Growth and Welfare Effects of Tax Cuts: The Case of a Productive Public Input with Technological Risk

This paper analyzes the dynamic impact of tax cuts within a stochastic model of endogenous growth with a congested public input. A decreasing taxation of deterministic income parts leads to the well-known positive growth effect. Nevertheless, due to the insurance effect associated with the taxation of stochastic income flows, the overall growth impact of taxation is ambiguous. It is shown that the optimal structure of financing government expenditure does not only depend on the degree of rivalry but also on the degree of risk aversion. The optimal real value of government debt decreases with a rise in congestion. We identify that in the case of proportional congestion, the base for tax cuts should be the growth neutral consumption tax. Maximizing the growth rate does not automatically coincide with maximizing welfare. Hence, the base for tax cuts gains importance to realize a welfare optimal policy.     

REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY

We develop a two‐period, three‐class of income model where low‐income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where the constrained low‐income and the unconstrained high‐income agents favour low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government debt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt‐to‐GDP ratio.     

Optimal Capital Taxation in a Neoclassical Growth Model

This paper studies the optimal factor tax incidence in a neoclassical growth model with a given share of government expenditure in output. In the Ramsey planner's optimization, the effect of next period's capital on government expenditure equals the given share of the marginal product of capital. Capital accumulation reduces the discounted net marginal product of next period's capital by way of increasing government expenditure. In order to internalize the distortion, it is optimal to tax capital income in the long run.     

THE OPTIMAL DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS

This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects.     

Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether the presence of imperfect income tax compliance affects the optimal provision of public goods within a framework in which public expenditure is financed by a general income tax that also accomplishes redistributive goals. We first derive the income tax structure, and then a generalized Samuelson rule. We argue that, under imperfect income tax compliance, it is desirable to distort public–good supply downwards, in the sense that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private consumption must exceed their marginal rate of transformation.     

Optimal size of the government: the role of the elasticity of substitution

This paper analyzes the optimal fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model with productive public services. Government expenditure, which may be subject to different degrees of congestion, is financed by distortionary income taxation. The standard result on the equality between the growth-maximizing, welfare-maximizing and first-best income tax rates holds if and only if production is Cobb–Douglas or there is proportional congestion. With non-proportional (or in the absence of) congestion, the first-best income tax is lower than the (second-best) welfare-maximizing income tax which, in turn, is lower than the growth-maximizing income tax if the elasticity of substitution is below unity. Under mild conditions these relations are reversed if the elasticity of substitution is above unity. Intuition on these results is also provided.     

Optimal taxation over the life cycle

We derive the optimal labor income tax schedule for a life cycle model with deterministic productivity variation and complete asset markets. An individual chooses whether and how much to work at each date. The government must finance a given expenditure and does not have access to lump sum taxation. We develop a solution method that uses the primal approach to solve for the optimal non-linear tax function. The average tax rate determines when an individual will work while the marginal tax rate determines how much she will work. Even in the absence of redistributive concerns, the optimal tax schedule has an increasing average tax rate at low levels of income to encourage labor market participation. The marginal tax rate at the top is strictly positive. Finally, the model is used to assess the effects of changing the current tax schedule to the optimal one. Under the preferred parameters, this delivers a welfare gain equivalent to 0.67 percent of lifetime consumption.     

The dual nature of public goods and congestion: the role of fiscal policy revisited

Abstract The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption‐based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax‐financed increase in government spending dominates both lump‐sum and consumption tax‐financing. Replacing the lump‐sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.     

A Case Against Zero Capital-Income Taxation

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate the optimal level of capital income taxation in light of stochastic endogenous economic growth. Although endogenous human capital is incorporated into our model, we restrict our investigation to the issue of optimal physical capital income tax; and the labor supply is also endogenously determined. This paper proves that the optimal capital income tax should be zero provided exogenous government expenditure on production; however, capital income should be taxed if we consider endogenous government consumption.     

Public Expenditure,Environment, and Economic Growth

This paper attempts to develop a model of endogenous growth with special consideration to the role of productive public expenditure in the presence of congestion effect of private capital and environmental pollution. We analyze the properties of the optimal fiscal policy in the steady‐state equilibrium when the level of production of the final good is the source of emission. Government allocates its income tax revenue between pollution abatement expenditure and productive public expenditure. In the steady‐state equilibrium, optimum ratio of productive public expenditure to national income is less than the competitive output share of the public input; and this ratio varies inversely with the magnitude of the emission‐output coefficient. The steady‐state equilibrium appears to be a saddle point; and the market economy growth rate is not necessarily less than the socially efficient growth rate in the steady‐state equilibrium.     

Intergenerational Allocation of Government Expenditures: Externalities and Optimal Taxation

This paper studies optimal capital and labor income taxes when the benefits of public goods are age‐dependent. Provided the government can impose a consumption tax, it can attain the first‐best resource allocation. This involves the uniform taxation of the cohorts' labor income and a zero capital income tax. With no consumption tax and optimally chosen government spending, labor income should be taxed nonuniformly across cohorts and the capital income tax should be nonzero. Deviations of the public goods from their respective optima create distortions. These affect the labor supply decisions of both cohorts and capital accumulation, providing a further reason to tax (or subsidize) capital income.     

IMPACT OF TAX, TRANSFER, AND EXPENDITURE POLICIES OF GOVERNMENT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN CANADA

This is a study of the first order incidence of government taxation and expenditure policies on the incomes of families and unattached individuals in Canada in 1970. The specific purposes of the study are twofold. The first is to estimate for calendar year 1970 the first order incidence of governments'actual tax, transfer, and expenditure policies on spending units. The second objective is to simulate the changes in this incidence that would have occurred in 1970 if the new federal personal income tax, unemployment insurance, old age sccurity and family allowance programs had been in operation during that year. The methodology is similar to that used by W. Irwin Gillespie in his pioneering 1964 study for the Royal Commission on Taxation.
It is concluded that the 1970 incidence of the combined tax and transfer programs of all levels of government is broadly redistributive, with net incidence of federal government programs being considerably more redistributive than that of provincial and local governments. In general, the public sector provides large net benefits to families and individuals with incomes of less than $4,000, declining net benefits to families earning from $4,000 to $11,000 and levies small but increasing levels of net tax on families and individuals with incomes in excess of $11,000. This general conclusion is relatively insensitive to the precise assumptions made about the shifting of taxes and the distribution of expenditures on pure public goods. From simulation experiments, recent reforms of the federal income tax, unemployment insurance, old age security and family allowance systems were estimated to increase the amount of redistribution from the rich to the poor.     

Getting on the wrong side of the Laffer curve

A Laffer curve constraint upon the government's ability to tax is assumed, in a simple economy with progressive negative income taxation, publicly provided goods and a government deficit which is a constant fraction of total income. If government's objective function is defined over the distributions of private consumption goods and publicly provided goods, and favours redistribution, then it can be optimal to set a tax rate in the prohibitive region of the assumed Laffer curve.     

Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies

We use a very standard life-cycle growth model, in which individuals have a labor-leisure choice in each period of their lives, to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income. The intuition for our result is straightforward. In a life-cycle model the individual's optimal consumption-work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual's lifetime. One way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age. If tax rates cannot be conditioned on age, a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal, as it can (imperfectly) mimic age-conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E62, H21.     

寻求更有效的财政政策——中国宏观经济分析

宏观财政政策是一种公共物品 ,其有效性的标准是 ,在实现政府利益的同时 ,能够增进社会的福利。面临通货紧缩 ,政府将继续实施以财政政策为主导的扩张性宏观政策 ,在财政支出空间有限的情况下 ,就要选择能够作大投资乘数 ,提高市场效率的措施 ;同时要考虑调整税制结构 ,改变对投资征高税的税制 ,逐步变生产型增值税为收入型增值税和消费型增值税 ,并通过把内资企业税负降至外资企业的水平 ,一方面提高企业的利润预期 ,另一方面 ,消除税负不公 ,提高社会经济效率和减少资本外流 ;在运用国债政策时 ,既要重视国债的发行和使用 ,更要重视国债的交易和流通 ,推进我国金融市场的发育和功能的发挥以及促进公用事业的企业化 ,转换资源配置方式 ,从政府配置转向市场配置 ,从集中配置转向分散配置。总之 ,在体制转轨时期 ,推行一种与市场化改革相结合的财政政策 ,把短期的政策操作和长期的制度调整结合起来 ,实现政策和体制联动。     

Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: What are the driving forces?

In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.     

Are short‐term effects of pollution important for growth and optimal fiscal policy?

We study optimal fiscal policy in a stock‐flow model of the environment within an endogenous growth framework, where some pollutants have a lasting impact on environmental quality which is restored through abatement expenditure, while others dissipate and hence, have a short‐term effect on the environment. All pollutants, however, affect the productivity of a public good negatively. Given that short‐term pollution, although it dissipates, is irreversible in this sense, a government cannot ignore its negative effects since this type of pollution lowers the productivity of all inputs. We find that a larger negative effect of short‐term pollutants as well as a higher congestion effect of private capital leads to corrective fiscal policies with higher optimal income tax and abatement expenditure rates, which have favorable growth consequences. Interestingly, we find that the rate of short‐term pollution does not affect optimal fiscal policy while that of the long‐term pollution does.     

Optimal labor income taxation in a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper presents a new approach to the two-sector optimal taxation problem. We derive the optimal labor income tax rate which depends on factor intensity across sectors. It is the labor intensity that determines the initial wage rate, and therefore the optimal labor tax rate. We show that an increase in the initial relative price of consumption goods decreases the optimal tax rate on labor income in the case that the consumption goods sector is capital-intensive while it increases the optimal tax rate on labor income in the case that the investment goods sector is capital-intensive.     

Emission Taxes and Optimal Refunding Schemes with Endogenous Market Structure

The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free-entry market where the production process generates emissions. We consider the regulation by a three-part tax policy: the government sets an emission tax, a refunding scheme, and an entry-license tax. In contrast to the case of the two-part tax-refund policy under no entry, we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside, the first-best outcome is always attained. Further, the government’s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes. Our result implies that the tax-refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry.     

Revenue and Progressivity Neutral Changes in the Tax Mix

There has been much debate about the redistributive implications of a consumption tax and the treatment of low income households. This article presents a general model which allows for the interdependence between income and consumption taxes, while allowing for transfer payments to the low paid. The appropriate adjustment of transfer payments in response to a change in the tax mix, in order to maintain a fixed real value of transfers, is examined. The use of exemptions, of those goods for which the proportion of expenditure falls as total household expenditure rises, in order to increase the progressivity of consumption taxes is also considered. The model enables changes in the tax mix, which are both revenue and progressivity neutral, to be devised.