The Political Economy of Basle II: The Costs for Poor Countries

The financial crises of the 1990s triggered many changes to the design of the international financial system. We use the formulation of the new Basle capital accord for banks (B‐II) to illustrate that, while much affected, developing countries have had very little influence on this so‐called new international financial architecture. We argue that B‐II has been formulated largely to serve the interests of powerful market players, with developing countries being left out. At the same time, we demonstrate that B‐II is likely to raise the costs and reduce the supply of external financing for developing countries in particular. Furthermore, and importantly, B‐II may well increase the pro‐cyclicality of external financing, an unfortunate outcome given that developing countries already face much volatility in terms of capital flows. Overall, while B‐II may indeed compensate for a range of weaknesses of Basle I, the exclusionary policy process and costs which B‐II imposes on developing countries require a re‐think of the way in which crucial elements of financial governance, such as the Basle capital accords, are developed and implemented.     

Financial integration and international risk sharing

Conventional wisdom suggests that financial liberalization can help countries insure against idiosyncratic risk. There is little evidence, however, that countries have increased risk sharing despite widespread financial liberalization. We show that the key to understanding this puzzling observation is that conventional wisdom assumes frictionless international financial markets, while actual markets are far from frictionless: financial contracts are incomplete and contract enforceability is limited. When countries remove official capital controls, default risk is still present as an implicit barrier to capital flows. If default risk were eliminated, capital flows would be six times greater, and international risk sharing would increase substantially.     

Sovereign credit ratings,capital flows and financial sector development in emerging markets

How does the sovereign credit ratings history provided by independent ratings agencies affect domestic financial sector development and international capital inflows to emerging countries? We address this question utilizing a comprehensive dataset of sovereign credit ratings from Standard and Poor's from 1995–2003 for a cross-section of 51 emerging markets. Within a panel data estimation framework, we examine financial sector development and the influence of sovereign credit ratings provision, controlling for various economic and corporate governance factors identified in the financial development literature. We find strong evidence that our sovereign credit rating measures do affect financial intermediary sector developments and capital flows. We find that i) long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings are important for encouraging financial intermediary development and for attracting capital flows. ii) Long-term local currency ratings stimulate domestic market growth but discourage international capital flows. iii) Short-term ratings (both foreign and local currency denominated) retard all forms of financial developments and capital flows. There are important implications in this research for policy makers to encourage the provision of longer-term credit ratings to promote financial development in emerging economies.     

International capital flows,returns and world financial integration

International capital flows have increased dramatically since the 1980s, with much of the increase being due to trade in equity and bond markets. Such developments are often attributed to the increased integration of world financial markets. We present a model that allows us to examine how greater integration in world financial markets affects the behavior of international capital flows and financial returns. Our model predicts that international capital flows are large (in absolute value) and very volatile during the early stages of financial integration when international asset trading is concentrated in bonds. As integration progresses and households gain access to world equity markets, the size and volatility of international bond flows decline. This is the natural outcome of greater risk sharing facilitated by increased integration. This pattern is consistent with declining volatility observed during 1975–2007 period in the G-7 countries. We also find that the equilibrium flows in bonds and stocks predicted by the model are larger than their empirical counterparts, and are largely driven by variations in equity risk premia. The model also predicts that volatility of equity and bond returns decline with integration, again consistent with the data for G-7 economies.     

Credit constraints, equity market liberalizations and international trade

This paper provides evidence that credit constraints are an important determinant of international trade flows. I exploit shocks to the availability of external finance and examine the impact of equity market liberalizations on the export behavior of 91 countries in the 1980-1997 period. I show that liberalizations increase exports disproportionately more in financially vulnerable sectors that require more outside finance or employ fewer collateralizable assets. This result is not driven by cross-country differences in factor endowments and is independent of simultaneous trade policy reforms. Moreover, it obtains with equal strength in the full panel of countries as well as in both panel and event-study analyses of countries which removed capital controls during the sample period. Finally, the effects of liberalizations are more pronounced in economies with initially less active stock markets, indicating that foreign equity flows may substitute for an underdeveloped domestic financial system. Similarly, opening equity markets has a greater impact in the presence of higher trade costs caused by restrictive trade policies.     

The Aftermath of a Currency Collapse: How Different are Emerging Markets?

In currency crises, unlike in orderly devaluations, the financial markets dominate events. Previous research has shown that the output effects of a crisis tend to be worse in emerging markets, and the current account adjustment greater. This paper examines the evolution of a wider range of macroeconomic variables from two years before a currency collapse to two years afterwards. On the basis of twelve recent episodes, it is shown that currency collapses (crises followed by depreciations) have had a much greater adverse impact in emerging markets (defined as relatively high‐income developing countries exposed to international capital markets) than in developed countries. There is greater nominal and real depreciation, a substantial inflation shock, a much bigger output effect, and far greater import compression, whilst inflows of portfolio capital virtually cease. These differences are statistically significant. Nevertheless there is wide variation n the post‐collapse experience of the six emerging markets studied (Mexico, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Russia and Brazil). Although all six experienced a sudden stop or even a reversal of capital flows and very sharp nominal depreciations, inflation remained low in Thailand, Korea and Brazil, and output losses were comparatively small in Russia and Brazil. Previous studies of individual crises suggest that important factors are the state of the banking system and its vulnerability to currency movements, the ability of the authorities to establish a credible macroeconomic policy after the collapse, and whether the crisis triggers significant political instability.     

Rhetorics of saving–investment correlations and the international mobility of capital: A survey

This study surveys the literature on saving–investment (SI) correlations and international mobility of capital (IMC) generated over more than three decades since the 1980s. Several studies have shown the presence of paradoxically high SI correlations for the developed countries with observed high IMC, and low SI correlations for the developing countries with observed low IMC. The studies accounting for structural breaks in model parameters provide dominant support for the decrease in SI correlations and increase in IMC after the switch from fixed to flexible exchange rate regime and the removal of policy restrictions on capital flows. The intertemporal optimisation approach to current account and the open-economy growth and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models mainly provide theoretical predictions and suggest that it is possible to find high SI correlations in the wake of high IMC. The increases in international capital flows have been the natural corollary of the growth of international trade in goods and services and increases in foreign direct investment flows. It is these factors, rather than international trade in capital market securities (bonds and equities) driven by the diversification benefits of financial portfolios per se, that have been the key levers of international financial flows.     

International good market segmentation and financial innovation

While international capital flows are now well liberalized, markets for goods remain segmented. To investigate how financial innovation may relieve the effects of this segmentation on risk sharing, we examine a series of two-country economies with internationally segmented good markets, distinguished by the available financial securities. Sufficient conditions for efficiency include complete international financial markets together with liberalized international financial flows. Under these conditions, heterogeneous agents from the same country may use securities as a substitute for the international shipment of goods. This allows them to partially circumvent the segmentation, allowing for efficient risk sharing.     

Off the cliff and back? Credit conditions and international trade during the global financial crisis

We study the collapse of international trade flows during the global financial crisis using detailed data on monthly US imports. We show that credit conditions were an important channel through which the crisis affected trade volumes, by exploiting the variation in the cost of capital across countries and over time, as well as the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors. Countries with higher interbank rates and thus tighter credit markets exported less to the US during the peak of the crisis. This effect was especially pronounced in sectors that require extensive external financing, have limited access to trade credit, or have few collateralizable assets. Exports of financially vulnerable industries were thus more sensitive to the cost of external capital than exports of less vulnerable industries, and this sensitivity rose during the financial crisis. The quantitative implications of our estimates for trade volumes highlight the large real effects of financial crises and the potential gains from policy intervention.     

Financial Development and Economic Growth in Africa

We revisit in this paper the debate between financial development and economic growth. In contrast to previous studies examining banking related measures, we focus on the capital account and the depth of African stock markets. We examine 15 African countries from 1995 to 2010 and employ both static and dynamic panel data methods. While the former suggest weak results overall, portfolio flows and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have consistently positive effects on economic growth under endogenous stock market capitalization. These findings reinforce the view that African countries should open their equity markets to international investors and encourage FDI.     

Trade Wars: The Exaggerated Impact of Trade in Economic Debate

The rules governing trade and capital flows have been at the centre of controversy as globalisation has proceeded. One reason is the belief that trade and capital flows have massive effects on the labour market – either positive, per the claims of international financial institutions and free trade enthusiasts, or negative, per the ubiquitous protestors at WTO, IMF and World Bank meetings demanding global labour standards. Comparing the claims made in this debate with the outcomes of trade agreements, this paper finds that the debate has exaggerated the effects of trade on economies and the labour market. Changes in trade policy have had modest impacts on the labour market. Other aspects of globalisation – immigration, capital flows and technology transfer – have greater impacts, with volatile capital flows creating great risk for the well-being of workers. As for labour standards, global standards do not threaten the comparative advantage of developing countries nor do poor labour standards create a ‘race to the bottom’.     

What drives the capital flows into BRICS economies?

Understanding what drives the capital flows has important policy implications for countries in managing the direction and magnitude of such flows. This paper empirically investigates the main drivers of capital flows into the fast‐growing BRICS countries, in the backdrop of their growing inward capital flows. Employing a fully balanced panel for the period 1995–2015, we focus on, among others, the hitherto commonly untested variables: sovereign credit ratings, economic freedom and ease of doing business ranking of these countries. In searching for the relevant interaction and causality among the drivers of capital flows, we employ the panel Granger causality test to arrive at the policy implications. The results suggest that market size is a significant driver of capital flows. In addition to infrastructure, economic freedom in the host countries, ease of doing business ranking and sovereign credit ratings are the main drivers in the long‐run growth of capital flows.     

Benefits and Costs of International Financial Integration: Theory and Facts

This paper provides a selective review of the recent analytical and empirical literature on the benefits and costs of international financial integration. It discusses the impact of financial openness and capital flows on consumption, investment and growth, as well as the impact of foreign bank entry on the domestic financial system. It argues that, for small open developing countries, the benefits of financial integration are mostly long term in nature, whereas risks can be significant in the short run. Careful preparation and management are therefore essential to ensure that short‐run costs do not lead to policy reversals. It also stresses that the empirical evidence on the impact of foreign direct investment on domestic capital formation and growth, as well as on the effects of foreign bank entry, should be viewed with caution. In particular, the possibility that foreign bank penetration may lead to adverse changes in the allocation of credit cannot be dismissed on the basis of the existing evidence.     

Boom‐and‐bust Cycles,External Imbalances and the Real Exchange Rate

When the current account balance and net capital outflows do not exactly offset each other, international payment flows arise. Payment flows into a country push the real exchange rate up, payment outflows push it down. This article uses a model of optimal consumption and portfolio choice to determine the factors that drive international payment flows during boom‐and‐bust cycles. It shows that during such episodes, capital inflows first exceed the deficit on current account, strengthening the currency. Later on, when the return on domestic capital reverts to its normal level, the current account recovers, yet the overall decline of the net foreign asset position provokes a fall of the real exchange rate even below its initial level. Case studies of countries experiencing rapid economic expansions followed by economic and financial meltdowns confirm the article's theoretical predictions.     

Portfolio Flows to Emerging Markets: Prospects,Pitfalls and Policy Implications

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the pattern of debt and equity portfolio flows (FPI) to the developing countries in recent years and discusses some policy and operational measures to facilitate greater FPI flows. Our analysis suggests that many countries need to adopt more aggressive measures to attract foreign portfolio investment. The major areas where improvements can facilitate FPI are identified as: political and legal environment, private sector development, improvement in macro-economic management, development of capital markets, strengthening of financial institutions, enforcement of market regulations, improvements in market operations, and effective dissemination of market information.     

The role of multinational production in a risky environment

This paper explores the aggregate consequences of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the opportunities for risk diversification available to consumers. The crucial difference between FDI and other international financial flows is that the former involves technology flows across countries. We present a model where firm-embedded productivity can be transferred costly across countries through the activity of multinational firms. We find that risk patterns affect multinationals' location decisions and, in turn, these decisions change the scope for international risk diversification even in a world with complete financial markets.     

Supply Chains,Global Financial Shocks and Firm Behaviour towards Liquidity Needs

Driven by the increasingly important role of supply chains in global production, this paper studies empirical association between global credit‐market shocks and firm behaviour towards liquidity needs across countries and industries. Focusing on the adjustment of working‐capital financing, we find two pieces of supporting evidence from international firm‐level panel data covering the period 2002:I–2012:IV. First, for industries where specific investment in the input supplier–customer relationship is large, firms are more exposed to credit‐market shocks. We find that measures of global credit‐market shocks are negatively associated with trade receivables, trade payables and inventories, conditional on the level of contract intensity in the industries where firms operate. Second, firms in emerging markets are more vulnerable to credit‐market shocks than are firms in developed countries. We are also able to verify the economic significance of sales growth, operating cash flows, cash stock and firm size in the overall adjustment. Our findings highlight the importance of balance‐sheet contagion along supply chains during the 2007–09 global financial crisis.     

民营企业从出口为主向出口、投资双向驱动的转变

由于国际金融危机引致各种贸易保护势头日益强化,我国产品通过贸易的方式进入国际市场变得更加困难;同时,资本及产业输入和输出比例的严重失衡,也让国际资本挤占了国际市场的盈利空间。民营企业如能借助本次国际金融危机所导致的世界经济结构调整,将直接出口面临的挑战转变为对外直接投资的机遇,选择好对外投资的主体、渠道、领域及对象,便可逐步完成从出口为主向出口和投资双向驱动的战略转变。     

The demand for safe assets in emerging economies and global imbalances: New empirical evidence

Recent economic theory has singled out mismatches between the supply and the demand of safe financial assets in emerging countries as drivers of international capital flows and, ultimately, global current account imbalances. This paper assesses empirically the contribution of such “search for safe assets” to the size and composition of emerging economies’ international asset portfolios. Excess demand for safe assets in financially less‐developed countries would imply that these countries hold disproportionately high shares of their total portfolios in foreign assets. Moreover, financially less‐developed countries would hold disproportionately high shares of their foreign portfolios in financially developed countries, which are the major producers of ostensibly safe assets. This paper finds little empirical support for these predictions. Financially less‐developed countries allocate a larger proportion of their total holdings to domestic assets. Even when focusing on their foreign portfolios, there is no evidence of a general bias towards the assets of financially developed countries. Overall, asset mismatches do not appear to explain the asset allocation of financially less‐developed countries.