A Factor Endowment Theory of Endogenous Growth and International Trade

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of multi‐country, two‐good and two‐factor, in which both long‐run growth and international trade patterns are examined. In each country, government expenditure on a public intermediate good plays a crucial role in the realization of persistent growth. It is shown that the long‐run pattern of international trade is determined in a Heckscher‐Ohlin manner.     

International trade and capital accumulation in an overlapping generations model with a public intermediate good

We investigate the effects of a public intermediate good on trade patterns, capital accumulation, and the gains from trade in a two‐country, three‐sector overlapping generations model. A public intermediate good affects not only the productivity of private production but capital accumulation; thus, the results differ from those obtained in previous studies. First, opening to trade may accelerate capital accumulation in the higher‐savings country. Additionally, the country producing a public intermediate good more (which is labor‐intensive) may be the importer of the investment good (which is the most capital‐intensive). Finally, the lower‐savings country may have lower steady‐state welfare under trade.     

Free Trade Agreement and Vertical Trade with a Manufacturing Base

We examine the effects of free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs and welfare in a three‐country model with vertical trade, where an FTA is formed between a country exporting a final good whose production involves using an intermediate good, and a country exporting the intermediate good in exchange for the final good. We demonstrate that the FTA reduces its member country's external tariff, whereas it raises the non‐member country's tariff. The non‐member country unambiguously becomes better off. In contrast, the FTA may or may not make its member countries better off. This implies that the formation of an FTA may not always be Pareto‐improving.     

Oligopsony Distortions and Welfare Implications of Trade*

While imperfect competition in the output market has garnered extensive focus in the new trade theory literature, input market imperfection has received considerably less attention. Since market power in input purchase has been growing in recent years, it is worth examining the welfare implications of trade arising from oligopsony power. We develop a model consisting of two final goods, one intermediate good, and two primary factors (capital and labor). One final good and the intermediate good employ primary factors, whereas the other final good uses labor and the intermediate input. All markets operate under perfect competition except for the intermediate input, which is oligopsonistic. Using this model, we show that oligopsony can lead to some anomalies such as an increase in the oligopsony output, reward to the intensive‐factor in the oligopsony sector, national welfare, and deterioration of terms of trade, but it always decreases the reward to the intermediate input.     

The Transmission of Sustained Growth through the Terms of Trade in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper develops a two‐country model of endogenous growth and international trade in intermediate goods. In autarky just one of the economies enjoys sustained growth. The trade situation may be characterized by complete specialization of both countries, or by incomplete specialization of the growing economy. In either case, trade transmits perpetual growth to the stagnant economy because of the permanent improvements in its terms of trade. The existence of a non‐reproducible factor in the growing economy is crucial to ensure propagation of growth. Moreover, under incomplete specialization countries converge in per capita income. This result relies on two assumptions. First, there must be a large enough share of world income to pay for the input in which the stagnant economy has comparative advantage. Second, all technologies producing intermediate goods should be equally intensive in the non‐reproducible factor.     

Shared Renewable Resources: Gains from Trade and Trade Policy

This paper examines the effects of international trade and trade policy in a two‐country, two‐good model with an open‐access renewable resource that is internationally shared. We show that both countries may still benefit from trade when they specialize in the production of their comparative advantage good, although the shared resource is reduced by trade. In addition, we demonstrate that the steady state utility of a resource‐good importing country may be reduced by trade, even if it specializes in the production of a non‐resource good. Import tariffs and export taxes on a resource good may increase or decrease the shared stock level depending on the production patterns in a trading steady state. The trade policy is likely to be Pareto‐improving when the shared stock rises, while both countries may be made worse off by the trade policy when the shared stock falls.     

Trade Gains, Paretian Transfer and the Tragedy of the Commons

Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme.     

International Trade and Volume Patterns under Quasilinear Preferences

We formally analyze the pattern and volume of trade by embedding quasilinear preferences in the standard perfectly competitive, two‐factor, two‐good, two‐country trade model. Quasilinear preferences deliver a natural partition of the two goods into a luxury and a necessity, and preserve the validity of the Heckscher–Ohlin and Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek theorems. In addition, the predicted factor content of trade under quasilinear preferences is smaller (larger) than the predicted factor content of trade under homothetic preferences if and only if the luxury good is capital (labor) intensive. This result offers a novel explanation for the “missing‐trade” mystery.     

A New Dynamic Trade Model of Increasing Returns and Monopolistic Competition

This paper formulates a two‐country by two‐factor by two‐good dynamic Chamberlin–Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade with endogenous time preferences. After proving the existence, uniqueness and local saddle‐point stability of the steady state, we examine the relationship between initial factor endowment and trade patterns in the steady state. It will be shown that (i) given that the representative household in each country supplies an equal amount of labor, only intra‐industry trade occurs in the steady state and (ii) other things being equal, the country with higher labor efficiency becomes the net exporter of the labor‐intensive good.     

Marshall's Scissors: The Gains and Losses from Trade

In a Ricardian two‐factor endowment model with Cobb–Douglas tastes and many goods, this paper describesthe interaction of the demand and supply sides to determine the gains and losses from trade. If the abundant factor has a sufficiently rich profile of comparative advantages, trade causesthe proportionate gain to the abundant factor to be smaller than the proportionate loss to the scarce factor. However, if the abundant factor has sufficiently skewed comparative advantages toward the best goods, then the opposite will hold. Some examples suggest that these patterns may have something to do with the selection of trade regimes. In the usual one‐factor Ricardian model the gains from trade to a country are enhanced by higher demand shares for imports, but such gains from trade from imports to a country is not the case in a factor endowment model.     

Why Free Trade May Hurt Developing Countries

This paper builds a general equilibrium trade model where a country produces two traded goods and one nontraded public consumption good. The government finances the provision of the public good by taxing the incomes of factors of production, and/or by imposing tariffs. Within this framework, the paper (i) shows that a small tariff or an income tax improves the country's welfare if there is an undersupply of public good, and (ii) identifies the circumstances in which an improvement in the country's terms of trade may reduce its welfare, and free trade can be inferior to autarky. A terms of trade improvement, or the movement from autarky to free trade, definitely improves the country's welfare if the government imposes a tariff that leaves the domestic relative price of the imported good unchanged.     

Public Spending on Industries,Private Investment and the Timing of International Trade Policy Changes

This paper incorporates public spending on industries (in terms of a durable public intermediate good) into a two-country, two-period, and two-sector, model with international labour mobility. The relationship between international trade policies, private investment, and public spending on industries has been examined. Due to international labour mobility, a policy change in one country also affect the relevant variables in the other country. The timing of the policy change is shown to be ciritical. [H30, F20]     

Trade with Time Zone Differences: Factor Market Implications

The main purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple two‐factor (skilled and unskilled labor) model, how a time‐saving improvement in business‐services trade benefitting from differences in time zones can have an impact on national factor markets. In doing so, we intend to capture the situation where the night‐shift work in one country is replaced by the day‐shift work in another country. In other words, we will show that trade with time zone differences will result in shifts of the relative supplies and demands for skilled labor around the globe.     

Skill distribution and income disparity in a North‐South trade model

Abstract. What are the impacts of free trade agreement on the welfare of different types of workers in a developed country? What is the impact of free trade on a developed country's income disparity? What is the effect of free trade on the skill distribution of a developed country? The objective of this paper is to address the above questions in a two‐sector general‐equilibrium North‐South trade model in which both countries produce one final good and one high‐tech intermediate input. The final good is produced with the use of a high‐tech intermediate input and unskilled workers. Horizontally differentiated skilled workers produce the high‐tech intermediate input. Each country is populated by a continuum of unskilled workers with differential potential ability. Workers in the North and South can acquire skills by investment in training or education. Thus, skill distribution in the North and South is determined endogenously in the model through a self‐selection process. I characterize two different types of equilibria: a closed‐economy equilibrium without trade and a free trade equilibrium. Then, I investigate the impact of free trade, in the presence of training costs, on the skill distribution within each country, income disparity, and social welfare. JEL classification: D63, F10, J31     

Oligopsonistic Intermediate Input and Patterns of Trade *

We examine the validities of traditional trade theorems and patterns of trade for an economy with an oligopsonistic intermediate input. Specifically, the model consists of two final goods. one intermediate good, and two primary factors. One final good and the intermediate good are produced using primary factors, capital and labor. The second final good is produced using the intermediate good and labor. All markets operate under perfect competition except the intermediate good market, which is oligopsonistic. This model reflects the real world phenomena of oligopsony power excerted by some industries (e.g., the food processing industry) in the intermediate good purchases. Our analysis shows that some of the traditional trade theorems and H.O trade pattern may be overturned if the factor intensity of the competitive sector lies between those of oligopsony and intermediate good sectors. [F12]     

HISTORY‐DEPENDENT PATHS AND TRADE GAINS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY WITH A PUBLIC INTERMEDIATE GOOD*

This study reexamines McMillan's (International Economic Review 19 (1978), 665–78) analysis of a dynamic small open economy with a public intermediate good. Concerning the trade patterns of the open economy, we find results that were overlooked in McMillan's analysis. Among others, if labor endowment is of intermediate size, there are two saddle‐point steady states, and the initial stock of the public good determines the long‐run trade pattern. We also add a gains‐from‐trade analysis to McMillan's model and demonstrate that if the economy has a comparative advantage in a good with productivity less sensitive to the public intermediate good, the economy may lose from trade at the steady state.     

Public infrastructure and trade in a dynamic two‐country model

We develop a two‐country dynamic trade model with public infrastructure having an “unpaid‐factor”‐type positive externality on private sectors’ productivity. With welfare‐maximizing national governments making infrastructure investment, we show that a country with a smaller labor endowment, a lower depreciation rate of infrastructure, and/or a lower time preference rate will become an exporter of a good that is more dependent on infrastructure and will gain from trade, whereas its trading partner may lose from trade. We consider both the nonstrategic governments case and the case of strategic governments that recognize the effect on the terms of trade.     

A Trade Model of Intermediate Products With Transportation Cost

This paper presents a trade model of intermediate products where a country has the same production technology as the outside world, and the source of trade is the unbalance in the factor endowment. The decision as to how much to process the raw material before exporting depends on the capital requirements for the processing, and the change in transportation cost due to the processing. The lower the requirements of capital coupled with a more rapid fall in the transportation cost in the earlier stage of production, the more probable that the country will export the processed intermediate good instead of the raw material.     

Effects of Multilateral Trade Liberalization on Prices*

To analyze the effects of simultaneous tariff reductions by multiple importing countries on prices, we construct a simple three‐country model where a good is produced by a monopolist with nonconstant marginal cost and imported by two countries. We compare two representative tariff‐reduction formulas: the “fixed‐amount” and the “uniform percentage” reductions. The uniform percentage reductions may increase the consumer price in the importing country, whose initial tariff is lower. Thus, importing countries with relatively low tariffs may prefer a bilateral trade agreement to a multilateral one to ensure consumer gains.     

Public infrastructure for production and international trade in a small open economy: a dynamic analysis

This paper develops a dynamic trade model with a stock of public infrastructure, which has a property of “unpaid factor of production”. We show that a country with a smaller (larger) labor endowment tends to become an exporter of a good whose productivity is more (less) sensitive to the stock of public infrastructure. We also show that after the opening of trade, the labor-scarce country becomes unambiguously better off but the labor-abundant country may become worse off. Overall, these results contrasts with those obtained in the case of public intermediate goods with a “creation of atmosphere” property.