MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS*

Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi‐product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, there is a trade‐off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price‐coordination between the product divisions. This makes some intra‐firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi‐product firms allow for competition between divisions. When there are effort spillovers, the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership. Even with some profit‐sharing, intra‐firm price competition can reduce quality‐adjusted price, which has important implications for antitrust policy.     

The intra‐alliance division of value created through collaboration

The differential benefits reaped by individual partners are a major determinant of the impact of strategic alliances on firm performance and an important (dis)incentive for alliance partners to collaborate in value creation. Theoretically, we lack an explicit theory of intra‐alliance value division; empirically, previous analysis has been hampered by methodological challenges. We propose a bargaining framework for intra‐alliance value appropriation, as well as a measure for capturing its variation. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 200 biotechnology R&D alliances, and are able to explain variation in value appropriation across alliance partners, partner types, and individual firms of each type. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intra‐industry diversification and firm performance

We study how intra‐industry product diversity affects firm performance by analyzing the implications of expanding a firm's product line within its core business. We conjecture that increases in product diversity initially undermine performance because of negative transfer effects but then improve it due to economies of scope. We further theorize that this U‐shaped effect of product diversity becomes more pronounced as the firm increases the intensity of its technology investment, yet is likely to be attenuated by the firm's accumulated experience with intra‐industry diversification. Data on 156 U.S.‐based software firms operating from 1990 to 2001 furnish support for these conjectures. Our study advances emerging research on intra‐industry diversification by underscoring some of its contingent performance effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

COMPATIBILITY INCENTIVES OF A LARGE NETWORK FACING MULTIPLE RIVALS*

Under network effects, we analyze when a firm with the largest market share of installed‐base customers prefers incompatibility with smaller rivals that are themselves compatible. With incompatibility, consumers realize that intra‐network competition makes the rivals' network more aggressive than a single‐firm network in adding customers. Consequently, under incompatibility the unique equilibrium can entail tipping away from the largest firm whatever its market share. The largest firm is more likely to prefer incompatibility as its share rises (above fifty per cent is necessary) or the potential to add consumers falls; the number of rivals and strength of network effects have ambiguous implications.     

Strategic frameworks for understanding employer participation in school‐to‐work programs

The knowledge and skills inherent in human capital are increasingly recognized as the essence of competitive advantage. Extending the emerging literature on capability building, this paper explores the strategic decision of participating in school‐to‐work programs from the transaction cost and resource‐based view of the firm. Using data from a national sample, we find that both strategic perspectives help to explain decisions to participate in school‐to‐work activities. Our findings indicate that school‐to‐work programs and activities may be understood as interorganizational strategies from a transaction cost view and evidence of a firm's motivation to develop human capital to build competitive advantage from a resource‐based view. Implications for school‐to‐work public policy development in the United States and future research are identified. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing foreign subsidiaries: agents of headquarters,or an interdependent network?

In this study, two different theoretical perspectives are used to develop sets of hypotheses regarding the mechanisms used to manage foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations. First, agency theory serves as the basis for a model that predicts the use of monitoring mechanisms and incentive compensation. Then, it is argued that these mechanisms are insufficient for managing subsidiaries characterized by high levels of intra‐firm international interdependence, the management of which is critical to many of today's complex global firms. A second set of hypotheses is argued, linking international interdependence to several social control mechanisms. Primary and secondary data from U.S. based multinational corporations were used to test both sets of hypotheses. The results indicate that agency theory, although a useful foundation for studies of control within MNCs, is limited in its ability to explain fully the phenomenon of foreign subsidiary control, however, the model based on intra‐firm interdependence had much greater predictive ability. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organizational knowledge networks and local search: The role of intra‐organizational inventor networks

Research summary : While firms tend to build on their own knowledge, we distinguish between depth and breadth of local search to investigate the drivers of these behaviors. Given that inventors in a firm carry out the knowledge creation activities, we strive to identify inventors responsible for these behaviors by employing the notion of an intra‐firm inventor network. A longitudinal examination of 14,575 inventors from four large semiconductor firms using patent data supports our hypotheses that the reach of inventors in the intra‐firm network and their span of structural holes have independent and interactive effects on these two types of local search behaviors. These findings have implications for research on exploitation and exploration, organizational knowledge, knowledge networks, and micro‐foundations. Managerial summary : Large amounts of knowledge may reside within firm boundaries, and managers are interested in understanding who may leverage this knowledge to generate novel ideas. We focus on collaborations among knowledge workers to address this question. Using the collaborations among all knowledge workers in a firm, we show that those who have higher reach to all others and those who form bridges to connect unconnected groups of workers tend to leverage not only more organizational knowledge, but also knowledge that is more dispersed in the organization. Managers could use these insights to shape the use of organizational knowledge by firm inventors, and also to make decisions about granting or withholding access to internal knowledge platforms for knowledge workers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The adoption of radical manufacturing technologies and firm survival

The emergence of dramatically innovative, or radical, new manufacturing technologies can force pivotal and life‐threatening decisions for industry competitors. These technologies can represent a huge cost for adopting firms, but may also offer the chance to achieve competitive advantage through superior manufacturing. While prior research has considered a range of production process decisions (e.g., JIT, mass customization) and outcomes for end‐product technologies, little attention has been given to adoption decisions relative to core manufacturing technologies. This study examines an industry's adoption of major manufacturing technologies over several decades and demonstrates that two groups of contingencies related to adoption (e.g., timing and cumulative effects) have a significant impact on firm performance. Based on a sample of over 1,000 firms, the results provide insights into the effects of adoption timing and ‘manufacturing technology bundles’ on firm survival. We also find that adoption of manufacturing technologies prior to the inflection point of the estimated Bass diffusion curve for each technology leads to significant reduction in firm mortality. Thus, we are able to demonstrate the ability of the Bass model to predict the survival outcomes of firms facing manufacturing technology adoption decisions. The strategic implications of these pivotal decisions are considered. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐Size Wage Gaps along the Formal‐Informal Divide: Theory and Evidence

Observationally equivalent workers are paid higher wages in larger firms. This fact is often called the “firm‐size wage gap” and is regarded as a key empirical puzzle. Using microlevel data from Turkey, we document a new stylized fact: The firm‐size wage gap is more pronounced for informal (unregistered) jobs than for formal (registered) jobs. To explain this fact, we develop a two‐stage wage‐posting game with market imperfections and segmented markets, the solution to which produces wages as a function of firm size in a well‐defined subgame‐perfect equilibrium. The model proposes two explanations. First, taxes on formal employment generate a wedge between formal and informal size wage gaps. Thus, government policy can potentially affect the magnitude of the firm‐size wage gaps. The second explanation features a market‐based framework with strategic interactions. Relative to small firms, large firms typically post higher wages for both formal and informal jobs. A high‐wage formal job attracts a larger pool of applicants than a high‐wage informal job. The larger pool of applicants for the formal job, in turn, allows the firm to somewhat lower the initial wage offer, while this second‐round effect is negligible for informal jobs. As a result, size differentials are lower in formal jobs than informal jobs. We argue that the observed patterns in the use of social connections in job search and heterogeneity in job preferences can be used to justify the validity of this second mechanism.     

The performance implications of intra‐ and inter‐regional geographic diversification

Engaging the debate regarding the appropriate level of geographic diversification for multinational enterprises (MNEs), we examine a critical, yet unresolved, question: How is performance impacted by the MNE's level of intra‐ and inter‐regional diversification versus the total level of geographic diversification? Using data from 123 U.S.‐based MNEs over a seven‐year period and leveraging both sales‐based and subsidiary‐based measures for diversification, we find that performance increases at an increasingly higher rate as firms concentrate more heavily on intra‐regional diversification. Regarding inter‐regional diversification and total geographic diversification, we find inverted‐U relationships to exist between firm performance and the level of geographic diversification. Different from recent research on multinationality, our robustness checks indicate no evidence of a sigmoidal relationship between the degree of regional diversification and performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A revised EMQ/JIT production-run model: An examination of inventory and production costs

Production-runs are an important cost minimizing scheduling and production planning activity. Commonly used classic lot-sizing models (i.e., economic manufacturing quantity or EMQ models) do not reflect current just-in-time (JIT) lot-sizing cost realities. The purpose of this paper is to present a cost comparison of the classic EMQ model and a revised EMQ/JIT model to show efficacy of a more cost inclusive model.     

An empirical examination of transaction‐ and firm‐level influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm

A large literature has successfully employed transaction cost economic theory to describe how exchange conditions affect the optimal form of organization. However, this approach has historically not accounted for the influence of firm‐specific attributes on the governance decision. This paper develops a model based on insights from transaction cost economics, the resource‐based view, and real options theory to examine how transaction‐level characteristics, firm‐specific capabilities, and product‐market scope influence the governance of production. Empirical evidence derived from analysis of 469 make‐or‐buy decisions involving 117 semiconductor firms indicates that decisions regarding the governance of production activities are strongly influenced by both transaction‐ and firm‐level effects. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vertical Exclusion with Downstream Risk Aversion or Limited Liability

An upstream firm with full commitment bilaterally contracts with two ex ante identical downstream firms. Each observes its own cost shock, and faces uncertainty from its competitor’s shock. When they are risk neutral and can absorb losses, the upstream firm contracts symmetric outputs for production efficiency. However, when they are risk averse, competition requires the payment of a risk premium due to revenue uncertainty. Moreover, when they enjoy limited liability, competition requires the upstream firm to share additional surplus. To resolve these trade‐offs, the upstream firm offers exclusive contracts in many cases.     

EXPLAINING FIRM CAPITAL STRUCTURE: THE ROLE OF AGENCY THEORY VS. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS

The study of capital structure has increasingly gained importance in strategic management research. Paradigms derived from organizational economics have also gained popularity in explaining firm actions. Agency theory and transaction cost economics represent two such paradigms that rely on the notion of market imperfections. Notwithstanding the similarities between them, these two offer different explanations of the role of debt and equity in a firm. The governance abilities of the financing structures and the nature of assets of the firm provide two key sources of differences. Viewing capital structure from transaction cost economics gives rise to predictions that are contradictory to those presented by agency theory. It is argued that the extant evidence mainly supports the transaction cost viewpoint. Two organizational phenomena—leveraged buyouts and product diversification—are used to highlight the comparison.     

A bargaining perspective on strategic outsourcing and supply competition

This article considers the outsourcing choice of a downstream firm with its own upstream production resources or assets. The novelty of the approach is to consider the outsourced function as involving resources consistent with the resource‐based view of the firm. From a bargaining perspective, we characterize a downstream firm's decision whether to outsource to an independent or to an established upstream firm. In so doing, the downstream firm faces a trade‐off between lower input costs afforded by independent competition, and higher resource value associated with those who can consolidate upstream capabilities. We show that this trade‐off is resolved in favor of outsourcing to an established firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inter‐temporal economies of scope,organizational modularity,and the dynamics of diversification

The question of whether corporations add value beyond that created by individual businesses has engendered much debate in recent years. Some of this debate has focused on the pros and cons of related vs. unrelated diversification. A standard explanation of the benefits of related diversification has to do with the ability to obtain intra‐temporal economies of scope from contemporaneous sharing of resources by related businesses within the firm. In contrast, this paper deals with inter‐temporal economies of scope that firms achieve by redeploying resources and capabilities between related businesses over time, as firms exit some markets while entering others. The transfer of resources due to market exit distinguishes our treatment of inter‐temporal economies of scope from standard intra‐temporal economies of scope. In addition, these inter‐temporal economies can benefit from a decentralized and modular organizational structure. This ability to obtain inter‐temporal economies of scope via organizational modularity and recombination suggests that corporations do not necessarily need a high degree of coordination between business units in order to benefit from a strategy of related diversification. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowledge complexity and the performance of inter‐unit knowledge replication structures

Research Summary: Intra‐firm replication of complex knowledge is difficult yet critical to firm growth and the exploitation of competitive advantage. Inter‐unit organizational structures can facilitate the replication of complex knowledge between a source unit and a recipient unit. This study examines how inter‐unit organizational structures perform at different levels of knowledge complexity. We dimensionalize the patterns of information‐processing interactions according to three specific factors: the degree of inter‐unit connectivity, the extent of mirroring between the structure and the knowledge configuration, and coordination mechanisms. Simulation analyses offer a set of novel findings on how the information‐processing and bounded‐rationality concerns of organizational design impact the replication performance of the structures. We derive optimal structures for different levels of knowledge complexity, and articulate their theoretical and practical implications. Managerial Summary: The growth of firms often involves redeployment of their complex knowledge to new subunits or markets, in the context of acquisitions, alliances, or the creation of multinational subsidiaries. Complex knowledge is difficult to imitate, and thus, serves as a source of competitive advantage. However, it is also challenging to replicate within a firm, which limits firms’ ability to redeploy their capabilities in pursuit of new opportunities. A proper design of inter‐unit structures can facilitate the replication of complex knowledge between intra‐firm units. This study examines how the design of inter‐unit structures affects the outcome of this replication. Our results suggest that managers in charge of redeployment efforts should be mindful of the connectivity among units, coordination mechanisms, information overload, and the level of knowledge complexity.     

Alleviating managerial dilemmas in human‐capital‐intensive firms through incentives: Evidence from M&A legal advisors

Research summary: We examine how human‐capital‐intensive firms deploy their human assets and how firm‐specific human capital interacts with incentives to influence this deployment. Our empirical context is the UK M&A legal market, where micro‐data enable us to observe the allocation of lawyers to M&A mandates under different incentive regimes. We find that law firms actively equalize the workload among their lawyers to seek efficiency gains, while “stretching” lawyers with high firm‐specific capital to a greater extent. However, lawyers with high firm‐specific capital also appear to influence the staffing process in their favor, leading to unbalanced allocations and less sharing of projects and clients. Paradoxically, law firms may adopt a seniority‐based rent‐sharing system that weakens individual incentives to mitigate the impact of incentive conflicts on resource deployment. Managerial summary: The study highlights the dilemmas when professional service firms allocate their key individuals to incoming projects, and the role that monetary incentives play in aggravating or alleviating these dilemmas. In the context of UK M&A law firms, we find that partners have a tendency to be attached to too many projects and not to share enough work, which is exacerbated when individual monetary incentives are stronger. Firms adopting a seniority based incentive system (lockstep system) are able to alleviate this effect. This implies that there is a trade‐off between rewarding personal performance versus balancing workloads and fostering collaboration among professionals. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mutual commitment to support exchange: relation‐specific IT system as a substitute for managerial hierarchy

This paper examines the effects of information technology (IT) on the governance of vertically related firms. We propose that a highly relation‐specific IT system in inter‐firm transactions plays a key role in the resulting inter‐firm governance as a mutual sunk‐cost commitment, in terms of leading to both less vertical integration (i.e., a change in governance mode as a first‐order effect) and a smaller number of suppliers (i.e., a change within a governance mode as a second‐order effect). As a result, this highly relation‐specific IT system (bilateral investment) can be an alternative governance mode of electronic integration that acts as a substitute for managerial hierarchy and vertical financial ownership. From a strategic management perspective, this paper provides transaction costs and resource‐based explanations on IT systems' impact on the organizational boundary decision and its impact on the likelihood of the firm achieving sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.