial risk that may lead to a regime change to a slowly moving debt crisis with high financial risk and high financial stress. In order to explore those issues, a macro policy model of Svensson type is introduced, exhibiting a regime of low and high financial stress. Then, a four dimensional multi-regime VAR is employed to an Euro area data set to support the theoretical model and the claim that in particular Southern Euro area countries are affected by debt deflation and financial market stress.     

Out‐of‐Sample Exchange Rate Forecasting and Macroeconomic Fundamentals: The Case of Japan

This study explores the respective out‐of‐sample exchange rate forecasting abilities of five macroeconomic fundamental models in comparison to a naïve random walk model for Japan during the post‐Bretton Woods era. To assess the influence of major economic changes, we estimate both linear and nonlinear models for all the macroeconomic fundamentals. Overall, most structural exchange rate models outperform a naïve random walk model in terms of forecasting accuracy in the short horizon. When the fundamentals are only linearly modelled, the forecasting ability of the Taylor rule is generally superior to other fundamental models. When the fundamentals are nonlinearly specified, the predictability of some other models rises dramatically to match that of the Taylor rule models in short and/or long horizons. Of importance, we determine that the yen/dollar exchange rate forecasting performance effectively improves in several fundamental models when influential economic changes are incorporated.     

Sovereign defaulters: Do international capital markets punish them?

We empirically study whether countries that default on their debt experience a reduction in their capital inflows, as suggested by the literature. Our data contain information on (i) the defaulter countries and their creditors and (ii) bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. With these we can study how FDI flows are affected by sovereign default by distinguishing between those flows coming from defaulters' creditor countries and others. According to our estimations, this distinction is crucial since the decline of FDI in flows after default is markedly concentrated on those flows originating in defaulters' creditor countries. The decay in FDI flows is higher in the years closer to the default date and for countries that have defaulted more times. We do not find evidence that countries shut their doors to defaulters' investment abroad, which is also a cost of default suggested in the literature.     

Fundamentals at Odds? The US Current Account Deficit and Dollar

In mid‐2008, the real effective exchange rate (REER) of the dollar was close to its minimum level for the past four decades. At the same time, however, the US trade and current account deficits remain large and, absent a significant correction in coming years, would contribute to a further accumulation of US external liabilities. The paper discusses the tension between these two aspects of the dollar assessment, and what factors can help to reconcile them. It focuses in particular on the terms of trade, adjustment lags and measurement issues related to both the REER and the current account balance.     

“汇改”后人民币汇率制度分析

自2005年7月21日人民币汇率形成机制进行重大改革以来,人民币对美元的基准汇率一直处于单边升值的态势.从宏观经济特征和模型实证分析中可以得出,虽然"汇改"后人民币货币篮子发挥了一定的作用,人民币汇率的灵活性在逐渐增强,但主要还是参考美元汇率来进行调节,属于"软钉住美元的汇率制度".     

Industry equilibrium with random exit or default

An industry consisting of a large number of small price taking firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks is considered. At the moment of entry, a firm takes on debt. We show that in a competitive equilibrium, some firms exit and pay out their debt while others choose to default. The outcome depends on the realization of firm‐specific shocks. The paper demonstrates that if the firms self‐select between exit with debt repayment and default, then the default region is disconnected from the exit region. The methodological contribution of the paper is the analytical characterization of the long‐run equilibrium for two scenarios of the initial distribution of productivity shocks. We consider two public policy mechanisms—contract enforcement and creditor protection. Our policy recommendation is that regulators need to reduce the contract enforcement if they want to decrease the long‐run default rate.     

Market Size and Investment Performance of Defaulted Bonds and Bank Loans: 1987–2001

The defaulted and distressed, public and private debt markets in the United States swelled to a record $680 billion (face value) at the end of 2001. The market value of this 'niche' segment was approximately $400 billion.
Defaulted security investors enjoyed an excellent year on average, as returns in 2001 were 17.5 per cent on bonds, 13.9 per cent on bank loans, and 15.6 per cent combined defaulted public bonds and private bank loans.
The Altman–New York University Salomon Center Index of Defaulted Bonds grew to over 200 individual issues and a face value of $56.2 billion; the market value was only $11.8 billion. The market–to–face value ratio of the Bond Index grew somewhat to 0.21 from 0.15 one year ago, but remained at a relatively low figure. The face value of our Defaulted Bank Loan Index also grew to $44.7 billion and the market–to–face value ratio remained quite low at 0.53.
The recovery rate on defaulted bonds (price just after default) was very low at 25 cents on the dollar; likewise, the bank loan recovery rate in 2001 was also relatively low at 55 cents on the dollar. With new defaulted bonds rising in 2001 to a record $63.6 billion (default rate of 9.80 per cent) and the default outlook for 2002 high investment opportunities should abound in the distressed debt market.
Indications are that distressed investors (both old and new) are successfully raising funds because investor expectations are buoyant.
(J.E.L.: G21, G33).     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

Dollar-Deutschemark Polarisation: Comparing The Pound And Franc

The extent to which movements in the sterling and franc bilateral exchange rates are associated with changes in the dollar‐deutschemark exchange rate is measured. In the case of the pound we find, in contrast to the impression that might be gained from previous studies, that its linkage to the dollar has been, since the late 1990s, as high as it was in the late 1970s. In the case of the franc, we find that it has for some time been a powerfully deutschemark‐linked currency. This calls into question the view that there has been significant ‘dollar‐deutschemark polarity’ with respect to the franc in the recent past. We suggest that policymaker guidance and market rules of thumb may partially explain the developments we observe.