Oligopsonistic Intermediate Input and Patterns of Trade *

We examine the validities of traditional trade theorems and patterns of trade for an economy with an oligopsonistic intermediate input. Specifically, the model consists of two final goods. one intermediate good, and two primary factors. One final good and the intermediate good are produced using primary factors, capital and labor. The second final good is produced using the intermediate good and labor. All markets operate under perfect competition except the intermediate good market, which is oligopsonistic. This model reflects the real world phenomena of oligopsony power excerted by some industries (e.g., the food processing industry) in the intermediate good purchases. Our analysis shows that some of the traditional trade theorems and H.O trade pattern may be overturned if the factor intensity of the competitive sector lies between those of oligopsony and intermediate good sectors. [F12]     

The Foreign Trade and Sectoral Impact of Truck Road Pricing for Cross-Border Trade

Truck road pricing is on the brink of beingintroduced in a number of European countries.The experience gained from Switzerland, thefirst country worldwide to implement such adistant-dependent pricing scheme, has provedinvaluable. Nevertheless, significant questionsstill remain. The present paper attempts toprovide some clarity by analysing the welfareand sectoral impact resulting from theintroduction of truck road pricing with respectto foreign trade. It is shown that this impactcan be separated into four effects: the pureterms of trade effect, the tax revenue effect,the transit tax revenue effect and the resourcegain effect (resources set free by a reductionin transport activity). A CGE simulation ofeach of these effects identifies theirquantitative implications. Out of the foureffects the pure terms of trade effect turnsout to dominate at both the sectoral andaggregate level. It triggers a trade-inducedwelfare loss. The tax revenue effect, and lessso the transit revenue effect, mitigate thisloss. For a full road transport costinternalization a trade-induced welfare loss isquantified for Austria at 1.3%. Sensitivity ofthis and other aggregate variables is high withrespect to household reaction to transport taxrevenue refunding. The trade-induced welfareloss of variable size as explored in thisarticle counterbalances a fraction of thewelfare gain due to internalization.     

Effects of Multilateral Trade Liberalization on Prices*

To analyze the effects of simultaneous tariff reductions by multiple importing countries on prices, we construct a simple three‐country model where a good is produced by a monopolist with nonconstant marginal cost and imported by two countries. We compare two representative tariff‐reduction formulas: the “fixed‐amount” and the “uniform percentage” reductions. The uniform percentage reductions may increase the consumer price in the importing country, whose initial tariff is lower. Thus, importing countries with relatively low tariffs may prefer a bilateral trade agreement to a multilateral one to ensure consumer gains.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization On Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergers*

This paper analyzes the effects of tariff reductions on horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly in a two-country world. It is shown that for mergers between two domestic firms and for cross-border mergers which supply both markets from a foreign plant, unilateral tariff reduction encourages mergers which concentrate market power at the expense of mergers which reduce cost, while bilateral tariff reductions have the opposite effect, encouraging mergers which significantly reduce cost. Cross-border mergers which continue to supply each market from a local plant are discouraged by both unilateral and bilateral tariff reduction.     

On the Terms of Trade and Sectoral Reallocations

A commonly held view is that a small open economy adjusts to a negative external shock by switching both expenditure and resources toward the domestic traded goods sector. We show that, when both labor and imported inputs are used as factors of production, the average labor intensity in the nontraded sector may increase substantially with a decline in the terms of trade. This can lead to an internal transfer of labor into the nontraded sector, and an improvement in the trade balance even with a decline in traded sector output. This result depends on a combination of a high elasticity of substitution across nontraded varieties and large differences in labor intensities in the production of nontraded varieties. Our analysis suggests that intersectoral labor flows are not necessarily a good measure of an economy's flexibility, and that intersectoral resource reallocation and expenditure‐switching can move in opposite directions.     

Exchange‐rate Effects on China's Trade*

Though China's share of world trade exceeds that of Japan, little is known about the response of China's trade to changes in exchange rates. The few estimates available have two limitations. First, the data for trade prices are based on proxies for prices from other countries. Secondly, the estimation sample includes the period of China's transformation from a centrally‐planned economy to a more market‐oriented one. We address these limitations with an empirical model explaining the shares of China's exports and imports in world trade in terms of the real effective value of the renminbi. The specifications control for foreign direct investment and for the role of imports of parts to assemble exports. Parameter estimation uses disaggregated monthly trade data and excludes China's decentralization period. We find that a 10 percent real appreciation of the renminbi lowers the share of aggregate Chinese exports by nearly one percentage point. However, the estimated response of imports is negligible and lacks precision.     

A Neo-Heckscher–Ohlin Model of Trade with Endogenous Production Patterns*

We propose a Neo-Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) model of trade that combines comparative endowment advantage, comparative technological advantage, international capital mobility and trade costs. Using an inframarginal approach, we produce a partition of the exogenous parameter space in a host of parameter value subsets that demarcate the various equilibrium patterns of production and trade. The results are startling! They suggest that production within the diversification cone – a key assumption of the Heckscher–Ohlin theory that is required for its core propositions (such as factor price equalisation) to hold – may only prevail on the razor's edge, or under exceptional circumstances. In addition, our findings nominate a mechanism by which improvements in transaction efficiency facilitate international trade thereby stimulating cross-country division of labour. Contrary to other generalisations of the Heckscher–Ohlin (such as the various derivatives of the Kemp–Jones model of trade), our model does not assume a purely Ricardian character: comparative endowment advantage may determine the pattern of trade even in the presence of opposing technological differences, as long as total factor productivity coefficients adjusted for transaction efficiency and factor intensity do not confer unambiguous comparative (technological) advantage. Still, ‘intensity-efficiency’-adjusted comparative technological advantage supersedes factor endowments in determining the flow of trade.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

The Fallacy of Free Trade *

The purpose of this paper is to explode the myth of free trade. Productivity and real wages in the United States rose sharply between 1950 and 1972, but since then real earnings have been falling in spite of a continuous rise in productivity. It turns out that America was more or less a closed economy until 1972, as its trade/GNP ratio was close to 10%; but since then it has become an open economy. the theoretical model shows how real wages may fall in an open economy, but not in a closed economy, in spite of rising productivity.     

Estimating the Euro Effects on Trade with Propensity Score Matching*

We investigate the effect of the euro on trade among EMU members. Using various semi‐nonparametric methods based on matching, we find that the euro has a statistical and economic impact on trade. The results show that two countries sharing the euro currency trade somewhere between 9% and 14% more than other country‐pairs. In addition, we find no evidence of trade diversion due to the euro.     

The Mercantilist Index of Trade Policy*

We introduce an index of trade policy restrictiveness defined as the uniform tariff that maintains the same trade volume as a given tariff/quota structure. Our index overcomes the problems of the trade‐weighted average tariff: It avoids substitution bias, correctly accounts for general equilibrium transfers, and takes import volume instead of welfare as benchmark. Empirical applications to international cross section and time‐series comparisons of trade policy confirm our theoretical results: Trade‐weighted average tariffs generally underestimate the true height of tariffs as measured by the trade‐volume‐equivalent index; this in turn always underestimates the welfare‐equivalent index.     

Labour Market Regulations and the Sectoral Reallocation of Workers: The Case of Trade Reforms

In this paper I highlight the importance of incorporating the institutional features of local labour markets into the analysis of trade reforms. A trade reform is often deemed beneficial because the elimination of trade barriers allows labour to reallocate towards those sectors in the economy in which the country has a comparative advantage. The amount and speed of the reallocation, however, and the post-reform behaviour of output, productivity and welfare, will depend on how regulated the labour market is. First, I document that high firing costs slow down the intersectoral reallocation of labour after a trade reform. Second, in order to isolate the effect of firing costs on labour reallocation, output and welfare after a trade reform, I build a dynamic general equilibrium model. I find that if a country does not liberalize its labour market at the outset of its trade reform, the intersectoral reallocation of workers will be 30% slower, and as much as 30% of the gains in real output and labour productivity in the years following the trade reform will be lost. From a policy standpoint, the message is that while trade reforms are desirable, they need to be complemented by labour market reforms in order to be fully successful.     

The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policies*

This paper applies Grossman and Helpman's (1994 ) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Grossman–Helpman politically‐determined export policy is identical to the rent‐shifting export policy, which is export subsidy (export tax) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition. The politically‐determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator.     

Optimal Trade Policies and Production Technology in Vertically Related Markets*

This paper shows that optimal trade policies for vertically related markets depend crucially on production technology. By employing a production function with variable‐coefficient technology, it shows that return to scale is crucial in determining the direction of government intervention. Therefore, the assumption of fixed‐coefficient production technologies, which has been popular in industrial organization and trade literature when modeling vertically related markets, should be used with caution.     

Evolving Patterns of International Trade

Theoretical models of growth and trade suggest that patterns of international specialization are dynamic and evolve endogenously over time. Initial comparative advantages are either reinforced or gradually unwound with the passage of time. This paper puts forward an empirical framework for modeling international trade dynamics that uses techniques widely employed in the cross-country literature on income convergence. On applying this framework to industry-level data, evidence is found for significant differences in international trade dynamics among the G-5 economies.     

Malaysia-Japan Commodity Trade and Asymmetric Effects of Exchange Rate Changes

Asymmetry analysis is a new norm in applied research and the link between the trade balance and the exchange rate is no exception. In this paper we investigate the asymmetric response of the trade balance of each of the 60 industries that trade between Malaysia and Japan. We find short-run asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes on the trade balance of 50 industries (including the two largest industries), short-run adjustment asymmetry in 47 industries, and short-run impact asymmetry in 30 industries. However, short-run asymmetric effects lasted into the long run only in limited number of industries. Results are industry-specific at best.     

Effects of Transboundary Pollution on the Mode of International Trade of a Polluting Good*

By analyzing a strategic interaction between environmentally‐concerned governments, we examine how the competition mode of international polluting oligopoly is determined. We show that a resulting form of competition depends on the magnitudes of marginal damage costs and cross‐border spillover as well as on the degrees of similarities in these environment‐related parameters.     

生产与消费方式变革对市场营销理论与实践的影响

工业经济时代的营销观念已不能适应现代生产方式和消费方式的变化。顺应知识经济生产方式与消费方式内在要求的新营销观念有以下基本内涵：市场营销的主体从综合性企业转变为拥有核心营销能力的专业性企业;营销客观从实物产品延伸到服务产品;营销活动的载体从有形趋向无形;市场营销的任务从满足需求到创新需求;知识经济时代的营销性质是品牌营销;市场营销的竞争态势更激烈。